Re: [peirce-l] Peirce-L's ends

2012-03-26 Thread Stephen C. Rose
What is currently working well on the list? What, if anything, could be
improved?


 If we should promote it, it would help to have a paragraph with succinct
directions that all could use.  I have been very impressed with the quality
of posts and the civility here.


What are our goals with this list?


 I have assumed the goal was/is to help all be more clear about Peirce and
his contributions and to suggest to a wide audience the relevance of Peirce
now and in the future.


Would it be right to say it is a community of inquiry? If so, how is the
inquiry going?


 Yes but not to the exclusion of a wider goal  It goes well  when
contributions add to the general sense of Peirce's relevance and the means
of expressing it.


If it is not right to see the goal of the list as primarily a community of
inquiry, what goals does it have? And how might they be best realized?


 The main goal would be to keep the flame alive and add fuel to it. I
think this is being realized. For example the recent Deacon interchange led
me to the PDF which shows that Deacon did indeed study Pierce. I intend to
do what I can to spread some of his insights.  Such posts as Gene's most
recent will appeal to a a wider audience than this list.   I see this list
as a force in the effort to move beyond the binary of Dawkins-speak and
religion-speak to a Peirce-informed worldview. The goal would thus be
articulating and spreading the relevance of Peirce. The means are are the
same with the Web where this gets done.


*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 2:35 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote:

 Hello all!



 Some stimulating discussions at the SAAP regarding this list have
 encouraged me to start a thread not with any particular goal in mind, but
 to see where it might lead.



 What I’m interested to pursue is of the nature of a “check-in” regarding
 this list.



 As a loosely affiliated group of Peirce enthusiasts, are we getting the
 most out of the list that we could be?



 What is currently working well on the list?

 What, if anything, could be improved?

 What are our goals with this list? Would it be right to say it is a
 community of inquiry? If so, how is the inquiry going?

 If it is not right to see the goal of the list as primarily a community of
 inquiry, what goals does it have? And how might they be best realized?



 Sharp observers may spot a certain encouragement towards communal critical
 self-reflection in the above.



 Cheers everyone, Cathy



 Catherine Legg

 Senior Lecturer, Philosophy Programme

 University of Waikato

 Private Bag 3105

 3240, Hamilton, New Zealand

 *http://waikato.academia.edu/CathyLegg*



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Re: [peirce-l] Peirce-L's ends

2012-03-26 Thread Gary Richmond
Cathy, Stephen, List--In reflecting on Cathy's good questions and
Stephen's thoughtful 'first response', I thought immediately of Joe's
remarks which pretty much constitute the peirce-l forum page, some of
them seemingly directed precisely to Cathy's questions. See: 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm It isn't necessary to read
all that Joe wrote there, but I find that every time I scroll down that
page that I find some paragraph heading or two that suggest subject
matter on list-related issues I want to reflect more on at that given
time, and I begin a new dialogue with Joe (reading through the whole
page once is also very highly recommended). But I think Cathy's
questions really do need our reflection, both apart from and  in the
context of Joe's goals and purposes for this forum. Best, Gary

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700

*** *** *** ***
 Stephen C. Rose  03/26/12 9:42 AM 
What is currently working well on the list? What, if anything, could be
improved?


 If we should promote it, it would help to have a paragraph with
succinct
directions that all could use.  I have been very impressed with the
quality
of posts and the civility here.


What are our goals with this list?


 I have assumed the goal was/is to help all be more clear about Peirce
and
his contributions and to suggest to a wide audience the relevance of
Peirce
now and in the future.


Would it be right to say it is a community of inquiry? If so, how is the
inquiry going?


 Yes but not to the exclusion of a wider goal  It goes well  when
contributions add to the general sense of Peirce's relevance and the
means
of expressing it.


If it is not right to see the goal of the list as primarily a community
of
inquiry, what goals does it have? And how might they be best realized?


 The main goal would be to keep the flame alive and add fuel to it. I
think this is being realized. For example the recent Deacon interchange
led
me to the PDF which shows that Deacon did indeed study Pierce. I intend
to
do what I can to spread some of his insights.  Such posts as Gene's most
recent will appeal to a a wider audience than this list.   I see this
list
as a force in the effort to move beyond the binary of Dawkins-speak and
religion-speak to a Peirce-informed worldview. The goal would thus be
articulating and spreading the relevance of Peirce. The means are are
the
same with the Web where this gets done.


*ShortFormContent at Blogger* 



On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 2:35 AM, Catherine Legg  wrote:

 Hello all!



 Some stimulating discussions at the SAAP regarding this list have
 encouraged me to start a thread not with any particular goal in mind,
but
 to see where it might lead.



 What I’m interested to pursue is of the nature of a “check-in”
regarding
 this list.



 As a loosely affiliated group of Peirce enthusiasts, are we getting
the
 most out of the list that we could be?



 What is currently working well on the list?

 What, if anything, could be improved?

 What are our goals with this list? Would it be right to say it is a
 community of inquiry? If so, how is the inquiry going?

 If it is not right to see the goal of the list as primarily a
community of
 inquiry, what goals does it have? And how might they be best realized?



 Sharp observers may spot a certain encouragement towards communal
critical
 self-reflection in the above.



 Cheers everyone, Cathy



 Catherine Legg

 Senior Lecturer, Philosophy Programme

 University of Waikato

 Private Bag 3105

 3240, Hamilton, New Zealand

 *http://waikato.academia.edu/CathyLegg*




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PEIRCE-L
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Re: [peirce-l] Book Review • “Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism”

2012-03-26 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Yet another attack of synchronicity -- I just now happened to be working on the 
markup of
some old work and I ran across this bit where I was trying to puzzle out a 
sensible picture
of how the normative science fit together within a pragmatic perspective on 
their objects.

| Questions about the good of something, and what must be done to get it,
| and what shows the way to do it, belong to the normative sciences of
| aesthetics, ethics, and logic, respectively.
|
} Aesthetic knowledge is a creature's most basic sense
| of what is good or bad for it, as signaled by the
| experiential features of pleasure or pain,
| respectively.
|
| Ethical knowledge deals with the courses of action
| and patterns of conduct that lead to these ends.
|
| Logical knowledge begins from the remoter signs
| of what actions are true and false to their ends,
| and derives the necessary consequences indicated by
| combinations of signs.
|
| In pragmatic thought, the normative disciplines can be imagined as three
| concentric cylinders resting on their bases, increasing in height as they
| narrow, from aesthetics to ethics to logic, in that order.  Considered with
| regard to the plane of their experiential bases, logic is subsumed by ethics,
| which is subsumed by aesthetics.  And yet, in another sense, logic affords
| a perspective on ethics, while ethics affords a perspective on aesthetics.
|
| 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_6#6.2._A_Candid_Point_of_View

Regards,

Jon

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

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[peirce-l] Aesthetics, Axiology, and Artistic Truth

2012-03-26 Thread Michael Shapiro
Dear Peirce Listers,
 
Apropos of the recent messages regarding the Peirce 
Society meeting at SAAP earlier this month in New York, yes, I was there too 
and 
heard Tom Short's responses after his paper (unsatisfactory, in my estimation; 
but he told me that he hadn't slept the night before) with regard to 
aesthetics. 
One shouldn't forget that Peirce himself is completely unsatisfactory when it 
comes to aesthetics (as he is on ethics).
 
Whenever I teach my course on Peirce's theory of 
interpretation, I tell my students (only half in jest) that my definition of a 
philosopher is someone who only solves problems of their own devising. By 
contrast, someone who is confronted with the problem of having to explain the 
facts of language or literature or music is in a rather different position 
vis-à-vis the data. My long experience with the analysis of aesthetic objects 
(mostly poetry and prose) convinces me that ultimately one has to deal with 
them 
axiologically, so to speak, by acknowledging the necessity of seeing them as 
repositories of values. In that light, the question as to why the Mona Lisa is 
admirable always comes under the concept of STYLE and its 
HISTORY. It is, moreover, on the grounds of style that one 
can begin to approach the problem of artistic truth in the spirit of 
pragmaticism.
 
In case this line of thought is of interest, here are 
some further observations on the specific role of style. (Comments always 
welcome.)
 
Style suffuses so much of what it means to be human, and 
has been the subject of so much analysis, that in order to move it away from 
problems of introspection and self-awareness one needs to redirect the age-old 
discussion into a more public arena where the contrast with custom allows 
insight into the ontology of human activity in general. This can be 
accomplished 
when style as a phenomenon that cuts across disciplinary boundaries is viewed 
TROPOLOGICALLY as a fundamentally COGNITIVE category. A global theory of style 
entails arguing more 
closely for the concept of STYLE AS A TROPE OF 
MEANING; and demonstrating how stylistic analysis can reveal itself 
not just as a compendium of traditionally taxonomized information but as the 
means whereby individual manifestations of style, their structural coherences, 
and their mirroring of signification can be identified and evaluated. 

 
I. Form and content. Insofar as the 
distinction can be clear at all, it does not actually coincide with but cuts 
across the boundary between what is style and what is not. Style then comprises 
characteristic features both of what is said or performed or made and of how it 
is said/performed/made. If it is obvious that style is the regard that what 
pays to how the faults of this formula are equally obvious. Architecture, 
nonobjective painting, and most music have no subject, nor do they literally 
say 
anything. So the what of one activity may be part of the how of another. No 
rule based on linguistic form alone could determine, for instance, whether or 
not a discursive meaning is ironic. In considering linguistic style at least, 
and perhaps even style generally, it soon emerges that the relation between 
form 
and content must in part be described metaphorically.
II. Content and expression. One famous theory of 
style, that of the French scholar Charles Bally, identifies linguistic style 
with the affective value of the features of organized language and the 
reciprocal action of the expressive features that together form the system of 
the means of expression of a language. From this Roman Jakobson fashioned a 
definition of style as a marked––emotive or poetic––annex to the neutral, 
purely cognitive information. Aside from the impossibility of consistently 
separating cognitive from affective information without remainder, it is 
equally 
transparent that definitions of style that trade in feelings, emotions, or 
affects go awry by overlooking not only structural features that are neither 
feelings nor expressed but also features that though not feelings ARE 
expressed.
III. Difference between stylistic and 
nonstylistic. A feature of style may be a feature of what is said, of what 
is exemplified, or of what is expressed. But not all such features are 
necessarily stylistic. Similarly, features that are clearly stylistic in one 
work may have no stylistic bearing in another locus. Nelson Goodman writes: A 
property––whether of statement made, structure displayed, or feeling 
conveyed––counts as stylistic only when it associates a work with one rather 
than another artist, period, region, school, etc. But there is no discovery 
procedure for the isolation of stylistic features, nor is there a fixed 
catalogue of stylistic properties or traits. Not every property that points in 
the direction of a certain author/performer/maker is necessarily stylistic in 
purport. 
IV. Perception and recognition of style. The 
registering and 

Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism

2012-03-26 Thread Eugene Halton
Dear Terry, Gary, Cathy, et al.,
Thanks for your comments. But I don't think you quite get my point, 
namely; that the idealizing of the passions, including the idealization of 
love, as a means of  creative agents capable of transforming the world though 
the active realization of intelligent ideals is wrongheaded. The statement I 
quoted suggests that narrow model of inquiry (for which it is a good statement) 
can generalize to become a general vehicle of world transformation. In my view 
Peirce would suggest that is pushing it too far. I say that it is precisely 
such idealizing of life to ratiocentric ends that has wrongly put the biosphere 
in jeopardy today, and nominalistic science has been a key player. Replacing in 
Forster's words, the vast cosmic mechanism with transforming the world 
though the active realization of intelligent ideals, may seem a better option, 
but does not to my mind go to the heart of the problem of idealizing conduct as 
determinant of practical life. Yes, Gary, I agree that is where the 
common-sensist element of Peirce's critical common-sensism allows more.
Cathy, I don't see a Romantic view of thought and feeling as 
mutually undermining opposites. Quite the, uh, opposite. The idealizing of the 
passions by thought, so that sentiment becomes a value rather than passionate 
reasonableness was part of my criticism. The problem of modern idealization 
involves what Max Weber called rationalization, but it also involves the 
colonization of the sentiments by idealizing rationality, in effect, disabling 
the spontaneous self and its spontaneous reasonableness.
The community of variescent life, inclusive of humans,  rather than 
a community of human inquirers, might be the better agent of world 
transformation. But the human element of it would have to be more than 
inquirers, in Peirce's sense. It would have to be whole human beings, 
passionately alive to their living habitats rather than to idealized conduct. 
That might also be a virtual definition of an artist engaged in creating a work.
Consider, Terry, where the gospel of greed that Peirce names in his essay on 
evolutionary love derives from. Dostoyevsky and D.H. Lawrence understood, in my 
view, that the idealization of love (and more broadly the idealization of the 
sentiments) would culminate in its opposite, the idealization of hate or greed. 
The nominalistic state of nature of Thomas Hobbes seems a good example of that, 
nature as the warre of every man against every man. Melville in 1851, 
Dostoyevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, and Lawrence in various writings, each 
showed how the idealizing of life and love is a mark of the tragic nature of 
modern life. But each also showed alternatives, which seem to me congruent with 
Peirce's larger outlook, involving yes, sociality, but the sociality of the 
community of the earth and of the spontaneous self. The living self bodying 
forth here and now and not fixed by some idealized horizon.
Lawrence: Every single living creature is a single creative unit, 
a unique, incommutable self. Primarily, in its own spontaneous reality, it 
knows no law. It is a law unto itself. Secondarily, in its material reality, it 
submits to all the laws of the material universe. But the primal, spontaneous 
self in any creature has ascendance, truly, over the material laws of the 
universe; it uses these laws and converts them in the mystery of creation. 
Lawrence's philosophy of living spontaneity is of a piece with Peirce's outlook 
on this one point in my opinion-despite Peirce's antipathy to the literary 
mind-each allowing qualitative uniqueness and a living spontaneity.
Perhaps there is similarity of Lawrence's idea of an incommutable, 
non-idealizing spontaneous self, in Peirce's idea of Now it is energetic 
projaculation (lucky there is such a word, or this untried hand might have been 
put to inventing one) by which in the typical instances of Lamarckian evolution 
the new elements of form are first created. Habit, however, forces them to take 
practical shapes, compatible with the structures they affect, and, in the form 
of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that 
sustains them.

Gene Halton






From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Catherine Legg
Sent: Sunday, March 25, 2012 9:42 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism

Tom that is a great quote in this context, thank you!

Gene your passionate warning against a  Pyrrhic victory of eviscerated, 
abstract intelligence in the service of ideals is important I think. It would 
seem that Peirce did criticize himself along these lines at one point where he 
compared his character unfavorably with that of James as a mere table of 
contents...a snarl of twine (or similar words).

Having said that, however, I worry that your