I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage me
from having anything to do with the book. The only half-way informative tidbit
is that the book concerns "a logic informed by recent advances in biophysics."
By the way, "On Sense and Reference" is not a book but a
Thanks Jon.
Recall that my goal is ultimately a calculus for biophysics, in addition to a
logic constructed upon it. Following your suggested approaches there is no way
to bind the characterization of sense with response potentials. So, different
goals perhaps.
On Boole and Frege, I am using t
Steven,
Even as a veteran of the behaviorist-cognitivist wars of the late great
twentieth century, who tended to favor the cognitive side and who found
psychology a compelling enough subject to spend a parallel portion of a
decade taking a M.A. in it, I too ceased belaboring the usual questions
o
Dear List,
I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book "On The Origin Of Experience"
and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you challenge two
things about it. First, over the years of my work I have developed an aversion
to using the term "consciousness," which seem
Dear Jason,
I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as
discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in
the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce.
Here is the abstract:
"This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Ar
Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!
The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but
Jason,
"Universal" is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is
called "general," something true of more than one object.
Some philosophers say "universals" and "particulars" where Peirce (with his
b
Greetings,
I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general
question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I.
What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs.
generals? How would one argue that universals are not merely m
Peircers,
Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of
information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and
the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the "Logic of
Science"
at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute
Peircers,
Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his "original
opinion"
about the "connections" of the three categories with the principal types of
signs and
the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third
guessing
had settled down, and y
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