Peircers,
Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his original
opinion
about the connections of the three categories with the principal types of
signs and
the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third
guessing
had settled down, and yet
Peircers,
Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of
information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and
the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the Logic of
Science
at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute
Jason,
Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is
called general, something true of more than one object.
Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his
better
Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!
The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects,
Dear Jason,
I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as
discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in
the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce.
Here is the abstract:
This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David
Dear List,
I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of Experience
and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you challenge two
things about it. First, over the years of my work I have developed an aversion
to using the term consciousness, which seems
I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage me
from having anything to do with the book. The only half-way informative tidbit
is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent advances in biophysics.
By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a book but a
