Re: [peirce-l] Emergence, semiotic, Deacon and Peirce
Gary, Thank you for your detailed explanation and consideration. I have not read the book, and I took the terminology as just-coined neologisms. Thank you for the explanation, and I am following it as I am familiar with basic physics; my bachelor's is in science. I am a junior Dewey scholar working my way through Peirce, and thus am grateful for these explanations. I would be delighted to read that book, given this section. Best, Jason On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 5:03 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > Jason, Gary and list, > > > > Yes, i guess it's time to change the subject line, so i've started a new one > that i hope will reflect where this discussion is heading. I should mention > that my own interest in this topic is intimately related with the chapter in > my own work in progress that i'm now struggling with, which overlaps a lot > with Deacon and with some Peircean passages on "thought" and semiosis. I'm > trying to squeeze a lot into this chapter, so it has to be concise without > being too abstract and abstruse. I haven't yet found what feels like a good > way to do that yet, and my musings toward the right expression sort of > spilled over into my "reply" to your message, Gary ... i didn't really think > that i was telling you anything that you didn't already know, i was just > trying to clarify matters for those who haven't yet read Deacon's book, so > my post was an experiment along those lines rather than a reply to what i > thought you were saying. > > > > Jason, i'm wondering whether you've read the book, or are basing your > suggestions on the definitions of teleo- and morphodynamics that Gary > provided a few messages back. I agree that emergence itself is a bottom-up > process – because top-down causality can only happen in highly emergent > systems. But i don't think Deacon's argument supports what you say here: > > > > JH: [[ But is not the distinction relative to analytic perspective? That > is, what is may be described in terms of morphodynamics, but what might > (will) be in terms of teleodynamics? The distinction is more temporal than > substantive? ]] > > > > If i understand what you're suggesting here, i don't agree with it. > Morphodynamic processes arise from far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, as > in Bénard cells for instance. But these in themselves are not enough to > generate life or sentience; those arise with teleodynamics. The distinction > is in how they work, not in whether they are present or future processes. > The great value in Deacon's book is that he explains exactly how they can > arise spontaneously, i.e. without a "designer". But in order to follow his > explanations, you have to absorb his explications of basic concepts of > physics such as "work", and in order to digest those, you have to get used > to thinking in terms of orthograde and contragrade change and how they > affect each other. Basically, each level of emergence enables new varieties > of orthograde change. But i'd better not go any further until i know more > about what i can assume about your background knowledge. I'm shooting in the > dark here, can't tell whether i'm taking too much for granted or too little. > > > > It might be helpful if i insert here a slice of my chapter in progress that > incorporates some of Deacon’s ideas. The chapter is about closure; this part > of it i’m more or less satisfied with, so far. Here goes: > > > > Cells enclose themselves in membranes in order to insulate internal > processes, but must import energy and selected materials across the boundary > in order to maintain those processes. This raises the question of how they > could have organized themselves in the first place: how did biological > systems emerge from the inorganic? Stuart Kauffman identified one crucial > step as catalytic closure, in which the product of one spontaneous reaction > acted as a catalyst for another reaction, which in turn produced the raw > materials of the first reaction. Such an autocatalytic loop can involve many > more than two separate reactions, but it can sustain itself and grow as long > as it produces its own catalysts – provided that it has a source of raw > materials which it can ‘eat’ or transform into the molecular forms which > constitute it. > > “Catalytic closure means that every molecule in the system either is > supplied from the outside as ‘food’ or is itself synthesized by reactions > catalyzed by molecular species within the autocatalytic system. Catalytic > closure is not mysterious. But it is not a property of any single molecule; > it is a property of a system of molecules. It is an emergent property” > (Kauffman 1995, 275). > > > > However, Thompson (2007, 105) points out that autocatalytic systems do not > qualify as autonomous agents if they do not produce their own boundary. “In > summary, the form or pattern of the autopoietic organization is that of a > peculiar circular interdependency between an interconnected web of > self-regenerating process
[peirce-l] Emergence, semiotic, Deacon and Peirce
Jason, Gary and list, Yes, i guess it's time to change the subject line, so i've started a new one that i hope will reflect where this discussion is heading. I should mention that my own interest in this topic is intimately related with the chapter in my own work in progress that i'm now struggling with, which overlaps a lot with Deacon and with some Peircean passages on "thought" and semiosis. I'm trying to squeeze a lot into this chapter, so it has to be concise without being too abstract and abstruse. I haven't yet found what feels like a good way to do that yet, and my musings toward the right expression sort of spilled over into my "reply" to your message, Gary ... i didn't really think that i was telling you anything that you didn't already know, i was just trying to clarify matters for those who haven't yet read Deacon's book, so my post was an experiment along those lines rather than a reply to what i thought you were saying. Jason, i'm wondering whether you've read the book, or are basing your suggestions on the definitions of teleo- and morphodynamics that Gary provided a few messages back. I agree that emergence itself is a bottom-up process – because top-down causality can only happen in highly emergent systems. But i don't think Deacon's argument supports what you say here: JH: [[ But is not the distinction relative to analytic perspective? That is, what is may be described in terms of morphodynamics, but what might (will) be in terms of teleodynamics? The distinction is more temporal than substantive? ]] If i understand what you're suggesting here, i don't agree with it. Morphodynamic processes arise from far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, as in Bénard cells for instance. But these in themselves are not enough to generate life or sentience; those arise with teleodynamics. The distinction is in how they work, not in whether they are present or future processes. The great value in Deacon's book is that he explains exactly how they can arise spontaneously, i.e. without a "designer". But in order to follow his explanations, you have to absorb his explications of basic concepts of physics such as "work", and in order to digest those, you have to get used to thinking in terms of orthograde and contragrade change and how they affect each other. Basically, each level of emergence enables new varieties of orthograde change. But i'd better not go any further until i know more about what i can assume about your background knowledge. I'm shooting in the dark here, can't tell whether i'm taking too much for granted or too little. It might be helpful if i insert here a slice of my chapter in progress that incorporates some of Deacon’s ideas. The chapter is about closure; this part of it i’m more or less satisfied with, so far. Here goes: Cells enclose themselves in membranes in order to insulate internal processes, but must import energy and selected materials across the boundary in order to maintain those processes. This raises the question of how they could have organized themselves in the first place: how did biological systems emerge from the inorganic? Stuart Kauffman identified one crucial step as catalytic closure, in which the product of one spontaneous reaction acted as a catalyst for another reaction, which in turn produced the raw materials of the first reaction. Such an autocatalytic loop can involve many more than two separate reactions, but it can sustain itself and grow as long as it produces its own catalysts – provided that it has a source of raw materials which it can ‘eat’ or transform into the molecular forms which constitute it. “Catalytic closure means that every molecule in the system either is supplied from the outside as ‘food’ or is itself synthesized by reactions catalyzed by molecular species within the autocatalytic system. Catalytic closure is not mysterious. But it is not a property of any single molecule; it is a property of a system of molecules. It is an emergent property” (Kauffman 1995, 275). However, Thompson (2007, 105) points out that autocatalytic systems do not qualify as autonomous agents if they do not produce their own boundary. “In summary, the form or pattern of the autopoietic organization is that of a peculiar circular interdependency between an interconnected web of self-regenerating processes and the self-production of a boundary, such that the whole system persists in continuous self-production as a spatially distinct individual (Thompson 2007, 101). Likewise Terrence Deacon, in his comprehensive study of emergence (Deacon 2011), argues that catalytic closure alone is not enough to bring about autogenesis, the emergent stage which he proposes as precursor to life. Self-enclosure is equally necessary, because without it, the autocatalytic process would exhaust the substrate it needs, or its products would dissipate into the surrounding medium; in either case the p
Re: [peirce-l] Logic is rooted in the social principle is rooted in logic
Gary,
You're correct that Deacon doesn't deal with "the cosmological question
of the origin of life" in Incomplete Science, in The Symbolic Species,
nor in any of his papers that I know of (see a list of them at
http://anthropology.berkeley.edu/users/terrence-w-deacon), and I didn't
mean to imply that he does. The question remains of considerable
interest to me, however, and I brought it up solely because every
emergentist I know of almost by necessity proceeds without asking from
whence came the original ground upon which emergence builds. But, again,
even Peirce saw that question as a pre-scientific one.
I also certainly didn't mean to suggest, by commenting that "what can
be 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as
the result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the
system)," that the "not-yet-organized" represents a system. And I most
assuredly agree with you that "a species and its Umwelt have to
co-evolve," such a basic notion in biosemiotics that I didn't expect
that my admittedly loose language could be misinterpreted by you of all
people. However, I'll have to be much more careful in expressing myself
in such matters as we approach a discussion of Deacon's book--"tossing
off" emails on this topic will surely not do, and so I appreciate your
criticism.
As to teleodynamics and morphodynamics, I'll wait to comment until
after you've responded to Jason's post, which I hope you will. If/when
you do, please consider changing the Subject of this thread to reflect
the new direction in which this discussion is going. Meanwhile I agree
with your comment:
GF: The whole idea of emergence and self-organization is that one kind
of process (e.g. teleodynamics) can arise from interactions of
lower-level processes (e.g. morphodynamics) even though no teleodynamic
process has ever happened before, so there is no teleodynamic context at
that point (though it will evolve from then on ... and the way it
evolves will change the situation, so that the spontaneous emergence of
a *new* teleodynamic process may be precluded in that environment -- as
has very likely happened on this planet).
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5700
```
IF POSSIBLE PLEASE CC messages to: gary.richm...@gmail.com
>>> Gary Fuhrman 1/12/2012 11:24 AM >>>
Gary,
GR: [[ Still, the question remains: whence the greater system?
Sometimes this strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I
see Deacon wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way).
So, what can be 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic
context (as the result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and
as the system) and within an Umwelt. ]]
GF: I don't think Deacon really deals with the cosmological question of
the origin of matter and energy, if that's what you're asking here; he
just takes them as the original ground on which emergence built, so to
speak, without asking where that ground came from. He also takes
evolution to be emergent, in other words he doesn't trace it all the way
back to the original nothing as Peirce does. But i don't think Peirce
would refer to the not-yet-organized as a "system" -- anyway i know i
wouldn't, because to me a system is organized by definition.
The term "context" is also problematic in this ... um, context. The
whole idea of emergence and self-organization is that one kind of
process (e.g. teleodynamics) can arise from interactions of lower-level
processes (e.g. morphodynamics) even though no teleodynamic process has
ever happened before, so there is no teleodynamic context at that point
(though it will evolve from then on ... and the way it evolves will
change the situation, so that the spontaneous emergence of a *new*
teleodynamic process may be precluded in that environment -- as has very
likely happened on this planet). Also it seems to me that a species and
its Umwelt have to co-evolve, so that the species develops not *within*
but *with* its Umwelt. -- But maybe i'm reading something into your
utterance that's not what you intended.
Gary F.
} Everything is always becoming something other than what it was
becoming. [Floyd Merrell] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
-Original Message-
Sent: January-11-12 1:58 PM
Gary,
I think that you're right in suggesting that it's probably not a good
idea to mix creation myths and the like--even Peirce's "non-scientific"
early cosmological musings--with emergent or evolutionary theory. I
would suggest, however, that such ideas do have semiotic and
metaphysical significance for Peirce (say, as much as Big Bang theory
has in the physical theories of some). Nonetheless, I would tend to
agree with this statement:
GF: Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in the
constraints imp
Re: [peirce-l] Logic is rooted in the social principle is rooted in logic
Greetings.
Gary, your last point on morpho- vs. teleo-dynamics is excellent.
But is not the distinction relative to analytic perspective? That is,
what is may be described in terms of morphodynamics, but what might
(will) be in terms of teleodynamics? The distinction is more temporal
than substantive?
I would not describe processive teleology as "top-down" causation, but
"bottom-up," and supporting the notion of "structural" causation.
Aristotle over Plato, in a manner of speaking. Earlier in the thread
"top-down" was stated.
I have supposed that the potentialities of processes may be integrated
ad infinitum, part and part to new whole, where the morphodynamics
generate teleodynamics. The former on the order of potentiality, what
can be here and now, and the latter of the order of a horizon of
possibility, what might be here and later. This would be bottom-up.
Best,
Jason H.
On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> Gary,
>
> GR: [[ Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this
> strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see Deacon
> wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be
> 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the
> result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and
> within an Umwelt. ]]
>
> GF: I don't think Deacon really deals with the cosmological question of the
> origin of matter and energy, if that's what you're asking here; he just takes
> them as the original ground on which emergence built, so to speak, without
> asking where that ground came from. He also takes evolution to be emergent,
> in other words he doesn't trace it all the way back to the original nothing
> as Peirce does. But i don't think Peirce would refer to the not-yet-organized
> as a "system" -- anyway i know i wouldn't, because to me a system is
> organized by definition.
>
> The term "context" is also problematic in this ... um, context. The whole
> idea of emergence and self-organization is that one kind of process (e.g.
> teleodynamics) can arise from interactions of lower-level processes (e.g.
> morphodynamics) even though no teleodynamic process has ever happened before,
> so there is no teleodynamic context at that point (though it will evolve from
> then on ... and the way it evolves will change the situation, so that the
> spontaneous emergence of a *new* teleodynamic process may be precluded in
> that environment -- as has very likely happened on this planet). Also it
> seems to me that a species and its Umwelt have to co-evolve, so that the
> species develops not *within* but *with* its Umwelt. -- But maybe i'm reading
> something into your utterance that's not what you intended.
>
> Gary F.
>
> } Everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming.
> [Floyd Merrell] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
>
> -Original Message-
> Sent: January-11-12 1:58 PM
>
> Gary,
>
> I think that you're right in suggesting that it's probably not a good idea to
> mix creation myths and the like--even Peirce's "non-scientific"
> early cosmological musings--with emergent or evolutionary theory. I would
> suggest, however, that such ideas do have semiotic and metaphysical
> significance for Peirce (say, as much as Big Bang theory has in the physical
> theories of some). Nonetheless, I would tend to agree with this statement:
>
> GF: Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in the
> constraints imposed by an emergent system on the processes it has emerged
> from (and still depends on for its existence). For instance, the
> self-organization of the brain emerges from the constant chaotic “firing”
> of individual neurons, yet it organizes itself by imposing constraints on
> them, and it's the latter part of this circle that is “top-down”.
> This is indeed “from the whole to the parts” but not in the sense where the
> “whole” is the world of possibilities and actualities are parts.
>
> GR: Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this
> strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see Deacon
> wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be
> 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the
> result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and
> within an Umwelt. In any event, I'll look forward to your further thoughts
> regarding " the connection between Thirdness and reciprocality."
>
> As to your thoughts as to an approach for reflecting on Deacon's book in the
> forum, I think your ideas are excellent. So let's continue to toss this
> around a bit and see what we list members come up with. You and I seem in
> agreement that *Incomplete Science* represents some extraordinary research
> with implications for semiotics generally, and reaching, perhaps, even beyond
Re: [peirce-l] Logic is rooted in the social principle is rooted in logic
Gary,
GR: [[ Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this
strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see Deacon wrestling
with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be 'built up' or
'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the result of the
reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and within an Umwelt.
]]
GF: I don't think Deacon really deals with the cosmological question of the
origin of matter and energy, if that's what you're asking here; he just takes
them as the original ground on which emergence built, so to speak, without
asking where that ground came from. He also takes evolution to be emergent, in
other words he doesn't trace it all the way back to the original nothing as
Peirce does. But i don't think Peirce would refer to the not-yet-organized as a
"system" -- anyway i know i wouldn't, because to me a system is organized by
definition.
The term "context" is also problematic in this ... um, context. The whole idea
of emergence and self-organization is that one kind of process (e.g.
teleodynamics) can arise from interactions of lower-level processes (e.g.
morphodynamics) even though no teleodynamic process has ever happened before,
so there is no teleodynamic context at that point (though it will evolve from
then on ... and the way it evolves will change the situation, so that the
spontaneous emergence of a *new* teleodynamic process may be precluded in that
environment -- as has very likely happened on this planet). Also it seems to me
that a species and its Umwelt have to co-evolve, so that the species develops
not *within* but *with* its Umwelt. -- But maybe i'm reading something into
your utterance that's not what you intended.
Gary F.
} Everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming.
[Floyd Merrell] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
-Original Message-
Sent: January-11-12 1:58 PM
Gary,
I think that you're right in suggesting that it's probably not a good idea to
mix creation myths and the like--even Peirce's "non-scientific"
early cosmological musings--with emergent or evolutionary theory. I would
suggest, however, that such ideas do have semiotic and metaphysical
significance for Peirce (say, as much as Big Bang theory has in the physical
theories of some). Nonetheless, I would tend to agree with this statement:
GF: Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in the
constraints imposed by an emergent system on the processes it has emerged from
(and still depends on for its existence). For instance, the self-organization
of the brain emerges from the constant chaotic “firing”
of individual neurons, yet it organizes itself by imposing constraints on them,
and it's the latter part of this circle that is “top-down”.
This is indeed “from the whole to the parts” but not in the sense where the
“whole” is the world of possibilities and actualities are parts.
GR: Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this
strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see Deacon wrestling
with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be 'built up' or
'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the result of the
reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and within an Umwelt.
In any event, I'll look forward to your further thoughts regarding " the
connection between Thirdness and reciprocality."
As to your thoughts as to an approach for reflecting on Deacon's book in the
forum, I think your ideas are excellent. So let's continue to toss this around
a bit and see what we list members come up with. You and I seem in agreement
that *Incomplete Science* represents some extraordinary research with
implications for semiotics generally, and reaching, perhaps, even beyond
biosemiotics. My own sense is that I'll be studying and reflecting on this book
for many years to come.
Best,
Gary
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