If the way history is made is through willed values, those values were
there before we were. They are ontological. I think the confusion in Peirce
is his relegation of ethics to the aesthetic. Kierkegaard did a similar
thing when he essentially sidelined the ethical. I muse that the semiotic
realm
TB = Terry Bristol
TB: I like it up to this statement that I find obscure.
CSP: Now an acceleration, instead of being like a velocity a relation between
two successive positions,
is a relation between three; so that the new doctrine has consisted in
the suitable introduction
of the
Jon, Terry, list,
I've seen it suggested in a thread somewhere on the Web that the reason that
the position-velocity-acceleration trichotomy is a good one is that that there
are universal laws of acceleration and velocity (and position?) but not of the
third or higher derivatives. (The third
A couple of comments on this passage from Forster and relating to S. Rose's
response:
1. The 'plan' by which the universal intelligence works is not a 'fixed' or
time(-space)-invariant 'plan'; (cf. likewise in Plato's Timaeus).
There is no way to reason forward to 'deduce' a better world
It seems to me that if there is a conflict between nominalism and
realism/idealism which plays out in history that it is important to delve
deeper. Peirce made spiritual or transcendent or musement matters subject
to experiment - human progress had to be real. Where I think I disagree is
in not
Jon, Ben et al. –
Bypassing the triad theme for a moment – I think Peirce makes a crucial point
that classical mechanics had a problem with acceleration.
Modern physics is based in the new 'acceleration paradigm' – but this is far
from being unproblematic.
If one starts with the Cartesian
Stephen – Your points are well taken. Might we say that we 'know' the eternal
good by our very nature without being able to articulate it or convince others
'rationally'.
I am a little unclear what you mean by 'ethics' here. I guess I must side with
Nietzsche and Royce (and Rorty) here and
