Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jon, List,

 

you wrote:

 

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)."

 

I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.


 

Best regards, Helmut


 

, 15. April 2024 um 19:47 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 



Helmut, List:

 


HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.


 

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

 


HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:


 

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

 


HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".


 

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

 


HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".


 

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.

 


HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).


 

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:



 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

supplement: thinking about it, I am not clear anymore, if composition "is"or"". Also classification is not simply "either-or", this either-or only applies to parallel classes, but between a class and a subclass it seems more complicated. How exactly, that is how to translate composition, determination, and classification into logic (e.g. Boole, EG, EntG, Venn) I haven´t worked out yet. I even don´t know, whether it is translatable at all, as propositional logic to me seems to suit classification, but not composition. Maybe an Euler-diagram is good for composition? But how to translate one into EG?



 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

 

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

 

Best regards

Helmut


 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type



Edwina, Jon, List,

 

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.  

 

ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

 

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

 

JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

 

Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

 

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.  

 

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

 

JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

 

Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

 

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term.  There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.    Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

 

I believe that Peirce's theories 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Helmut Raulien]

 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

 

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

 

Best regards

Helmut


 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type



Edwina, Jon, List,

 

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.  

 

ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

 

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

 

JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

 

Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

 

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.  

 

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

 

JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

 

Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

 

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term.  There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.    Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

 

I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'.  It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues:  (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer.

 

I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's writings.  But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not coined that word.

 

I