Re: [peirce-l] Aesthetics, Axiology, and Artistic Truth
Thank you for posting your thoughts on this, Michael! How does the concept of style which you elaborate below relate to Peirce's distinction of 'tone' from 'token' and 'type'? Cheers, Cathy -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Michael Shapiro Sent: Tuesday, 27 March 2012 9:59 a.m. To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Aesthetics, Axiology, and Artistic Truth Dear Peirce Listers, Apropos of the recent messages regarding the Peirce Society meeting at SAAP earlier this month in New York, yes, I was there too and heard Tom Short's responses after his paper (unsatisfactory, in my estimation; but he told me that he hadn't slept the night before) with regard to aesthetics. One shouldn't forget that Peirce himself is completely unsatisfactory when it comes to aesthetics (as he is on ethics). Whenever I teach my course on Peirce's theory of interpretation, I tell my students (only half in jest) that my definition of a philosopher is someone who only solves problems of their own devising. By contrast, someone who is confronted with the problem of having to explain the facts of language or literature or music is in a rather different position vis-à-vis the data. My long experience with the analysis of aesthetic objects (mostly poetry and prose) convinces me that ultimately one has to deal with them axiologically, so to speak, by acknowledging the necessity of seeing them as repositories of values. In that light, the question as to why the Mona Lisa is admirable always comes under the concept of STYLE and its HISTORY. It is, moreover, on the grounds of style that one can begin to approach the problem of artistic truth in the spirit of pragmaticism. In case this line of thought is of interest, here are some further observations on the specific role of style. (Comments always welcome.) Style suffuses so much of what it means to be human, and has been the subject of so much analysis, that in order to move it away from problems of introspection and self-awareness one needs to redirect the age-old discussion into a more public arena where the contrast with custom allows insight into the ontology of human activity in general. This can be accomplished when style as a phenomenon that cuts across disciplinary boundaries is viewed TROPOLOGICALLY as a fundamentally COGNITIVE category. A global theory of style entails arguing more closely for the concept of STYLE AS A TROPE OF MEANING; and demonstrating how stylistic analysis can reveal itself not just as a compendium of traditionally taxonomized information but as the means whereby individual manifestations of style, their structural coherences, and their mirroring of signification can be identified and evaluated. I. Form and content. Insofar as the distinction can be clear at all, it does not actually coincide with but cuts across the boundary between what is style and what is not. Style then comprises characteristic features both of what is said or performed or made and of how it is said/performed/made. If it is obvious that style is the regard that what pays to how the faults of this formula are equally obvious. Architecture, nonobjective painting, and most music have no subject, nor do they literally say anything. So the what of one activity may be part of the how of another. No rule based on linguistic form alone could determine, for instance, whether or not a discursive meaning is ironic. In considering linguistic style at least, and perhaps even style generally, it soon emerges that the relation between form and content must in part be described metaphorically. II. Content and expression. One famous theory of style, that of the French scholar Charles Bally, identifies linguistic style with the affective value of the features of organized language and the reciprocal action of the expressive features that together form the system of the means of expression of a language. From this Roman Jakobson fashioned a definition of style as a marked––emotive or poetic––annex to the neutral, purely cognitive information. Aside from the impossibility of consistently separating cognitive from affective information without remainder, it is equally transparent that definitions of style that trade in feelings, emotions, or affects go awry by overlooking not only structural features that are neither feelings nor expressed but also features that though not feelings ARE expressed. III. Difference between stylistic and nonstylistic. A feature of style may be a feature of what is said, of what is exemplified, or of what is expressed. But not all such features are necessarily stylistic. Similarly, features that are clearly stylistic in one work may have no stylistic bearing in another locus. Nelson Goodman writes: A property––whether of statement made, structure displayed, or feeling conveyed––counts as stylistic only when it associates a work with one rather than another artist,
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
[peirce-l] Idealization (was: Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism)
these laws and converts them in the mystery of creation.” Lawrence’s philosophy of living spontaneity is of a piece with Peirce’s outlook on this one point in my opinion—despite Peirce’s antipathy to the “literary” mind—each allowing qualitative uniqueness and a living spontaneity. Perhaps there is similarity of Lawrence’s idea of an incommutable, non-idealizing spontaneous self, in Peirce’s idea of “Now it is energetic projaculation (lucky there is such a word, or this untried hand might have been put to inventing one) by which in the typical instances of Lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created. Habit, however, forces them to take practical shapes, compatible with the structures they affect, and, in the form of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them.” Gene Halton *From:* C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] *On Behalf Of *Catherine Legg *Sent:* Sunday, March 25, 2012 9:42 PM *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism Tom that is a great quote in this context, thank you! Gene your passionate warning against a “Pyrrhic victory of eviscerated, abstract intelligence in the service of ideals” is important I think. It would seem that Peirce did criticize himself along these lines at one point where he compared his character unfavorably with that of James as “a mere table of contents…a snarl of twine” (or similar words). Having said that, however, I worry that your comments, Gene, are predicated on a Romantic view of thought and feeling as mutually undermining opposites, which is actually the tail-end of modernism. Peirce’s semiotics on the other hand gives us the means to get past that dichotomy - to be able to see for the first time the elegant feelings of fine mathematicians and logicians, and the rigorous critical structure of great art. I see Terry’s post on sociality as logic driving at this point from a different direction. Cathy *From:* C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] *On Behalf Of *Tom Gollier *Sent:* Monday, 26 March 2012 3:47 a.m. *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Subject:* Re: Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism Cathy, I'll have to wait for this discussion to develop further and/or the talk to get posted, but I thought this quote from Peirce might be pertinent. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same general kind. [CP 1.383] Tom On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 12:44 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote: On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 9:23 AM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: I want to conclude this note with a passage near the end of the book which I very much liked and have been reflecting on since. Forster writes: On [Peirce's] view, human beings are not cogs in a vast cosmic mechanism, but rather are free, creative agents capable of transforming the world though the active realization of intelligent ideals. The ultimate fate of the world is indeterminate and there is no guarantee that the forces of reasonableness will triumph. Nevertheless, the potential for victory is there. All it requires, he thinks, is a community of individuals who devote their energy to the pursuit of truth and goodness, a community united, not by mutual self-interest, but by a common love of reasonableness (Forster, op. cit., 245). Cathy, this brought to my mind the discussion of Peirce's esthetics following Tom Short's fine talk in the Robin session at SAAP. Any thoughts on that in this connection? *** Yes that discussion was interesting - I wish we had had the time to pursue it further. This might not mean so much to people who were not at the talk (perhaps Tom Short might be persuaded to post a copy of it here). But anyway, Tom claimed the subject matter of Peirce's aesthetics was not the beautiful but the *admirable*. To test this, and because I was worried that the talk had mainly spoken at the general level, I asked about a specific example - the Mona Lisa, and whether a Peircean aesthetics as described by Tom might have anything to say about that work, and if so, what. I was worried it looked like I hadn't really understood the very point Tom was trying to make, and Tom suggested that a painting of a beautiful woman is not the sort of thing Peirce has in mind, but Felicia Cruse said she wanted to hear what Tom had to say about it, and artworks in general. Then Rosa Mayorga pointed out that Peirce himself describes the subject matter of aesthetics as 'the growth of concrete reasonableness' (here is the connection Gary is pointing out) so we should work with that. So I guess the question is whether a painting by Leonardo
Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism
On Fri, Mar 23, 2012 at 9:23 AM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.comwrote: I want to conclude this note with a passage near the end of the book which I very much liked and have been reflecting on since. Forster writes: On [Peirce's] view, human beings are not cogs in a vast cosmic mechanism, but rather are free, creative agents capable of transforming the world though the active realization of intelligent ideals. The ultimate fate of the world is indeterminate and there is no guarantee that the forces of reasonableness will triumph. Nevertheless, the potential for victory is there. All it requires, he thinks, is a community of individuals who devote their energy to the pursuit of truth and goodness, a community united, not by mutual self-interest, but by a common love of reasonableness (Forster, op. cit., 245). Cathy, this brought to my mind the discussion of Peirce's esthetics following Tom Short's fine talk in the Robin session at SAAP. Any thoughts on that in this connection? *** Yes that discussion was interesting - I wish we had had the time to pursue it further. This might not mean so much to people who were not at the talk (perhaps Tom Short might be persuaded to post a copy of it here). But anyway, Tom claimed the subject matter of Peirce's aesthetics was not the beautiful but the *admirable*. To test this, and because I was worried that the talk had mainly spoken at the general level, I asked about a specific example - the Mona Lisa, and whether a Peircean aesthetics as described by Tom might have anything to say about that work, and if so, what. I was worried it looked like I hadn't really understood the very point Tom was trying to make, and Tom suggested that a painting of a beautiful woman is not the sort of thing Peirce has in mind, but Felicia Cruse said she wanted to hear what Tom had to say about it, and artworks in general. Then Rosa Mayorga pointed out that Peirce himself describes the subject matter of aesthetics as 'the growth of concrete reasonableness' (here is the connection Gary is pointing out) so we should work with that. So I guess the question is whether a painting by Leonardo da Vinci might somehow contribute to the growth of human concrete reasonableness. Doesn't seem to me it couldn't. That painting in particular, apparently people have been known to stand in front of it for hours and not necessarily be able to articulate why. I hope I have captured an accurate enough snapshot of the discussion as memory of such things is inevitably selective. Regards to all, Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism
Michael I just read the book review from Nathan Houser you shared - it is lucidly written over 6 pages and gives a commanding overview of Peirce's realism. I really enjoyed reading it, thanks for posting it. Cathy On Fri, Mar 9, 2012 at 6:13 PM, Michael DeLaurentis michael...@comcast.netwrote: If there has already been a post about this, my apologies. Book review just in on CSP and nominalism. ** ** Michael J DeLaurentis ** ** ** ** ** ** - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Deacon's incompleteness and Peirce's infinity
Very rich post, Gary (F), thank you! I've recently been alerted to the importance of Deacon by Gary (R) and he is now 'on my list'. On the interesting issue of Deacon's 'Absence' which you raise in the last paragraph, I wonder whether the Absent is absent from Being or just the actual world. If the latter, perhaps it is not entirely inaccessible to a Peircean phaneroscopy fearlessly navigating the Platonic Universe. Cheers, Cathy On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 4:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Jon, Gary, Ben and List, ** ** There's another part of the *Minute Logic* which may be related to the connection Jon is making between “objective logic” and “categories”. It is definitely related to the argument in Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *, which Gary R. suggested some time ago as worthy of study here. We haven't found a way to study it systematically, but maybe it's just as well to do it one post at a time. Or one thread at a time, if replies ensue.*** * ** ** The central part of Deacon's argument presents “a theory of emergent dynamics that shows how dynamical process can become organized around and with respect to possibilities not realized” (Deacon, p. 16). Depending on the context, he also refers to these “possibilities not realized” as “absential” or “ententional”. His argument is explicitly anti-nominalistic and acknowledges the reality of a kind of final causation in the physical universe (“teleodynamics”). It has a strong affinity with Peirce's argument for a mode of being which has its reality *in futuro*. In other words, he argues for the reality of Thirdness without calling it that – indeed without using Peirce's phaneroscopic categories at all. (Personally i doubt that he is familiar enough with them to use them fluently, but maybe he decided not to use them for some reason.) ** ** “Incompleteness” is a crucial concept of what i might call Deaconian realism. In physical terms, it is connected with Prigogine's idea of *dissipative structures* (including organisms) as *far from equilibrium* in a universe where the spontaneous tendency is *toward* equilibrium, as the Second Law of thermodynamics would indicate. Teleodynamic processes take incompleteness to a higher level of complexity, but i don't propose to go into that now. Instead i'll present here a Peircean parallel to Deacon's “incompleteness”. The connection lies in the fact that *incompleteness*is etymologically – and perhaps mathematically? – equivalent to *infinity*. ** ** First, we have this passage from Peirce's Minute Logic of 1902: ** ** [[[ I doubt very much whether the Instinctive mind could ever develop into a Rational mind. I should expect the reverse process sooner. The Rational mind is the Progressive mind, and as such, by its very capacity for growth, seems more infantile than the Instinctive mind. Still, it would seem that Progressive minds must have, in some mysterious way, probably by arrested development, grown from Instinctive minds; and they are certainly enormously higher. The Deity of the Théodicée of Leibniz is as high an Instinctive mind as can well be imagined; but it impresses a scientific reader as distinctly inferior to the human mind. It reminds one of the view of the Greeks that Infinitude is a defect; for although Leibniz imagines that he is making the Divine Mind infinite, by making its knowledge Perfect and Complete, he fails to see that in thus refusing it the powers of thought and the possibility of improvement he is in fact taking away something far higher than knowledge. It is the human mind that is infinite. One of the most remarkable distinctions between the Instinctive mind of animals and the Rational mind of man is that animals rarely make mistakes, while the human mind almost invariably blunders at first, and repeatedly, where it is really exercised in the manner that is distinctive of it. If you look upon this as a defect, you ought to find an Instinctive mind higher than a Rational one, and probably, if you cross-examine yourself, you will find you do. The greatness of the human mind lies in its ability to discover truth notwithstanding its not having Instincts strong enough to exempt it from error. ]] CP 7.380 ] ** ** This suggests to me that fallibility – which not even Peirce attributes to God – is a highly developed species of incompleteness. The connection with infinity, and with Thirdness, is further brought out in Peirce's Harvard Lecture of 1903 “On Phenomenology”: ** ** [[[ The third category of which I come now to speak is precisely that whose reality is denied by nominalism. For although nominalism is not credited with any extraordinarily lofty appreciation of the powers of the human soul, yet it attributes to it a power of originating a kind of ideas the like of which Omnipotence has failed to create as real objects, and those general conceptions which men
Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
...To suggest such a thing seems no more outrageous than Copernicus proposing that our planet is not the center of things or Newton suggesting that the observations made before him suggest a universal previously unconsidered. Of course, I am well aware of the reluctance to make such associations, they appear arrogant and immodest. But must we not be immodest to challenge received authority and dream of new and grander conceptions?... Hi Steven, As I suspected you're putting forward a hypothesis. That's fine, but one of the greatest dangers in speculative thought I think is mistaking the hypothesis generation stage, the making of suggestions, for the full inquiry. All manner of suggestions abound about all manner of things - the hard work is to show which suggestions are *true*. There's a good discussion by Peirce of all this buried somewhere in the History of Science volumes (ed Eisele), where he describes many suggestions that have been made about the Egyptian pyramids, how the builders consciously aligned them with all manner of astronomical observations. The problem was that the suggestions 'explained' the data that existed beautifully, but were never tested on new data. Peirce found new data for them and they fell over. How such 'new data' might be obtained in your chosen area of inquiry is not clear to me, but I would say the need for it is no less crucial. Thank you for sharing your searching inquiries with us on the list. Cheers, Cathy On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 6:58 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.uswrote: Dear Cathy, Let us ignore for a moment the contents of the book, which presents for a general audience a theory dealing with the foundations of logic and apprehension, considered by many audiences on first sight to be a tired subject. Today's audience will require some motivation to read the book in the face of an education and professional dogma that considers that work in logic is complete. In the face also of late twentieth century presentations of logic in the media, whose ambassador is Star Trek's Spock, where logic is ridiculed as an art, the domain of aliens, lacking the passion of the human endeavor. Is it not the case that life created by an evolved intelligent species and placed into environments in which it would not otherwise appear suggests that such species may play a role in the bigger picture, that in fact, it may be necessary for the universe to evolve and realize its potential? How many times in the unfolding of life in the universe will such an opportunity appear? If we are presented with it how can we, how dare we, ignore it? To suggest such a thing seems no more outrageous than Copernicus proposing that our planet is not the center of things or Newton suggesting that the observations made before him suggest a universal previously unconsidered. Of course, I am well aware of the reluctance to make such associations, they appear arrogant and immodest. But must we not be immodest to challenge received authority and dream of new and grander conceptions? The observations upon which the arguments of Copernicus and Newton are founded are no less compelling that recent advances in biophysics. The veil is being lifted and whether it be my theory or another that enables it, it now seems inevitable that we will understand the nature of living systems to the degree possible in order to create them by our design and for our purpose. This view is surely more plausible than the alternative in popular culture, which is to see this potential in descendants of current computing systems and robotics, which relies upon sterile machines to awaken and tell us what to do. I understand the caution, and in large part it is the reason for my seeking feedback outside of my immediate circle. It is a simple and startling observation. As I note, it is one that amuses me but is none-the-less seriously made. How does one know such a thing? It is an abduction, a speculation from current circumstance. The bigger question is, can it be verified or falsified by science? And surely, it can. It is not merely plausible in the fictional sense, it is plausible in fact. To which discipline must we turn to ensure this verification or denial? Who has given greater and deeper consideration to the operation of the senses, to the function of the mind, if it is not the logicians, and especially Peirce? How does one understate such a thing? With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 5, 2012, at 7:52 PM, Catherine Legg wrote: Hi Steven, I'm afraid I must join my voice to those who feel they would not pick up the book based on your blurb (or preface - why call it a 'Proemial'? What is a 'proemial'??) below. Though many of the component ideas are interesting, your overall expression of them seems to display a grandiosity which
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Very interesting - thanks, Phyllis! Cathy On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: Gary, Cathy and Listers, I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up my next book and send it in. Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results). Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity. However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for computational modeling. This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book: Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to carry on this work. Regards, Phyllis BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact) during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Catherine Legg Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list! The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live human subjects, but how / where /when? Best regards, Cathy On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April from IGI Global). When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily derivative. Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither exploratory, nor analytical
[peirce-l] Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism
Read a paper the other day which I really enjoyed and wanted to share the reference here: *Danielle Macbeth, Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism, Philosophia 40 (1):27-39.* *http://philpapers.org/rec/MACVOA* Basically Macbeth dissects the version of pragmatism put forward by Robert Brandom in his recent John Locke lectures, and argues that what he is doing with logical diagrams is not at all what Kant and Peirce were doing. Previously she had mainly worked on logical diagrams in Frege, so I'm interested that she is turning to Peirce. Anyway here is the official abstract: In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project of analysis to encompass various relationships between meaning and use. As the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical relations between vocabularies so Brandom’s extended project seeks to clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between vocabularies. The point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that such understanding is appropriate to the case of natural language, the very idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My aim is to clarify the prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with what I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as developed by Peirce. Cheers, Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list! The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live human subjects, but how / where /when? Best regards, Cathy On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote: This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April from IGI Global). When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily derivative. Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent students in many fields. -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction GR = Gary Richmond JD = Jonathan DeVore JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive. JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced to a particular conclusion. That compulsive element could be thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e., it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law). GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan. I agree with Gary that this point is well taken. If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative terms, that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon, then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning, are basically category three. Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the formal sense that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties relatively well, at least, for many practical purposes. That recognition allows the categorical question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific means. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to
Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic
Dear Jason, I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce. Here is the abstract: This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism should be a position worth fighting for. If that sounds of interest, the link is here: http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2918 Cheers, Cathy And here is the abstract: The link On Sun, Mar 4, 2012 at 4:34 PM, Khadimir khadi...@gmail.com wrote: Greetings, I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I. What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs. generals? How would one argue that universals are not merely merely generals? By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created through a process of induction or what Locke called abstraction. I offer an example to indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is informal. I am familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy, and I would look forward to Peircean and other views on the matter. Citations and references with limited explanation would be a fine way to answer, as I would not ask too much of anyone's time. Best and Thank You, Jason Hills - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition
Thanks for the thoughtful reply, Gary! The issue you raise about how deduction and induction should be categorised is an interesting one. I had always thought of deduction as falling clearly under secondness, due to the compulsion involved. But you are right to note that in theorematic deduction the mind is not passive but active, and that this form of reasoning was very important to Peirce. I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. H... Cheers, Cathy On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Cathy, list, When I first read your remark suggesting that the birth, growth and development of new hypostatic abstractions should be in the position of 3ns rather than argumentative proof of the validity of the mathematics as I had earlier abduced, I thought this might be another case of the kind of difficulty in assigning the terms of 2ns and 3ns in genuine triadic relations which had Peirce, albeit for a very short time in his career, associating 3ns with induction (while before and after that time he put deduction in the place of 3ns as necessary reasoning--I have discussed this several times before on the list and so will now only refer those interested to the passage, deleted from the 1903 Harvard Lectures--276-7 in Patricia Turrisi's edition--where Peirce discusses that categorial matter). I think his revision of his revision to his original position may have been brought about by the clarification resulting from thinking of abduction/deduction/induction beyond critical logic (where they are first analyzed as distinct patterns of inference), then in methodeutic where a complete inquiry--in which hypothesis formation is 1ns, the deduction of the implications of the hypothesis for testing is 3ns, and, finally, the actual inductive testing is 2ns--provides a kind of whetstone for categorial thinking about these three. (Yet, even in that 1903 passage he remarks that he will leave the question open.) Be that as it may, I am beginning to think that you are clearly on to something and that that transforming of a predicate into a relation which we call hypostatic abstraction certainly ought to be in the place of 3ns. Re-reading parts of Jay Zeman's famous and fine article on hypostatic abstraction further strengthened that opinion. See: http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/jzeman/peirce_on_abstraction.htm Zeman writes: It is hypostatic or subjectal abstraction that Peirce is interested in; a hint as to why he is interested in it is given in his allusions in these passages to mathematical reasoning [. . .] Jaakko Hintikka has done us the great service of bringing to our attention and tying to contemporary experience one of Peirce's central observations about necessary—which is to say mathematical—reasoning: this is that nontrivial deductive reasoning, even in areas where explicit postulates are employed, always considers something not implied in the conceptions so far gained [in the particular course of reasoning in question], which neither the definition of the object of research nor anything yet known about could of themselves suggest, although they give room for it. As is well known, Peirce calls this kind of reasoning theorematic (in contrast to corollarial reasoning) because it introduces novel elements into the reasoning process in the form of icons, which are then 'experimented upon in imagination.' Zeman quotes Hintikka to the effect that Peirce himself seems to have considered a vindication of the concept of abstraction as the most important application of his discovery [of the theorematic/corollarial distinction] and then remarks that Peirce would indeed have agreed that the light shed on necessary reasoning by this distinction helps greatly to illuminate the role of abstraction. . . See, also: EP2:394 where Peirce comments that it is hypostatic abstraction that leads to the generalizality of a predicate and, of course, what is general is 3ns. In short, I think you are quite right Cathy to have suggested that correction of my categorial assignments. As Peirce notes near the end of the Additament to the Neglected Argument, hypothetic abstraction concerns itself with that which necessarily would be *if* certain conditions were established (EP2:450). Best, Gary On 2/21/12, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote: Gary wrote: For the moment I am seeing these three as forming a genuine tricategorial relationship, which I'd diagram in my trikonic way, thus: Theoretical mathematics: (1ns) mathematical hypothesis formation (creative abduction--that piece of mathematics) | (3ns) argumentative proof (of the validity of the mathematics) (2ns) the mathematics itself [...] Wouldn't argumentative proof be the 2ness, and the 3ness would be something like the birth, growth
Re: [peirce-l] Philosophia Mathematica articles of interest
Thank you for publicising that, Irving! Both papers were part of a mini-conference myself and Clemency Montelle organized at the NZ Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, in Dec '09. Peirce featured prominently in discussions on the day, which is unusual for Australasian philosophy. Another paper from that mini-conference which is still in advance access, and has a similar theme to the Catton Montelle paper, is Danielle Macbeth, Seeing How It Goes: Paper-and-Pencil Reasoning in Mathematical Practice: http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/content/20/1/58.abstract?sid=2b61ff33-ea 82-434f-9c8d-67675faf094b I would love to hear more about recent publications on Peirce from other list members, though at the same time cognisant of the danger of tipping off a bibliographic deluge. Cheers, Cathy -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Irving Sent: Tuesday, 14 February 2012 8:36 a.m. To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Philosophia Mathematica articles of interest The newest issue of Philosophia Mathematica, vol. 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2012) has some items that may be of interest to members of PEIRCE-L; in particular: Catherine Legg, The Hardness of the Iconic Must: Can Peirce's Existential Graphs Assist Modal Epistemology?, pp. 1-24 Philip Catton Clemency Montelle, To Diagram, to Demonstrate: To Do, To See, and to Judge in Greek Geometry, pp. 25-27 [the title alone of this one puts me in mind of Reviel Netz's book, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive History, which argues that the demonstrations in Euclid's Elements involved diagrammatic reasoning, rather than logical deductions, using proof to mean argumentation rather than, say, syllogistic logic, and I suspect that Peirce would have loved to have read this and Netz's book]; and Thomas McLaughlin's review of Matthew Moore's edition of Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Writings of Charles S. Peirce, pp. 122-128. You can find the preview at: https://webmail.iu.edu/horde/imp/view.php?popup_view=1index=17992mailbox =INBOXactionID=view_attachid=1mimecache=c8c67315bb4e056828f0a08507e94ea 0 Irving H. Anellis Visiting Research Associate Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought 902 W. New York St. Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis Indianapolis, IN 46202-5159 USA URL: http://www.irvinganellis.info -- --- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Call for papers: Special Issue of the Transactions: Joseph Ransdell and His Legacy
Ben – thank you for posting the CFP on the Peirce blog – for taking the trouble to redo the Transactions masthead in the same style, and for chivalrously protecting my email address from the spambots I might have naively exposed it to. You correctly traced the source of the *bolded black Trebuchet MS * - I cut and pasted some irreplaceable sentences into the CFP from you-know-where, and it took over. I hope many on this list will feel inspired to submit something – whether solely or in collaboration. All best regards, Cathy *From:* C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] *On Behalf Of *Benjamin Udell *Sent:* Wednesday, 8 February 2012 11:07 a.m. *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Subject:* Re: Call for papers: Special Issue of the Transactions: Joseph Ransdell and His Legacy Cathy, list, It's good to have you back. Very gratifying Call for Papers! Not only would Joe feel honored, he'd feel the fondness for him in the call's faithful use of his favorite font at Arisbe, *bolded black Trebuchet MS.*You can usually tell when you're at Arisbe. I posted the Call for Papers at http://csp3.blogspot.com/2012/02/call-for-papers-on-ransdell.html but my presumption stopped short of including the Transactions masthead image, so the masthead will look more or less odd, depending on what fonts are available on the user's computer. Your email address there is shielded from the average spambot by a javascript trick. Best, Ben - Original Message - *From:* Catherine Legg *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Sent:* Tuesday, February 07, 2012 12:19 AM *Subject:* [peirce-l] Call for papers: Special Issue of the Transactions: Joseph Ransdell and His Legacy Dear Peirceans, Hello again! I don’t know whether this list accepts attachments. In case it does not, the material is cut and pasted below, but I imagine it will not come out properly on many email readers. If you do not receive a copy of the attachment, and would like one, please email me. All best regards, Cathy *CALL FOR PAPERS:* - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
[peirce-l] FW: SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
Dear Peirceans, Just a short note to say that after a long absence from this list, I'm back, and *how* nice it is to read such thoughtful and wide-ranging posts as the below. I'm remembering the old magic that drew me to the list and to Peirce studies back in the mid-90s, and the 'intellectual hope' that Gary speaks eloquently of below, of creating (by 'bodying forth', rather than arguing about it) a new paradigm in semiotics and philosophy, is one that moves me too. On the topic of which, I am about to post a Call For Papers for a very specific project which hopefully will be of interest to this list. Stand by... Yours, Cathy Catherine Legg Senior Lecturer, Philosophy Programme University of Waikato Private Bag 3105 3240, Hamilton, New Zealand http://waikato.academia.edu/CathyLegg -Original Message- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Gary Richmond Sent: Friday, 3 February 2012 9:51 a.m. To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: Re: SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION Peter, Stephen, list, Peter, you wrote: PS: I am a little surprised at the lack of follow-up from the list to Steve's suggestions, below. I do not personally have any opinion regarding the prospect of Peirceans forming a new generation of public intellectuals, but this is a theme that I recall being raised on the list in the past, and generating lively discussion. Stephen had written: SR: Did Peirce ever say anything relevant to the issue of peer review? As for example implying a division between disciplines, in which ordinary persons would have no relevant contribution to make, and areas where anyone of ordinary capacities might be seen to have a valuable contribution to make? The impression I have is that Peirce might be quite iconoclastic regarding the vetting all of claims to truth, not to mention the proliferation of specialization and its sequestration under the umbrellas of academia and professions. GR: For my own part, I would hope--and that's all that it is and can be for now: a hope--that a more Peircean approach to forming a new generation of public intellectuals might come to be. By a Peircean approach I mean to include such thing as Socratic dialogue (that is, as Peirce understood it, not as Plato misinterpreted it); critical commonsensism (== pragmatism); a tripartite method of scientific inquiry involving the individual abductive generation of hypotheses, the deduction of the implications of certain hypotheses for testing, and the actual inductive test occur, the results to be reviewed and reflected upon by the relevant scientific communities of interest; the notion of the significant differences (including methodological) between Cenoscopic (philosophy) and Idioscopic (the 'special' sciences); the assumption of an extreme realist metaphysic--countering nominalistic and reductivistic tendencies--upon essentially pan-semiotic analyses (following the findings of a tricategorial phenomenology); his ethics of inquiry, etc. Still, all of this--and much more--has been 'out there' for well over a century, almost two (we are approaching the centenary of Peirce's death in 2014), and, while there has been some progress especially in the theory related to much that has been outlined above, for a philosophy which has as its name, pragmatism, there has been scant little application of it to communities of inquiry it seems to me. Nevertheless, after decades of specialization, one can imagine that we're beginning to see a new, growing ideal of interdisciplinary semiotic thinking, this being one of the great possibilities of biosemiotics as some are conceiving it,and certainly one of the principal reasons why I'm drawn to it. Not only Deacon's work, but also Eliseo Fernandez's and Soren Brier's (both of these scholars are on this list, btw) tend towards this new interdisciplinary thinking. But the terrain is vast and extraordinarily complex such that both Brier and Deacon, for example, have had to write very long, very dense, very complex books. On the other hand, I've recommended Fernandez's work here since his short articles gives one--at least gave me--enough of a sense of the value and importance of the possibilities inherent in this relatively newly budding semiotic approach as to afford me the patience and fortitude to tackle a tome like Deacon's *Incomplete Science*. So, in a word, this is difficult material to take up as a individual or, a fortiori, as a community because of its complexity. I've been talking about beginning a discussion of Deacon's book here for some time, and Gary Fuhrman made a good faith attempt at getting it going. But now I think it'll take a great deal more preparation for us to get such a discussion off the ground (at the moment we are both rereading the book, btw). Peirce clearly distinguishes kinds of sciences (theoretical and practical, censocopic and specific, research/review/applied
