[peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process"
List, "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" is the shortest of Joe's papers on Arisbe. To my way of thinking it is, however, one of his best, analyzing in a mere 16 paragraphs ideas which seem to me of the greatest importance in consideration of the further development of semeiotic theory, perhaps especially in contributing to our understanding of semiosis as it is involved in life processes (== biosemiosis). I am especially responsive to these themes as a result of my recently attending (June 21 - 26) a Biosemiotic Gathering at Rockefeller University, organized in an exemplary fashion by Victoria N. Alexander for the Dactyl Foundation in collaboration with the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies. I had earlier promised here to give a report on that conference, but have been frustrated by, shall we say, continuing difficult exigencies. However, off-list, I've been reminded of my promise of a report. Since what I consider to be the most stimulating themes of that June conference are anticipated in Joe's "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process," I thought I'd offer--as a kind of preamble--a brief report of the conference concentrating on papers related to aspects of semiosis/teleology/autonomy. I'll also note a few interesting presentations by members of this forum on other themes. So, here's my brief report. THE CONFERENCE: You can find the program of the Biosemiotic Gathering at http://dactylfoundation.org/?page_id=3026 Below the brief introductory comments is a link to all the Abstracts http://dactylfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/abstractsGB11.pdf Finally, in the Program just below that, a name highlighted is a link to a full paper, for example, this one by Eliseo Fernández. http://www.lindahall.org/services/reference/papers/fernandez/Energy_semiosis_and_emergence.pdf DAY 1: I had to miss the first session (including the keynote address by Don Favareau, one of the leading names in this relatively new biosemiotic field. This happened since, at the last moment it was decided (after a reversal or two) that I would be allowed to read Vinicius Romani's excellent paper, "Perception grounds communication," http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/?p=29 which I had to practice that very first morning of the conference. Homeland security had refused to allow Vinicius to board his plane to NYC from Sao Paolo (for what I considered to be no good reasons--so, visitors to the USA, keep up on the latest Homeland Security rules and regulations!) I thought his paper ought to be presented at the conference and I volunteered to do so. I will not attempt to summarize Vinicius', or any of the papers. Suffice it to say that for me, at least, his paper builds to an extraordinary example of Helen Keller breaking through to symbols and language through collateral experience. I highly recommend those interested in the topic suggested by his title to read the paper in full. This was followed by Eugene Halton's "Virtuality, Effacement, and Symbolizing" (his name doesn't yet link to his paper). Gene, one of the USA's finest sociologists, and "guerilla/gorilla philosophers" as he recently put it in an off-list message, argues that face-to-face interaction, fundamental in human communication since the get-go (the earliest human history), seems in our time to be endangered. Example: Facebook literally effaces. Gene is a kind of Renaissance man of our time (sociologist, musician, philosopher, athlete, bon vivant, etc., etc.), so that if you ever get a chance to meet him, do so! Finally, Victoria N. Alexander, mentioned above, who founded and heads the Dactyl Foundation, and who organized the conference to near perfection, presented "Mysterious Objects: Integrating Biosemiotics with Complex systems Science." Victoria, whose scientific speciality appears to be complexity and systems theory, means to "provide further conceptual tools for integrating biosemiotics with complex systems science." She employs and extends Jeff Goldstein's notion of 'negation' in consideration of evolutionary emergence, this in a complex argument involving purpose, emergence, and semiosis. (Btw, I recently finished Tori's second novel, Naked Singularity, which is, in my personal opinion, one of the best novels--so far--of the 21st century. DAY 2: The second day seemed to me dominated by what I came to think of as the 'code people', those scientists who don't allow for triadic semeiotic penetrating as deep as, say, the cell level. At the moment they seem to dominate the conference but, in my opinion, more by force of personality than by the strength of their ideas (which is not to suggest that their ideas are weak--the opposite is the case; but they tend to speak rather 'passionately' (and, to my taste, a bit, well, dogmatically) on their "strictly scientific" themes. So, again, I began to contrast these 'code people' with the 'semeiotic folk'. At the conclusion of the gathering, however, I felt that t
[peirce-l] Peirce's law ((P>Q)>P)>P
Dear list, I was wondering if anyone has come up with some good, non-trivial examples of Peirce's law holding when Q is false. I've come up with some examples, but they all imply the truth of Q. How can you have a false logical relationship still imply the truth of its initial proposition? Thanks,Keith - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?"
"Category theory," "theory of categories," and even "categorial theory" could be hard to distinguish in some languages. Anyway, we're getting into the territory of distinctions that are semantically nontrivial yet confusingly expressed, such as that between "relation algebra" and "relational algebra," and that between "algebraic topology" and "topological algebra." Another option would be to use Peirce's word "categorics" generally for philosophical category theories, rather than keeping it to Peirce-style categorics. Problem is that the accompanying adjective is "categorical" rather than "categorial." Less sonorous options include "categoriacs," "categoristics," and "categoriology." Another option would be to resist the transference of the sense of either "philosophical" or "mathematical" to phrases like "category theory," and instead speak of "mathematical categorics" and "philosophical categorics." Those phrases are rather long. My guess is that the best bets for philosophical theory of categories, Peircean or otherwise, are "categoristics" and "categoriology." "Categoristics" has fewer syllables than "categoriology," and its correlated adjective "categoristical" has quite that advantage over "categoriological." Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Gary Fuhrman" To: Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2011 2:11 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?" I don't think "Doctrine of Categories" would work because the word "doctrine" no longer means what it did in Peirce's time. As for "Theory of Categories", a quick internet search shows that it's used by some mathematicians as a synonym for "Category Theory", so unless they can be broken of that habit, that difference in name isn't enough to distinguish between the two disciplines. Maybe Gary needs to come up with an ugly neologism as Peirce would have done -- "trichotomologics"? -- if he needs to avoid confusing mathematicians. (I don't think "category theory" would be ambiguous for anybody else.) Gary F. -Original Message- From: Irving Sent: July-21-11 10:55 AM Not to continue to be overly fussy, but I propose "Doctrine of Categories" or "Theory of Categories" for the philosophical use, whether speaking of Aristotle, or Kant (Kategorienlehre) or Peirce, and reserve "Category Theory" for the the that branch of abstract algebra that formalizes a number of algebraic properties of collections of transformations between mathematical objects (such as binary relations, groups, sets, topological spaces, etc.) of the same type, subject to the constraint that the collections contain the identity mapping and are closed with respect to compositions of mappings, ... unless and until it is demonstrated that the philosophical concept, whether Aristotle's, Kant's, or Peirce's, is equivalent to, or at least in some important sense related to, the algebraists' concept. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?"
I don't think "Doctrine of Categories" would work because the word "doctrine" no longer means what it did in Peirce's time. As for "Theory of Categories", a quick internet search shows that it's used by some mathematicians as a synonym for "Category Theory", so unless they can be broken of that habit, that difference in name isn't enough to distinguish between the two disciplines. Maybe Gary needs to come up with an ugly neologism as Peirce would have done -- "trichotomologics"? -- if he needs to avoid confusing mathematicians. (I don't think "category theory" would be ambiguous for anybody else.) Gary F. -Original Message- From: Irving Sent: July-21-11 10:55 AM Not to continue to be overly fussy, but I propose "Doctrine of Categories" or "Theory of Categories" for the philosophical use, whether speaking of Aristotle, or Kant (Kategorienlehre) or Peirce, and reserve "Category Theory" for the the that branch of abstract algebra that formalizes a number of algebraic properties of collections of transformations between mathematical objects (such as binary relations, groups, sets, topological spaces, etc.) of the same type, subject to the constraint that the collections contain the identity mapping and are closed with respect to compositions of mappings, ... unless and until it is demonstrated that the philosophical concept, whether Aristotle's, Kant's, or Peirce's, is equivalent to, or at least in some important sense related to, the algebraists' concept. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?"
I second Irving's proposal. With respect, Steven On Jul 21, 2011, at 7:55 AM, Irving wrote: > Not to continue to be overly fussy, but I propose "Doctrine of > Categories" or "Theory of Categories" for the philosophical use, > whether speaking of Aristotle, or Kant (Kategorienlehre) or Peirce, and > reserve "Category Theory" for the the that branch of abstract algebra > that formalizes a number of algebraic properties of collections of > transformations between mathematical objects (such as binary relations, > groups, sets, topological spaces, etc.) of the same type, subject to > the constraint that the collections contain the identity mapping and > are closed with respect to compositions of mappings, ... unless and > until it is demonstrated that the philosophical concept, whether > Aristotle's, Kant's, or Peirce's, is equivalent to, or at least in some > important sense related to, the algebraists' concept. > > > - Message from g...@gnusystems.ca - > Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2011 10:31:23 -0400 > From: Gary Fuhrman > Reply-To: Gary Fuhrman > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?" > To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > > >> Following up on yesterday's post clarifying ?category theory? as Gary >> Richmond uses the term ? as the third in a trichotomy constituting >> phenomenology ? here is an edited and updated version of the >> conversation that ensued between Gary (GR) and me (GF) on peirce-l >> just before the list migration. The main issue here is the question >> of whether (or why) phaneroscopy or phenomenology should be called a >> science ? as it definitely was by Peirce, although Joe Ransdell >> doubted the appropriateness of this designation. >> >> >> >> I have revised my own part here and there, omitting or changing the >> parts that i no longer consider worthwhile, and added a bit at the >> end, but have left GR's words pretty much as he wrote them (with a >> few omissions). His first comment deals with my reference to >> observation and generalization as ?stages? in the process or practice >> of phaneroscopy: >> >> >> >> GR: As I read him, for Peirce the three categories do not necessarily >> represent 'stages'; yet they can represent them. For example, they >> are stages in what I call the vector of process, which starts at 1ns >> passing through 3ns arriving at 2ns (quintessential examples: >> evolution, or inquiry). But, for example, in the vector of >> involution, which commences at 3ns which involves 2ns which itself >> involves 1ns, it does not represent stages at all (quintessential >> example: the derivation of the categories themselves in "The Logic of >> Mathematics"). [note: I analyze 3 of the 6 vectors as more logical >> and 3 as more temporal, or, chronological, although, in a very >> important sense this is just a matter of emphasis; while no vector >> acts independently of all the others, except for the purposes of >> analysis.] >> >> GF: The observational stage (as i call it) regards the phaneron >> monadically, i.e. doesn't even distinguish between the phaneron and >> the mind it is present to. >> >> >> >> GR: You and de Tienne and I seem in complete agreement on this. >> >> >> >> GF: The generalization stage deploys a mathematical logica utens >> (which for Peirce is prior to the normative science of logic) to >> characterize the essential elements of the phaneron. This much can be >> very amply illustrated with many direct quotes from Peirce. >> >> >> >> GR: Again, we agree; I made this argument regarding logica utens to >> Joe for both phenomenology and the first two normative sciences on a >> couple of occasions. >> >> >> >> GF: If we take the ?faculties? of observation and generalization as >> the Firstness and Thirdness in a phenomenological trichotomy, the >> secondness in this trichotomy is less directly represented by Peirce, >> but as De Tienne points out, the phaneron must be objectified, i.e. >> treated dyadically, in order to be described; and what you refer to >> as ?category theory? is a description. >> >> >> >> GR: This is where I think we may differ. For me iconoscopy is the >> descriptive phase sans generalization of the relational kind, and it >> is category theory which concerns itself with generalizing those >> descriptions into the kind of genuine tricategorial relations my >> trikonic diagrams, for example, attempt to analyze. And, while it >> seems eminently reasonable that a logica utens will be involved in >> your 3rd "stage", it may very well also be employed in the 2nd, >> objectifying, "stage"--yet, to describe x as an example of >> secondness, say, does yet place it in relation to a--it's--firstness >> or thirdness, necessarily, and at all. >> >> >> >> GF: Peirce does define phaneroscopy as ?description of the phaneron? >> in CP 1.284, and to me, the dyadic quality of the objectification >> necessary in order to produce a description is strongly suggested by >> his reference in
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?"
Not to continue to be overly fussy, but I propose "Doctrine of Categories" or "Theory of Categories" for the philosophical use, whether speaking of Aristotle, or Kant (Kategorienlehre) or Peirce, and reserve "Category Theory" for the the that branch of abstract algebra that formalizes a number of algebraic properties of collections of transformations between mathematical objects (such as binary relations, groups, sets, topological spaces, etc.) of the same type, subject to the constraint that the collections contain the identity mapping and are closed with respect to compositions of mappings, ... unless and until it is demonstrated that the philosophical concept, whether Aristotle's, Kant's, or Peirce's, is equivalent to, or at least in some important sense related to, the algebraists' concept. - Message from g...@gnusystems.ca - Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2011 10:31:23 -0400 From: Gary Fuhrman Reply-To: Gary Fuhrman Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?" To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Following up on yesterday's post clarifying ?category theory? as Gary Richmond uses the term ? as the third in a trichotomy constituting phenomenology ? here is an edited and updated version of the conversation that ensued between Gary (GR) and me (GF) on peirce-l just before the list migration. The main issue here is the question of whether (or why) phaneroscopy or phenomenology should be called a science ? as it definitely was by Peirce, although Joe Ransdell doubted the appropriateness of this designation. I have revised my own part here and there, omitting or changing the parts that i no longer consider worthwhile, and added a bit at the end, but have left GR's words pretty much as he wrote them (with a few omissions). His first comment deals with my reference to observation and generalization as ?stages? in the process or practice of phaneroscopy: GR: As I read him, for Peirce the three categories do not necessarily represent 'stages'; yet they can represent them. For example, they are stages in what I call the vector of process, which starts at 1ns passing through 3ns arriving at 2ns (quintessential examples: evolution, or inquiry). But, for example, in the vector of involution, which commences at 3ns which involves 2ns which itself involves 1ns, it does not represent stages at all (quintessential example: the derivation of the categories themselves in "The Logic of Mathematics"). [note: I analyze 3 of the 6 vectors as more logical and 3 as more temporal, or, chronological, although, in a very important sense this is just a matter of emphasis; while no vector acts independently of all the others, except for the purposes of analysis.] GF: The observational stage (as i call it) regards the phaneron monadically, i.e. doesn't even distinguish between the phaneron and the mind it is present to. GR: You and de Tienne and I seem in complete agreement on this. GF: The generalization stage deploys a mathematical logica utens (which for Peirce is prior to the normative science of logic) to characterize the essential elements of the phaneron. This much can be very amply illustrated with many direct quotes from Peirce. GR: Again, we agree; I made this argument regarding logica utens to Joe for both phenomenology and the first two normative sciences on a couple of occasions. GF: If we take the ?faculties? of observation and generalization as the Firstness and Thirdness in a phenomenological trichotomy, the secondness in this trichotomy is less directly represented by Peirce, but as De Tienne points out, the phaneron must be objectified, i.e. treated dyadically, in order to be described; and what you refer to as ?category theory? is a description. GR: This is where I think we may differ. For me iconoscopy is the descriptive phase sans generalization of the relational kind, and it is category theory which concerns itself with generalizing those descriptions into the kind of genuine tricategorial relations my trikonic diagrams, for example, attempt to analyze. And, while it seems eminently reasonable that a logica utens will be involved in your 3rd "stage", it may very well also be employed in the 2nd, objectifying, "stage"--yet, to describe x as an example of secondness, say, does yet place it in relation to a--it's--firstness or thirdness, necessarily, and at all. GF: Peirce does define phaneroscopy as ?description of the phaneron? in CP 1.284, and to me, the dyadic quality of the objectification necessary in order to produce a description is strongly suggested by his reference in CP 5.42 to ?the second faculty? as a ?resolute discrimination? fastening itself ?like a bulldog upon the particular feature that we are studying?. GR: When Peirce writes "particular feature" in the snippet quoted directly above, it again seems to me that this second branch of phenomenology does not yet involve genuinely tricategorial relations which the final branch, category th
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?"
Following up on yesterday's post clarifying “category theory” as Gary Richmond uses the term – as the third in a trichotomy constituting phenomenology – here is an edited and updated version of the conversation that ensued between Gary (GR) and me (GF) on peirce-l just before the list migration. The main issue here is the question of whether (or why) phaneroscopy or phenomenology should be called a science – as it definitely was by Peirce, although Joe Ransdell doubted the appropriateness of this designation. I have revised my own part here and there, omitting or changing the parts that i no longer consider worthwhile, and added a bit at the end, but have left GR's words pretty much as he wrote them (with a few omissions). His first comment deals with my reference to observation and generalization as “stages” in the process or practice of phaneroscopy: GR: As I read him, for Peirce the three categories do not necessarily represent 'stages'; yet they can represent them. For example, they are stages in what I call the vector of process, which starts at 1ns passing through 3ns arriving at 2ns (quintessential examples: evolution, or inquiry). But, for example, in the vector of involution, which commences at 3ns which involves 2ns which itself involves 1ns, it does not represent stages at all (quintessential example: the derivation of the categories themselves in "The Logic of Mathematics"). [note: I analyze 3 of the 6 vectors as more logical and 3 as more temporal, or, chronological, although, in a very important sense this is just a matter of emphasis; while no vector acts independently of all the others, except for the purposes of analysis.] GF: The observational stage (as i call it) regards the phaneron monadically, i.e. doesn't even distinguish between the phaneron and the mind it is present to. GR: You and de Tienne and I seem in complete agreement on this. GF: The generalization stage deploys a mathematical logica utens (which for Peirce is prior to the normative science of logic) to characterize the essential elements of the phaneron. This much can be very amply illustrated with many direct quotes from Peirce. GR: Again, we agree; I made this argument regarding logica utens to Joe for both phenomenology and the first two normative sciences on a couple of occasions. GF: If we take the “faculties” of observation and generalization as the Firstness and Thirdness in a phenomenological trichotomy, the secondness in this trichotomy is less directly represented by Peirce, but as De Tienne points out, the phaneron must be objectified, i.e. treated dyadically, in order to be described; and what you refer to as “category theory” is a description. GR: This is where I think we may differ. For me iconoscopy is the descriptive phase sans generalization of the relational kind, and it is category theory which concerns itself with generalizing those descriptions into the kind of genuine tricategorial relations my trikonic diagrams, for example, attempt to analyze. And, while it seems eminently reasonable that a logica utens will be involved in your 3rd "stage", it may very well also be employed in the 2nd, objectifying, "stage"--yet, to describe x as an example of secondness, say, does yet place it in relation to a--it's--firstness or thirdness, necessarily, and at all. GF: Peirce does define phaneroscopy as “description of the phaneron” in CP 1.284, and to me, the dyadic quality of the objectification necessary in order to produce a description is strongly suggested by his reference in CP 5.42 to “the second faculty” as a “resolute discrimination” fastening itself “like a bulldog upon the particular feature that we are studying”. GR: When Peirce writes "particular feature" in the snippet quoted directly above, it again seems to me that this second branch of phenomenology does not yet involve genuinely tricategorial relations which the final branch, category theory, diagrams (less or more iconically). Rather, what occurs here is the 'mere' description of individual features in relation to one or another of the categories, not yet all three at once (although, of course, the three are always present), while the work of iconoscopy is, in my view, the "resolute discrimination . . . of features"-- but not of tricategorial relations. That is, instead, the work of category theory. GF (concluding the paragraph): However i don’t know of a place where Peirce explicitly presents phenomenology as comprising a triad like this. GR: Perhaps not; still, throughout his life Peirce sometimes makes these categorial triads explicit (typically, for example, in semeiotic grammar), while there are many times when they are only implied, but clearly enough so. Still, there are other places where they are merely adumbrated, or only two of the three categorial elements are given, etc. No doubt there are still other genuine tricategorial relations
