Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS

2012-05-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
 on a distinction between sign and 
representamen). But for Deely and some others, _sign_ refers to the 
whole semiotic triad of the representamen, the object (or the 
significate, or significate object, as Deely calls it), and the 
interpretant.


Best, Ben

On 5/13/2012 5:39 AM, Gary Moore wrote:


Dear Benjamin Udell,

Gary Moore: Although John Harvey’s reply was extremely good and very 
thought provoking, this is the best argued and most informative and 
just downright practically effective letter I have ever received on a 
philosophy thread on the internet in twelve years! I appreciate the 
distinction made in paragraph 2] very much. I did have trouble trying 
to find any sort of definition for precisely the terminological 
combination “prime necessity” which, though it combines two well known 
terms, is not at all self-explicative together as obviously Peirce 
wants them to be together. You are perfectly right in saying Peirce is 
just using it as an example. ¶


[_Addendum_ ] Gary Moore: To explain my interest I need to show an 
ongoing conflict with S. J. McGrath over another such combination term 
with a violent and variegated history: the /analogia entis/ which he 
says is the primary concept of Thomas Aquinas. He says it is 
absolutely necessary to all thinking as such as well as to any 
meaningful theology. He obviously treats it as a form of logical 
argument. But it is not. It is a literary trope. Now, that does not 
diminish its importance because literary explication always goes with 
using language. Literary explication shows that psychology, explicit 
and implicit, governs all our expression. Yet in logic and philosophy 
it is only rarely acknowledged, and then only as a minor concern when 
it fact it is the overwhelming concern of the whole of language. Its 
formation of language comes long before logic and philosophy. Deely 
demonstrates that the /analogia entis/ is NOT/a logical argument/ but 
does show the analysis of the word “God”, which Aquinas definitively 
says we can never really say anything ‘real’ about, acts as I see it 
as a black whole around which theology, philosophy, and psychology 
revolve around and . . . The term /analogia entis/ McGrath is so hot 
and bothered about does not even occur in Aquinas anywhere.


Gary Moore: But your further analysis, as well as the Peirce you quote 
[3], have been vastly rewarding! You quote “Necessity /de omni/ is 
that of a predicate which belongs to its whole subject at all times.” 
I take this to refer to “Firstness”. In turn, I take these to refer to 
John Deely’s use of Aquinas’ /ens ut primum cogitum/ which is 
literally the first ‘thing’ you know and gives you the ability to know 
everything else. This is the key to all of Deely’s thinking. I 
searched for /ens ut primum cogitum / at Arisbe and found absolutely 
nothing which is probably my fault. Is the identification accurate? ¶


[Addendum] Gary Moore: In */A Thief of Peirce: The Letters of Kenneth 
Laine Ketner and Walker Percy/ * , Percy makes the strange statement 
[page 6] that “To tell the truth, I’ve never seen much use in CSP’s 
“Firstness”, except to make the system more elegant.”]


Gary Moore: At paragraph 8], you say, “ordinary discourse itself can 
evolve and become less vague and more specialized”. This is true. That 
this evolution occurs is undeniable. But this indicates the nature of 
language itself which I am always ‘within’ and yet is the only 
viewpoint I have of it. This is why I disagree with Deely about his 
blanket condemnation of solipsism which, like Kant’s categories for 
the same reason, he is forced to do an about face. */FOUR AGES OF 
UNDERSTANDING/ * , page 588, “ “But this is not sufficient for the 
preclusion of solipsism for the species anthropos , and hence for each 
individual within it; for whatever may be the mechanism of 
representative consciousness, that does not change the basic situation 
admitted on all hands: nothing directly experienced has as such an 
existence also apart from our experiencing of it. This view is the 
hallmark of modernity. But the moderns never succeeded in figuring out 
/why/ they were speculatively driven, over and over again, into a 
solipsistic corner from which, as Bertrand Russell summarized the 
modern dilemma in the historical twilight of its dominance in 
philosophy, there seems no way out. For only the sign in its proper 
being can effect the needed passage. And ideas as /representations/ 
are emphatically not signs, but the mere vehicles and foundations 
through which the action of signs works to achieve, over and above 
individual subjectivity, the interweave of mind and nature that we 
call experience.Ӧ


Gary Moore: And on page 645, Deely grudgingly gives Kant credit for 
influencing Peirce: “ The second great scheme of categories was that 
of Kant. We passed over Kant’s categories without any discussion of 
their detail, except to point out that, in the nature of the case, 
they could provide no more than

Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS

2012-05-12 Thread Benjamin Udell

Gary M., list,

In the passage that you quote from EP 2: 266, what Peirce says is,

   [] This scholastic terminology has passed into English speech
   more than into any other modern tongue, rendering it the most
   logically exact of any. This has been accomplished at the
   inconvenience that a considerable number of words and phrases have
   come to be used with a laxity quite astounding. Who, for example,
   among the dealers in Quincy Hall who talk of articles of /prime
   necessity/, would be able to say what that phrase prime necessity
   strictly means? He could not have sought out a more technical
   phrase. There are dozens of other loose expressions of the same
   provenance. 

Peirce isn't praising the phrase prime necessity by calling it most 
technical. He's just pointing out that people use, without knowing their 
meanings, phrases that are supposed to be reserved for technical senses. 
That much seems clear enough from the context. Less obvious is that 
prime necessity was no doubt in Peirce's view a good example because 
he thought pretty much nobody really knew what it meant.


   Still another threefold distinction, due to Aristotle (I Anal.
   post., iv), is between necessity /de omni/ (/tò katà pantós/), /per
   se / (/kath autó/), and /universaliter primum / (/kathólou prôton/).
   The last of these, however, is unintelligible, and we may pass it
   by, merely remarking that the exaggerated application of the term
   has given us a phrase we hear daily in the streets, 'articles of
   prime necessity.' Necessity /de omni/ is that of a predicate which
   belongs to its whole subject at all times. Necessity /per se/ is one
   belonging to the essence of the species, and is subdivided according
   to the senses of /per se/, especially into the first and second
   modes of /per se/. (Peirce, 1902, from his portion of Necessity in
   Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James Mark Baldwin, editor,
   v. 2, p. 145 via Google Books
   
http://books.google.com/books?id=Dc8YIAAJpg=PA145lpg=PA145dq=%22Still+another+threefold+distinction%22
   and via Classics in the History of Psychology
   http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Baldwin/Dictionary/defs/N1defs.htm#Necessity
   . 

I don't know what Latin word is being translated as necessity in that 
paragraph but, given the neuter adjective in /universaliter primum/ 
(literally, universally first), if it's a word with the necess- 
element in it, then it is /necesse/ (= /necessum/) or /necessarium/ 
(necessary, neuter adjectives) rather than /necessitas/ or 
/necessitudo/ (necessity, feminine abstract nouns).


Peirce can be terminologically demanding, but fortunately he defined 
many terms and phrases, in the Century Dictionary and in the Dictionary 
of Philosophy and Psychology. As for Peirce's own terminology, he 
defines some of it in those books, but the first place to look is the 
Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms 
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html , edited by 
Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, U. of Helsinki, and containing Peirce's 
own definitions, often many per term across the decades.


Gary Fuhrman very helpfully took a list of Peirce entries at the DPP 
that I started in Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography in Wikipedia, 
and expanded it to include Peirce entries for letters P-W (which aren't 
at the Classics in the History of Psychology). 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm . Where he has not also 
provided the text, he still provides the page number so that one can 
find it via Google Books' edition 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Dc8YIAAJpg=PA145lpg=PA145dq=%22Still+another+threefold+distinction%22 
or via Internet Archive's edition 
http://www.archive.org/details/philopsych02balduoft .


The Century Dictionary is online for free 
http://www.global-language.com/CENTURY/; it's bigger and more 
encyclopedic than the OED. I recommend installing the DjVu reader rather 
than settling for jpg images of pages. A list of the entries written or 
supervised/approved by Peirce is at 
http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep . Peirce's work on the Century 
Dictionary will be in Writings vol. 7, now scheduled for 2013. Online 
software for W 7 is now planned (Peirce Edition Project April 2012 
Update http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/PEP-Update-April%202012.pdf ).


As regards ordinary discourse as the final cause of all intellectual 
endeavors, I'd say that ordinary discourse itself can evolve and become 
less vague and more specialized. Some ordinary discourse contains 
hundreds of ways to characterize snow; but not ordinary discourse in 
English, and most of us will not accumulate enough experience with snow 
to get what those characterizations are about. Yet for some those 
characterizations are very practical, often needful. Between highly 
developed ideas and ordinary ideas, there will usually be some struggle, 
it's a two-way street.


Best, Ben

On 5/12/2012 12:25 PM, Gary Moore wrote:


Dear John 

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell

Jon,

The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but 
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference 
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce 
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and q are 
considered to expose all relevant logical structure (as usually in 
propositional logic), then a claim like p formally implies q is false. 
On the other hand, a proposition /à la/ if p then q (or p materially 
implies q) is contingent, neither automatically true nor automatically 
false. I agree that you can see it as the same relationship on two 
different levels. That seems the natural way to look at it.


Another kind of implication is expressed by rewriting a proposition like 
Ax(Gx--Hx) as G=H. In other words All G is H gets expressed G 
implies H. In first-order logic, at least, it actually comes down to a 
material conditional compound of two terms in a universal proposition.


If in addition to logical rules one has postulated or generally granted 
other rules, say scientific or mathematical rules, then these lead to 
scientific or mathematical implications, the associated conditionals 
being true by the scientific or mathematical rules, not just 
contingently on a case-by-case basis. Anyway, all these kinds of 
implication do seem like the same thing in various forms.


It's not clear to me how any of this figures into the 
concept-vs.-judgment question. The only connection that I've been able 
to make out in my haze is that when we say something like p formally 
implies p, we're thinking of the proposition p as if it were a concept 
rather than a judgment; our concern is limited to validity. If we say 
'p, ergo p' or, in a kindred sense, p proves p, we're thinking of p as 
a judgment, and our concern includes soundness as well as validity.


Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 2:25 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:


Ben,

Just to give a prototypical example, one of the ways that the distinction
between concepts and judgments worked its way through analytic philosophy
and into the logic textbooks that I knew in the 60s was in the 
distinction
between a conditional ( → or - ) and an implication ( ⇒ or = ).  
The
first was conceived as a function (from a pair of truth values to a 
single
truth value) and the second was conceived as a relation (between two 
truth
values).  The relationship between them was Just So Storied by saying 
that
asserting the conditional or judging it to be true gave you the 
implication.


I think it took me a decade or more to clear my head of the dogmatic 
slumbers
that this sort of doctrine laid on my mind, mostly because the 
investiture of
two distinct symbols for what is really one and the same notion viewed 
in two
different ways so obscured the natural unity of the function and the 
relation.


Cf. http://mywikibiz.com/Logical_implication

Regards,

Jon





-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv.  To 
remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the 
line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message.  To post a message to the 
list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell

Hi, Jim

Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean 
quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity' class? Is 
that a class with just one element?  Well, be that as it may, since I'm 
floundering here, still I take it that Frege did not view a judgment as 
basically fragment of an inference, while Peirce viewed judgments as 
parts of inferences; he didn't think that there was judgment except by 
inference (no 'intuition' devoid of determination by inference).


Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 3:08 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:


Hi Ben;

My interest was historical (and philosophical) in the sense of what 
did they say about the developing work of symbolic logic in their 
time. The period is roughly 1879-1884. The anchor was two references 
by Irving (the historian of logic) to Van Heijenhoort and Sluga as 
worthy start points.  But the issue of simply language/calculus(?) 
need not be the end. This is not a Frege or Logic forum per se, but I 
wanted to keep the thread alive and focused on symbolic logic 
because I get curious how the (darn) textbook came about periodically.


The priority principle, as extracted by Sluga, with Frege following 
Kant, takes the judgment as ontologically, epistemologically, and 
methodologically primary. Concepts are not.


I will suppose, for now, that the content of a judgment is obscured in 
a couple of ways. First, if you treat the concept as the extension of 
classes, and then treat the class as a unity class or use the Boolean 
quantifier v for a part of a class, you end up with an abstract 
logic that shows only the logical relations of the propositional 
fragment. (especially if the extensions of classes are truth values)


Frege might say that this obscures the content of the judgment. Thus, 
I would say that the propositional fragment is not primary at all for 
Frege, and is just a special case.


You are on to something with the rheme and dicisign. But in 1879, the 
systems of symbolic logic did not appreciate the propositional 
function, the unrestricted nature of the quantifier, and the confusion 
that results from a lack of analysis of a judgment and the poverty of 
symbolism for expressing the results of the analysis.


Jim W



Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 12:24:33 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Jim, Jon, list,

I'm following this with some interest but I know little of Frege or 
the history of logic. Peirce readers should note that this question of 
priority regarding concept vs. judgment is, in Peirce's terms, also a 
question regarding rheme vs. dicisign and, more generally, First vs. 
Second (in the rheme-dicisign-argument trichotomy).


Is the standard placement of propositional logic as prior to term 
logic, predicate calculus, etc., an example of the Fregean 
prioritization?


Why didn't Frege regard a judgment as a 'mere' segment of an inference 
and thus put inference as prior to judgment?


I suppose that one could restate an inference such as 'p ergo q' as a 
judgment 'p proves q' such that the word 'proves' is stipulated to 
connote soundness (hence 'falsehood proves falsehood' would be false), 
thus rephrasing the inference as a judgment; then one could claim that 
judgment is prior to inference, by having phrased inference as a 
particular kind of judgment. Some how I don't picture Frege going to 
that sort of trouble.


Anyway it would be at the cost of not expressing, but leaving as 
implicit (i.e., use but don't mention), the movement of the reasoner 
from premiss to conclusion, which cost is actually accepted when 
calculations are expressed as equalities (3+5 = 8) rather than as 
some sort of term inference ('3+5, ergo equivalently, 8').


If either of you can clarify these issues, please do.
Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 11:41 AM, Jim Willgoose wrote:



-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv.  To 
remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the 
line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message.  To post a message to the 
list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell

Sorry, corrections in bold:


Jon,

The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but 
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference 
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce 
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and q are 
considered to expose all relevant logical structure (as usually in 
propositional logic), then a claim like p formally implies q is 
false. On the other hand, a proposition /à la/ if p then q (or p 
materially implies q) is contingent, neither automatically true nor 
automatically false. I agree that you can see it as the same 
relationship on two different levels. That seems the natural way to 
look at it.


Another kind of implication is expressed by rewriting a proposition 
like Ax(Gx--Hx) as G=H. In other words All G is H gets 
expressed G implies H. In first-order logic, at least, it actually 
comes down to a material conditional compound of two terms in a 
universal proposition.


If in addition to logical rules one has postulated or generally 
granted other rules, say scientific or mathematical rules, then these 
lead to scientific or mathematical implications, the associated 
conditionals being true by the scientific or mathematical rules, not 
just contingently on a case-by-case basis. Anyway, all these kinds of 
implication do seem like the same thing in various forms.


It's not clear to me how any of this figures into the 
concept-vs.-judgment question. The only connection that I've been able 
to make out in my haze is that when we say something like p formally 
implies p, we're thinking of the proposition p as if it were a 
concept rather than a judgment; our concern is limited to validity *as 
of an argument* p ergo p. If we *_/say/_* 'p, ergo p' or, in a 
kindred sense, p proves p, we're thinking of p as a judgment, and 
our concern includes the soundness as well as validity *of the 
argument p ergo p*.


Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 2:25 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:


Ben,

Just to give a prototypical example, one of the ways that the 
distinction
between concepts and judgments worked its way through analytic 
philosophy
and into the logic textbooks that I knew in the 60s was in the 
distinction
between a conditional ( → or - ) and an implication ( ⇒ or = 
).  The
first was conceived as a function (from a pair of truth values to a 
single
truth value) and the second was conceived as a relation (between two 
truth
values).  The relationship between them was Just So Storied by saying 
that
asserting the conditional or judging it to be true gave you the 
implication.


I think it took me a decade or more to clear my head of the dogmatic 
slumbers
that this sort of doctrine laid on my mind, mostly because the 
investiture of
two distinct symbols for what is really one and the same notion 
viewed in two
different ways so obscured the natural unity of the function and the 
relation.


Cf. http://mywikibiz.com/Logical_implication

Regards,

Jon






-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv.  To 
remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the 
line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message.  To post a message to the 
list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell

Hi, Jim,

Sorry, I'm not following you here. F and a look like logical 
constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using v, and so 
on.  I don't know why there's a question raised about taking the 
judgment as everything that implies it, or as everything that it 
implies. Beyond those things, maybe you're suggesting, that Frege didn't 
take judgments as mere fragments of inferences, because he wasn't aware 
of some confusion that would be clarified by taking judgments as mere 
fragments of inferences? But I'm afraid we're just going to have to 
admit that I'm in over my head.


Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 7:36 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Ben,

I suppose you could take the judgment as everything which implies it. 
(or is implied by it) In this way, you could play around with the 
judgment stroke and treat meaning as inferential. But, using a rule 
of substitution and instantiation, I could show the content of the 
following judgment without any logical constants


/- ExFx
Fa x=a
ExFx

But if I say vx, is v a or is it another class G? Further, vx is 
a logical product.  The above analysis has no logical constants.  I 
guess the point is that once you segment Fx and then talk of two 
interpretations; boolean classes or propositions, you create some 
confusion which Frege (according to Sluga) traces back to favoring 
concepts over judgments with resulting totalities such as m+n+o+p that 
are not rich enough, lacking in meaning and content. But this is in 1882.


Jim W

Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 16:41:32 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean 
quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity' class? Is 
that a class with just one element?  Well, be that as it may, since 
I'm floundering here, still I take it that Frege did not view a 
judgment as basically fragment of an inference, while Peirce viewed 
judgments as parts of inferences; he didn't think that there was 
judgment except by inference (no 'intuition' devoid of determination 
by inference).


Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 3:08 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Hi Ben;

My interest was historical (and philosophical) in the sense of
what did they say about the developing work of symbolic logic in
their time. The period is roughly 1879-1884. The anchor was two
references by Irving (the historian of logic) to Van Heijenhoort
and Sluga as worthy start points.  But the issue of simply
language/calculus(?) need not be the end. This is not a Frege or
Logic forum per se, but I wanted to keep the thread alive
and focused on symbolic logic because I get curious how the (darn)
textbook came about periodically.

The priority principle, as extracted by Sluga, with Frege
following Kant, takes the judgment as ontologically,
epistemologically, and methodologically primary. Concepts are not.

I will suppose, for now, that the content of a judgment is
obscured in a couple of ways. First, if you treat the concept as
the extension of classes, and then treat the class as a unity
class or use the Boolean quantifier v for a part of a class, you
end up with an abstract logic that shows only the logical
relations of the propositional fragment. (especially if the
extensions of classes are truth values)

Frege might say that this obscures the content of the judgment.
Thus, I would say that the propositional fragment is not primary
at all for Frege, and is just a special case.

You are on to something with the rheme and dicisign. But in 1879,
the systems of symbolic logic did not appreciate the propositional
function, the unrestricted nature of the quantifier, and the
confusion that results from a lack of analysis of a judgment and
the poverty of symbolism for expressing the results of the analysis.

Jim W



Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 12:24:33 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Jim, Jon, list,

I'm following this with some interest but I know little of Frege
or the history of logic. Peirce readers should note that this
question of priority regarding concept vs. judgment is, in
Peirce's terms, also a question regarding rheme vs. dicisign and,
more generally, First vs. Second (in the rheme-dicisign-argument
trichotomy).

Is the standard placement of propositional logic as prior to term
logic, predicate calculus, etc., an example of the Fregean
prioritization?

Why didn't Frege regard a judgment as a 'mere' segment of an
inference and thus put inference as prior to judgment?

I 

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell

Jim,

Sorry, I'm just getting more confused. I've actually seen a, b, etc. 
called constants as opposed to variables such as x, y, etc. 
Constant individuals and variable individuals, so to speak, anyway in 
keeping with the way the words constant and variable seem to be used 
in opposition to each other in math. But if that's not canonical, then 
it's not canonical. Also, I thought F was a predicate term, a dummy 
letter, and at any rate a (unknown or veiled) constant as I would 
have called it up till a few minutes ago.  I thought ~ was a functor 
that makes a new predicate ~F out of the predicate F. If ~ and the 
other functors are logical constants, then isn't the predication 
relationship between F and x in Fx also a logical constant, though 
it has no separate symbol? Really, I think the case is hopeless. I need 
to read a book on the subject.


I don't see why conceptual analysis would start with the third 
trichotomy of signs (rheme, dicisign, argument) and move to the first 
trichotomy of signs (qualisign, sinsign, legisign). Maybe you mean that 
conceptual analysis would start with Third in the trichotomy of rheme, 
dicisign, argument and move to that trichotomy's First. I.e. move from 
argument back to rheme. But I don't see why the conceptual-analysis 
approach would prefer that direction.


On your P.S., I don't know whether you're making a distinction between 
propositions and sentences.


Thanks but this all seems hopeless! Let's drop this sub-thread for at 
least 24 hours.


Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 10:06 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:


Ben,

I made it too complicated. Sorry. It didn't help that /- was brought 
into the discussion.  You had the basic idea earlier with dicent and 
rheme. Fx and Fa have to be kept together. So, the interpretant side 
of the semiotic relation has priority. Conceptual  analysis would move 
from the third trichotomy back to the first. Synthesis would move 
from the first to the third. If this is close, the priority principle 
would place emphasis on the whole representation. (By the way, F is 
a function and a is an individual, ~+-- are the logical constants.)


Jim W

PS If words have meaning only in sentences (context principle), does 
this mean that term, class, and propositional logics are meaningless?


Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 20:30:53 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Hi, Jim,
Sorry, I'm not following you here. F and a look like logical 
constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using v, and so 
on.  I don't know why there's a question raised about taking the 
judgment as everything that implies it, or as everything that it 
implies. Beyond those things, maybe you're suggesting, that Frege 
didn't take judgments as mere fragments of inferences, because he 
wasn't aware of some confusion that would be clarified by taking 
judgments as mere fragments of inferences? But I'm afraid we're just 
going to have to admit that I'm in over my head.

Best, Ben
On 5/11/2012 7:36 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Ben,

I suppose you could take the judgment as everything which implies
it. (or is implied by it) In this way, you could play around with
the judgment stroke and treat meaning as inferential. But, using
a rule of substitution and instantiation, I could show the content
of the following judgment without any logical constants

/- ExFx
Fa x=a
ExFx

But if I say vx, is v a or is it another class G? Further,
vx is a logical product.  The above analysis has no logical
constants.  I guess the point is that once you segment Fx and then
talk of two interpretations; boolean classes or propositions, you
create some confusion which Frege (according to Sluga) traces back
to favoring concepts over judgments with resulting totalities such
as m+n+o+p that are not rich enough, lacking in meaning and
content. But this is in 1882.

Jim W

Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 16:41:32 -0400
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean
quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity'
class? Is that a class with just one element?  Well, be that as it
may, since I'm floundering here, still I take it that Frege did
not view a judgment as basically fragment of an inference, while
Peirce viewed judgments as parts of inferences; he didn't think
that there was judgment except by inference (no 'intuition' devoid
of determination by inference).

Best, Ben

On 5/11/2012 3:08 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Hi Ben;

My interest was 

Re: [peirce-l] Beginning to answer On Information Technology

2012-04-08 Thread Benjamin Udell
Ernesto,

There are extensive links to online materials on EGs at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_graph#References. Also, Ahti-Veikko J. 
Pietarinen has just posted some new material including Ten Myths about 
Existential Graphs at his webpages at http://www.helsinki.fi/~pietarin/. Once 
there, click in the lefthand sidebar on TALKS.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: ernesto cultura 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:50 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Beginning to answer On Information Technology

Dear Jon, and list,

as I said to you and list I was keeping these answers of yours for future 
reading and consideration as I was very busy some weeks ago.

The links seem to be very insteresting.

I found a Professor in Germany who studies Existential Graphs and IT:

the link is 

http://www.dr-dau.net/eg_readings.shtml

I dont know him and I dint make any contact with him until now!

In fact it is the result of a mere and simple search on google.

I'm very busy and bored with some tasks in my doctorate program (where I am a 
student).
Boring questions that relates Brazilian art and Brazilian (always imature) 
policy.

I'm feeling distant from this marvellous path where Peirce's theory can be 
found.

Still keeping myself close to all of you,

Ernesto.

 Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2012 12:04:36 -0500
 From: jawb...@att.net
 To: pachito_profes...@hotmail.com
 CC: peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu; ari...@stderr.org; inqu...@stderr.org
 Subject: Re: On Information Technology

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Technical support

2012-04-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
List,

The previous tech support person for peirce-l, Ali Zimmerman, has left her 
position. From now on, for subscription problems, please contact me and Gary, 
and if we cannot resolve the problem, we will contact the new tech person who 
is currently settling into place. A few of you have notified us of problems, 
and we hope that they can be resolved with the new tech person's help during 
the coming work week. Thank you for your patience.

Ben Udell and Gary Richmond

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

[peirce-l] Arisbe to IUPUI and may temporarily appear gone

2012-04-03 Thread Benjamin Udell
List,

Arisbe has now been transferred to IUPUI server (but the url remains and will 
remain http://www.cspeirce.com/) . Now, it takes a while for the changed server 
location to propagate through the Internet, so it Arisbe may seem to be down 
when you try to access it. But don't worry, everybody will be able to access it 
soon enough!

Thanks to Nathan Houser, David Pfeifer, Bill Stuckey, and people behind the 
scenes for making this possible.

Best regards,
Ben Udell, for myself and Gary Richmond

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

2012-03-29 Thread Benjamin Udell
I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben

- Original Message - 

Jason, list,

That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
  a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such 
continuity pretty credible. 
  b.. Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons 
instead of physics reasons? 
  c.. Real infinitesimals? 
  d.. Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities 
such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove 
the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences 
of Four Incapacities)
Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they 
say is wrong with synechism?

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Khadimir
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos


Steven,


This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one.  
If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a 
scientific dualist on your view?  I would agree that many contemporary 
positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a 
hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers).  
However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the 
view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection 
of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). 


Best,
   Jason




On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

  Dear Cathy,

  Non-Peirceans, if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two 
camps:

 1. the religious dualist,
 2. the scientific dualist.

  Often they are in both.

  One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls Thirdness (more 
generally, the mind) in their conception of God, the other does not know 
how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there 
are two dogmas working against the Peircean.

  It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I 
respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here:

 Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One?
 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72

  This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago.

  Peirce's objection to the Russelization of logic is relevant here, because 
the eradication of psychologism placed the mind (esp. Thirdness) beyond 
the reach of 20th Century science and logic.

  It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did 
indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called Thirdness, 
as grounded in both a conception of God and a conception of Physics. Now I 
rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this God conception is 
not the usual one but one that is really non-theistic in the modern sense, in 
that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western 
conception.

  This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction 
in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's Ideality in the 
physical sciences and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more 
like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion 
of the later).

  So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is 
important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you 
do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience 
unfamiliar with them.

  With respect,
  Steven


  --
 Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
 http://iase.info



  On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote:

   Gary R wrote:
   *
   For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see 
esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation 
so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector 
theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns 
(esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three 
involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, 
even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in 
that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only 
a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. 
Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on 
possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation 
which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns.
  
   This is 

Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • A Guess at the Riddle

2012-03-22 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jon, Terry, list,

I've seen it suggested in a thread somewhere on the Web that the reason that 
the position-velocity-acceleration trichotomy is a good one is that that there 
are universal laws of acceleration and velocity (and position?) but not of the 
third or higher derivatives. (The third derivative of position is informally 
known as jerk, also, jolt, surge, and lurch.) I don't know why there shouldn't 
be a universal law of jerk, becoming very salient when two strongly gravitating 
masses drift toward each other. But I'm no physicist. In fact, a two-ton truck 
does put on a few pounds as it moves from mountain top to sea level. The weight 
difference wouldn't make it fall faster, but I think that the difference in the 
strength of the gravitational field would. Otherwise one should be falling 
earthward at 32ft per sec. per sec. no matter how far from Earth one is. Also 
toward everything else in the universe. Then they'd all cancel each other out 
and there'd be no gravitation. I'd better stop before I drift too far out into 
space myself.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 4:56 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • A Guess at the Riddle


TB = Terry Bristol

TB: I like it up to this statement that I find obscure.

CSP: Now an acceleration, instead of being like a velocity a relation between 
two successive positions,
  is a relation between three;  so that the new doctrine has consisted in 
the suitable introduction
  of the conception of Threeness.  On this idea, the whole of modern 
physics is built.

TB: I very much look forward to your comments on the overall passage.

Terry,

This just says that we estimate the velocity of a particle moving through a 
space by taking
two points on its trajectory and dividing the distance traveled between them by 
the time it
takes to do so.  To get the instantaneous velocity at a point on the trajectory 
we take the
limit of this quotient as pairs of points are chosen ever closer to the point 
of interest.

We estimate acceleration by taking three points, taking the velocity between 
the first two,
taking the velocity between the last two, then taking the rate of change in the 
velocities
as an estimate of the acceleration.  We get the instantaneous acceleration by 
choosing the
three points ever closer and taking the limit.

By the way ...

This is probably a good time to mention an objection that is bound to arise in 
regard to Peirce's
use of the series of quantities, Position, Velocity, Acceleration, to 
illustrate his 3 categories.
There is nothing about that series, which can of course be extended 
indefinitely, to suggest that
the categories of monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are universal, 
necessary, and sufficient.
Not so far as I can see, not right off, at least.  So making that case for 
Peirce's Triple Threat
will probably have to be mounted at a different level of abstraction.

Regards,

Jon

-- 

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Links to more Peirce MS images - GEP

2012-03-21 Thread Benjamin Udell
List,

I've added links at http://www.cspeirce.com/digitized.htm to pages leading to 
Peirce manuscript images Los manuscritos de C. S. Peirce   
http://www.unav.es/gep/MSCSPeirce.html at Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos.  I've 
translated the Spanish annotations into English. 

This currently includes 
MSS: 
(year 1866) 732, 
(year 1873) 380  381, 
(years 1893-1914)
717, 1395, 865, 867, 732, 569, 599, 600, 1246, 7, 449, 776, 280, 1334, 339C, 
339D, 792, 793, 283, 322, 200, 618, 634, 640, 654, 664, 670, 675, 676, 
(undated) 499, 801, 840, 866, 868, and 
Letters 67, 98, 181, 261, 387, 390.

I hadn't realized how much Jaime Nubiola and his colleagues had posted there. 
Way to go, G.E.P.! There are also some transcriptions and Spanish translations 
of the manuscripts. I know that there's still more to dig up at G.E.P.

Best, Ben

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Reply versus Reply All

2012-03-20 Thread Benjamin Udell
Steven, list,

The need to click on Reply All in order to reply _on list_ to a message is 
not unique to peirce-l.  It avoids a recurrent problem.  Under peirce-l's old 
system, people sometimes accidentally sent to peirce-l personal messages 
unintended for peirce-l, and in some cases it led to considerable embarassment. 
 We will, however, seek to add text about using Reply All to the message 
appended by the server to the bottom of each peirce-l message.

Best regards,
Ben Udell and Gary Richmond

- Original Message - 
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 2:06 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] The family of Benjamin Peirce


First: someone needs to fix the reply-to on the list so that replies are 
directed to it and not the author.

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce

2012-03-18 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jon, list,

Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.

Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a 
pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.

I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on 
Thursday and met some of the people whom I slightly know from online. Contrary 
to the reputations of philosophers in general as mean, they were a bunch of 
what Gary Richmond called sweethearts. One person self-identified as a 
linguist and made an interesting statement (but I wasn't taking notes). I 
wondered whether it was Michael Shapiro. Later I realized that I had omitted 
Shapiro's five-volume _Peirce Seminar Series_ from the Arisbe page of journals 
and book series. I've added it now http://www.cspeirce.com/journals.htm 

Some blogs and home pages are listed at http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm

The blogs are those of some peirce-l members and, I've notice, aren't always 
focused on Peirce, but, well, they're blogs, we're not all focused on Peirce 
all the time.

If anybody has a more-or-less Peirce-related blog or a home page that s/he 
would like to see added, please let me know.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Jon Awbrey 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 1:40 PM 
Subject: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce 

Peircers,

A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of Analogy in 
Language Structure”
reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and 
Peirce”, parts of which
may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of Abduction, 
Deduction, Induction”.

Here is the link --

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy

Regards,

Jon

-- 

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey 
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ 
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey 
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey 
word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ 
word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ 

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving, all,

In my previous post I said that I would include the full Peirce quotes, but 
for the first Peirce quote I included only the portion included in the Commens 
Dictionary. For the full quote (CP 4.233), go here: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=3JJgOkGmnjECpg=RA1-PA193lpg=RA1-PA193dq=%22Mathematics+is+the+study+of+what+is+true+of+hypothetical+states+of+things%22

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 6:11 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce 
edition

Irving, Gary, Malgosia, list,

Irving, I'm sorry that I gave you the impression that I think that a lemma is 
something helpful but unproven inserted into a proof. I mean a theorem placed 
in among the premisses to help prove the thesis. Its proof may be offered then 
and there, or it may be a theorem from (and already proven in) another branch 
of mathematics, to which the reader is referred. At any rate it is as Peirce 
puts it a demonstrable proposition about something outside the subject of 
inquiry. 


The idea that theorematic reasoning often involves a lemma comes not from me 
but from Peirce. Theorematic reasoning, in Peirce's view, involves 
experimentation on a diagram, which may consist in a geometrical form, an array 
of algebraic expressions, a form such as All __ is __, etc.  I don't recall 
his saying anything to suggest that theorematic reasoning is particularly 
mechanical.  I summarized Peirce's views in a paragraph in my first post on 
these questions, and I'll reproduce it, this time with the full quotes from 
Peirce. He discusses lemmas in the third quote.
Peirce held that the most important division of kinds of deductive reasoning is 
that between corollarial and theorematic. He argued that, while finally all 
deduction depends in one way or another on mental experimentation on schemata 
or diagrams,[1] still in corollarial deduction it is only necessary to imagine 
any case in which the premisses are true in order to perceive immediately that 
the conclusion holds in that case, whereas theorematic deduction is deduction 
in which it is necessary to experiment in the imagination upon the image of the 
premiss in order from the result of such experiment to make corollarial 
deductions to the truth of the conclusion.[2]  He held that corollarial 
deduction matches Aristotle's conception of direct demonstration, which 
Aristotle regarded as the only thoroughly satisfactory demonstration, while 
theorematic deduction (A) is the kind more prized by mathematicians, (B) is 
peculiar to mathematics,[1] and (C) involves in its course the introduction of 
a lemma or at least a definition uncontemplated in the thesis (the proposition 
that is to be proved); in remarkable cases that definition is of an abstraction 
that ought to be supported by a proper postulate..[3]


1 a b Peirce, C. S., from section dated 1902 by editors in the Minute Logic 
manuscript, Collected Papers v. 4, paragraph 233, quoted in part in 
Corollarial Reasoning in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, 
2003-present, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, editors, University of Helsinki.: 

  How it can be that, although the reasoning is based upon the study of an 
individual schema, it is nevertheless necessary, that is, applicable, to all 
possible cases, is one of the questions we shall have to consider. Just now, I 
wish to point out that after the schema has been constructed according to the 
precept virtually contained in the thesis, the assertion of the theorem is not 
evidently true, even for the individual schema; nor will any amount of hard 
thinking of the philosophers' corollarial kind ever render it evident. Thinking 
in general terms is not enough. It is necessary that something should be DONE. 
In geometry, subsidiary lines are drawn. In algebra permissible transformations 
are made. Thereupon, the faculty of observation is called into play. Some 
relation between the parts of the schema is remarked. But would this relation 
subsist in every possible case? Mere corollarial reasoning will sometimes 
assure us of this. But, generally speaking, it may be necessary to draw 
distinct schemata to represent alternative possibilities. Theorematic reasoning 
invariably depends upon experimentation with individual schemata. We shall find 
that, in the last analysis, the same thing is true of the corollarial 
reasoning, too; even the Aristotelian demonstration why. Only in this case, 
the very words serve as schemata. Accordingly, we may say that corollarial, or 
philosophical reasoning is reasoning with words; while theorematic, or 
mathematical reasoning proper, is reasoning with specially constructed 
schemata. (' Minute Logic', CP 4.233, c. 1902)

2. Peirce, C. S., the 1902 Carnegie Application, published in The New Elements 
of Mathematics, Carolyn Eisele, editor, also transcribed by Joseph M. Ransdell, 
see From Draft A - MS L75.35-39

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
Malgosia, Irving, Gary, list,

I should add that this whole line of discussion began because I put the cart in 
front of the horse. The adjectives bothered me. Theoretical math vs. 
computational math - the latter sounds like of math about computation. And 
creative math vs. what - consumptive math? consumptorial math?  Then I 
thought of theorematic vs. corollarial, thought it was an interesting idea and 
gave it a try. The comparison is interesting and there is some likeness between 
the distinctions.  However I now think that trying to align it to Irving's and 
Pratt's distinctions just stretches it too far.  And it's occurred to me that 
I'd be happy with the adjective computative - hence, theoretical math versus 
computative math.

However, I don't think that we've thoroughly replaced the terms pure and 
applied as affirmed of math areas until we find some way to justly 
distinguish between so-called 'pure' maths as opposed to so-called 'applied' 
yet often (if not absolutely always) mathematically nontrivial areas such as 
maths of optimization (linear and nonlinear programming), probability theory, 
the maths of information (with laws of information corresponding to 
group-theoretical principles), etc.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 1:14 PM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce 
edition

Malgosia, list,

Responses interleaved.

- Original Message - 
From: malgosia askanas 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 12:31 PM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce 
edition

[BU] Yes, the theorematic-vs.-corollarial distinction does not appear in the 
Peirce quote to depend on whether the premisses - _up until some lemma_ - 
already warrant presumption.
BUT, but, but, the theorematic deduction does involve the introdution of that 
lemma, and the lemma needs to be proven (in terms of some postulate system), 
or at least include a definition (in remarkable cases supported by a proper 
postulate) in order to stand as a premiss, and that is what Irving is 
referring to.

[MA] OK, but how does this connect to the corollarial/theorematic distinction? 
 On the basis purely of the quote from Peirce that Irving was discussing, the 
theorem, again, could follow from the lemma either corollarially (by virtue 
purely of logical form) or theorematically (requiring additional work with 
the actual mathematical objects of which the theorem speaks).  

[BU] So far, so good.

[MA] And the lemma, too, could have been obtained either corollarially (a 
rather needless lemma, in that case) 

[BU] Only if it comes from another area of math, otherwise it is corollarially 
drawn from what's already on the table and isn't a lemma.

[MA] or theorematically.   Doesn't this particular distinction, in either 
case, refer to the nature of the _deduction_ that is required in order to pass 
from the premisses to the conclusion, rather than referring to the warrant (or 
lack of it) of presuming the premisses?  

[BU] It's both, to the extent that the nature of that deduction depends on 
whether the premisses require a lemma, a lemma that either gets something from 
elsewhere (i.e., the lemma must refer to where its content is established 
elsewhere), or needs to be proven on the spot. But - in some cases there's no 
lemma but merely a definition that is uncontemplated in the thesis, and is not 
demanded by the premisses or postulates but is still consistent with them, and 
so Irving and I, as it seems to me now, are wrong to say that it's _always_ a 
matter of whether some premiss requires special proof. Not always, then, but 
merely often. In some cases said definition needs to be supported by a new 
postulate, so there the proof-need revives but is solved by recognizing the 
need and conceding a new postulate to its account.

[MA] If the premisses are presumed without warrant, that - it seems to me - 
does not make the deduction more corollarial or more theorematic; it just 
makes it uncompleted, and perhaps uncompletable.

[BU] That sounds right.

Best, Ben

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jason, all,

If I had bothered to search on computational mathematics I would have found 
that the potential ambiguity that worried me is already actual, as you clearly 
show.  Do you think that the phrase computative mathematics is too close to 
the phrase computational mathematics for comfort?  I hope not, but please say 
so if it is.

Problem is, the applied in applied mathematics is used in various ways 
that, as Dieudonné of the Bourbaki group pointed out in his Britannica article 
(15th edition I think), jumbles trivial and nontrivial areas of math together, 
and has all too many, umm, applications. One area of pure math X may be 
_applied_ in another area of math Y, whih is to say that Y is the guiding 
research interest. If on the other hand Y is applied in X, then that's to say 
that X is the guiding research interest. And both X and Y remain areas of 
'pure' math. Then there are areas of so-called 'applied' but often nontrivial 
math like probability theory. Then there are applications in statistics and in 
the special sciences. Then there applications in practical/productive 
sciences/arts. And of course, sometimes theoretical or 'pure' math is developed 
specifically for a particular application. (All in all, we won't be able to get 
rid of the term applied, but in some cases we may be find an alternate term 
with the same denotation in the given context).

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Khadimir 
To: Benjamin Udell 
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu 
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce 
edition

This latest post caught my attention.

Since my first degree was a B.S. in computational mathematics, I thought that 
I would weigh-in.  

One can make the distinctions as follows, beginning with pure vs. applied 
mathematics.  I will give a negative definition, since I am not so skilled with 
the Peircean terminology used so far; applied mathematics is the use of 
mathematics as a formal, ideal system to specific problems of existence.  For 
instance, consider the use of statistical confidence intervals to solve 
problems in manufactoring relating to the rate of production of defective vs. 
non-defective goods.  Pure mathematics is not bound by existent conditions, but 
pure becomes applied when used in that context.  Hence, I am treated 
applied mathematics as an informal, existential constraint that alters the 
purpose and use of pure mathematics.

Computational mathematics is for the most part a subset of applied mathematics, 
which focuses on how to adapt computational formulas so that they may be run or 
run more efficiently on a given computation system, e.g., a binary computer.  
Computational mathematics, then, is primarily focused on formulas and 
computation of said formulas, which is to be more specific about the limits 
that make it an applied mathematic.

I offer this as a different viewpoint, one coming from where the distinction 
has practical effects.

Jason H.

On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 12:47 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:

  Malgosia, Irving, Gary, list,

  I should add that this whole line of discussion began because I put the cart 
in front of the horse. The adjectives bothered me. Theoretical math vs. 
computational math - the latter sounds like of math about computation. And 
creative math vs. what - consumptive math? consumptorial math?  Then I 
thought of theorematic vs. corollarial, thought it was an interesting idea and 
gave it a try. The comparison is interesting and there is some likeness between 
the distinctions.  However I now think that trying to align it to Irving's and 
Pratt's distinctions just stretches it too far.  And it's occurred to me that 
I'd be happy with the adjective computative - hence, theoretical math versus 
computative math.

  However, I don't think that we've thoroughly replaced the terms pure and 
applied as affirmed of math areas until we find some way to justly 
distinguish between so-called 'pure' maths as opposed to so-called 'applied' 
yet often (if not absolutely always) mathematically nontrivial areas such as 
maths of optimization (linear and nonlinear programming), probability theory, 
the maths of information (with laws of information corresponding to 
group-theoretical principles), etc.

  Best, Ben


  - Original Message - 
  From: Benjamin Udell 
  To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 

  Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 1:14 PM 
  Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's 
Peirce edition

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Dear Steven,

In your previous post, you said,

  Although the dialogic makes these passages a little difficult to read, it 
seems very clear to me that Peirce, in CP 4.549, is explicitly not referring to 
his own categories as predicated predicates, or assertions on assertions. 

  I think the question of what is a category is clearly addressed earlier, 
in CP 4.544, Peirce says:

  ... of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote 
Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very 
promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and 
therefore can only be denoted by Indices.
Now you say, 

  After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben.

  Peirce is indeed referring to his own categories (it is difficult to read 
the dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning 
predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred 
earlier.

  The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, i.e., 
they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed. 

Peirce doesn't say in Prolegomena (CP 4.530-572) that categories _are_ 
indices, instead he says that, for categories are denotable only by indices, 
and the reason that he gives is not indecomposibility, but instead their being 
enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part such that 
they cannot be satisfactorily defined..  But the supposed indecomposibility 
of Prolegomena-categories was the only specific positive reason you give for 
thinking that by Category in Prolegomena he means the same that he means by 
Category pretty much everywhere else. Meanwhile you've left untouched the 
positive reasons for thinking that it is not the same Category as everywhere 
else:

1. He says: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories 
but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments and which you have 
explained as predicates of predicates. Peirce usually calls his own categories 
Categories, not Predicaments, and usually uses Predicaments as an 
alternate term for Aristotle's categories (substance, quantity, relation, 
quality, position (attitude), state, time (when), place, action, passion 
(undergoing).

2. He calls Modes of Being three things whose terms, as the CP editors note, 
he often enough uses as terms for his own categories - Actuality, Possibility, 
and Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny) - that is, Secondness, Firstness, and 
Thirdness, respectively.

3. He says that the divisions so obtained - i.e., 1st-intentional, 
2nd-intentional, 3rd-intentional - must not be confounded with the different 
Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On 
the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates - i.e., the 
Prolegomena-categories - is different in the different Modes of Being. And on 
those successions, he says, and remember the year is 1906, his thoughts are 
not yet harvested. Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categories are 
the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Cc: Benjamin Udell 
Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2012 5:20 PM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction 

Dear Ben,

After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben. 

Peirce is indeed referring to his own categories (it is difficult to read the 
dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning 
predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred 
earlier. The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, 
i.e., they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed. 

In my terms, Peirce argues that they are necessary distinctions. The world 
forces them upon us, we do not force them upon the world.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering 
http://iase.info

On Mar 9, 2012, at 2:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary F., Jon, Gary R. list,

I agree, Gary F., all your points are good. Also I did a search on 
predicament in the CP and usually it turned out to be when he discussed 
Aristotle's Categories, or Predicaments. I don't think that he means his own 
categories by Category in the Prolegomena. And the Modes of Being in 
Prolegomena correspond to what he says of his own categories elsewhere:

Firstness, quality, possibility, chance, some, vagueness, etc.
Secondness, reaction, actuality, brute fact, this, determinateness, etc.
Thirdness,  representation, necessity/destiny, habit, rule, all, generality, 
etc.

Still, Jon, I have to agree with you that it's hard to see why Peirce would 
refuse to see his categories as predicates of predicates - not predicates as 
merely grammatical entities but as _accidentia_, just as Peirce tended to 
regard subject and _substantia_ as nearly the same thing. Peirce even calls his 
categories accidents (not coincidences but descriptive attributes), see 
Section 11 in both A New List of Categories (1867) and corresponding section 
in his rewrite The Categories (1893) (both papers interleaved at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm).

Peirce also has his own Universes correlated to Firstness, Secondness, 
Thirdness - the Universes of (1) Ideas, (2) Brute facts, (3) Habits. So the 
idea of Universes and Categories being not so very different is not what makes 
it hard to believe that the Prolegomena's Categories are not his own 
Categories, though the Prolegomena's idea that one needs indices to distinguish 
Categories (Predicaments) does make it seem unlikely that the Prolegomena's 
Categories are Peirce's own Categories.

Your point about looking for arity or valence because of the mathematical 
underpinnings of the categories is well taken.

Regarding the Prolegomena's Modes of Being and their lack of perspicuous arity, 
Peirce's use of the word Destiny in place of Necessity suggests that he is 
not thinking quite about the classical three modalities, or even the simplest 
Booleanized version (with a hypothetical necessity a la the hypothetical 
universal) but instead where the hypothetical or conditional necessity or 
destiny is not simply A(G-H) but something a little more complicated.

So one might get closer, if not all the way, to arity or valence by thinking of 
it a la the classical concept/judgment/reasoning trichotomy, as
Possibility  - Blue   (term, rheme)
Actuality   - Socrates was a man. (proposition, dicisign)
Destiny   - If you do X, then Y will result. (argument, more or less).

I also agree with Gary R. about all those Objective Logic posts. Sending on 
one day post after post with nothing but quotes is a bit much. Can't you just 
send a bunch of quotes together like Joe used to do, then in a next post 
proceed to a discussion?

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 10:40 AM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Ben, Jon and list, 

I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me 
that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in 
question, Peirce does NOT use the term Categories in reference to what he 
elsewhere calls categories, or elements of the phaneron, or even sometimes 
universes -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. 

The Prolegomena is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs, and 
the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of propositions. 
The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP 4.544-5:

[[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs fail 
But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote Categories 
and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very 
promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and 
therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a single instance, 
is the collection of all things in the Physical Universe 

Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category 
are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of 
Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of Predicates. I 
never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe the two correctly 
is a question for careful study. ]]]

Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to 
Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying that 
he prefers the term Predicaments for classes of predicates, no doubt because 
this avoids confusing them with the different Modes of Being which are 
elsewhere called categories. And indeed he never mentions Categories again 
in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in the whole 
article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only 

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving,

Do you think that your theoretical - computational distinction and likewise 
Pratt's creator - consumer distinction between kinds of mathematics could be 
expressed in terms of Peirce's theorematic - corollarial distinction? That 
identification seems not without issues but still pretty appealing to me, but 
maybe I've missed something. (For readers unfamiliar with Peirce's way of 
distinguishing theormatic from corollarial, see further below where I've copied 
my Wikipedia summary with reference links in the footnotes.)

Peirce at least once said that theorematic deduction is peculiar to 
mathematics, though he didn't say that it was peculiar to pure mathematics. He 
tended to regard probability theory as mathematics applied in philosophy, and I 
don't recall him saying that (at its theoretical level) probability theory 
tends to draw mainly corollarial conclusions. He also allowed of theorematic 
deduction, when needed, in the formation of scientific (idioscopic) 
predictions. Obviously some pretty deep math has been and continues to be 
inspired by problems in special sciences, e.g., in 1990 Ed Witten won a Fields 
Medal from the International Union of Mathematics for math that he developed 
for string theory.

In case like those of Newton, Leibniz, Hamilton, Witten, etc., one can say that 
they were doing theorematic math for computational use in special sciences, but 
should we say that mathematical physics in general is a theorematic, or 
mathematically theoretical, area? The question seems still more acute as to 
probability theory and the 'pure'' maths of information. I've seen it said that 
probability theory can be considered a mathematical application of enumerative 
combinatorics and measure theory, and that the laws of information have turned 
out to have corresponding group-theoretic pinciples. It seems hard not to call 
nontrivial areas like probability theory and such information theory 
theorematic, yet they are traditionally regarded as applied.  Bourbaki's 
Dieudonné in his math classifications article in (I think) the 15th edition of 
Encyclopedia Britannica complained that the term applied mixes trivial and 
nontrivial aras of math together. 

What I'm wondering is whether the pure-applied distinction would tend to 
re-assert itself (in cases like that of measure and enumeration vs. probability 
theory) as theorematic pure mathematics and theorematic applied 
mathematics, or some such. I've noticed, about these mathematically nontrivial 
areas of applied mathematics, that they tend to pay special attention to 
total populations, universes of discourse, etc., and to focus on structures of 
alternatives and implications, among cases (or among propositions, or 
whatever), often with regard to the distribution or attribution of characters 
to objects. They seem to be sister sciences (to use the old-fashioned phrase) 
- John Collier once said at peirce-l that among probability theory, such 
information theory, and mathematical logic, he found that he could base any two 
of them on the remaining third one. (But Peirce classified mathematics of logic 
as the first of three divisions of pure mathematics.) How, if this subject 
interests you, do you think one might best capture the difference between these 
something-like-applied yet mathematically nontrivial areas, and so-called 
'pure' mathematics?

Best, Ben(summary of Peirce views on corollarial vs. theorematic appears 
below)

  Charles Sanders Peirce held that the most important division of kinds of 
deductive reasoning is that between corollarial and theorematic. He argued 
that, while finally all deduction depends in one way or another on mental 
experimentation on schemata or diagrams,[1] still in corollarial deduction it 
is only necessary to imagine any case in which the premisses are true in order 
to perceive immediately that the conclusion holds in that case, whereas 
theorematic deduction is deduction in which it is necessary to experiment in 
the imagination upon the image of the premiss in order from the result of such 
experiment to make corollarial deductions to the truth of the conclusion.[2] 
He held that corollarial deduction matches Aristotle's conception of direct 
demonstration, which Aristotle regarded as the only thoroughly satisfactory 
demonstration, while theorematic deduction (A) is the kind more prized by 
mathematicians, (B) is peculiar to mathematics,[1] and (C) involves in its 
course the introduction of a lemma or at least a definition uncontemplated in 
the thesis (the proposition that is to be proved); in remarkable cases that 
definition is of an abstraction that ought to be supported by a proper 
postulate..[3]


1.. 1 a b Peirce, C. S., from section dated 1902 by editors in the Minute 
Logic manuscript, Collected Papers v. 4, paragraph 233, quoted in part in 
Corollarial Reasoning in the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, 
2003-present, Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, editors, 

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
Dear Steven,

That's what I increasingly thought after re-reading your thread-commencing post 
again after sending my post about it. You did not think the things that you at 
times had seemed to me to think. It was really about stylistics and word 
choice. 

In one case I noted that you had not literally said that which you somehow 
seemed to me to say, - instead you had indeed said the thing that made more 
sense - you had not said, as I somehow had thought, that a certain _discovery_ 
would impact the human species and the universe, instead you spoke of the 
discovery of _something_ that would impact the human species and the universe, 
and that thing was something on the order of nature's plan.  How did I go 
astray?  Impacting us sounds like something that a _discovery_ would do, not 
something that _nature's plan_ would do.  Nature's plan does something deeper 
than that, it plans or plots us.  I suppose that one could speak of something 
with radical significance for the human species and the universe.  Well, maybe 
I'm too sleepy to make suggestions right now.  Now, you have a right to expect 
a reader to attend to what you actually say and not just to vague impressions 
of what you say.  But when one writes a book blurb, it's best to write it in 
extra-hard-to-misconstrue ways, as if the reader may be a bit groggy, like I am 
right now!

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Cc: Benjamin Udell 
Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 8:40 PM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Dear Ben,

I appreciate your very useful response.

I said the entire species and that the universe could not proceed, not the 
entire universe. So I would not expect the impact to fill the eternal moment, 
only localized parts. Similarly, I would hesitate to suggest that the entire 
mass/energy complex of the world could eventually be structured to become a 
single organism. It seems implausible 'though it is perhaps worth some 
consideration equally as a theme for a Science Fiction novel or as a potential 
solution to the dark-energy problem (I do, after all, propose a weak universe 
effect that may, I suppose, accumulate at very large scales to increase 
thinning edge-wise expansion).

Your points, however, are well taken. If it continues in its current form I 
should define more clearly what I mean by proceed. For example: 

... the universe itself could not proceed, could not further evolve beyond the 
stage that we represent ...

Thanks.

With respect, 
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering 
http://iase.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Fw: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda

2012-03-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded. 

- Original Message - 
From: Robert Lane 
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 4:58 PM 
Subject: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda 

Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,

Below is the program for our upcoming meeting, as well as the agenda for the 
subsequent business meeting. The program and agenda are also available at the 
Peirce Society's website:  
http://www.peircesociety.org/agenda-2012-04-05.html

I hope to see you in Seattle!

Best regards,
Robert Lane
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

***

Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society 
7-9:00 p.m., Thursday April 5, 2012 
Westin Seattle 
Seattle, Washington, USA

Program

Chair: Robert Lane (University of West Georgia)

Presidential Address: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami), Types,  Tokens, 
and Words

Jean-Marie Chevalier (Collège de France), Peirce's Critique of the First 
Critique: A Leibnizian False Start (Winner of the 2011-12 Peirce Society Essay 
Contest)

Business Meeting Agenda

1. Approval of minutes of the 2011 meeting (Risto Hilpinen)
http://www.peircesociety.org/minutes/minutes-2011-04-21.html

2. Report from the Executive Committee (Risto Hilpinen)

3. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society

4. Financial statement (Robert Lane)

5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project

6. Report from the Nominating Committee and election of new officers  (Rosa 
Mayorga)

7. New business

8. Adjournment (Risto Hilpinen)

-- 

Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy 

Editor, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society

Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

[telephone and email] 
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

2012-03-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jason, 

Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's 
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is 
called general, something true of more than one object.

Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his 
better English) said generals and singulars or individuals.

In logic, a universal proposition has the form All G is H, and a 
particular proposition has the form Some G is H and is not singular but 
merely vague as to which singular or singulars are being referred to.

Universal in its etymological sense means that which is true of everything, 
or at least of everything in a given class. Such a universal is maximally 
general in some sense. So Peirce's arguments that there are real generals and 
not only singulars also support the reality of universals. 

I'm willing to distinguish universals such as numbers from among other kinds of 
generals, but I haven't found philosophers interested in doing that. I'd also 
allow a universal that is singular (but usually polyadic) and non-general, 
e.g., a total population cdefgab etc. of a universe of discourse. So, as far as 
I know, in something like a response to your question, I'm not aware of 
philosophers dealing with universals differently than with generals, although 
I'd sure like to know of philosophers who do so. 

The word universal also has some other senses. See universal in the Century 
Dictionary. The entry looks like it could well have been written by Peirce.

Djvu version 
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu?djvuoptspage=415
JPG version 
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=08page=415
Google version http://books.google.com/books?id=MPdOYAAJpg=PA6623

See entry below. - Best, Ben
universal (u-ni-ver'sa??l), a. and n. [ F. universel = Sp. Pg. universal = It. 
universale,  L. universalis, of or belonging to all or to the 'whole,  
universus,all together, whole, entire, collective, general: see universe. Hence 
colloq. abbr. vernal, varsal.] I. a. 1. Pertaining to the universe in its 
entirety, or to the human race collectively.

   Sole monarch of the universal earth. 

Shak., K. and J., ilL 2. 94.

   All partial evil, universal good. 

Pope, Essay on Man, i. 292.

2. Pertaining to all things or to all mankind distributively. This is the 
original and most proper signification.

  Those men which have no written law of God to shew what Is good or evil carry 
written in their hearts the universal law of mankind, the Law of Reason, 
whereby they judge, as by a rule which God hath given unto all men for that 
purpose. Hooker, Eccles. Polity, L 16.

   Nothing can be to us Catholic or universal in Religion but what the 
Scripture teaches.

Milton, Eikonoklastes, xiii.

   Which had the universal sanction of their own and all former ages. Story, 
Speech, Salem, Sept. 18,1828.

3. Belonging to or predicated of all the members of a class considered without 
exception: as, a universal rule. This meaning arose In logic, where it is 
called the complex sense of universal, and has been common in Latin since the 
second century.

Hearing applause and universal shout.

Shak., M. of V..11L 2. 144.

We say that every argument which tells in favour of the universal suffrage 
of the males tells equally in favour of female suffrage. Macaulay, West. Rev. 
Def. of Mill. 

4. In logic, capable of being predicated of many individuals or single cases; 
general. This, called the simple sense of universal, in which the word is 
precisely equivalent to general, is quite opposed to its etymology, and 
perpetuates a confusion of thought due to Aristotle, whose ??? it 
translates. (See II., 1 (b).) In Latin it is nearly as old, perhaps older, than 
def. 3.- Universal agent, in law, on agent with unqualified power to act, in 
place of his principal, in all things which the latter can delegate, as 
distinguished from a general agent, who has unrestricted power in respect to a 
particular kind of business or at a particular place.-Universal arithmetic, 
algebra.-Universal chuck, a form of chuck having a face-plate with dogs which 
can move radially and simultaneously, to hold objects of different sizes.- 
Universal church, in theol., the church of God throughout the world.-Universal 
cognition. See cognition. -Universal compass, a compass with extension legs 
adapted for striking circles of either large or small size.- Universal 
conception, a general concept.-Universal conversion. See conversion, 
2.-Universal coupling, a coupling so made that the parts united may meet at 
various angles, as a gimbal Joint-Universal deluge. See deluge, 1.-Universal 
dial. See dial.-Universal ferment. See ferment.-Universal Friends, an American 
sect of the eighteenth century, followers of Jemima Wilkinson, who professed to 
have prophetic and miraculous powers.-Universal galvanometer, a galvanometer 
capable of measuring either currents or 

Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce

2012-02-26 Thread Benjamin Udell
James, list,

Theology, Catholic or otherwise, is hardly my forte, and I find on first look 
into infallibilism (i.e., Wikipedia) that Catholic infallibilism is itself 
largely a theoretical idea, like you say, and the list of supposedly infallible 
statements is a matter of debate, but the Immaculate Conception and the 
Assumption of Mary seem widely agreed upon as examples. Papal infallibilism 
became official only in the 19th Century and could grow. Peirce would seem 
likely to take the long view even if he did not already on principle prefer to 
stick to his fallibilist (and therefore tychist and synechist) principles; his 
allowance for practical infallibility along the line of something like that 
which is called moral certainty seems as far as he could go.

I was barely acquainted with van Fraassen - a paper of his is among those 
linked at Arisbe. So this mornng I've been reading that paper 
http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/docs-publd/FalseHopesEpist.pdf The 
False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research Vol. LX, No. 2, March 2000.  Peirceans will find something to argue 
with in his views of scientific method, induction, and abduction (he seems not 
to glimpse a cenoscopic level logically between math and special sciences).  
Also, FWIW in my semi-Peircean view, application of the distinction between 
_ordo essendi_ and _ordo cognoscendi_ would invert, along at least one axis, 
van Fraassen's epistemological landscape and abduction's place in it. On the 
other hand his view that values (and virtues) matter in the formation of 
scientific understanding and his anti-foundationalism suggest congeniality with 
Peirce. He has an engaging style and one feels that one can hear him talking, 
then one wants to start talking too! More by van Fraassen is at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/index.html , and there I found his 
synopsis http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/SynopsisES.htm of his book 
The Empirical Stance. There he sketches his argument that empiricists need not 
embrace a secular orientation and says that he attempts to provide a more 
positive content for other orientations.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: James Albrecht
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 8:58 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce


Worth taking a look at Bas Van Fraasen's The Empirical Stance related to the 
progress of inference and the secular/religious outlook.  (Wikipedia says van 
fraasen is a catholic convert, which puts an interesting light on the work.)

Also seems worth pointing out that catholic infallibilism is a purely 
theoretical construct even in the context of catholic theology: no one can tell 
you with precision what the exact set of infallible teachings are, such that 
the practical reality of the idea has subsisted entirely in a historical 
conformation of the individual to a teaching tradition. 

On Friday, February 24, 2012, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
 Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list,

 I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once 
 said that he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_ 
 infallibility instead of _theoretical_ infallibility. See C. S. Peirce an G. 
 M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism by Jaime Nubiola, Cognitio IX/1 (2008), 
 73-84, at http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html .

 In at least one other writing (I forget which), Peirce said that fallibilism 
 is about propositions about _experience_, or something much like that. I 
 don't know whether that involves a variation in Peirce's viewpoint or merely 
 of perspective and terminology.

 More information on the dissertation:

 Walker Percy and the Magic of Naming: The Semeiotic Fabric of Life by Karey 
 L. Perkins
 Dissertation information including abstract: 
 http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/english_diss/76/
 Even shorter link than Jon's* to the PDF: 
 http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_diss

 *Competitiveness in link-shortening benefits the polis as a whole.

 Best, Ben

 - Original Message -
 From: Gary Richmond

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce

2012-02-24 Thread Benjamin Udell
Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list,

I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once 
said that he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_ 
infallibility instead of _theoretical_ infallibility. See C. S. Peirce and G. 
M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism by Jaime Nubiola, Cognitio IX/1 (2008), 
73-84, at http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html .

In at least one other writing (I forget which), Peirce said that fallibilism is 
about propositions about _experience_, or something much like that. I don't 
know whether that involves a variation in Peirce's viewpoint or merely of 
perspective and terminology.

More information on the dissertation:

Walker Percy and the Magic of Naming: The Semeiotic Fabric of Life by Karey 
L. Perkins 
Dissertation information including abstract: 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/english_diss/76/ 
Even shorter link than Jon's* to the PDF: 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_diss
 

*Competitiveness in link-shortening benefits the polis as a whole.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Richmond
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, February 24, 2012 11:21 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce


I would tend to agree with you, Stephen. Gary

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700

*** *** *** ***
 Stephen C. Rose  02/24/12 10:24 PM 


‘Belief.  Truth.  Values.  These are relative things’ ” (LR 113).  Percy, 
however, believes in absolutes.


The above from the dissertation speaks volumes to me.  Percy's Catholicism can 
hardly be perceived as transcendent because it is based on supposition. Peirce 
believed (I think) that such transcendence as he knew was demonstrable, 
provable. The only way transcendence can be understood going forward is as 
something accessible within the immanent frame, in everyday life. I believe the 
new paradigm will come  by taking one word of the above - values - and 
suggesting that there are indeed ontological values and that these are willed. 
Precisely for this reason they can be proved to be the engine of such progress 
as we have in history. I think the words above contain impossibility of Percy's 
position. His Catholicism is a belief which to him may be true. 


The only thing that breaks into the transcendent and absolute are willed 
values. Such as come to life in the experience of those who achieve a measure 
of justice in the world, of love in their lives, of life beyond the binary. 
Percy understood the problem but not the answer. Peirce understood both. 

ShortFormContent at Blogger

On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 6:28 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

 Kenneth,

 Thanks, very interesting.

 Here's a slightly shorter link, with out the search operation:

 http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_disssei-redir=1

 Regards,

 Jon


 Kenneth Ketner wrote:

 digitally available at

  
 http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_disssei-redir=1#search=%22semeiotic%20religion%22

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

2011-12-16 Thread Benjamin Udell
Peter, list,

Thanks for your response. 

The augmentationist vision itself in its essence does not seem a conceptually 
difficult one. In the 1970s I had some amateur notion of it though I knew 
nothing of practical developments in IA. Without the initial government funding 
and without the early time-sharing?  I'd guess maybe ten years' delay for 
email, word processors, personal computers, etc. That would be my current bet 
if it were possible to bet on such things.  Economic and cultural factors via 
entrepreneurs etc. soon enough would have come into powerful play, just as such 
factors came into play against such things via IBM and its particular agenda 
earlier.  Maybe it's just me, watching too many Jetsons cartoons when I was a 
kid, expecting tsunamis of progress (and in some ways we got The Simpsons 
instead, which I think is the point of the latter's theme song's resemblance to 
the former's). I'd agree that the Internet might have developed quite 
differently, and with less built-in freedom.

You wrote, 
   PS: I think this is absolutely true, and I just want to add that 
Engelbart's particular vision of IA has largely failed to materialize, due to 
the general unwillingness of corporations to provide training for their 
employees
I think that the common lack of skills in using the augmentations is not due 
mainly to insufficient training programs offered by employers, but instead due 
first of all to the nature of the beast. I've know plenty of people who did 
take employer-offered courses but soon forgot most of it because they didn't 
put it quickly to use, and this is because 
(A) most people get bored easily with such things, as we already know, 
(B) no amount of training is a substitute for habitual exploration when it 
comes to using computer programs, and that is something that should be but 
never is drummed in in every common computer application training course (in 
fact the courses should be structured whenever possible (after an elementary 
level of rote learning of procedures), to engrain practices of exploration and 
of trying things out) and 
(C) workplace pressures urgently favor getting work done as soon as possible, 
quick and dirty. 
It's the old busy reader problem, mutatis mutandis a user, this time one who 
is interested only when too busy to absorb much. The problem is, that one 
doesn't really want to deal with figuring out a more efficient way to do things 
with an application except when one is actually confronted by work to be done, 
but that's also when one doesn't have extra time to find a more efficient way 
using advanced features.  For my part, I didn't like to do the same tedious 
work twice, and I found that the best short cut was the trek through the 
mountains (advanced features), and I simply concealed from my superiors that 
it was for such purposes that I was taking a little extra time.  Except in the 
case of one very helpful boss, it was only after I started showing and 
explaining the results, that they started to appreciate its practicality.  But 
I had almost no success in convincing co-workers to use my great secret, the 
key for which they kept asking me - but which was not some magical little set 
of series of key strokes or menu item clicks but instead resisting to some 
extent the boredom, work pressures, and temptations to chat, and practicing 
curiosity, exploration, front-loading (i.e., the mountain trek), etc., so 
that one would have an easier time in dealing with the problems that arose 
every day.  I.e., grasping that, unlike a typewriter, a computer was always a 
learning experience, pleasant and otherwise. Well, that was all ten and more 
years ago, maybe some things have changed.

I just googled on intelligence augmentation affectivity and found little. I 
found more with intelligence augmentation emotion. It looks like a subject 
more of the future than of the past!

Best, Ben

- Original Message -
From: Skagestad, Peter
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, December 16, 2011 9:19 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO 
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

Ben,

Thank you for your comments, which I have been chewing on. I wish I had some 
insightful responses, but this is all I come up with.

You wrote:
I find it very hard to believe that the second computer revolution could have 
very easily failed to take place soon enough after the first one, given the 
potential market, though as you say below, you were mainly concerned (and I 
agree with you) to reject a monocausal technological determinism.

PS: We are in the realm of speculation here, and I cannot claim to be an 
economic historian, but I do not believe the evolution of either interactive or 
personal computing was market-driven. When you read, for instance, the 
Licklider biography The Dream Machine (I forget the author's name), you find 
Licklider knocking his head against the wall trying to persuade IBM to provide 

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-06 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jim, Irving, John, Peter, list,

Thank you for the added comment, Jim. I've been stealing time to try to rummage 
through online sources but this subject is very abstract for me. I'll just have 
to remove the problematic sentence pending clarification.

Best, Ben 

- Original Message - 
From: Jim Willgoose
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2011 3:47 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate 
for Semiotic


Ben, Irving, John, Peter et. al.  
 
I do not grasp the pairing of model theorist/semanticist or proof 
theorist/universalist either. It seems that a universal grammar ( a term 
adopted once by Peirce) need not be understood in only one of the following 
ways.  First, it need not be understood as strong enough to represent or 
express any domain of knowledge. But secondly, it need not be understood solely 
as relating to proof. Thus, if a formal grammar is presupposed by both logic 
and methodology, it seems an open choice whether one wants to write a proof in 
it for a limited domain of knowledge, or use a fragment of it to model other 
domains of knowledge. Putnam seems to suggest that Peirce was in the vanguard 
of treating model theory as particularist. ( I will look for the paper)  
Experience teaches us what the limitations are. But I will say (following 
Putnam) that model theory as a body of knowledge appears a posteriori. 
 
Jim W.
 



Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2011 13:52:56 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate 
for Semiotic
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Irving, list,

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving, list,

Thank you for your response, erudite and to the point as always.

I agree, it's hard even to imagine a mathematician simultaneously abjuring 
abstraction and not abjuring mathematics itself. The main kind of abstraction 
that I've read that mathematicians traditonally abjured in earlier centuries 
was the abstraction not made to solve an already standing problem (e.g., 
imaginaries are needed for some roots of polynomials). In that narrower sense, 
in his Britannica article Dieudonné called abstractionists the mathematicians 
who abstract freely and exploratively. 

How did I go so wrong in my previous post? Well, I believed a sentence (quoted 
below) that has long been in the Wikipedia Peirce article. It had references 
that I was in a poor position to check. You're saying in effect that the 
article is wrong about van Heijenoort's opinion. So it may be wrong about the 
two others' opinions as well. Is there an easy way to revise it without adding 
much to its length? Will it be okay if I just get rid of the word 
semanticists? Replace it with particularists (a word that I just made up)? 
  Jean Van Heijenoort (1967),[85] Jaakko Hintikka (1997),[86] and Geraldine 
Brady (2000)[79] divide those who study formal (and natural) languages into two 
camps: the model-theorists / semanticists, and the proof theorists / 
universalists. Hintikka and Brady view Peirce as a pioneer model theorist.

  79. a b Brady, Geraldine (2000), From Peirce to Skolem: A Neglected Chapter 
in the History of Logic, North-Holland/Elsevier Science BV, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands.

  85. ^ van Heijenoort (1967), Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus in 
Synthese 17: 324-30.

  86. ^ Hintikka (1997), The Place of C. S. Peirce in the History of Logical 
Theory in Brunning and Forster (1997), The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of 
C. S. Peirce, U. of Toronto.
If you can help me with that sentence, I'd much appreciate it. 

You wrote,
   Setting aside, therefore, the issue of abstraction, the more complex issue 
under consideration is that regarding the perceived distinction between model 
theorists and semanticists on the one hand and proof theorists on the other. 
This is an erroneous distinction insofar as the historical and philosophical 
literature, from van Heijenoort forward, distinguishes between two types of 
semantics
  [SEMANTICS, with some added formatting] Model-theoretic (or intensional) 
semantics. 
  (Actually, van Heijenoort's terminology is itself at first somewhat 
misleading, insofar as he initially associated the limited universes of 
discourses of the algebraic logicians with the set-theoretic, and not with the 
course-of-values of Frege and the set theory of Russell; although he then 
immediately corrected himself by associating the Russello-Fregean extensional 
semantics with the set theoretical.) Set-theoretic (or extensional, which would 
also include Frege's course-of-values, or Werthverlauf) semantics 


If I've got it right, you're saying below that the model-theoretic approach 
implies logic-as-calculus but not vice versa. 
   Having said that, there is, for van Heijenoort and those who came after 
him, a complex of dichotomies that are bound together to distinguish
  [LOGICS, with some added formatting and futzing] Algebraic logic of De 
Morgan, Boole, Peirce, and Schröder  Quantification-theoretic - or more 
properly, despite van Heijenoort - function-theoretic and set-theoretic logic 
of Frege, Peano, and Russell 
  Logicae utentes, which are logic as calculus only, extensional, but with 
restricted universe(s) of discourse, relativism/particularity, and for some, 
model-theoretic (possibly with an intensional, rather than extensional, 
semantic)

  The classical Boole-Schröder calculus. Logica magna, which is logic as 
language preeminently, but also as calculus, extensional semantic, 
absolutism/universality.

  Systems such as Frege's. 
  Van Heijenoort would agree that it was the incorporation of the  
model-theoretic or logic as calculus approach of the Booleans or algebraic 
logicians, by Löwenheim, Skolem, and Herbrand, [continued next right] ...into 
the pure lingusitic approach of the Fregeans, that gave modern mathematical 
logic its character as first-order functional (or predicate) logic and enabled 
them and their successors, Gödel preeminently among them, the possibility of 
tying the model-theoretic conception of satisfiability to the proof-theoretic 
conception of validity, and enabled them to explore the model-theoretic and 
proof-theoretic properties of systems such as Hilbert's and the Principia.  

And Hilbert, somewhere in between, according to van Heijenoort.

The association of logica utens with algebraic logic and calculus only was a 
bit surprising to me; I thought that logica utens was logic used in practice 
rather than acquired by theoretical study.  I guess the idea is that their 
algebraic logic was concerned with formalizing and rendering 

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
 objects as to measurable 
properties. But in any case I don't see why you'd have me stopping amid a 
general discussion to note that, rather obviously, mathematical and 
philosophical objects (usually) lack mass, physical velocity, etc. I suspect 
that you've accepted some transference of sense where the word thing or 
object starts to imply physical/material thing/object with measurable 
physical properties as a result of habitual use of the word thing or 
object in context of physical or material science, so that the use of 
object in another sense sounds odd and worth noting to you. Many people 
accept such a transference of sense, which is why I periodically note that, by 
object, Peirce means anything you can talk or think about and that he doesn't 
usually mean object in some narrower sense. 

As regards the difference between thing and object aside from formality of 
expression (and Heideggerian approaches), you haven't expressed, and I don't 
see, _what_ is the difference between them that you refer to. 

In general, you seem to be getting at an idea that seems like it could well be 
interesting, but it might be a whole lot clearer if you weren't trying to 
confine it to the form of an objection to a pretty unobjectionable rendition of 
Peirce's notion of 'object.'

As regards Things - Representation - Form, back on October 5th you quoted 
Peirce from W1, p. 256, Harvard Lecture VIII, Forms of Induction and Hypothesis 
- from 1865 which is very early.
   The first distinction we found it necessary to draw - the first set of of 
conceptions we have to signalize-form a triad

   Thing  Representation   Form.  

   ... The thing is that for which a representation might stand prescinded 
from all that would constitute a relation with with any representation. The 
form is the respect in which a representation might stand for a thing, 
prescinded from both thing and representation
It's hard to see why you think that Peirce used Thing instead of Object 
because it fails the representational quality. He did not explain it in that 
way, and he did say that the thing is prescinded from all that would 
constitute a relation with any representation, even though the representation 
stands for said thing. As to conjecture, it is possible that he preferred 
Thing because he was more Kantian back in 1865, and Kant often said Ding; 
also Peirce was discussing the Thing as hypothesized and unknowable, whereas 
Object suggests something thrown upon the thinker (or whatever person) and 
not so hidden noumenally. Peirce soon enough rejected the idea of the 
unknowable thing-in-itself.

One also sees that Peirce there defines 'Thing', 'Representation', and 'Form' 
pretty much as he later defined (in On a New List of Categories 1867) 
'Object', 'Representamen', and 'Ground', respectively. His 'Thing' became his 
'Object'.

Again, I get the sense that you're trying to raise interesting issues that 
shouldn't depend on particular ways of construing or misconstruing Peirce, and 
maybe you should raise them more directly and clearly.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Jerry LR Chandler 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Cc: Benjamin Udell 
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 10:49 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate 
for Semiotic


Gary, Ben, Steven, List: 


With regard to alternative interpretations of Steven's philosophy, a few 
further comments appear to be called for.


Ben, while I admire your faithfulness to Peircean text, I do think that we must 
constantly keep in mine that between 100 and 150 years have past sense CSP 
wrote.  During this time, the sciences and mathematics have created new meaning 
for many.many, many terms that CSP used.  Knowledge of the history of science 
becomes a key element in interpreting CSP views.

  Experience.  One way to get a handle on what Joe is saying about experience 
and the empirical is Peirce's emphasis on mathematics as experimentation on 
diagrams. The result of this in Peircean discussions on peirce-l that I've 
noticed, is an avoidance of the phrase 'empirical science.' Special sciences 
(physical, chemical, biological, human/social) involve reliance on _special_ 
classes of experience, _special_ experiments, to study _special_ classes of 
positive phenomena. The title of the book _The Mathematical Experience_ is 
entirely congenial to the Peircean outlook. Cenoscopic philosophy, in Peirce's 
view, deals with positive phenomena in general, not by special classes. I once 
found Peirce discussing what he meant by positive but unfortunately I didn't 
make a note of it. I don't recall Peirce anywhere saying that mathematics 
studies 'hypothetical phenomena' or something like that. But he does see 
experimentation and experience in mathamatics, in its study - there are all 
kinds of things in mathematics that one cannot make do whatever one wishes.

The archaic term special sciences has little if any meaning in the structure

[peirce-l] TITLES OF POSTS

2011-12-03 Thread Benjamin Udell
List,

Gary and I have a request to people replying in a slow read: that people please 
do not change the titles of posts replying _in_ the slow read. The single 
automatic Re: is good (don't delete it!) but please change nothing else - the 
letter case, the wording, etc., of the post's title. The previous slow read did 
get splintered via post titles.

Our request is for the sake of _most simply and easily_ keeping together the 
posts that belong in the slow-read thread, not only in current archives, but 
also in people's email programs when they sort by email title, and in currently 
unknown future archives. We can't count on every store of thread posts having 
the power to make all the proper thread connections independently of post 
titles. 

Best regards, 
Ben Udell and Gary Richmond

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

Re: [peirce-l] Reply to Steven Ericsson-Zenith Jerry Chandler re Hilbert Peirce

2011-11-27 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving, Jerry, Steven, list,

Irving, thanks for your response, more interesting and informative than what I 
have to say! 

Irving wrote,
  Is there some sort of causality, Aristotelian or otherwise, in [application 
of] inference rules? Once again, I am at a loss here to comprehend how this 
issue of causality relates to the nature of axiom systems or to formalism.
I suspect that Jerry has in mind causal reasoning or something like model-based 
reasoning. The latter is an AI subject that I don't know much about, but the 
simplest examples in online texts consist of causal reasoning as opposed to 
diagnostic reasoning, e.g., causally reasoning from stroke to confusion, as 
opposed to diagnostically reasoning from confusion to stroke.  I am not 
convinced that those are just other words for predictive reasoning versus 
explanatory reasoning, but there seems at least some parallelism.  Anyway, if 
one has a mathematical model of a mechanical system, and one runs it forward, 
then the calculations might seem to reflect a causal process, though such model 
runs are often not practically feasible, and I don't know whether Newtonian 
mechanics, though deterministic, has been proven or disproven to be (in 
principle) always computable; at this point I'm thinking of digital models, 
while the broadest sense of 'model' could be very broad.

One can expand the idea of causal reasoning to the idea of following a 
connection of reaction/resistance (or at least a connection of neighborhood). 
For example, traversal of the GW bridge from Manhattan will lead a person to be 
in New Jersey, or 'cause' a person to come to be in New Jersey. When one is 
thinking in graph-theoretical terms of the problem of the Seven Bridges of 
Königsberg, I'm not sure that one can still call that aspect of the reasoning 
'causal' (and certainly proof of the problem's insolubility is not itself 
'causal' or 'connectional' in a non-meta sense). Any deductive proof can be 
considered as following a 'path' but my guess is that it is indeed somewhat 
'meta', be it soever fruitful, to regard every deductive proof as a 'causal' or 
'connectional' reasoning about where (i.e., to what logical conclusion) the 
proof path leads the reasoner. If it's a meta view, then it would leave intact 
a distinction between causal/connectional reasoning and other kinds. And of 
course hovering in the background is a notion that concrete causal or 
connection-traversing processes are nature's own kind of inference processes, 
which we map with causal reasoning. At this point I tend to get confused (or 
more confused than I was already). Clearly my mind is wandering now, don't take 
this all too seriously. Is every natural process of decision or determination 
an inference process, and is every inference process also a decision process? I 
like to think that they are but in different senses, but I don't have a clear 
idea what senses. 

I'm not completely wandering. I'm thinking in terms of inference and 
Aristotle's four causes. Peirce somewhere said that logic is governed by final 
causality, and in MS 634 (Sept. 1909) quoted by Joe, Peirce says that the end 
does _act_ (i.e., agentially) mentally as a cause. I remember Joe Ransdell and 
John Collier discussing entropy's increase as a final cause, and that's how 
I've come to think of it, but it's a case where the final cause does not 
causally act in the sense of a causal agent (traditionally, 'agent cause' is 
the same as 'efficient cause'). In Peirce's metaphysics, the three operative 
principles are a 1stness-2ndness-3rdness trichotomy of (1st) 
chance/spontaneity, (2nd) mechanical necessity (corresponding more or less to 
efficient causation), and (3rd) creative love (corresponding more or less to 
final causation).  For Peirce in those terms, matter is a Second, and so 
chance/spontaneity does not correspond more or less to the material cause, 
though it seems to have a ghost of role there since matter and collections of 
particles so lend themselves to statistical treatment and stochastic processes. 
Also we won't find the formal cause as an alternative in Peirce except, I 
guess, as an aspect of the final cause or a way of looking at the final cause. 
It's tempting to think of mathematics as governed by formal causality, with 
formal causes turning agential through active imagination submitting to and 
honoring postulates, contractually as it were, as if they had the force of the 
actual.

While my mind is wandering, here's a Peirce quote, and a table of mine 
assembling some of the ideas I've discussed.

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/object.html
  [A sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some principle, and 
by some species of causation, with something else, called its _Object_. In a 
word, whether physically, rationally, or otherwise directly or indirectly, its 
Object, as agent, acts upon the sign, as patient. ('The Basis of 
Pragmaticism', MS 283, 1905)
  Traditional 

Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic²

2011-11-25 Thread Benjamin Udell
Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for 
SemioticCORRECTION, sorry. - Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell 
To: Neal Bruss ; PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 4:07 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic²


Neal, list, 

Peirce's views on the classification evolved over time. I don't know of a 
single source with fully elaborated examples of each and every kind of sign. I 
hope other peirce-listers can chime in with some help.

*The 'canonical' 9-fold classification was set forth in MS 540 from 1903, 
published in Collected Peirce v. 2 paragraphs 233-272 and contains a number of 
examples, though not always happily elaborate. This appears as Nomenclature of 
Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined in The Essential Peirce v. 2, 
pp. 289-299. The 9-fold consists of three trichotomies of classes of signs. The 
trichotomies are not fully independent; for example, legisigns include all 
symbols, some but not all indices, and [CORRECTION not 'no icons'] some but not 
all icons [END CORRECTION]. This works out so that the 9 classes intersect to 
form 10 (rather than 27) sign classes fully specified at the level of analysis 
constituted by the 9-fold. 

  Peirce's Ten Classes of Sign (from CP 2.254-263 1903) (I put this table into 
Wikipedia)  Sign's own
  phenome-
  nological
  category Relation
  to
  object Relation
  to
  interpretant Specificational redundancies
  in parentheses Some examples 
  (I) Qualisign Icon Rheme (Rhematic Iconic) Qualisign A feeling of red 
  (II) Sinsign Icon Rheme (Rhematic) Iconic Sinsign An individual diagram 
  (III) Index Rheme Rhematic Indexical Sinsign A spontaneous cry 
  (IV) Dicisign Dicent (Indexical) Sinsign A weathercock or photograph 
  (V) Legisign Icon Rheme (Rhematic) Iconic Legisign A diagram, apart from 
its factual individuality 
  (VI) Index Rheme Rhematic Indexical Legisign A demonstrative pronoun 
  (VII) Dicisign Dicent Indexical Legisign A street cry (identifying the 
individual by tone, theme) 
  (VIII) Symbol Rheme Rhematic Symbol (-ic Legisign) A common noun 
  (IX) Dicisign Dicent Symbol (-ic Legisign) A proposition (in the 
conventional sense) 
  (X) Argument Argument (-ative Symbolic Legisign) A syllogism 


*Decads (sets of ten) of trichotomies.* Peirce sought to analyze sign classes 
more finely, by adding more trichotomies. The general idea was that each added 
trichtomy would take the total number of sign classes up to the next triangular 
number T.  So the number of classes would be the (n+1)th triangular number 
(i.e., T_(n+1)). One trichotomy, 3 classes. Two trichotomies, 6 classes. Three 
trichotomies, 10 classes, and so on. Peirce made various attempts to divide 
signs into ten trichotomies (leading to 66 classes) but he did not reach a 
satisfactory conclusion and left the work incomplete. I once read a paper 
online, something related to education, which gave good, interesting, 
elaborated examples of the kinds of representation and interpretation embodied 
by some of these trichotomies, but I can't remember the paper's name and I 
vaguely think that the author or one of the authors was Phyllis Chiasson. 

*Instances/replicas.* Additionally, Peirce discussed how sinsigns (tokens) can 
serve as 'instances' or 'replicas' of legisigns (types), and how legisigns 
(including all symbols) need such instances/replicas in order to be actually 
expressed. The general word 'horse' is a symbol, but its individual utterance 
is an indexical sinsign to your experience of a horse. Eventually Peirce also 
wrote of replicas that are not individual things/events. The term 'horse', 
apart from its expression in any particular language, is a symbol (and 
legisign) which has, as replicas, symbols (the words 'horse,' _caballo_, 
_equus_, etc.) that prescribe qualities of appearance (depending on language) 
for their individual replicas, which are individual indices (indexical 
sinsigns) such as individual utterances 'horse', 'caballo', etc. Peirce's sign 
theory's setting is not in a putative deductive formalism, so Quine's 'gavagai' 
questions of translational indeterminacy are not a burning issue in Peircean 
semiotics.

*Images, diagrams, metaphors. Peirce also divided 'hypoicons' (icons apart from 
any attached indices) into images, diagrams, and metaphors. He had a great deal 
to say about diagrams. He held that mathematical thought proceeds 
diagrammatically, and he makes his distinction between corollarial and 
theorematic reasoning in terms of uses of diagrams. A diagram can be 
geometrical, or consist in an array of algebraic expressions or even in a 
common form like All ___ is ___ which is subject, like any diagram, to 
logical/mathematical transformation.

I tried to cover much of the above, and to note some of Peirce's changes of 
view, and many of his

Re: [peirce-l] community of inquiry

2011-11-01 Thread Benjamin Udell
John, Michael, list, 

I'd look harder, but right now I've a nasty cold. I've looked and don't find 
Peirce speaking in so many words of a community of inquiry, inquirers, 
research, researchers, investigation, or investigators.

It's occurred to me that, given that Peirce (in the Fixation of Belief) 
defines inquiry as any struggle to move from uncertainty to belief, be it by 
tenacity, authority, congruence, or science, it wouldn't be surprising if 
Peirce regarded a 'community of inquiry' as no special kind of community; every 
community would be a community of inquiry among other things. On thee other 
hand, a scientific community would be a special kind of community.
  I do not call the solitary studies of a single man a science. It is only 
when a group of men, more or less in intercommunication, are aiding and 
stimulating one another by their understanding of a particular group of studies 
as outsiders cannot understand them, that I call their life a science. 

  C. S. Peirce, The Nature of Science, MS 1334, Adirondack Summer School 
Lectures, 1905. http://www.unav.es/gep/index-en.html
Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: John Quay jq...@unimelb.edu.au
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 6:24 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] community of inquiry


Thank you very much for sharing these Michael - they are very helpful.

One thought that has been with me lately is that such references do not
merely point to a community of inquiry, but rather to a community of
practice for which inquiry is indispensible, whether this community is
limited to a particular community or expanded to a generalized community
(issue of truth). 

I suppose I am raising as a question Peirce's meaning of the term
community as this connects with inquiry and practice - ?

Does anyone else perceive such an issue?

Kind regards

John Quay




On 1/11/11 11:55 PM, Michael J. DeLaurentis michael...@comcast.net
wrote:

 By no means based on an exhaustive search, John, here are three passages
 which spring to mind, though not using the very phrase community of
 inquiry. (1) On the Doctrine of Chances... : passim, including the
 following -- ...three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite
 community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made
 supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of the intellectual activity,
 as indispensable requirements of logic. (2) Some Consequences of Four
 Incapacities: Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
 that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY [caps in
 original], without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in
 knowledge.  (3) Critical Review of Berkeley's Idealism: And the catholic
 consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in
 this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion
 of minds to which we belong  You may be well aware of these already, in
 which case, my apologies. But these are the passages (in addition to what
 you cite below) I have found frequently cited in connection with the
 community of inquiry.  Ben Udell is usually quite adept at scouring the
 entire oeuvre and coming up with relevant passages, so I expect, if he has
 the time, he may again come up with an exhaustive sourcing.
 
 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of John Quay
 Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 5:59 AM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: [peirce-l] community of inquiry
 
 Hi Peirce-listers
 
 Just wondering if anyone can help me.
 
 The phrase community of inquiry is often attributed to Peirce and yet I
 cannot find any instance of his actually using this phrase. Sources of this
 attribution can be drawn to Matthew Lipman (amongst others), associated with
 his work in Philosophy for Children
 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Lipman)
 
 Peirce definitely speaks often of the importance of community and of
 inquiry, but does not tend to use these words in close association.
 
 I was wondering if anyone knew of a passage (or passages) in Peirce's work
 that would speak clearly to the association between community and inquiry?
 
 I understand that Peirce draws a close connection between notions of
 community and scientific or pragmatic truth, for example when he states that
 ³the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
 investigate, is what we mean by the truth²  (Peirce, 1878, p. 299, CP
 5.407). But is this the main source of the phrase community of inquiry?
 
 Any help appreciated.
 
 Kind regards

-- 
John Quay, PhD
Lecturer
Melbourne Graduate School of Education
234 Queensberry Street
The University of Melbourne
VIC, 3010, Australia
T: +61 3 8344 8533 / M: 0438 048 955
E: jq...@unimelb.edu.au
http://www.edfac.unimelb.edu.au/profile/John.Quay
www.education.unimelb.edu.au
CRICO Provider code 00116K


Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 3

2011-10-19 Thread Benjamin Udell
 mathematicians to solve it), and that 'pure' 
maths and sociology are toward opposite ends of a spectrum.  You can see an 
outline of Peirce's later spectrum or classification of research at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#Sciences. 
Also http://www.uta.fi/~attove/peirce_syst.PDF (Tommi Vehkavaara's diagrams of 
Peirce's successive views over the years).

A library scientist Birger Hjørland in Denmark wrote on a webpage of his 
(http://www.iva.dk/bh/Core%20Concepts%20in%20LIS/articles%20a-z/classification_of_the_sciences.htm):
 There is not today (2005), to my knowledge, any organized research program 
about the classification of the sciences in any discipline or in any country. 
As Miksa (1998) writes, the interest for this question largely died in the 
beginning of the 20th century. I don't think that that quite applies to 
mathematicians, but all the same it seems that people interested in Peirce and 
mathematicians are currently the main two groups with an abiding interest in a 
classification with some philosophical or logical basis. Anybody, please 
correct me if I'm wrong.

Thanks again for your remarks. 

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Sally Ness
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Monday, October 17, 2011 11:38 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities 
Segment 3


Ben, list, 


Thanks very much for this second response--I should say that I did not receive 
any Peirce posts for about 10 days, due to a change in the email system I use, 
so I may have missed a post  from you--apologies for any lack of acknowledgment 
 if that was the case.  Anyway, I appreciate your adding to the record on this 
paper in such a detailed and thoughtful way.


It is interesting, as you point out,  that Peirce starts with economics as an 
example  of a social science, and that he makes the connection (which certainly 
does seem to have ethical and practical aspects) to political economy so 
explicit in the 1902 quote.   I hope that the classificational issues you raise 
might be addressed by other listers.   I am not familiar with this manuscript, 
but it reads to me as though Peirce saw economics as having different parts 
to it, making it a science that could belong to more than one class of science 
with regard to differing parts of its character.  Certainly, its mathematical 
part is larger, and more elaborately developed, than is the case with at 
least the main streams of many of the other social sciences.  


Regarding psychology, your comments led me to realize that the independence 
Peirce wanted to declare for logic in relation to psychological phenomena may 
have had consequences for the way in which other social sciences are understood 
in relation to Perice's logic as well, if psychology is taken as representative 
of all the social sciences in some way.  This is quite a thought, and my first 
response would be, hold on a minute!  I wonder if others have reflected on 
this.  In my view, psychology would be the weakest candidate for representing 
the social sciences in general, focused as it has been on subject- matter that 
typically, in the mainstreams of the discipline, has been defined as basically 
individual in character (individual psyches).  It would seem to have a special 
relationship to philosophy and to logic that is not replicated in the other 
social sciences in this regard.  I haven't thought this through enough to say 
more, but I thank you for bringing it to my attention.


Your comment here about mathematical work seems just right:
Now, let's say that often enough sociological factors in mathematical work pale 
to the point that _usual_ sociological factors and explanations offer 
diminishing returns for sociology about mathematics. 


Indeed, mathematics would seem to be so  pale as to be a special case.  The 
spectrum of such paleness it might be understood to sit at the far end of might 
be worth fleshing out at some point, although I doubt there would be much hope 
for consensus on that!


Your comment at the end of that paragraph is really what I was trying to 
articulate at a number of points in my posts--thank you for this clarification: 


   So Joe's criticisisms of sociology of science might apply better to actual 
sociology, at least as he knew it, as actually or potentially abused for 
political ends, than to sociology at its ideal best.


Finally, thanks for the reference to Feynman's work.  His perspective does seem 
akin to a cultural anthropological one.  I am not familiar with it, but hope to 
learn more of it.


Thanks again,
Sally




On Oct 15, 2011, at 12:26 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 3

2011-10-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational CoSally, list,

I can't resist trying to catch up somewhat, even if I'm slower than ketchup. 

I think that Joe would have taken your criticisms in your post below quite 
seriously. You might even have changed his mind, or at least gotten him to 
define sociology as he used it in his paper. 

Economics and science.  Any study of people and society should be able to take 
logical determination into account - determination (causation in the broadest 
sense) by signs and evidences and interpretants as cognitive or semiosic 
factors. Economics continually considers the impacts of expectations and 
beliefs on decision-making about means. 

Science (along with mathematics) involves the active arranging for oneself (and 
the community of inquirers) to be determined by the object through signs to 
true interpretant propositions. Science is a deliberately redoubled form of 
logical determination, seeking bases for nontivial interpretant conclusions 
that are bases for further nontrivial interpretant conclusions and, to put it 
another way, seeking to know or learn in or on what lights or grounds one knows 
or learns things. As it happens, economics is a 'social science' that Peirce 
saw as suited to study and aid scientific research itself. Peirce wrote in 
Draft E - MS L75.180-181 in Memoir 28 his 1902 Application to the Carnegie 
Institute:
  [...] I examine the question of the kinds of knowledge of which the diffusion 
is most desirable, always in the interest of the advancement of science. I find 
the normative sciences, including economics, of greatest importance. If our 
people could only learn enough political economy to see that it is a difficult 
science in which it is needful to trust experts, there would be far more money 
to spend on science than the genius of the country could use to the best 
advantage. The analytical part of political economy is directly dependent on 
logical methodeutic. It is a question whether it is not a branch of logic. 
(The passage raises a host of classificational questions. Did Peirce think that 
some of economics is part of ethics? And if the analytical part of economics 
directly depends on logical methodeutic, but is not part of logic, then by 
Peirce's Comtean classificational rule, it must come at some point _after_ 
logic, which means that, though normative, it is either in metaphysics or in 
the special sciences - presumably it would be there as an application of 
philosophical normative science.)

Psychology (and sociology) and science. Peirce also insisted in the Carnegie 
Application (in Memoir 15, in Draft D - MS L75.247-248) that logic (including 
methodeutic) as part of cenosocopic philosophy is independent of psychology as 
a special science. However, that is not to say that all study of science is in 
logic or in methodeutic in particular. There seems no reason in principle that 
a special science, aided by applications from broader or more abstract 
sciences, _cannot_ successfully study actual disciplines of science, 
mathematics, etc., as actually practiced. (I do see an inherent _difficulty_, 
though not an impossibility, in studying minds that may be more brilliant than 
one's own mind, minds studying subject matters that may be above one's 
paygrade, etc.) Now, let's say that often enough sociological factors in 
mathematical work pale to the point that _usual_ sociological factors and 
explanations offer diminishing returns for sociology about mathematics. The 
result seems much like what Joe says - one is not so much doing sociology (as 
usually understood) any more. The question is: so what? I grant the practical 
and theoretical difficulties, but not the theoretical impossibility. One's work 
becomes more interdisciplinary and might not entirely belong in the sciences of 
discovery at all - it could, in Peirce's (and I assume Joe's) view get into 
Science of Review which does depend on special sciences, cenoscopy, and 
mathematics, and endeavors to form a philosophy of them all. So Joe's 
criticisisms of sociology of science might apply better to actual sociology, at 
least as he knew it, as actually or potentially abused for political ends, than 
to sociology at its ideal best.

Unity of subject matter. I'm also not sure that I agree with Joe about an 
importance of the unity of subject matter to a point where it seems (though Joe 
assuredly did not say this) that unities of means and of purpose don't invite 
or require being taken into account from the beginning. _Ulysses_ and sociology 
about Dublin are both about Dublin but have different purposes. Even among the 
sciences, Peirce for his part distinguishes by purposes and method as well as 
by subject matter. But that's a whole other discussion. 

Implicit norms. In regard to your identifying Joe's discussion of implicit 
norms as belonging to a theme in cultural anthropology, it's also hard to 
resist mentioning Feynman's view that 

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 1

2011-10-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational CoDear Sally, list,

I've been occupied, and I guess that it's too late for me to catch up with the 
rest of the slow read, anyway I won't be miffed if nobody replies to this. 
Here's a cut-down version of the draft that I was working on for Segment 1. 
It's interleaved with a previous reply from you.

Thank you for all your careful efforts, Sally, they've been a success.

Best, Ben

 Original Message - 
From: Sally Ness 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2011 5:03 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities 
Segment 1


[SN] Dear Ben, List,


[SN] Thanks for your response.  Sorry about the subscription wall.  If there 
are others who ran into this problem, I have a .doc copy that I can send 
off-list (I don't think the list serve will allow me to attach it to a post).


[SN] Ben, I'm glad to see your comments about JR's commitment to developing 
new forms of communication that were not elitist--at least in the 
paper-credential sense as you put it.  Elitism and arrogance are terms that 
reoccur in JRs paper and in the discourse relating to it.  It would seem to 
afford the slow read an opportunity to reflect on how JR lived and worked in 
relation to these ideas as well.  I think your examples of his working against 
elitism of certain kinds are very well chosen.  Peirce seems obviously to have 
been a model for JR in this regard.  However, Peirce seems also to have been 
painfully aware of forms of elitism that permeated his own character, and 
which left him far from perfect in his own view of himself (I wish I had 
quotes to back this up, but I'm mainly thinking vaguely back to some 
biographical material from Joseph Brent's and Kenneth Ketner's works, and 
various phrasing patterns in Peirce's writing--nothing easy to reference).  
Peirce wasn't just fighting the elitism out there. That is part of what 
imbues Peirce's work with such a moving spirit of humility, in my reading 
anyway.  I imagine JR was similar in this regard, although I don't really get 
a strong sense of it in this particular paper.

[BU] Elitism gets involved with arrogance and so on, but they're not the 
selfsame thing. Peirce confessed to and regretted his sometimes contemptuous 
manner (e.g., towards William James, see CP 6.174-182 or here), but his 
contempt didn't mean that he misunderstood the topic (one of Zeno's Paradoxes) 
that occasioned it. Peirce was also something of an elitist (e.g., in The 
Fixation of Belief, see CP 5.380), but never made a contrite kind of 
confession of it that I'm aware of, and I don't know that he ever saw it as a 
flaw.  To judge of Joe's attitude in his article - was he getting into elitism? 
- it doesn't really depend, for example, on whether he had a peremptory tone 
about Kleinman. One needs collateral information both on Kleinman's topics and 
on what collateral information Joe had about those topics, because those topics 
involved particular circumstances, from 15 or more years ago.

[SN] I'm not sure I'm following your analogies about the architects and 
engineers (they represent the scientist/insider, I think), ...

[BU] Yes, I got mixed up. I'd have to revise to say, somebody playing engineer 
who yet lacks interest in developing something reliable and suchlike. That 
would be a closer parallel to people criticizing scientific methods from an 
unscientific standpont, in an unscientific spirit, etc.

[SN] ... but your explanation of where JR sees the shadows springing up is 
very helpful, particularly when you foreground the role of official 
interests.  JR's paper also makes this strong distinction between forms of 
expertise that are the consequences of technical practice and seemingly free 
of officialdom and forms of authority that are based in institutional contexts 
and are utterly disconnected form such practices.  A lot would seem to be 
hanging on this dissociation.  I'll try to zero in on this in the next segment 
or the one after.  In any case, I do read JRs paper as being written with the 
science wars of the 1980s and 90s very much in mind (the original version was 
presented before the 1996 Sokal hoax, but it was still in the news when the 
revised versions were written).  I have wondered if JR made a strong link 
between Kleinman's ideas and those of Foucault.  Foucault seems more in the 
background here than Derrida to me, but that's not to say both aren't exerting 
an influence.

[BU] Thanks to your generosity, I've read the Kleinman article in question, 
Why Science and Scientists are Under Fire (September 29, 1995). Also, I've 
found another one online cowritten by him that goes over some of the same 
territory, Democratizing Science, Debating Values by Abby J. Kinchy and 
Daniel Lee Kleinman, summer 2005, _Dissent_ 
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=213. But Kleinman's earlier 
article in turn criticizes another unnamed article by 

[peirce-l] Slow read: Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic

2011-10-01 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded at Nathan Houser's request. Thank you for your persistence, Nathan! - 
Best, Ben.
===

Message for Peirce-L

The last thing I want to do is intrude on a good ongoing discussion but I guess 
I'd better take a moment to introduce the October slow read of Joe's early 
paper on Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic.  JR originally presented 
this paper in 1976 in Atlanta at the inaugural meeting of the Semiotic Society 
of America and published it in the proceedings.  It was republished with 
revisions in 1977 in Semiotica.  It is worth remembering that in 1976 when Joe 
wrote this paper Peirce's semiotics was not widely known.  (Yesterday I 
composed and posted an earlier version of this introductory message but it 
disappeared in cyberspace.  I recomposed my message and tried sending it again 
twice failing both times.  I'll give up for now and send it to Ben (Gary is on 
vacation) and ask him to post it on the forum and I'll work with the tech 
people at IUPUI to find out why my posts aren't going through.  In the 
meantime, in case the cyber logjam breaks, you may receive three earlier 
versions of this post.  In at least one of them my signature routine reverted 
to my pre-retirement signature with titles I no longer hold - my apologies to 
André De Tienne and David Pfeifer.) 

I should point out that shortly after agreeing to lead the October discussion, 
I lost contact with Peirce-L and only managed to restore my connectivity 
(apparently not entirely yet) in mid-September during the lively discussion of 
JR's Sciences as Communicational Communities.  I missed all of the previous 
slow read discussions which probably dealt with many of the same issues I'll 
raise for the October read.  Let me know if I ask you to consider topics you've 
already poured over in earlier slow reads and, of course, bring your own 
questions to the forum.

As it happens, I'm just beginning an extended weekend family visit and won't be 
able to take up discussion of Leading Ideas until next Tuesday (the 4th).  
But I'll make some introductory remarks now and will try to at least comment on 
any posts that come in before the 4th.

JR began this paper by pointing out that Peirce conceived of semiotics as a 
foundational theory capable of unifying sub-theories dealing with 
communication, meaning, and inference.  This may call for some discussion. He 
then claims that 90% of Peirce's prodigious philosophical output is directly 
concerned with semiotic.  This is an odd claim in a way since it does not seem 
to be straightforwardly true. How can we make sense of it?

Issues that may require clarification or revision in light of earlier slow read 
discussions and/or further development in Joe's later writings:

What are the so-called semiotical sciences (what JR also called special 
semiotic)?

Why does JR equate mind with semiosis?  It seems to me that mind is generally 
regarded as something like a system of signs, or a semiotic system, while 
thought, as dynamic, not static, is equated with semiosis.

JR says that Peirce conceived of truth as a more generic . . . conception, 
namely the conception of a goal-directed activity which normally moves from a 
state of dissatisfaction to a state of satisfaction.  Isn't this too broad? It 
seems to me that playing a game falls under this conception.  What is the 
extra ingredient that makes such goal-directed activity truth seeking?

More generally, what are the key elements, according to JR, of Peirce's basic 
model for science/semiosis/cybernetics, namely, the truth-seeking tendency in 
human life?  And, perhaps more importantly, is this really a universal 
tendency? 

Is the end-state of every sign-interpretational process really the object of 
that process?  Perhaps, we might ask, does truth merge with reality at the end 
of semiosis?  This seems to be what JR is saying.  Some Peirce scholars 
(Hookway, for example) say that this is not Peirce's mature view. 

A related question/concern is whether, as JR seems to have supposed, our only 
access to real objects is by way of the immediate objects of semiosis.

Other things we may want to consider (although it's mainly up to you to decide 
this) are JR's interesting and rather brilliant way of explaining how the 
concept of a semiotic object might be derived from the concept of an utterer 
(with reference to MS 318 - of which the relevant parts are published in EP2); 
his suggestion that the need to account for the possibility of error in 
interpretation is a generic feature of all semiosis; and his account of 
Peirce's conception of symbolic signs and their relation to iconic and 
indexical signs.

These are only suggestions to help focus your early reading of JR's Some 
Leading Ideas.  We'll see where things go.

Remember that the slow read discussions are not intended to dominate the 
Peirce-L forum.  Joe would have been distressed over the thought that the 
normal give and take of Peirce-L might be 

Re: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe enhancements

2011-09-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
Thanks, Gary and Irving.  

For my part I agree that it's best to postpone On Peirce's Conception of the 
Iconic Sign so that Fernando can do it.

I'm sorry that I've been out of loops both on-list and off-list! I plan to get 
back into the current slow read. We all have our distractions, but I seem to 
cope with mine less well than, say, Gary copes with his. 

Thanks regarding also Arisbe. I'd appreciate it if people take a look at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/projects.htm and tell me of past or present Peirce 
centers/institutes/projects that are not listed there. If you have a link, even 
one that does not currently work, please send it along. In general, please send 
me Arisbe website suggestions, questions, updates, corrections. I'm usually 
pretty quick to repair a broken link when I learn of one.  

Yes, as I go along I'm adding links for More by the given author. Thanks, 
Irving, I've just added your preprint on truth tables.

As to what else I've done:
  a.. Most of html effort:  Late June to July, in a number of pages, reduced 
html markup by using css markup, replaced framesets with statically positioned 
elements, some scrollable.  Haven't yet removed every vestige of 
old-fashioned kinds of html markup, for various reasons.  Of course, every 
time I fiddle with something, it's a kind of html/css effort.  Sometimes I go 
back and re-do things to be simpler or more consistent.  Some of my effort is 
to make Arisbe look alive and kicking - variations in the appearance, while 
keeping Joe's basics - bolded fonts, certain colors, triangular bullets, often 
linen backgrounds, etc.  I really like the bolded fonts. I don't know what it 
is these days with websites and their tiny grey fonts. 
  b.. Have lately tried to make things easier for those using automated screen 
readers (this matter is known as accessibility).  Separating myth from fact 
about accessibility is not alway easy. 
  c.. I've added a few pages such as: 
a.. list of (more or less) Peirce-related journals ; 
b.. page of PEP links (not strictly necessary but I liked getting them all 
into one place); 
c.. page of links to Peirce manuscripts, letters, drawings online, 
especially those at Harvard's Houghton Library website.  Harvard's color is 
crimson, so I used some clover, which they're not completely out of yet 
(colloquially speaking); and 
d.. if somebody has an idea for a new page, let me know.
  d.. Made a sortable table of Joe's compilation of data on 351 dissertations 
on Peirce.  Joe had them compiled no later than February 1, 2007.  I suppose 
that very plausibly a further compilation sits on a computer of his in Lubbock. 
  e.. Many current websites don't delete broken links, thank goodness, so now 
links to old Peirce-related websites preserved on the Wayback Machine are in 
the page on Centers, Projects, Institutes, etc. 
  f.. Added language tags for personal names all over the place.  Now, say you 
have a name like Mihhail Lotman at U. of Tartu in Estonia.  What language(s) 
do you put? I put lang=et (Estonian). 
  g.. Recently linked at the Peirce-Related Papers page:   papers by Tony 
Jappy, Eliseo Fernández, Gary Richmond, Paul Burgess, Irving Anellis, Fernando 
Zalamea, and Jaime Nubiola  Sara Barrena. 
a.. Restored some links to papers by Ian Adam and John Upper that used to 
be there but were removed, I guess because the original links were broken. 
b.. Links to S.E.E.D. articles now repaired.  Special case, some links 
broken not because a linked Website is gone or a paper has been moved, but 
mostly because of slightly inaccurate URLs and because S.E.E.D.'s server seems 
especially sensitive to capitalization in URLs and the S.E.E.D. articles are 
not consistent in their URL caps/non-caps. 
c.. Links atop page to other article collections.  (Connect to the City, 
not just to the House).
  h.. Various little touchups.
Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Richmond richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2011 11:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe 
enhancements


List,
It's become necessary to make a change in the slow read schedule. Fernando 
Andacht, who this past January stepped up to open the slow read series with a 
thread centered on his interview with Joe Ransdell, and who was scheduled to 
emcee Joe's On Peirce's Conception of the Iconic Sign this month, will have 
to postpone that second read until the beginning of next year because of 
several new, unexpected, and wholly demanding professional obligations. Since 
the icon is a topic of Fernando's special interest and expertise, I look 
forward to his emceeing that read this coming January.
Meanwhile, Ben Udell has, in my opinion, been doing quite extraordinary work on 
the Arisbe site, so that whenever I visit it (not frequently enough, I'm 
afraid) I think I find a new enhancement. On the other hand, much of Ben's 
greatest 

Re: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe enhancements

2011-09-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
P.S., regarding Arisbe website suggestions, you can make them on-list, but if 
you want to send an Arisbe suggestion off-list, send it to both me and Gary: 

richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu 
gary.richm...@gmail.com 
bud...@nyc.rr.com 

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Benjamin Udell 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2011 5:28 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe 
enhancements


Thanks, Gary and Irving.  

For my part I agree that it's best to postpone On Peirce's Conception of the 
Iconic Sign so that Fernando can do it.

I'm sorry that I've been out of loops both on-list and off-list! I plan to get 
back into the current slow read. We all have our distractions, but I seem to 
cope with mine less well than, say, Gary copes with his. 

Thanks regarding also Arisbe. I'd appreciate it if people take a look at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/projects.htm and tell me of past or present Peirce 
centers/institutes/projects that are not listed there. If you have a link, even 
one that does not currently work, please send it along. In general, please send 
me Arisbe website suggestions, questions, updates, corrections. I'm usually 
pretty quick to repair a broken link when I learn of one.  

Yes, as I go along I'm adding links for More by the given author. Thanks, 
Irving, I've just added your preprint on truth tables.

As to what else I've done:
  a.. Most of html effort:  Late June to July, in a number of pages, reduced 
html markup by using css markup, replaced framesets with statically positioned 
elements, some scrollable.  Haven't yet removed every vestige of 
old-fashioned kinds of html markup, for various reasons.  Of course, every 
time I fiddle with something, it's a kind of html/css effort.  Sometimes I go 
back and re-do things to be simpler or more consistent.  Some of my effort is 
to make Arisbe look alive and kicking - variations in the appearance, while 
keeping Joe's basics - bolded fonts, certain colors, triangular bullets, often 
linen backgrounds, etc.  I really like the bolded fonts. I don't know what it 
is these days with websites and their tiny grey fonts. 
  b.. Have lately tried to make things easier for those using automated screen 
readers (this matter is known as accessibility).  Separating myth from fact 
about accessibility is not alway easy. 
  c.. I've added a few pages such as: 
a.. list of (more or less) Peirce-related journals ; 
b.. page of PEP links (not strictly necessary but I liked getting them all 
into one place); 
c.. page of links to Peirce manuscripts, letters, drawings online, 
especially those at Harvard's Houghton Library website.  Harvard's color is 
crimson, so I used some clover, which they're not completely out of yet 
(colloquially speaking); and 
d.. if somebody has an idea for a new page, let me know.
  d.. Made a sortable table of Joe's compilation of data on 351 dissertations 
on Peirce.  Joe had them compiled no later than February 1, 2007.  I suppose 
that very plausibly a further compilation sits on a computer of his in Lubbock. 
  e.. Many current websites don't delete broken links, thank goodness, so now 
links to old Peirce-related websites preserved on the Wayback Machine are in 
the page on Centers, Projects, Institutes, etc. 
  f.. Added language tags for personal names all over the place.  Now, say you 
have a name like Mihhail Lotman at U. of Tartu in Estonia.  What language(s) 
do you put? I put lang=et (Estonian). 
  g.. Recently linked at the Peirce-Related Papers page:   papers by Tony 
Jappy, Eliseo Fernández, Gary Richmond, Paul Burgess, Irving Anellis, Fernando 
Zalamea, and Jaime Nubiola  Sara Barrena. 
a.. Restored some links to papers by Ian Adam and John Upper that used to 
be there but were removed, I guess because the original links were broken. 
b.. Links to S.E.E.D. articles now repaired.  Special case, some links 
broken not because a linked Website is gone or a paper has been moved, but 
mostly because of slightly inaccurate URLs and because S.E.E.D.'s server seems 
especially sensitive to capitalization in URLs and the S.E.E.D. articles are 
not consistent in their URL caps/non-caps. 
c.. Links atop page to other article collections.  (Connect to the City, 
not just to the House).
  h.. Various little touchups.
Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Richmond richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2011 11:12 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe 
enhancements


List,
It's become necessary to make a change in the slow read schedule. Fernando 
Andacht, who this past January stepped up to open the slow read series with a 
thread centered on his interview with Joe Ransdell, and who was scheduled to 
emcee Joe's On Peirce's Conception of the Iconic Sign this month, will have 
to postpone that second read until the beginning of next year

[peirce-l] Note from Gary Richmond

2011-09-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
List,

Sorry I've been out of it for the last week or so. 

Gary Richmond has asked me to send the list a note that, if anyone needs to 
contact him, they should use his gmail account gary.richm...@gmail.com .

Best, Ben


-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Jerry Dozoretz

2011-08-21 Thread Benjamin Udell
List,

Jerry Dozoretz passed away earlier this month. Condolences to his beloved wife 
Ann and family. Ann emailed Nathan Houser, Gary Richmond, and me about it today.

Denver Post obituary 
http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/denverpost/obituary.aspx?n=jerry-dozoretzpid=153047257
 (August 12-14). 

Jerry had a Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Californis, Santa Barbara. 
He was an Instructor and Assisstant Professor of Philosophy from 1970 to 1983. 
An article of his was published in _Peirce Studies_ 1. Starting in 1983 he 
worked in the private sector, eventually going into business for himself. He 
had five children.

Jerry was the chief operating officer of the Peirce Group, which owns the 
Arisbe website and peirce-l, and was working on their relocation from Texas 
Tech to the Institute for American Thought at IUPUI. He was also working on the 
relocation of Joseph Ransdell's papers and library to the IAT.

He was a pleasure to work with.  I'm at a loss for words.  In our last phone 
conversation Jerry told me that he and Joe had been friends since childhood.  
As usual he sounded well and upbeat and 20 years younger than he was. 

Ben Udell

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

[peirce-l] Fw: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions

2011-08-19 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded.

- Original Message - 
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 4:55 PM
Subject: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions


CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

2011-12 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Contest

Topic: Any topic on or related to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.

Awards: $500 cash prize; presentation at the Society's next annual  
meeting, held in conjunction with the Pacific APA (in Seattle,  
Washington, April 4-7, 2012); possible publication, subject to  
editorial revision, in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce  
Society.

Submission Deadline: January 16, 2012.

Length: Because the winning essay may be published in the  
Transactions, the length of contest submissions should be about the  
length of an average journal article. The maximum acceptable length is  
10,000 words, including notes. The presentation of the winning  
submission at the annual meeting cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time.

Open to: Graduate students and persons who have held a Ph.D. or its  
equivalent for no more than seven years. Entries from students who  
have not yet begun their graduate training will not be considered.  
Past winners of the contest are ineligible. Joint submissions are  
allowed provided that all authors satisfy the eligibility requirements.

Advice to Essay Contest Entrants:

The winning entry will make a genuine contribution to the literature  
on Peirce. Therefore, entrants should become familiar with the major  
currents of work on Peirce to date and take care to locate their views  
in relation to published material that bears directly on their topic.

Entrants should note that scholarly work on Peirce frequently benefits  
from the explicit consideration of the historical development of his  
views. Even a submission that focuses on a single stage in that  
development can benefit from noting the stage on which it focuses in  
reference to other phases of Peirce's treatment of the topic under  
consideration. (This advice is not intended to reflect a bias toward  
chronological studies, but merely to express a strong preference for a  
chronologically informed understanding of Peirce's philosophy.)
We do not require but strongly encourage, where appropriate, citation  
of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition.  
Ideally, citation of texts found in both the Collected Papers and the  
Writings should be to both CP and W.

Submissions should be prepared for blind evaluation and must not be  
under consideration for publication elsewhere.

Cover letter or email should include complete contact information,  
including mailing address and phone numbers, and a statement that the  
entrant meets the eligibility requirements of the contest.

Electronic submissions are preferred. Submissions should be sent as  
email attachments (Microsoft Word documents, RTF files, or PDF files  
only) to Robert Lane, secretary-treasurer of the Society:  
[email address at http://www.westga.edu/~rlane]

Please include Peirce Essay Contest Submission in the subject line  
of your email.

Submissions by traditional mail are also acceptable. Please mail  
submissions to:

Robert Lane
Philosophy Program
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118
Attn: Peirce Essay Contest

-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy
Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

[Phone  email at webpage]
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, Steven, Peter,

It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his cotary propositions said 
that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close 
to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's 
perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time of the 
compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism.

But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that B is 
in fact a premiss or postulate for C. A is A is an axiom, but it entails very 
little. Rather, everything entails A is A. Thus we often say presupposes in 
the sense of entails. Thus fallibililism can be more basic than scientific 
falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice 
falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism.

Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in C. S. Peirce 
and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism. 
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of allowing of 
practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty.

Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to 
posts' ends, when replying to a post.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process


I agree with Peter.

Steven


On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

 Gary,
 
 I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
 But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
 and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by 
 the falsifiability of hypotheses.
 
 Peter
 
 From: Gary Richmond [richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu]
 Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; Skagestad, Peter
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
 Semiosis Process
 
 Peter, Gary F.
 
 Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever 
 conclusive.
 
 I would agree with you that Popper was a fallibilist as well as a 
 falsificationist, and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The 
 point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very 
 well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more 
 could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly 
 that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for 
 example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, Two Fallibilists in Search of 
 the Truth http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being 
 exactly Peirce and Popper.
 
 Btw, I too have found the swamp/bog metaphor in both their works eeiry 
 given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.
 
 Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say 
 that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his 
 other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to 
 agree with him).
 See:  
 http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
 Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, 
 is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can 
 establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever 
 remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails 
 fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future 
 revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge.
 
 Best,
 
 Gary R.
 
 Skagestad, Peter 8/5/2011 12:12 PM 
 Gary,
 
 This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
 interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
 falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
 and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
 statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
 number of observed black ravens will prove the statement All ravens are 
 black, whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
 nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
 course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
 perception that it is white.
 
 Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
 (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are basic only in the sense 
 that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus 
 Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of 
 basic statements concludes:
 
 The empirical bases of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about 
 it. Science does not rest on solid 

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
 basic than falsification).

Best,

Gary

 Benjamin Udell 8/5/2011 2:53 PM 

List, Steven, Peter,

It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his cotary propositions said 
that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close 
to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's 
perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time of the 
compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism.

But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that B is 
in fact a premiss or postulate for C. A is A is an axiom, but it entails very 
little. Rather, everything entails A is A. Thus we often say presupposes in 
the sense of entails. Thus fallibililism can be more basic than scientific 
falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice 
falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism.

Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in C. S. Peirce 
and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism. 
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of allowing of 
practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty.

Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to 
posts' ends, when replying to a post.

Best, Ben

- Original Message -
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDUmailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 2:22 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
Process

I agree with Peter.

Steven

On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:01 AM, Skagestad, Peter wrote:

 Gary,

 I agree that falsifiability entails the fallibility of scientific knowledge. 
 But the fallibilty of perceptual judgements, which is affirmed by both Peirce 
 and Popper, appears to me to be an independent conclusion, not entailed by 
 the falsifiability of hypotheses.

 Peter


 From: Gary Richmond Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 12:56 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDUmailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU; 
 Skagestad, Peter
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
 Semiosis Process

 Peter, Gary F.

 Peter, thanks for this helpful clarification that a falsification is not ever 
 conclusive.

 I would agree with you that Popper was a fallibilist as well as a 
 falsificationist, and that that distinction certainly needs to be made. The 
 point I wanted to make in passing, but which I clearly didn't express very 
 well  in my post addressed to Tori and the list ( suggesting that a lot more 
 could be said about it--and has been, even recently on this list!) is exactly 
 that both were fallibilists (and Tom Short, apparently, as well).  See, for 
 example, Susan Haack and Konstantin Kalenda, Two Fallibilists in Search of 
 the Truth http://www.jstor.org/pss/4106816 , the two fallibilists being 
 exactly Peirce and Popper.

 Btw, I too have found the swamp/bog metaphor in both their works eeiry 
 given that Popper wasn't aware of Peirce's work.

 Anyhow, just a question for now: Would you agree that it is correct to say 
 that falsifiability entails fallibilism as this writer remarks? What of his 
 other claims? (In the light of your comments, at the moment I would tend to 
 agree with him).
 See:  
 http://science.jrank.org/pages/9302/Falsifiability-Popper-s-Emphasis-on-Falsifiability.html
 Moreover, falsifiability, as the ongoing risk of falsification in our world, 
 is a permanent status for Popper. No amount of successful testing can 
 establish a hypothesis as absolutely true or even probable: it forever 
 remains conjectural. That all scientific theories remain falsifiable entails 
 fallibilism, the view that our best epistemic efforts remain open to future 
 revision. There can be no certain foundations to knowledge.

 Best,

 Gary R.

 Skagestad, Peter 8/5/2011 12:12 PM 

 Gary,

 This is not exactly Popper's view, although this is how Popper has often been 
 interpreted, e.g. by Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic. Popper's 
 falsificationism is based on a purely logical asymmetry between falsification 
 and verification in that a single counterexample will refute a universal 
 statement, whereas no number of confirming instances will prove it. Thus no 
 number of observed black ravens will prove the statement All ravens are 
 black, whereas a single white raven will refute it. But it does not follow, 
 nor did Popper ever say, that a falsification is ever conclusive, as I can of 
 course be mistaken both in my belief that  am looking at a raven and in my 
 perception that it is white.

 Basic statements, Popper makes clear in The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
 (pp. 105-111), are themselves testable; they are basic only in the sense 
 that we have decided not to test them, at least for the time being. Thus 
 Popper was a fallibilist as well as a falsificationist. His discussion of 
 basic statements concludes:

 The empirical

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?

2011-07-21 Thread Benjamin Udell
Category theory, theory of categories, and even categorial theory could 
be hard to distinguish in some languages. Anyway, we're getting into the 
territory of distinctions that are semantically nontrivial yet confusingly 
expressed, such as that between relation algebra and relational algebra, 
and that between algebraic topology and topological algebra. 

Another option would be to use Peirce's word categorics generally for 
philosophical category theories, rather than keeping it to Peirce-style 
categorics. Problem is that the accompanying adjective is categorical rather 
than categorial. 

Less sonorous options include categoriacs, categoristics, and 
categoriology. 

Another option would be to resist the transference of the sense of either 
philosophical or mathematical to phrases like category theory, and 
instead speak of mathematical categorics and philosophical categorics. 
Those phrases are rather long. 

My guess is that the best bets for philosophical theory of categories, Peircean 
or otherwise, are categoristics and categoriology. Categoristics has 
fewer syllables than categoriology, and its correlated adjective 
categoristical has quite that advantage over categoriological.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Fuhrman 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2011 2:11 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?


I don't think Doctrine of Categories would work because the word doctrine 
no longer means what it did in  Peirce's time. As for Theory of Categories, a 
quick internet search shows that it's used by some mathematicians as a synonym 
for Category Theory, so unless they can be broken of that habit, that 
difference in name isn't enough to distinguish between the two disciplines. 
Maybe Gary needs to come up with an ugly neologism as Peirce would have done -- 
trichotomologics? -- if he needs to avoid confusing mathematicians. (I don't 
think category theory would be ambiguous for anybody else.)

Gary F.

-Original Message-
From: Irving
Sent: July-21-11 10:55 AM

Not to continue to be overly fussy, but I propose Doctrine of Categories or 
Theory of Categories for the philosophical use, whether speaking of 
Aristotle, or Kant (Kategorienlehre) or Peirce, and reserve Category Theory 
for the the that branch of abstract algebra that formalizes a number of 
algebraic properties of collections of transformations between mathematical 
objects (such as binary relations, groups, sets, topological spaces, etc.) of 
the same type, subject to the constraint that the collections contain the 
identity mapping and are closed with respect to compositions of mappings, ... 
unless and until it is demonstrated that the philosophical concept, whether 
Aristotle's, Kant's, or Peirce's, is equivalent to, or at least in some 
important sense related to, the algebraists' concept.

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU