Thank you, Ben, for your detailed explanation. I understand it completely. From time to time I had the instinctive urge to contradict one or the other theory that had appeared in the thread. Now, about "Instincts", there is a discussion in Biosemiotics List (Ozzie, are you a member of Biosemiotics List?).
Best,
Helmut

 "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote:
 

Helmut, I suggested back on July 12, 2015, that the thread be brought back to explicit relations to Peirce - I did see that the thread had earlier been explicitly or at least clearly related to Peirce. You made the same kind of point very well on July 2 2015, saying "It is Peirce-related only in a way like everything is Peirce-related, because Peirce has constructed a model for everything." Stephen replied to my post and my reply to him was much stronger, not because Stephen was off-topic, and indeed at this point he was quite on-topic, but instead because Stephen seemed to be defending the view that Peirce-relatedness should be regarded in a watered-down way.

To put it another way, the reader should not be left wondering what is the potential or supposed relation to Peirce in post after post of an extended discussion, or left to understand that any discussion of some same topic as interested Peirce is automatically germane here. A post or thread may digress from Peirce - Joe Ransdell sometimes did so, and I've done it myself often enough (e.g. my recent comment about early-20th-Century German culture), but after a while in a series of posts the thread should be brought back to Peirce explicitly. Otherwise why call this forum 'peirce-l'? Why then should The Peirce Group or Indiana University support it? Why not just open an email list at Google groups or wherever for 'general discussion'? Yet, if it isn't peirce-l, one will lose a lot the peirce-l audience. Active participants here are active often because they're aware of an audience. One can't have it both ways.

Questions of instinct can be quite relevant to Peirce, since he has it playing an important role in abductive inference and also in other modes of inference in some his writings. The discussion of ideology can involve discussion of fixation of belief, in which Peirce was interested. But that doesn't mean that all discussion of ideology is particularly Peirce-related.  Keeping one's text engaged with Peirce tends to require some ongoing reading of Peirce or at least thinking about Peirce. People like to be able to post to peirce-l's audience of hundreds of members, but need to keep up the active participant's end of the bargain with the audience - bring it back to Peirce. One can't have it both ways. This doesn't even mean mentioning Peirce in every post. Joe Ransdell once sent posts with an extended discussion of Locke - but did explain some points why he thought it relevant to Peirce.

I've had some more Peirce-related remarks to make about Ben Novak's book but I've gotten caught up in practical matters again.

Best, Ben

On 7/13/2015 12:46 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Ben Novaks Book is Peirce-related, because it is about abduction, and how abduction was misused by Hitler. Edwina had mentioned many other historical, economical, and other causes for this ideology. This was Peirce related because it was about the fixation of belief. Instincts for example are relevant for the apriori method of fixating belief, eg. the tribalistic instinct Edwina had mentioned. Stephen Jarosek said, that everything is culture, I said no, politics and ideologies are not working (fixating the belief in themselves) just with cultural conditioning, but by manipulating, amplifying and suppressing human instincts. Hitlers abduction is a misuse of the scientific method, to manipulate instincts is a misuse of the apriori method. What kind of signs are instincts, inherited representamens? immediate objects?
Best,
Helmut

Supplement: But I dont want to push the thread to continuing- anyway it is not about abduction anymore, and "instincts" would better fit to biosemiotics, I suppose- so I am not desperately waiting for an answer. Best,
Helmut

Von: "Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com>

I thought I raised a valid point but I think it turned out to be a red flag. Sorry.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Sun, Jul 12, 2015 at 7:52 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

Stephen, please don't join in the insultingly trivializing games that others have played with the meaning of "Peirce-related", and please don't convert it to a question of what is Peirce is relevant or related to. PEIRCE-L has the audience that it has because of the promise of Peirce-related discussion, and The Peirce Group and Indiana University continue peirce-l's _existence_ for the sake of Peirce-related discussion. The Peirce Group will not go on indefinitely allowing peirce-l to be commandeered for the extended, multi-post discussion of people's pet causes that are not sufficiently Peirce-related. - Best, Ben

On 7/12/2015 7:38 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

Peirce is relevant to the issues we are discussing, particularly to the relationship between semiosis then and now, to the growing iteration and acceptance of triadic rather than binary thinking, and to the huge sea change which Helmut just noted. There is a text probably prominent on Arisbe that lists about a dozen or more ways that Peirce is relevant to now. Unless we are committed to textual exegesis these matters are relevant. The matter of fixing belief according to scientific method is not merely relevant but worth discussion. Also his understanding of the individual which is not exactly charitable toward the concept. I think what is missing are some folk who used to participate regularly and were clearly writing from a Peircean perspective.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Sun, Jul 12, 2015 at 6:33 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

Folks, I'm not the moderator (that's Gary Richmond), just the co-manager, but it seems like this thread has gotten away from explicitly Peirce-related matters. Is it possible to bring it back to Peirce matters?

Best, Ben

On 7/12/2015 6:24 PM, Thomas wrote:

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