Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his original 
opinion
about the connections of the three categories with the principal types of 
signs and
the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third 
guessing
had settled down, and yet leaves the question undecided in his own mind at that 
time.

Working from the understanding that all semiotic phenomena are irreducibly 
triadic,
taking irreducibile in the strictest sense of the word, specific reasons must 
be
given for assigning any number less than 3 to the arity of any aspect or 
component
of a semiotic species, for example, a type of sign relation or a type of 
inference,
in effect, exhibiting an approximate reduction in some looser sense of 
reduction.

There are plenty of examples in Peirce's early work where he demonstrates the 
form
of reasoning that he uses to make these categorical associations and 
connections,
and I had intended to go hunt a few of these up, but the niche of the web where
I last copied them out is down right now, so I will have to try again later.

Regards,

Jon

CL = Cathy Legg
GR = Gary Richmond

CL: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.
Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of
surprise due to error.

GR: And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career
(with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented
on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

CSP: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference 
through an Icon,
 and is thus connected with Firstness;  Induction, or trying how things 
will act, is
 inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness;  
Deduction, or
 recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a 
Symbol, and
 is thus connected with Thirdness. ... [My] connection of Abduction with 
Firstness,
 Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by 
my finding
 no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction split, at once, 
into the
 Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities.

 CSP, ''Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking :
 The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism'', Turrisi (ed.), 276-277.

GR: Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the 
matter.

CSP: [In] the book called ''Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins 
University'',
 while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused 
Abduction with
 the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities.  
Subsequently,
 writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that 
book
 but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of 
Induction
 in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here 
in Cambridge
 I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and 
Deduction with the
 Second [op. cit., 277].

GR: [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling
At the time I first published this division of inference
and 'Peirce'.]

GR: So, as he sees here, for those few years Peirce was confused about
these categorial associations. In that sense Peirce is certainly at least
partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker
about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns.  Still,
he continues in that section by stating:

GR: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided.
Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness,
nor induction with anything but 2ns.

GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but 
thirdness,
nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to 
that
way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three 
categories
together in consideration of a complete inquiry — as he does, for 
example, very
late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the 
section the
CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468–6.473; also, EP 
2:440–442] —
he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the 
hypothesis) with 1ns,
deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising 
tests of it)
with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns.

GR: But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved 
confusing
even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in 
which
he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to 
leave
the question undecided (for now).

--

academia: 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of
information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and
the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the Logic of 
Science
at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute (1866).

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Here is a link to an archival copy in case the current web page goes off-line 
again:

• 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100702011126/http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv.  To 
remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the 
line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message.  To post a message to the 
list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

2012-03-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jason, 

Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's 
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is 
called general, something true of more than one object.

Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his 
better English) said generals and singulars or individuals.

In logic, a universal proposition has the form All G is H, and a 
particular proposition has the form Some G is H and is not singular but 
merely vague as to which singular or singulars are being referred to.

Universal in its etymological sense means that which is true of everything, 
or at least of everything in a given class. Such a universal is maximally 
general in some sense. So Peirce's arguments that there are real generals and 
not only singulars also support the reality of universals. 

I'm willing to distinguish universals such as numbers from among other kinds of 
generals, but I haven't found philosophers interested in doing that. I'd also 
allow a universal that is singular (but usually polyadic) and non-general, 
e.g., a total population cdefgab etc. of a universe of discourse. So, as far as 
I know, in something like a response to your question, I'm not aware of 
philosophers dealing with universals differently than with generals, although 
I'd sure like to know of philosophers who do so. 

The word universal also has some other senses. See universal in the Century 
Dictionary. The entry looks like it could well have been written by Peirce.

Djvu version 
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu?djvuoptspage=415
JPG version 
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=08page=415
Google version http://books.google.com/books?id=MPdOYAAJpg=PA6623

See entry below. - Best, Ben
universal (u-ni-ver'sa??l), a. and n. [ F. universel = Sp. Pg. universal = It. 
universale,  L. universalis, of or belonging to all or to the 'whole,  
universus,all together, whole, entire, collective, general: see universe. Hence 
colloq. abbr. vernal, varsal.] I. a. 1. Pertaining to the universe in its 
entirety, or to the human race collectively.

   Sole monarch of the universal earth. 

Shak., K. and J., ilL 2. 94.

   All partial evil, universal good. 

Pope, Essay on Man, i. 292.

2. Pertaining to all things or to all mankind distributively. This is the 
original and most proper signification.

  Those men which have no written law of God to shew what Is good or evil carry 
written in their hearts the universal law of mankind, the Law of Reason, 
whereby they judge, as by a rule which God hath given unto all men for that 
purpose. Hooker, Eccles. Polity, L 16.

   Nothing can be to us Catholic or universal in Religion but what the 
Scripture teaches.

Milton, Eikonoklastes, xiii.

   Which had the universal sanction of their own and all former ages. Story, 
Speech, Salem, Sept. 18,1828.

3. Belonging to or predicated of all the members of a class considered without 
exception: as, a universal rule. This meaning arose In logic, where it is 
called the complex sense of universal, and has been common in Latin since the 
second century.

Hearing applause and universal shout.

Shak., M. of V..11L 2. 144.

We say that every argument which tells in favour of the universal suffrage 
of the males tells equally in favour of female suffrage. Macaulay, West. Rev. 
Def. of Mill. 

4. In logic, capable of being predicated of many individuals or single cases; 
general. This, called the simple sense of universal, in which the word is 
precisely equivalent to general, is quite opposed to its etymology, and 
perpetuates a confusion of thought due to Aristotle, whose ??? it 
translates. (See II., 1 (b).) In Latin it is nearly as old, perhaps older, than 
def. 3.- Universal agent, in law, on agent with unqualified power to act, in 
place of his principal, in all things which the latter can delegate, as 
distinguished from a general agent, who has unrestricted power in respect to a 
particular kind of business or at a particular place.-Universal arithmetic, 
algebra.-Universal chuck, a form of chuck having a face-plate with dogs which 
can move radially and simultaneously, to hold objects of different sizes.- 
Universal church, in theol., the church of God throughout the world.-Universal 
cognition. See cognition. -Universal compass, a compass with extension legs 
adapted for striking circles of either large or small size.- Universal 
conception, a general concept.-Universal conversion. See conversion, 
2.-Universal coupling, a coupling so made that the parts united may meet at 
various angles, as a gimbal Joint-Universal deluge. See deluge, 1.-Universal 
dial. See dial.-Universal ferment. See ferment.-Universal Friends, an American 
sect of the eighteenth century, followers of Jemima Wilkinson, who professed to 
have prophetic and miraculous powers.-Universal galvanometer, a galvanometer 
capable of measuring either currents or 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Catherine Legg
Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to
 representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of
 something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given
 sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
 students in many fields.


 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
 Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
 Induction

 GR = Gary Richmond
 JD = Jonathan DeVore

 JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
     think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
     fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
     will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
     under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

 JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
     there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
     to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
     thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
     use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
     it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

 GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

 I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

 If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative
 terms,
 that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a
 phenomenon,
 then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of
 reasoning,
 are basically category three.

 Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the
 formal sense
 that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties
 relatively
 well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the
 categorical
 question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal
 scientific means.

 Regards,

 Jon

 --

 academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
 inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
 mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
 word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
 word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
 listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
 

Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

2012-03-04 Thread Catherine Legg
Dear Jason,

I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as
discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in
the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce.

Here is the abstract:
This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and
Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of
universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether
universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends
to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues
which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which
from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of
scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism
not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent
front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism
should be a position worth fighting for.

If that sounds of interest, the link is here:
http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2918

Cheers, Cathy
And here is the abstract:
The link

On Sun, Mar 4, 2012 at 4:34 PM, Khadimir khadi...@gmail.com wrote:
 Greetings,

 I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general
 question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I.

 What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs.
 generals?  How would one argue that universals are not merely merely
 generals?  By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created
 through a process of induction or what Locke called abstraction.  I offer
 an example to indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is
 informal.  I am familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy,
 and I would look forward to Peircean and other views on the matter.
  Citations and references with limited explanation would be a fine way to
 answer, as I would not ask too much of anyone's time.

 Best and Thank You,
    Jason Hills
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
 listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of
 the message. To post a message to the list, send it to
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-04 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of Experience 
and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you challenge two 
things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have developed an aversion 
to using the term consciousness, which seems to me to be too overloaded and 
vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my wife) argues that it will 
interest people more if I use it. Second, the vague transhumanism concerns 
me. 

Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the book?


Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could not 
proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.

This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of mastering 
the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than viewing 
intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it suggests 
that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes that an 
intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it would not 
otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.

Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with a 
fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
reproduce.

The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be an 
essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that intelligent 
species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the natural 
dynamics of the unfolding world.

Such a species would become the evolved “intelligent designers” of life, 
extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, an 
inevitable part of nature's “plan” to move life beyond its dependence upon the 
environment in which it first evolves.

If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding of 
the world.

In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's nothing 
like a modern computer system.

The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant with 
implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the Newtonian 
stage in the development of our understanding and learn the details of how 
sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in our directed 
actions, and how intelligent thought functions.

Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of sense. 
Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep consideration.

Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help us. 
If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the period 
before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as Galileo and 
Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A breakthrough of a kind 
similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is required.

But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we 
need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when 
mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were 
invented, it is the logicians that concerned themselves with explaining the 
nature and operation of thought and sense. Recall that George Boole (1815-1864) 
entitled his work on logic The Laws Of Thought[1] and the founder of modern 
logic, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), wrote the book entitled Sense And 
Reference[2]. I know from experience that it is a surprise to many that use 
logic everyday in their education and computing professions that the original 
concern of logicians is the operation of the senses and the mind. If we are to 
uncover the mechanics of sense and thought, if we are to understand the 
biophysical operation of the mind, then it is this earlier inquiry to which we 
must return.

My subject here is logic of the kind that existed before the current era. It is 
a logic informed by recent advances in biophysics. It explores solutions that 
could not have been considered by the founders of mathematical logic because 
they lacked this new data, and it takes steps toward a calculus for biophysics. 
It does not provide the final answer. This is because we propose that something 
new is to be discovered. But we do present an hypothesis that identifies 
exactly what that something is and how to find it. What is more, even if we 
discover the hypothesis is false we will learn something new and make progress.

The speculation above, that we can discover something so profound that 

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-04 Thread malgosia askanas
I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage me 
from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way informative tidbit 
is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent advances in biophysics.  
By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a book but a 25-page journal 
article, and it has nothing to do with either the senses (such as sight or 
smell) or with making sense of the world.  And what are the mechanics of 
sense; have we now extended scientific mechanism to incorporeals, just to 
forestall its demise?

-malgosia

At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
Dear List,

I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of 
Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me to 
be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my wife) 
argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the vague 
transhumanism concerns me.

Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the book?


Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could not 
proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.

This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes that 
an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it would 
not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.

Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with a 
fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
reproduce.

The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be an 
essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that intelligent 
species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the natural 
dynamics of the unfolding world.

Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of life, 
extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its dependence upon 
the environment in which it first evolves.

If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding of 
the world.

In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
nothing like a modern computer system.

The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the details 
of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in our directed 
actions, and how intelligent thought functions.

Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of sense. 
Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep consideration.

Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help us. 
If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the period 
before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as Galileo and 
Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A breakthrough of a kind 
similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is required.

But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we 
need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when 
mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were 
invented, it is the logicians that concerned themselves with explaining the 
nature and operation of thought and sense. Recall that George Boole 
(1815-1864) entitled his work on logic The Laws Of Thought[1] and the founder 
of modern logic, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), wrote the book entitled Sense And 
Reference[2]. I know from experience that it is a surprise to many that use 
logic everyday in their education and computing professions that the original 
concern of logicians is the operation of the senses and the mind. If we are to 
uncover the mechanics of sense and thought, if we are to understand the 
biophysical operation of the mind, then it is this earlier inquiry to which we 
must return.

My subject here is logic of the kind that existed before the current era. It