Re: [peirce-l] Aesthetics, Axiology, and Artistic Truth
Thank you for posting your thoughts on this, Michael! How does the concept of style which you elaborate below relate to Peirce's distinction of 'tone' from 'token' and 'type'? Cheers, Cathy -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Michael Shapiro Sent: Tuesday, 27 March 2012 9:59 a.m. To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Aesthetics, Axiology, and Artistic Truth Dear Peirce Listers, Apropos of the recent messages regarding the Peirce Society meeting at SAAP earlier this month in New York, yes, I was there too and heard Tom Short's responses after his paper (unsatisfactory, in my estimation; but he told me that he hadn't slept the night before) with regard to aesthetics. One shouldn't forget that Peirce himself is completely unsatisfactory when it comes to aesthetics (as he is on ethics). Whenever I teach my course on Peirce's theory of interpretation, I tell my students (only half in jest) that my definition of a philosopher is someone who only solves problems of their own devising. By contrast, someone who is confronted with the problem of having to explain the facts of language or literature or music is in a rather different position vis-à-vis the data. My long experience with the analysis of aesthetic objects (mostly poetry and prose) convinces me that ultimately one has to deal with them axiologically, so to speak, by acknowledging the necessity of seeing them as repositories of values. In that light, the question as to why the Mona Lisa is admirable always comes under the concept of STYLE and its HISTORY. It is, moreover, on the grounds of style that one can begin to approach the problem of artistic truth in the spirit of pragmaticism. In case this line of thought is of interest, here are some further observations on the specific role of style. (Comments always welcome.) Style suffuses so much of what it means to be human, and has been the subject of so much analysis, that in order to move it away from problems of introspection and self-awareness one needs to redirect the age-old discussion into a more public arena where the contrast with custom allows insight into the ontology of human activity in general. This can be accomplished when style as a phenomenon that cuts across disciplinary boundaries is viewed TROPOLOGICALLY as a fundamentally COGNITIVE category. A global theory of style entails arguing more closely for the concept of STYLE AS A TROPE OF MEANING; and demonstrating how stylistic analysis can reveal itself not just as a compendium of traditionally taxonomized information but as the means whereby individual manifestations of style, their structural coherences, and their mirroring of signification can be identified and evaluated. I. Form and content. Insofar as the distinction can be clear at all, it does not actually coincide with but cuts across the boundary between what is style and what is not. Style then comprises characteristic features both of what is said or performed or made and of how it is said/performed/made. If it is obvious that style is the regard that what pays to how the faults of this formula are equally obvious. Architecture, nonobjective painting, and most music have no subject, nor do they literally say anything. So the what of one activity may be part of the how of another. No rule based on linguistic form alone could determine, for instance, whether or not a discursive meaning is ironic. In considering linguistic style at least, and perhaps even style generally, it soon emerges that the relation between form and content must in part be described metaphorically. II. Content and expression. One famous theory of style, that of the French scholar Charles Bally, identifies linguistic style with the affective value of the features of organized language and the reciprocal action of the expressive features that together form the system of the means of expression of a language. From this Roman Jakobson fashioned a definition of style as a marked––emotive or poetic––annex to the neutral, purely cognitive information. Aside from the impossibility of consistently separating cognitive from affective information without remainder, it is equally transparent that definitions of style that trade in feelings, emotions, or affects go awry by overlooking not only structural features that are neither feelings nor expressed but also features that though not feelings ARE expressed. III. Difference between stylistic and nonstylistic. A feature of style may be a feature of what is said, of what is exemplified, or of what is expressed. But not all such features are necessarily stylistic. Similarly, features that are clearly stylistic in one work may have no stylistic bearing in another locus. Nelson Goodman writes: A property––whether of statement made, structure displayed, or feeling conveyed––counts as stylistic only when it associates a work with one rather than another artist,
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
[peirce-l] Idealization (was: Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism)
That is a very rich reply, Gene, thank you. You write: ”The problem of modern idealization involves what Max Weber called rationalization, but it also involves the colonization of the sentiments by idealizing rationality, in effect, disabling the spontaneous self and its spontaneous reasonableness.” Worth further thought to my mind is whether Peirce’s model of inquiry does involve **colonizing** the sentiments, and if so, in what way. Certainly he wants to **make use of them within a long-range evolutionary process**. But that word **use** – what does it mean exactly? Does it mean something like * *exploit**? Or could it mean something like **include**? In which case Peirce is making room for spontaneity rather than suppressing it. Recall the vital role he gives to instinct in generating abductions. That seems spontaneous to me. It seems to me that you are thinking something like the following – if individual feelings form part of some kind of long-range communal project, they cannot be spontaneous. (If this is not right please correct me.) But does that follow? Isn’t the nature of final causes that they are bound to happen at some point but not bound to happen at any particular time or in any particular way? Thus leaving room for spontaneity and idiosyncracy to harmonise with rationality - ? Cheers, Cathy *From:* C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] *On Behalf Of *Eugene Halton *Sent:* Tuesday, 27 March 2012 10:51 a.m. *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Subject:* Re: Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism Dear Terry, Gary, Cathy, et al., Thanks for your comments. But I don’t think you quite get my point, namely; that the idealizing of the passions, including the idealization of love, as a means of “creative agents capable of transforming the world though the active realization of intelligent ideals” is wrongheaded. The statement I quoted suggests that narrow model of inquiry (for which it is a good statement) can generalize to become a general vehicle of world transformation. In my view Peirce would suggest that is pushing it too far. I say that it is precisely such idealizing of life to ratiocentric ends that has wrongly put the biosphere in jeopardy today, and nominalistic science has been a key player. Replacing in Forster’s words, the “vast cosmic mechanism” with “transforming the world though the active realization of intelligent ideals,” may seem a better option, but does not to my mind go to the heart of the problem of idealizing conduct as determinant of practical life. Yes, Gary, I agree that is where the common-sensist element of Peirce’s critical common-sensism allows more. Cathy, I don’t see “a Romantic view of thought and feeling as mutually undermining opposites.” Quite the, uh, opposite. The idealizing of the passions by “thought,” so that sentiment becomes a value rather than passionate reasonableness was part of my criticism. The problem of modern idealization involves what Max Weber called rationalization, but it also involves the colonization of the sentiments by idealizing rationality, in effect, disabling the spontaneous self and its spontaneous reasonableness. The community of variescent life, inclusive of humans, rather than a community of human inquirers, might be the better agent of world transformation. But the human element of it would have to be more than inquirers, in Peirce’s sense. It would have to be whole human beings, passionately alive to their living habitats rather than to idealized conduct. That might also be a virtual definition of an artist engaged in creating a work. Consider, Terry, where the “gospel of greed” that Peirce names in his essay on evolutionary love derives from. Dostoyevsky and D.H. Lawrence understood, in my view, that the idealization of love (and more broadly the idealization of the sentiments) would culminate in its opposite, the idealization of hate or greed. The nominalistic state of nature of Thomas Hobbes seems a good example of that, nature as the “warre of every man against every man.” Melville in 1851, Dostoyevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, and Lawrence in various writings, each showed how the idealizing of life and love is a mark of the tragic nature of modern life. But each also showed alternatives, which seem to me congruent with Peirce’s larger outlook, involving yes, sociality, but the sociality of the community of the earth and of the spontaneous self. The living self bodying forth here and now and not fixed by some idealized horizon. Lawrence: “Every single living creature is a single creative unit, a unique, incommutable self. Primarily, in its own spontaneous reality, it knows no law. It is a law unto itself. Secondarily, in its material reality, it submits to all the laws of the material universe. But the primal, spontaneous self in any creature has ascendance, truly, over the material laws of the universe; it uses
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
I can confirm that last bit about the difficulty of explaining these concepts, though I do so as a Deweyan always wondering exactly how did he borrow and deviate from Peirce's concepts. I do hear a number of people say that they like Peirce, but it is never clear to what they are referring. That might be due to my ignorance of the received view of Peirce. Perhaps someone could enlighten me? Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote: Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben - Original Message - Jason, list, That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such continuity pretty credible. b.. Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons instead of physics reasons? c.. Real infinitesimals? d.. Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities) Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they say is wrong with synechism? Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Khadimir To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Steven, This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). Best, Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear Cathy, Non-Peirceans, if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 1. the religious dualist, 2. the scientific dualist. Often they are in both. One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls Thirdness (more generally, the mind) in their conception of God, the other does not know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. Peirce's objection to the Russelization of logic is relevant here, because the eradication of psychologism placed the mind (esp. Thirdness) beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called Thirdness, as grounded in both a conception of God and a conception of Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this God conception is not the usual one but one that is really non-theistic in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western conception. This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's Ideality in the physical sciences and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion of the later). So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience unfamiliar with them. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Ben and list, In part it is a reflection of what I like to talk about, but they tend to reject a variant of your fourth bullet point, especially either the direct or indirect implications of Four Incapacities, Consequences of Four Incapacities, and the continuity of inference and semiotic. However, the discussion never reaches that level of detail. Instead, I ask such questions as--as I did at a conference last weekend to a superbly inviting, mostly analytic audience--why do you think that conscious intentionality must begin as a conscious (noetic/attentive) phenomenon rather than in bodily intentionality? In this case, the interlocutor was treating conscious intentionality as if it were ex nihilo and was insouciant on the point, though one does not need Peircean continuity to answer that question. This is the kind of Cartesian dualism that I see in the wild, i.e., a species of discontinuity. Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: ** I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben - Original Message - Jason, list, That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? - Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such continuity pretty credible. - Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons instead of physics reasons? - Real infinitesimals? - Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities) Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they say is wrong with synechism? Best, Ben - Original Message - *From:* Khadimir *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Steven, This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). Best, Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear Cathy, Non-Peirceans, if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 1. the religious dualist, 2. the scientific dualist. Often they are in both. One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls Thirdness (more generally, the mind) in their conception of God, the other does not know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. Peirce's objection to the Russelization of logic is relevant here, because the eradication of psychologism placed the mind (esp. Thirdness) beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called Thirdness, as grounded in both a conception of God and a conception of Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this God conception is not the usual one but one that is really non-theistic in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western conception. This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's Ideality in the physical sciences and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion of the later). So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience unfamiliar with them. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar
