Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-12-10 Thread kirstima
John, Jon, I agree with John on the issue of "every word.." Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording in: JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs. It's best to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-12-07 Thread kirstima
John & Jon, The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb 'to indentify' did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary. Many questions arose. JFS: "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures that are isomorphic. Some mathematicians call

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-12-02 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa JFS:   In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms:   ‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’.  The sheet is no longer   identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-11-29 Thread Gary Richmond
Gary F, John, Thanks for this clarification, Gary, as it was very helpful, perhaps especially. Gf: Peirce’s terminology in referring to a graph as a “word” is rather sloppy, but after all, this is a personal letter from a self-described “garrulous old man” to a new acquaintance. It is not an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-11-28 Thread gnox
John, Gary R, See my insertions below … Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 28-Nov-17 15:52 On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911 > (unless it is. indeed,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-11-28 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911 (unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric." There was nothing sloppy about Peirce's note or my comment. Following is the context from my note of 12 noon, Nov.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-11-28 Thread Gary Richmond
Jon A, John, Kirsti, list, Jon A wrote: By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion” is either word magic, word animism (?), or nomimalism, the very ilk of ills that Peirce's theory of signs is prescribed to cure us against. In Peirce's case I'll chalk it up to simple sloppy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-11-28 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A and Kirsti, Jon, replying to JFS [In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about which the statements on the paper could be true. In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty. Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

2017-11-28 Thread kirstima
John, Jon, list, Thank you for a most interesting discussion. Not being so keen on set theory, or the utterly simple assertions formal logic has so far dealt with, I would like to draw your attention to these assertion of mine: If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard