[peirce-l] Modus Dolens

2012-05-16 Thread Jon Awbrey

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/10/modus-dolens/

;}

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Re: [peirce-l] Peirce forum migration on 17-May-2012

2012-05-15 Thread Jon Awbrey

Bill,

That reminds me, some of the information on the Gmane archive
didn't get updated about the move from Texas Tech, so you might
want to look at that, too.

Cf.  http://dir.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce

Under Detailed Statistics it still gives the URL as:

http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/people/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm

It seems to say that anyone can edit this, but it wouldn't let me.

TIA,

Jon

Stuckey, William E wrote:

PEIRCE-L subscribers,

On 17-May-2012, the PEIRCE-L list will be migrating to a new environment, the 
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3) We expect that list members' current individual settings will be be 
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Re: [peirce-l] What Peirce Preserves

2012-05-14 Thread Jon Awbrey

Re: Studies in Logic and Its Vicissitudes
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8116

Irving  All,

Between 1865 and 1870, C.S. Peirce had already begun to set out the rudiments
of an information-theoretic semantics for inquiry, communication, and thought
in general, along with a logic of relatives that is powerful enough to handle
polyadic relations, in particular, the triadic relations that one requires in
the theory of signs and throughout mathematics.

This is the palette of ideas that Peirce found himself forced to develop
to paint a picture of inquiry that could even hope to be “true to life”.
Many of these ideas we would not see again until the late 20th century.

When it comes to the reception of this picture, this style, by judges from
another school, I think we have to sort the aesthetic or affective impacts
from the cognitive or intellectual factors.  Personally, I don't suppose
I will ever have the investigative resources or skills to find out what
really happened in the case of Peirce, but common sense tells me that
handing out his relics like favors at a scalping party must betoken
some form of active, if unconscious hostility.

And if I were to speculate on the springs and catches of that hostility,
I would guess that there is probably a link between fearing the message
and counting coup on the messenger.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Jon Awbrey

Re: Jim Willgoose
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8141

JA = Jon Awbrey
JW = Jim Willgoose

JA: Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking 
about
the notion of judgment that was represented by the judgment stroke in 
Frege's
“Begriffsschrift” and that supposedly got turned into the turnstile symbol 
( ⊦ )
or “assertion symbol” in later systems of notation?

JW: Sluga ties the priority of judgement in Frege to Kant's favoring judgements
over concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason.  The article is open source.
I can see a connection with the judgement stroke /- since one asserts the
truth;  a trick that is hard to do with only concepts or objects.  Sluga
includes a quote from Frege where he says something to the effect that
he (Frege) never segments the signs of even an incomplete expression
in any of his work. (ie. x is never separated from F as in Fx.)

Jim,

With this token and this turnstile then we enter on a recurring issue,
revolving on the role of assertion, evaluation, or judgment of truth,
in contradistinction to “mere contemplation”, as some of my teachers
taught me to bracket it, of a “proposition”, whatever that might be.

If I have not made it clear before, this is one of the points where
I see the so-called “Fregean Revolution”, more French than American,
if you catch my drift, begin to take a downward turn.  But I cannot
decide yet whether to assign that to Frege's account, taken in full
view of his work as a whole, or whether it is due to the particular
shards that his self-styled disciples tore off and took to extremes.

Regards,

Jon

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[peirce-l] Mathematics, Phenomenology, Normative Science, Metaphysics

2012-05-11 Thread Jon Awbrey

o~o~o~o~o~o

I began to be curious about the recurrence of the following passage
from Peirce in internet discussions over the last dozen years or so.

Syllabus : Classification of Sciences (1.180-202, G-1903-2b)
• http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm

 o-o
 | |
 |  o Metaphysics  |
 | /|  |
 |/ |  |
 |   /  |  |
 |Normative Science o   |  |
 | / \  |  |
 |/   \ |  |
 |   / \|  |
 |  Mathematics o   o Phenomenology|
 | |
 | Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;|
 | metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.  |
 | |
 | Charles Sanders Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 1.186 (1903) |
 | |
 o-o

Here is just the sample of occurrences that I could find right off hand.
Most of these were cross-posted to several different logic and ontology
lists:  Arisbe, CG, SUO, the list on Peirce topics that Mary Keeler ran,
and various incarnations of the Peirce List, but it's usually easier to
find the copies that I posted to the Arisbe and Inquiry Lists.

• 2000 Nov • Referenced in later posts but no longer live or archived
• 2004 Mar • http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-March/001262.html
• 2005 Jun • http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-June/002804.html
• 2010 May • http://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2010-May/014789.html
• 2010 Jun • http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2010-June/003640.html
• 2011 Nov • http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2011-November/003730.html
• 2011 Dec • http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/7563

o~o~o~o~o~o

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Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Jon Awbrey

JW = Jim Willgoose

JW: I followed up on two paper suggestions by Irving (Sluga and Van Heijenoort) 
in
the context of the language or calculus topic.  With Sluga, I detect the 
idea
that the Begriffsshrift is a universal language because it is meaningful in
a way that the Boolean logic is not.  Sluga sees his paper as an extension
and adjustment of Van Heijenoort's paper on logic as language or calculus.
He places great emphasis on the priority principle.  He quotes from Frege,
I begin with judgments and their contents and not with concepts ... The
formation of concepts I let proceed from judgments. (Posthumous writings)
Sluga says, This principle of priority, in fact, constitutes the true
center of his critique of Boolean logic.  That logic is a mere calculus
for him because of its inattention to that principle, while his own logic
approximates a characteristic language because of its reliance on it.
(Sluga, Frege against the Booleans) The Frege quote above is from around
1879 and the material focus is on 1884 or earlier; especially Boole's
calculating logic and the Begriffsshrift. (a response to Schroder's
criticism).  There is a lot more to this article, including linking
the priority principle to the better known context principle.
(words have meaning only in sentences) What I am doing is reading
these two papers concurrently with Mitchell and Ladd-Franklin
from Studies in Logic. (1883)

JW: ps. I like the way you diagram a thread on your site.

Jim,

Sorry, I was away on several excursions and missed that part of the context.

My main concern, here and elsewhere, resides with the potential contribution of
Peirce to our understanding of inquiry.  If I were starting a new project today,
instead of trying to dig my way out of unfinished business, it would get a title
like The Unrealized Potential of Peirce's Thought or maybe The Unmet 
Challenge
of Peirce's Work.  My feeling is that only a small fraction of Peirce's 
potential
contribution to our understanding has yet been realized and that something 
critical
has been lost in the years between Peirce and Russell.  Consequently, my 
concern is
less with Boole and Frege than with the clues their work provides to what was 
found
and what was lost.

It has long been my experience that we cannot grasp the full import of Peirce's 
work
from the shadows that are cast on the analytic, atomistic, logistic, reductive 
plain.
I prefer looking at the work of what came after from Peirce's conceptual 
perspective,
instead of the other way around.  I think that affords a much clearer view of 
things.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-10 Thread Jon Awbrey

JW = Jim Willgoose

JW: List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans;
Notre Dame Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis
upon the priority principle in Frege, which stresses that the
judgement is epistemically, ontologically, and methodologically
primary.  He tries to show that Frege thought that Schroder's
view exhibited a bias towards the methodological primacy of
concepts by drawing on Schroder's Introductory parts of the
Algebra of Logic.  I think the central claim of the Sluga
paper is that this supposed bias of the Booleans towards
abstraction and the treatment of concepts as extensions
of classes leads to a confusion over the relation between
abstract or pure logic and predicate logic.  How this is,
is not always easy to see, but the segmenting of the judgement
relation does seem to lead to a problem in seeing the abstract
logic as a special case of predicate logic.  How serious any of
this is I don't know.  For instance, Mitchell took issue with a
Mr. Peirce for speaking of a universe of relation instead of
a universe of class terms. (Studies in Logic; Johns Hopkins 1883).
Maybe Peirce was vaguely aware of something which the products of
analysis would end up obscuring.

Jim,

Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking about
the notion of judgment that was represented by the judgment stroke in Frege's
“Begriffsschrift” and that supposedly got turned into the turnstile symbol ( ⊦ )
or “assertion symbol” in later systems of notation?

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] What Peirce Preserves

2012-05-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce Preservation (Studies in Logic and Its Vicissitudes)
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8116

Irving  All,

The question of how logic, mathematics, phenomenology, and philosophy
in general relate to one another has come up again several times in
recent discussions, so let me refer once again to a statement from
Peirce that I always find enlightening on that score, at least,
with respect to how Peirce himself viewed their dependencies
and their relative standings as foundations.

| Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;
| Metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 1.186 (1903)

Here is a digram of these relations, with the more basic inquiries
at the bottom and those that rest on them higher up in the ordering.

|
|
|  o Metaphysics
| /|
|/ |
|   /  |
|Normative Science o   |
| / \  |
|/   \ |
|   / \|
|  Mathematics o   o Phenomenology
|

Cf. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-March/001262.html

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] What Peirce Preserves

2012-05-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce Papers Preservation
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8116

Irving,

Turning to your list of points ...

IA: My points were -- to put them as simplistically and succinctly as
possible -- that:

IA: (a) _Studies in Logic_ did not get laid aside because of the diffusion of
its contents (Epicurean logic; probability, along with algebraic logic)
but because:

IA: (i) philosophers either mathophobic or innumerate were unprepared
or unable to tackle the algebraic logic; while:

IA: (ii) the mathematician who were capable of handling it did not ignore
_Studies in Logic_ in the pre-Principia day (witness Dodgson's being
inspired to devise falsifiability trees by Ladd-Franklin's treatment of
the antilogism and Marquand's contribution on logic machines;  witness
the praise for _Studies in Logic_ by Venn, Schröder, and even Bertrand
Russell's recommendation to Couturat that he read _Studies in Logic_);

IA: (b) once the Fregean revolution began taking effect, in the
post-Principia era, not only _Studies in Logic_ slid off the
radar even for those capable of handling the mathematics, but so
did most of the work in algebraic logic from Boole and De Morgan
through Peirce and Schröder to even the pre-Principia Whitehead,
in favor of logistic, that is in favor of the function-theoretic
approach rather than the older algebraic approach to logic, and
THAT was why, in 1941, Tarski expressed surprise and chagrin that
the work of Peirce and Schröder hadn't been followed through and
that, in 1941, algebraic logic languished in the same state in which
it had existed forty-five years earlier.  Incidentally, Gilbert Ryle
attributed the interest of philosophers in logistic preeminently to
the advertisements in favor of it by Bertrand Russell, convincing
philosophers that the new mathematical logic could help them
resolve or eliminate philosophical puzzles regarding language
and epistemology (at the same time, we might add, that Carnap
was arguing for the use of the logical analysis of language
in eliminating metaphysics).

IA: (I do not believe that in my previous posts I said anything to the
contrary or said anything that could be construed to the contrary.)

I need to say something about the use of the terms algebraic and functional,
as they tend to have a diversity of meanings, and some of their connotations 
have
shifted over the years, even in the time that I have observed them being 
applied to
styles of logical notation.

We used to use terms like algebraic logic and algebra of logic almost as
pejoratives for the older tradition in symbolic logic, going back even as far
Leibniz, but that was due to using the term algebra in a very narrow sense,
connoting a restriction to finitary operations, those that could be built up
from a finite basis of binary operations.

More often lately, algebraic tends to be used for applications of category 
theory,
but category theory is abstracted from the concrete materials of functions 
mapping
one set to another, making category theory the apotheosis of functions as a 
basis
for mathematical practice.  Moreover, Peirce's use of ∏ and ∑ for quantifiers is
actually more functional in spirit than the later use of symbols like ∀ and ∃.

These are just some of the reasons that I find myself needing another criterion
for distinguishing Peirce's paradigm of logical notation from later devolutions.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] What Peirce Preserves

2012-05-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

Re: Peirce Preservation (Studies in Logic and Its Vicissitudes)
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8116

IA = Irving Anellis (also, Intelligence Augmentation)

IA: Jon Awbrey wrote: I would tend to sort Frege more in a class with
Boole, De Morgan, Peirce, and Schröder, since I have the sense when
I read them that they are all talking like mathematicians, not like
people who are alien to mathematics.

IA: I would thoroughly concur.

IA: Although Peirce had, perforce, deliberately identified himself as a
logician in _Who's Who_, and part 2 of his 1885 AJM paper, after being
accepted by Sylvester, was refused publication by Simon Newcomb (who
succeeded Sylvester as AJM editor) because Peirce insisted that the
paper was logic rather than mathematics, each of these people worked
in mathematics as mathematicians (Boole, De Morgan Peirce, Schröder
primarily in algebra, but also contributing to differential and integral
calculus and function theory; Frege primarily in function theory, but
also working in algebra; and all to some extent in geometry as well).

Oh, I didn't mean to suggest that logicians and mathematicians are mutually
exclusive categories.  I don't see any necessary contradiction between being
a logician and being a mathematician, but logicists distinguish themselves as
striving to reduce mathematics to logic — and even that need not be extreme in
its aims, depending on what an individual inquirer means by logic — but when
someone sets out to reduce logic itself to a style of purely syntactic analysis,
then I find myself needing to draw a line.

Thanks a million for the summary below, as it will help me
catch up after many distractions of travel and daily events.

Regards,

Jon

IA: My points were -- to put them as simplistically and succinctly as
possible -- that:

IA: (a) _Studies in Logic_ did not get laid aside because of the diffusion
of its contents (Epicurean logic; probability, along with algebraic
logic) but because

IA: (i) philosophers either mathophobic or innumerate were unprepared or
unable to tackle the algebraic logic; while

IA: (ii) the mathematician who were capable of handling it did not ignore
_Studies..._ in the pre-Principia day (witness Dodgson's being
inspired to devise falsifiability trees by Ladd-Franklin's treatment of
the antilogism and Marquand's contribution on logic machines; witness
the praise for _Studies..._ by Venn, Schröder, and even Bertrand
Russell's recommendation to Couturat that he read _Studies..._);

IA: (b) once the Fregean revolution began taking effect, in the
post-Principia era, not only _Studies in Logic_ slid off the radar
even for those capable of handling the mathematics, but so did most of
the work in algebraic logic from Boole and De Morgan through Peirce and
Schröder to even the pre-Principia Whitehead, in favor of logistic,
that is in favor of the function-theoretic approach rather than the
older algebraic approach to logic, and THAT was why, in 1941, Tarski
expressed surprise and chagrin that the work of Peirce and Schröder
hadn't been followed through and that, in 1941, algebraic logic
languished in the same state in which it had existed forty-five years
earlier. Incidentally, Gilbert Ryle attributed the interest of
philosophers in logistic preeminently to the advertisements in favor of
it by Bertrand Russell, convincing philosophers that the new
mathematical logic could help them resolve or eliminate philosophical
puzzles regarding language and epistemology (at the same time, we might
add, that Carnap was arguing for the use of he logical analysis of
language in eliminating metaphysics).

IA: (I do not believe that in my previous posts I said anything to the
contrary or said anything that could be construed to the contrary.)

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Re: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce

2012-05-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Jack,

All histories of logic written that I've read so far are very weak on Peirce,
and I think it's fair to say that even the few that make an attempt to cover
his work have fallen into the assimilationist vein.

Regards,

Jon

Jack Rooney wrote:

Despite all this there are several books on the history of logic eg Kneale  
Kneale[?].


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Re: [peirce-l] Manifolds of Sense and Interpretation

2012-04-19 Thread Jon Awbrey

Steven,

There are the sounds of things in your overture that resonate with many themes
of long-standing interest to me -- the possibility of integrating dynamic and
symbolic aspects of intelligent systems, the logical analogues of differential
manifolds and the triadic relations that anchor their most general definitions,
the potential of geometric, graph-theoretic, or topological syntaxes for logic,
just to name a few -- but other notes strike more dissonant chords in my mind's
ear, for instance, the apparent confounding of descriptive sciences, this time
biology, biophysics, and physics, with the normative science of logic.  However
much descriptive sciences and normative sciences may bear on one another, their
characters and objectives remain distinct.  I don't foresee that biologism will
fare any better than psychologism when it comes to supplying a basis for logic.
But maybe that is not what you're saying?

Regards,

Jon

cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce Lists

 Manifolds Of Sense And Interpretation, Logic And Computation As Biophysics
 (or why logicians are rightly theoretical biophysicists too)

 In 1904 Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) objected to the “Russellization” of
 logic on the basis that logical expressions consisting of dyadic relations are
 not reducible to the interpretant manifold, to the manifest non-local quality
 of our ongoing experience in bringing the distribution and variety of sense to
 actionable unity, observing that beyond the immediate composition of cause and
 effect statements this action is necessarily deferred to the logician. 
Mechanical
 inference from dyadic relations neglects something immediate and deferred 
that is
 actionable.

 The illusive mechanics that Peirce suggests is by definition the mechanics of
 biophysics, describing how sense is characterized by the structures involved
 and how the biophysical structure is moved from apprehension to action. I will
 argue that this mechanics is fundamental to the inquiry of logic, determining
 the natural laws of logic, and that it is time for logicians to return to 
these
 foundational issues as theoretical biophysics, a field in which a wealth of 
new
 data promises to inform us.

 I present the state of my own inquiry: a new logic and model of computation
 based upon the function of flexible closed manifolds describing how sense is
 characterized, symbolic processing, and covariant response potentials, the 
analogs
 of biophysical cells and multicellular membranes and their associated 
mechanics.
 The mathematization of this approach formally requires a unification of logic 
and
 geometry. I will present steps toward the specification of such a logic and 
its
 geometric implementation in dynamic structure designed to enable the 
explanation
 and reproduction of biophysical function.  And I will speak to the 
predictions of
 the theory concerning the mechanisms that remain to be discovered.

 Manifolds of sense and interpretation, logic and computation as biophysics 
by
 Steven Ericsson-Zenith is the abstract for a presentation at Stanford 
University
 Mathematical Logic Seminar on May 8th, 2012. 4:15pm at Math corner, room 
380-X.

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[peirce-l] Paradisaical Logic The After Math

2012-04-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Not too coincidentally with the mention of Peirce's existential graphs,
a tangent of discussion on another blog brought to mind an old favorite
passage from Peirce, where he is using his entitative graphs to exposit
the logic of relatives.  Here is the observation that I was led to make:

| Paradisaical Logic
|
| Negative operations (NOs), if not more important than
| positive operations (POs), are at least more powerful
| or generative, because the right NOs can generate all
| POs, but the reverse is not so.
|
| Which brings us to Peirce’s amphecks, NAND and NNOR,
| either of which is a sole sufficient operator for all
| boolean operations.
|
| In one of his developments of a graphical syntax for logic,
| that described in passing an application of the Neither-Nor
| operator, Peirce referred to the stage of reasoning before
| the encounter with falsehood as “paradisaical logic, because
| it represents the state of Man’s cognition before the Fall.”
|
| Here’s a bit of what he wrote there —
|
| C.S. Peirce • Relatives of Second Intention
| 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/04/07/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-relatives-of-second-intention/

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] A Question About Categories

2012-03-30 Thread Jon Awbrey
hi claudio, I am traveling through the middle of next week, with only my iphone 
to hand. that was a rather abbreviated way of explaining categories and would 
require supplementation. if it were only a matter of mathematics, that would 
suffice, but we are talking about phenomenology, categories of appearance, so 
the question is what complexity of mathematical models are forced on us by the 
complexity of the phenomenal domain before us.

regards,

jon

On Mar 29, 2012, at 1:15 PM, Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com wrote:

 Dear Jon,
 thanks for the constant 'help' that to give to all listers
 
 I have found your explanation of the categories very practical (below in 
 red), and since I'd like to quote it, I wanted to ask you if it is yours or 
 if you can give me the origin.
 Thanks again
 Best
 CL
 -- 
 Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri
 Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo
 Universidad de Buenos Aires
 Home address: Gral. Lemos 270  (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina
 Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976
 Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123
 E-mail: claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar
 
 Jon Awbrey said the following on 14/03/2012 03:14 p.m.:
 
 Diane, 
 
 Between any 2 sets of 3 there are 3! (count 'em, 6) 
 ways of forming a 1-to-1 correspondence, and there 
 may be reason for considering the sense of each 1. 
 When it comes to Peirce's categories, which are 
 best understood as the dimensions of relations, 
 roughly speaking, what monadic, dyadic, triadic 
 relations, respectively, have in common, it is 
 also good to recall that Peirce often stressed 
 the order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd = First, Last, Middle. 
 
 | By the third, I mean the medium or connecting 
 | bond between the absolute first and last. 
 | The beginning is first, the end second, 
 | the middle third. 
 | 
 | Peirce, CP 1.337 
 
 Regards, 
 
 Jon 
 
 Diane Stephens wrote: 
 In the book *Semiotics I* by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart 
 which shows 
 concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first 
 is *quality*, a second is *fact* and a third is *law.*  I understand all 
 but second as past as in: 
 
 First - *present * 
 Second - *past * 
 Third - *future * 
 
 I would appreciate some help. 
 
 Thanks. 
 
 -- 
 Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri
 Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo
 Universidad de Buenos Aires
 Home address: Gral. Lemos 270  (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina
 Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976
 Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123
 E-mail: claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

2012-03-27 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here's another prospectus on normative inquiry that I wrote up in September 
1992.

Prospects For Inquiry Driven Systems

1.3.1. Logic, Ethics, Esthetics

The philosophy I find myself converging to more often lately is the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. According 
to this account, logic, ethics, and esthetics form a concentric series of normative sciences, each a subdiscipline of 
the next. Logic tells how one ought to conduct one's reasoning in order to achieve the stated goals of reasoning in 
general. Thus logic is a special application of ethics. Ethics tells how one ought to conduct one's activities in 
general in order to achieve the good appropriate to each enterprise. What makes the difference between a normative 
science and a prescriptive dogma is whether this telling is based on actual inquiry into the relationship of conduct 
to result, or not.


In this view, logic and ethics do not set goals, they merely serve them. Of course, logic may examine the consistency of 
an arbitrary selection of goals in the light of what science tells about the likely repercussions in nature of trying to 
actualize them all. Logic and ethics may serve the criticism of certain goals by pointing out the deductive implications 
and probable effects of striving toward them, but it has to be some other science which finds and tells whether these 
effects are preferred and encouraged or detested and discouraged relative to a particular form of being.


The science which examines individual goods, species goods, and generic goods from an outside perspective must be an 
esthetic science. The capacity for inquiry into a subject must depend on the capacity for uncertainty about that 
subject. Esthetics is capable of inquiry into the nature of the good precisely because it is able to be in question 
about what is good. Whether conceived as empirical science or as experimental art, it is the job of esthetics to 
determine what might be good for us. Through the exploration of artistic media we find out what satisfies our own form 
of being. Through the expeditions of science we discover and further the goals of own species' evolution.


Outriggers to these excursions are given by the comparative study of biological species and the computational study of 
abstractly specified systems. These provide extra ways to find out what is the sensible goal of an individual system and 
what is the perceived good for a particular species of creature. It is especially interesting to learn about the 
relationships that can be represented internally to a system's development between the good of a system and the system's 
perception, knowledge, intuition, feeling, or whatever sense it may have of its goal. This amounts to asking the 
questions: What good can a system be able to sense for itself? How can a system discover its own best interests? How can 
a system achieve, from the evidence of experience, a cognizance, evidenced in behavior, of its own best interests?


http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Essays/Prospects_For_Inquiry_Driven_Systems#1.3.1._Logic.2C_Ethics.2C_Esthetics

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism

2012-03-27 Thread Jon Awbrey

A Facebook acquaintance posted this on my wall ...

Bakhtin Meets Pocahontas --

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GITVPh7GVSE

Cheers,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Book Review • “Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism”

2012-03-26 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Yet another attack of synchronicity -- I just now happened to be working on the 
markup of
some old work and I ran across this bit where I was trying to puzzle out a 
sensible picture
of how the normative science fit together within a pragmatic perspective on 
their objects.

| Questions about the good of something, and what must be done to get it,
| and what shows the way to do it, belong to the normative sciences of
| aesthetics, ethics, and logic, respectively.
|
} Aesthetic knowledge is a creature's most basic sense
| of what is good or bad for it, as signaled by the
| experiential features of pleasure or pain,
| respectively.
|
| Ethical knowledge deals with the courses of action
| and patterns of conduct that lead to these ends.
|
| Logical knowledge begins from the remoter signs
| of what actions are true and false to their ends,
| and derives the necessary consequences indicated by
| combinations of signs.
|
| In pragmatic thought, the normative disciplines can be imagined as three
| concentric cylinders resting on their bases, increasing in height as they
| narrow, from aesthetics to ethics to logic, in that order.  Considered with
| regard to the plane of their experiential bases, logic is subsumed by ethics,
| which is subsumed by aesthetics.  And yet, in another sense, logic affords
| a perspective on ethics, while ethics affords a perspective on aesthetics.
|
| 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_6#6.2._A_Candid_Point_of_View

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • A Guess at the Riddle

2012-03-23 Thread Jon Awbrey

Re: Benjamin Udell
At: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8026

Re: Terry Bristol
At: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8029

In the passage I quoted, Peirce is describing a critical juncture in the 
evolution
of our physical understanding.  One of the things we can see in the formula F = 
ma
is the transition from an intuitive, dualistic, cause-effect conception of 
force to
a geometric description of change in differential, relative terms.  To observe 
all
that in the physics of his day was not only perceptive but downright prescient.

But my present interest is more directed to this question:  “Is there a similar 
transition
to be expected in the evolution of semiotics, the theory of signs, or the 
theory of inquiry
itself?”  Developing a conceptual framework that allows us to consider that 
question in any
productive way will require us to pursue the matter of “Thirdness as it 
naturally arises …
more generally in systems theory.”

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • A Guess at the Riddle

2012-03-22 Thread Jon Awbrey

TB = Terry Bristol

TB: I like it up to this statement that I find obscure.

CSP: Now an acceleration, instead of being like a velocity a relation between 
two successive positions,
 is a relation between three;  so that the new doctrine has consisted in 
the suitable introduction
 of the conception of Threeness.  On this idea, the whole of modern physics 
is built.

TB: I very much look forward to your comments on the overall passage.

Terry,

This just says that we estimate the velocity of a particle moving through a 
space by taking
two points on its trajectory and dividing the distance traveled between them by 
the time it
takes to do so.  To get the instantaneous velocity at a point on the trajectory 
we take the
limit of this quotient as pairs of points are chosen ever closer to the point 
of interest.

We estimate acceleration by taking three points, taking the velocity between 
the first two,
taking the velocity between the last two, then taking the rate of change in the 
velocities
as an estimate of the acceleration.  We get the instantaneous acceleration by 
choosing the
three points ever closer and taking the limit.

By the way ...

This is probably a good time to mention an objection that is bound to arise in 
regard to Peirce's
use of the series of quantities, Position, Velocity, Acceleration, to 
illustrate his 3 categories.
There is nothing about that series, which can of course be extended 
indefinitely, to suggest that
the categories of monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are universal, 
necessary, and sufficient.
Not so far as I can see, not right off, at least.  So making that case for 
Peirce's Triple Threat
will probably have to be mounted at a different level of abstraction.

Regards,

Jon

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[peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • A Guess at the Riddle

2012-03-21 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here is a passage from Peirce that I find telling and personally compelling, 
for reasons I hope to tell later on.
It often comes up in explaining Thirdness as it naturally arises in physics, 
and more generally in systems theory.

Selections from C.S. Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle”, CP 1.354–416

[quote]

359.   First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of 
experience, and they satisfy the mind for a very long time. But at last they are found inadequate, and the Third is the 
conception which is then called for. The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, 
and brings them into relationship.


We are told that every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative stage; now its qualitative stage is when dual 
distinctions,— whether a given subject has a given predicate or not,— suffice; the quantitative stage comes when, no 
longer content with such rough distinctions, we require to insert a possible half-way between every two possible 
conditions of the subject in regard to its possession of the quality indicated by the predicate.


Ancient mechanics recognized forces as causes which produced motions as their immediate effects, looking no further than 
the essentially dual relation of cause and effect. That is why it could make no progress with dynamics. The work of 
Galileo and his successors lay in showing that forces are accelerations by which a state of velocity is gradually 
brought about. The words cause and effect still linger, but the old conceptions have been dropped from mechanical 
philosophy; for the fact now known is that in certain relative positions bodies undergo certain accelerations.


Now an acceleration, instead of being like a velocity a relation between two successive positions, is a relation between 
three; so that the new doctrine has consisted in the suitable introduction of the conception of Threeness. On this idea, 
the whole of modern physics is built.


The superiority of modern geometry, too, has certainly been due to nothing so much as to the bridging over of the 
innumerable distinct cases with which the ancient science was encumbered; and we may go so far as to say that all the 
great steps in the method of science in every department have consisted in bringing into relation cases previously discrete.


[/quote]

— Charles S. Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle”, MS 909 (1887–88).
• First published in CP 1.354–416.   Reprinted in EP1, 245–279.
• 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/03/21/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-a-guess-at-the-riddle/

Regards,

Jon

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[peirce-l] Peirce Community Blogs Home Pages

2012-03-20 Thread Jon Awbrey

Thanks, Ben, that is some rockin' blog roll !

• http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm

cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

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[peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce

2012-03-18 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of Analogy in 
Language Structure”
reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and 
Peirce”, parts of which
may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of Abduction, 
Deduction, Induction”.

Here is the link --

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] A Question About Peirce's Categories

2012-03-15 Thread Jon Awbrey

Steven,

I think the point about sequentiality is correct.

Relations are ordered according to their arities or dimensions,
and Peirce holds that three are enough to generate all others,
but not all relations of constraint or determination, that is,
information, are causal or temporal in nature, not even if we
try to imagine some order of triadic causality or temporality.

Attempting to understand the relational categories by setting out ordered lists
of terms that are regarded as naming absolute, monadic, non-relational essences
is a sign that our understanding has gone off track and fallen into yet another
rut of reductionism.  I don't know what to call it -- absolutism? monadicism?
non-relativism? -- but it's just as bad a form of reductionism as nominalism.

Regards,

Jon

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

Dear Diane,

I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using 
notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights.

In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking) I would prefer: 


1st  = the immediate experience
2nd = the accessible record
3rd = the manifold of unity

In brief: immediacy, record, unification.

It would be important for me to observe that no sequential nature should be read into the process 
suggested by these categories, they covary in what I would call the eternal moment. The 
conception of time is a product of the unifying effect of what Peirce calls thirdness.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info

On Mar 14, 2012, at 8:56 AM, Diane Stephens wrote:

In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first is quality, a second is fact and a third is law.  I understand all but second as past as in: 

First - present 
Second - past 
Third - future 


I would appreciate some help.

Thanks.


--
Diane Stephens
Swearingen Chair of Education
Wardlaw 255
College of Education
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
803-777-0502
Fax 803-777-3193 


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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-13 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

I think it's true that some of the difficulties of this discussion may be due to
different concepts of predicates, or different ways of using the word 
predicate
in different applications, communities, and contexts.

If I think back to the variety of different communities of interpretation
that I've had the fortune or misfortune of passing through over the years,
I can reckon up at least this many ways of thinking about predicates:

1.  In purely syntactic contexts, a predicate is just a symbol,
a syntactic element that is subject to specified rules of
combination and transformation.

As we pass to contexts where predicate symbols are meant to have meaning,
most disciplines of interpretation will be very careful, at first, about
drawing a firm distinction between a predicate symbol and the object it
is intended to denote.  For example, in computer science, people tend
to use forms like constant name, function name, predicate name,
type name, variable name, and so on, for the names that denote
the corresponding abstract objects.

When it comes to what information a predicate name conveys,
what kind of object the predicate name denotes, or finally,
what kind of object the predicate itself is imagined to be,
we find that we still have a number of choices:

2.  Predicate = property, the intension a concept or term.
3.  Predicate = collection, the extension of a concept or term.
4.  Predicate = function from a universe domain to a boolean domain.

It doesn't really matter all that much in ordinary applications which you 
prefer,
and there is some advantage to keeping all the options open, using whichever one
appears most helpful at a given moment, just so long as you have a way of moving
consistently among the alternatives and maintaining the information each 
conveys.

Regards,

Jon

SE = Steven Ericsson-Zenith

SE: Ben and I appear to be speaking across each other and, possibly, agreeing 
fiercely.

SE: Recall that in the 1906 dialectic Peirce is drawing a distinction between 
the wider usage
of Category at the time, i.e., Aristotle's Categories considered by you 
in the dialog,
and saying that he prefers to call these Predicaments.  Having made this 
distinction he
then speaks about the indices that are his categories.

SE: As I said earlier, the index in this case does not point to the elements of 
the category
but the category itself. There is Firstness as opposed to x is a first. 
 The confusion
may be that Ben thinks I am saying that a category is some set of indices 
to its members.
That is not the case, a category stands alone and we can point to it 
(index).  Icons are
the selection mechanisms of properties of classes, not indices.

SE: Predicaments are higher order, assertions about assertions, predicates of 
predicates,
I prefer to say predicated predicates or assertions about assertions 
which is more
generally understood today.

SE: Being as careful as he is, I see no evidence to cause us to suppose that 
the categories that
Peirce attributes to himself in 1906 are different than those he identifies 
as early as 1866.

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-12 Thread Jon Awbrey

GF: Good point, Jon -- we should not neglect the element of performance art in 
philosophy! :-)

GF: However I'm not sure it's right to say that the metaphysical order is more 
fundamental than the
phenomenological. It doesn't seem to jibe with Peirce's classification of 
the sciences, either.

JA: Yes, we always have the choice between first in nature and first for us.
I have no strong feelings about which first comes first -- I was just going
by Peirce's statement:

CSP: Besides, it would be illogical to rely upon the categories to decide so 
fundamental a question.

JA: But you are right, one could just as well say that independent foundations 
are both fundamental
without one foundation being more fundamental than the other.

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Re: [peirce-l] [Inquiry] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-12 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

There is a continuity of purpose that unites all the various category systems,
from Aristotle through the present day.  Clearly, the categories of Aristotle,
Kant, Peirce, and contemporary mathematics are the same in neither number nor
content, but the logical function and semiotic utility they serve is the same.

The problem for which categories are proposed as a solution by Aristotle is
that signs are equivocal, perhaps inherently and even necessarily, at least,
for creatures like us, and so we have need of additional signs for reducing
their ambiguities to the point where logic can begin to apply, as it cannot
apply to words that are used in incompatible categories of meaning or sense.

Here is the that inaugural passage from Aristotle again —

| Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common,
| the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name
| being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly
| both be called animals (ζωον), these are equivocally named. For they
| have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of essence)
| corresponding with the name being different. For if you are asked to
| define what the being an animal means in the case of the man and the
| portrait, you give in either case a definition appropriate to that
| case alone.
|
| Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name but the
| name means the same in each case — has the same definition corresponding.
| Thus a man and an ox are called animals. The name is the same in both cases;
| so also the statement of essence. For if you are asked what is meant by their
| both of them being called animals, you give that particular name in both cases
| the same definition.
|
| Aristotle, Categories, 1.1a1–12.
|
| Translator's Note. “Ζωον in Greek had two meanings, that is to say, living 
creature, and,
| secondly, a figure or image in painting, embroidery, sculpture.  We have no 
ambiguous noun.
| However, we use the word ‘living’ of portraits to mean ‘true to life’.”  
(H.P. Cooke).
|
| http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Notes/Precursors#Aristotle

As I commented —

In the logic of Aristotle categories are adjuncts to reasoning that are 
designed to resolve ambiguities
and thus to prepare equivocal signs, that are otherwise recalcitrant to being 
ruled by logic, for the
application of logical laws.  The example of ζωον illustrates the fact that we 
don't need categories
to make generalizations so much as we need them to control generalizations, to 
reign in abstractions
and analogies that are stretched too far.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-12 Thread Jon Awbrey

Ben, Steven,  All ...

I may have missed a few posts but I don't understand the fuss about indices.
The types of signs not in one-to-one correspondence with the types of objects.
You can refer to the same object by means of a pronoun or some other index --
for example, Looky there!, Voila!, or I don't know what it is, but there
it goes again -- or you can refer to it by means of a noun, or some figure of
speech with iconic properties.  It is simply a matter of convenience in certain
cases that we use an index or icon when a more definitive symbol might take a 
lot
of work to fashion.

Regards,

Jon

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
Ben and I appear to be speaking across each other and, possibly, agreeing fiercely. 

Recall that in the 1906 dialectic Peirce is drawing a distinction between the wider usage of Category at the time, i.e., Aristotle's Categories considered by you in the dialog, and saying that he prefers to call these Predicaments. Having made this distinction he then speaks about the indices that are his categories. 


As I said earlier, the index in this case does not point to the elements of the category but the 
category itself. There is Firstness as opposed to x is a first. The 
confusion may be that Ben thinks I am saying that a category is some set of indices to its members. 
That is not the case, a category stands alone and we can point to it (index). Icons are the 
selection mechanisms of properties of classes, not indices.

Predicaments are higher order, assertions about assertions, predicates of predicates, I prefer to 
say predicated predicates or assertions about assertions which is more 
generally understood today.

Being as careful as he is, I see no evidence to cause us to suppose that the 
categories that Peirce attributes to himself in 1906 are different than those 
he identifies as early as 1866.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info


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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic

2012-03-10 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Short on time till Monday, but I was able to redo the Objective Logic
excepts as a blog post, that may be easier to read all in one piece:

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/03/09/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-objective-logic/

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic

2012-03-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

o~o~o~o~o~o

Note 2

o~o~o~o~o~o

Objective Logic (cont.)

The first question, then, which I have to ask is:  Supposing such a thing
to be true, what is the kind of proof which I ought to demand to satisfy me of
its truth?  Am I simply to go through the actual process of development of 
symbols
with my own thoughts, which are symbols, and am I to find in the sense of 
necessity
and evidence of the following of one thought upon another an adequate assurance 
that
the course followed is the necessary line of thought's development?  That is 
the way
the question has usually been put, hitherto, both by Hegelians and by 
Anti-Hegelians.

But even if I were to find that the sequence of conceptions in Hegel's logic 
carried
my mind irresistibly along its current, that would not suffice to convince me 
of its
universal validity.  Nor, on the other hand, does the mere fact that I do not 
find a
single step of Hegel's logic, or any substitute for it that I have met with, 
either
convincing or persuasive, give me any assurance whatever that there is no such 
life-
history.  It seems to me natural to suppose that it would be far easier 
satisfactorily
to answer the question of whether there is such a thing than to find out what 
particular
form that life-history would take if it were a reality;  and not only natural 
to suppose so,
but made as certain by solid reasons as any such anticipation in regard to 
proofs could well be.

— Charles S. Peirce, “Minute Logic” (1902), CP 2.112

o~o~o~o~o~o

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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic

2012-03-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

o~o~o~o~o~o

Note 3

o~o~o~o~o~o

Objective Logic (cont.)

But whatever be the kind and degree of our logical assurance that there is any 
real world,
external or internal, that same kind and degree of assurance we certainly have 
that there
not only may be a living symbol, realizing the full idea of a symbol, but even 
that there
actually is one.

I examine the question from this point of view.  It certainly seems as if the 
mere
hypothesis of such a thing as a symbol sufficed to demonstrate such a 
life-history.
Still, a fallacy is to be suspected.  How can a mere hypothesis prove so much 
as this
seems to prove, if it proves anything?  I call in the data of experience, not 
exactly
the every-minute experience which has hitherto been enough, but the experience 
of most
men, together with the history of thought.  The conclusion seems the same.  Yet 
still,
the evidence is unsatisfactory.  The truth is that the hypothesis involves the 
idea of
a different mode of being from that of existential fact.  This mode of being 
seems to
claim immediate recognition as evident in the mere idea of it.  One asks 
whether there
is not a fallacy in using the ordinary processes of logic either to support it 
or to
refute it.

— Charles S. Peirce, “Minute Logic” (1902), CP 2.114–115

o~o~o~o~o~o

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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic

2012-03-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

Gary,

Sorry, the incitement for this reading is that array of questions that arose
in regard to the relations among Peirce's categories, predicates of predicates,
the possibly finite sequence of intentions, and the modes of being that he
mentioned in his passage about Predicaments.

I had to include a lot of Peirce's set-up, but I think the connection with
categories and modes of being will be clear toward the end of the section.

Regards,

Jon

Gary Richmond wrote:

 Jon,

 It would be helpful if you'd add some context
 to a message which is entirely a quotation.

 Best,

 Gary

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Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic

2012-03-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

o~o~o~o~o~o

Note 4

o~o~o~o~o~o

Objective Logic (cont.)

Aristotelianism admitted two modes of being.  This position was attacked
by William Ockham, on the ground that one kind sufficed to account for all
the phenomena.  The hosts of modern philosophers, to the very Hegels, have
sided with Ockham in this matter.  But now the question comes before us for
reëxamination:  What are the modes of being?

One might antecedently expect that the cenopythagorean categories would require
three modes of being.  But a little examination will show us that they could be
brought into fairly presentable accordance with the theory that there were only
two, or even only one.  The question cannot be decided in that way.  Besides,
it would be illogical to rely upon the categories to decide so fundamental
a question.  The only safe way is to make an entirely fresh investigation.

But by what method are we to pursue it?  In such abstract questions, as we shall
have already found, the first step, often more than half the battle, is to 
ascertain
what we mean by the question — what we possibly ''can'' mean by it.  We know 
already
how we must proceed in order to determine what the meaning of the question is.  
Our
sole guide must be the consideration of the use to which the answer is to be 
put —
not necessarily the practical application, but in what way it is to subserve the
''summum bonum''.  Within this principle is wrapped up the answer to the 
question,
what being is, and what, therefore, its modes must be.

It is absolutely impossible that the word “Being” should bear any meaning 
whatever
except with reference to the ''summum bonum''.  This is true of any word.  But 
that
which is true of one word in one respect, of another in another, of every word 
in some
or another respect, that is precisely what the word “being” aims to express.  
There are
other ways of conceiving Being — that it is that which manifests itself, that 
it is that
which produces effects — which have to be considered, and their relations 
ascertained.

— Charles S. Peirce, “Minute Logic” (1902), CP 2.116

o~o~o~o~o~o

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

Ben  All,

At any rate, there is no particular hurry to come to a decision.
As I get time, I'll go back and review the passage in the context
of that paper and others.  For now, let me make a first pass over
your comments and say what I can say off the cuff, subject to the
usual risk of backtracking later.

BU = Ben Udell
JA = Jon Awbrey

BU: The passage by Peirce that you quoted below has nagged at me for some time.
On your mywikibiz page to which you linked, as regards that passage, you
said The first thing to extract from this passage is the fact that
Peirce's Categories, or 'Predicaments', are predicates of predicates.

Let us call that H_1.  Categories = Predicates of Predicates.

I was tempted into that interpretation, despite the possibility
of becoming the foil of a subsequent aporia, by the simple fact
that it appears to help me make sense, not only of what Peirce
might mean by a category, but of all the other claims that he
makes for their properties.

As a general rule, I interpret Peirce's categories as categories of relations.
I suppose I am led to do this by the fact that Peirce makes very strong claims
about his categories -- the claim that three are necessary and sufficient, etc. 
--
and I see nothing else that could anchor these claims except the extremely hard
facts of mathematics that he emphasizes throughout his work under the heading of
triadic irreducibility.

If Peirce intends to explain his categories by means of words like
Actuality, Possibility, Destiny -- words whose meanings are hardly
fixed across traditions of interpretation but range from the fluid
to the flighty and fanciful -- then I can but take him at his word,
at any given moment, whether he means the same thing by them as he
means by First, Last, Middle, in that order or some other, or then
again Quality, Reaction, Representation, or any of the other terms.

But if he means to turn it about, and explain those arrays of highly variable
and traditionally volatile terms by means of mathematical relations, where we
have some hope of probating, proving or disproving, the properties attributed
to these categories, then that is reason to think we are moving in a positive
direction, clarifying obscure words in the light of more determinate concepts.

BU: In the editors' footnote to CP 4.549, the editors say that what there
Peirce calls the Modes of Being are Usually called categories by Peirce.
See vol. 1, bk. III.  Maybe they're wrong, but what here he calls the
Modes of Being -- Actuality, Possibility, and Destiny (or Freedom from
Destiny) do at least comprise one of his formulations of his categories,
even if not the definitive formulation.

BU: Peirce says [...] what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer
the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of
predicates ... Peirce everywhere else prefers the name Categories for his
own categories and who is the you who would have been speaking of Peirce's
own categories?

In Peirce's dialogue, formally speaking, you addresses the Reader.
I initially read you as referring to Peirce's alter ego in a dialogue
with himself, but it occurs to me that another possibility might be Hegel.

BU: Peirce says,

CSP: [...] the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different
 Modes of Being:  Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny).
 On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in
 the different Modes of Being.

Given what I said above, I am content to leave it open at present whether 
Categories,
Modalities, Modes of Being, Predicaments, Predicates of Predicates, and all the 
rest
are exemplifying the same formal structure or not.  What is less variable for 
me is
the fact that no other reason is given anywhere in Peirce's work for claiming 
the
necessity and sufficiency of three categories except the mathematical facts 
about
the valences of relations.

Regards,

Jon

BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are
different in the different Modes of Being?  Where in his other
writings does he call his own categories predicates of predicates?
It's hard not to think that by Predicates of Predicates he does not
mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional,
2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that
his thoughts are not yet harvested, will end up being treated by him
as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds -- instances or applications of his categories.

JA: We have of course discussed the bearing of Peirce's categories on his
other triads several times before, even to the point of going through
his early writings in excruciating detail.  I do not think I have the
strength to do that again, but it may be possible to recover the gist
of those examinations from various archives here and there on the web.

JA: One of the nagging things

[peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • Objective Logic

2012-03-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

| Objective Logic
|
| With Speculative Rhetoric, Logic, in the sense of Normative Semeotic,
| is brought to a close.  But now we have to examine whether there be a
| doctrine of signs corresponding to Hegel's objective logic;  that is to
| say, whether there be a life in Signs, so that — the requisite vehicle
| being present — they will go through a certain order of development,
| and if so, whether this development be merely of such a nature that
| the same round of changes of form is described over and over again
| whatever be the matter of the thought or whether, in addition to
| such a repetitive order, there be also a greater life-history that
| every symbol furnished with a vehicle of life goes through, and what
| is the nature of it.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CP 2.111, “Minute Logic” (1902)

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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-06 Thread Jon Awbrey

Steven,

Here's a snippet from Boole that I think well illustrates
his take on the relation between logic and the psychology
of the thinking process.

| In proceeding to these inquiries, it will not be necessary
| to enter into the discussion of that famous question of the
| schools, whether Language is to be regarded as an essential
| instrument of reasoning, or whether, on the other hand, it
| is possible for us to reason without its aid. I suppose this
| question to be beside the design of the present treatise, for
| the following reason, viz., that it is the business of Science
| to investigate laws; and that, whether we regard signs as the
| representatives of things and of their relations, or as the
| representatives of the conceptions and operations of the
| human intellect, in studying the laws of signs, we are
| in effect studying the manifested laws of reasoning.
|
| (Boole, Laws of Thought, p. 24.)

Boole is saying that the business of science, the investigation of laws,
applies itself to the laws of signs at such a level of abstraction that
its results are the same no matter whether it finds those laws embodied
in objects or in intellects. In short, he does not have to choose one or
the other in order to begin. This simple idea is the essence of the formal
approach in mathematics, and it is one of the reasons that contemporary
mathematicians tend to consider structures that are isomorphic.  Peirce
uses this depth of perspective for the same reason. It allows him to
investigate the forms of triadic sign relations that exist among objects,
signs, and interpretants without being blocked by the impossible task of
acquiring knowledge of supposedly unknowable things in themselves, whether
outward objects or the contents of other minds.  Like Aristotle and Boole
before him, Peirce replaces these impossible problems with the practical
problem of inquiring into the sign relations that exist among commonly
accessible objects and publicly accessible signs.

• http://www.mywikibiz.com/User:Jon_Awbrey/PEIRCE#Formal_perspective
• 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Charles_Sanders_Peirce/Cache#Formal_perspective

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

 Thanks Jon.

 Recall that my goal is ultimately a calculus for biophysics, in addition
 to a logic constructed upon it.  Following your suggested approaches there
 is no way to bind the characterization of sense with response potentials.
 So, different goals perhaps.

 On Boole and Frege, I am using the titles of the books only to highlight
 the overall concern of the authors, rather than the particular approach
 of each author. I decided to avoid the psychologistic divide in logic
 in this short piece.  I'll review that decision.

 Steven

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Jon Awbrey

Hi Phyllis,

Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty?

| Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000),
| The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown,
| (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis,
| Philadelphia, PA.

We had been discussing this on The Wikipedia Review a few years ago,
so there will be a few excerpts and additional links on this thread:

http://wikipediareview.com/index.php?showtopic=15318

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his original 
opinion
about the connections of the three categories with the principal types of 
signs and
the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third 
guessing
had settled down, and yet leaves the question undecided in his own mind at that 
time.

Working from the understanding that all semiotic phenomena are irreducibly 
triadic,
taking irreducibile in the strictest sense of the word, specific reasons must 
be
given for assigning any number less than 3 to the arity of any aspect or 
component
of a semiotic species, for example, a type of sign relation or a type of 
inference,
in effect, exhibiting an approximate reduction in some looser sense of 
reduction.

There are plenty of examples in Peirce's early work where he demonstrates the 
form
of reasoning that he uses to make these categorical associations and 
connections,
and I had intended to go hunt a few of these up, but the niche of the web where
I last copied them out is down right now, so I will have to try again later.

Regards,

Jon

CL = Cathy Legg
GR = Gary Richmond

CL: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.
Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of
surprise due to error.

GR: And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career
(with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented
on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

CSP: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference 
through an Icon,
 and is thus connected with Firstness;  Induction, or trying how things 
will act, is
 inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness;  
Deduction, or
 recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a 
Symbol, and
 is thus connected with Thirdness. ... [My] connection of Abduction with 
Firstness,
 Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by 
my finding
 no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction split, at once, 
into the
 Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities.

 CSP, ''Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking :
 The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism'', Turrisi (ed.), 276-277.

GR: Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the 
matter.

CSP: [In] the book called ''Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins 
University'',
 while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused 
Abduction with
 the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities.  
Subsequently,
 writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that 
book
 but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of 
Induction
 in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here 
in Cambridge
 I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and 
Deduction with the
 Second [op. cit., 277].

GR: [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling
At the time I first published this division of inference
and 'Peirce'.]

GR: So, as he sees here, for those few years Peirce was confused about
these categorial associations. In that sense Peirce is certainly at least
partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker
about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns.  Still,
he continues in that section by stating:

GR: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided.
Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness,
nor induction with anything but 2ns.

GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but 
thirdness,
nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to 
that
way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three 
categories
together in consideration of a complete inquiry — as he does, for 
example, very
late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the 
section the
CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468–6.473; also, EP 
2:440–442] —
he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the 
hypothesis) with 1ns,
deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising 
tests of it)
with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns.

GR: But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved 
confusing
even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in 
which
he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to 
leave
the question undecided (for now).

--

academia: 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of
information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and
the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the Logic of 
Science
at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute (1866).

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Here is a link to an archival copy in case the current web page goes off-line 
again:

• 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100702011126/http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary.

Jon

cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

Gary Richmond wrote:

Cathy, Stephen, list,

Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as
secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the
secondness of surprise due to error.

And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with
the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented on by him
in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference
through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or
trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus
connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations
of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected
with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,
Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed
by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion
split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of
Qualities. . .  (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right
Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.
276-7).

Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter.

[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns
Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty
well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is
the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh
volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite
understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction
in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures
here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the
third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277].

[You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time
I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.]

So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about
these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at
least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many
a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference
patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating:

At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question
undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with
anything but thirdness,  nor induction with anything but 2ns.

I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but
thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I
mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in
methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in
consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very
late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the
section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468
- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction
(here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the
retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it)
with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with
2ns.

But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently
proved confusing  even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few
tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back
again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for
now).

Best,

Gary


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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore

JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative 
terms,
that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon,
then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning,
are basically category three.

Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the formal 
sense
that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties 
relatively
well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the 
categorical
question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific 
means.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite❢

2012-03-01 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

My exploratory, glacial, back-tracking style of thinking is more suited to 
wikis than blogs,
so my blog posts, like Peircean signposts, tend to grow over time.  At any 
rate, here's the
updated postings on subjects related to the open access revolution, more 
lately, of course,
the reactionary pushback against it that is being mounted by entrenched private 
interests.

• 
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/02/02/knowledge-workers-of-the-world-unite%E2%9D%A2/
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/02/18/the-big-picture/
• http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/elsewhere%E2%9D%A2/

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] A New Dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce

2012-02-26 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Synchroncity In The Asynchronous World (SITAW) !!!

We recently had a discussion of related issues on PolicyMic ...

http://www.policymic.com/articles/why-the-pope-can-t-be-tried-at-the-icc#comment-16229

Regards,

Jon

Benjamin Udell wrote:

James, list,

Theology, Catholic or otherwise, is hardly my forte, and I find on first look into 
infallibilism (i.e., Wikipedia) that Catholic infallibilism is itself largely a 
theoretical idea, like you say, and the list of supposedly infallible statements is a 
matter of debate, but the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary seem widely 
agreed upon as examples. Papal infallibilism became official only in the 19th Century and 
could grow. Peirce would seem likely to take the long view even if he did not already on 
principle prefer to stick to his fallibilist (and therefore tychist and synechist) 
principles; his allowance for practical infallibility along the line of something like 
that which is called moral certainty seems as far as he could go.

I was barely acquainted with van Fraassen - a paper of his is among those linked at 
Arisbe. So this mornng I've been reading that paper 
http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/docs-publd/FalseHopesEpist.pdf The 
False Hopes of Traditional Epistemology Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Vol. LX, No. 2, March 2000.  Peirceans will find something to argue with in his views of 
scientific method, induction, and abduction (he seems not to glimpse a cenoscopic level 
logically between math and special sciences).  Also, FWIW in my semi-Peircean view, 
application of the distinction between _ordo essendi_ and _ordo cognoscendi_ would 
invert, along at least one axis, van Fraassen's epistemological landscape and abduction's 
place in it. On the other hand his view that values (and virtues) matter in the formation 
of scientific understanding and his anti-foundationalism suggest congeniality with 
Peirce. He has an engaging style and one feels that one can hear him talking, then

one wants to start talking too! More by van Fraassen is at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/index.html , and there I found his synopsis 
http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/abstract/SynopsisES.htm of his book The Empirical 
Stance. There he sketches his argument that empiricists need not embrace a secular 
orientation and says that he attempts to provide a more positive content for other 
orientations.


Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: James Albrecht
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 8:58 PM

Subject: Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce


Worth taking a look at Bas Van Fraasen's The Empirical Stance related to the 
progress of inference and the secular/religious outlook.  (Wikipedia says van fraasen is 
a catholic convert, which puts an interesting light on the work.)

Also seems worth pointing out that catholic infallibilism is a purely theoretical construct even in the context of catholic theology: no one can tell you with precision what the exact set of infallible teachings are, such that the practical reality of the idea has subsisted entirely in a historical conformation of the individual to a teaching tradition. 


On Friday, February 24, 2012, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:

Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list,

I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once said that 
he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_ infallibility instead of 
_theoretical_ infallibility. See C. S. Peirce an G. M. Searle: The Hoax of 
Infallibilism by Jaime Nubiola, Cognitio IX/1 (2008), 73-84, at 
http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html .

In at least one other writing (I forget which), Peirce said that fallibilism is 
about propositions about _experience_, or something much like that. I don't 
know whether that involves a variation in Peirce's viewpoint or merely of 
perspective and terminology.

More information on the dissertation:

Walker Percy and the Magic of Naming: The Semeiotic Fabric of Life by Karey 
L. Perkins
Dissertation information including abstract: 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/english_diss/76/
Even shorter link than Jon's* to the PDF: 
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_diss

*Competitiveness in link-shortening benefits the polis as a whole.

Best, Ben

- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond 


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Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce

2012-02-24 Thread Jon Awbrey

Kenneth,

Thanks, very interesting.

Here's a slightly shorter link, with out the search operation:

http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_disssei-redir=1

Regards,

Jon

Kenneth Ketner wrote:

digitally available at

http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079context=english_disssei-redir=1#search=%22semeiotic%20religion%22 



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[peirce-l] Michael K. Bergman • “Give Me a Sign : What Do Things Mean On The Semantic Web?”

2012-02-24 Thread Jon Awbrey

Michael K. Bergman • “Give Me a Sign : What Do Things Mean On The Semantic Web?”

| The logic behind these distinctions and nuances leads us to Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839–1914).
| Peirce (pronounced “purse”) was an American logician, philosopher and 
polymath of the first rank.
| Along with Frege, he is acknowledged as the father of predicate calculus and 
the notation system
| that formed the basis of first-order logic. His symbology and approach 
arguably provide the logical
| basis for description logics and other aspects underlying the semantic Web 
building blocks of the RDF
| data model and, eventually, the OWL language. Peirce is the acknowledged 
founder of pragmatism, the
| philosophy of linking practice and theory in a process akin to the scientific 
method. He was also the
| first formulator of existential graphs, an essential basis to the whole field 
now known as model theory.
| Though often overlooked in the 20th century, Peirce has lately been enjoying 
a renaissance with his
| voluminous writings still being deciphered and published.
|
| 
http://www.mkbergman.com/994/give-me-a-sign-what-do-things-mean-on-the-semantic-web/

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Re: [peirce-l] Poem

2012-02-23 Thread Jon Awbrey

Something there is that loves a war?

http://writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88/frost-mending.html

Stephen C. Rose wrote:

Would this qualify as a Peircean poem?

How about no war in Iran http://ping.fm/kCcFs

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/


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[peirce-l] Elsewhere❢

2012-02-23 Thread Jon Awbrey

Precocious comments set aside to simmer …

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/elsewhere%E2%9D%A2/

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Dangerous Method

2012-02-22 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

I haven't had a chance to hunt down the passages that came to mind,
but it happens that I was currently reviewing a favorite text from
Peirce that falls into roughly the same ballpark, at least it does
within the play on my own field of dreams. At any rate, I found it
worth the while to blog a choice bit of it for further reflection:

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/02/22/ouch%E2%9D%A2/

Regards,

Jon

Jon Awbrey wrote:

EC = Ernesto Cultura

EC: Dear List, without pretension.
I hope you like this: https://www.createspace.com/3788010
It is on Object (Peirce), and Das Ding (Freud, etc. ...)
obvious relationship. I also wrote this (2002) about Peirce
and Chinese concept of Tao https://www.createspace.com/3798955
I will search for this book of John Muller.
Thanks, Ernesto (Brazil)

Ernesto,

Thanks, noted for comment later, but I'll have to do some searching first
before I can find the passages in Peirce and Freud that it brings to mind.

Regards,

Jon


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Re: [peirce-l] Dangerous Method

2012-02-22 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here are the passages from Peirce and Freud that always strike me
as resonating with each other, throwing light in one direction on
pragmatic objects in the context of inquiry as conceived by Peirce
and reflecting light in the other direction on Freud's Project of
1895, in which later commentators would not only see the first signs
of object relations theory but also distinct hints of cybernetic ideas.

It looks like I copied these passage out on at least two occasions,
once in 2003 on the Arisbe List and again in 2004 in the Inquiry List:

Expectation, Satisfaction, Disappointment

Arisbe List

* http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2003-February/thread.html#1628
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2003-February/001628.html

Inquiry List

* http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/thread.html#1867
# http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2004-November/001867.html

I might try blogging about these passages and what I see in them ...
maybe tomorrow ...

Regards,

Jon

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[peirce-l] Perennial Themes • Tri, Tri Again

2012-02-18 Thread Jon Awbrey

Stephen, Steven, and All,

Here are links to a collection of wiki-works where I made
an old college try at introducing the necessary elements
from the ground up.

• http://mywikibiz.com/Inquiry_Live
• http://mywikibiz.com/Logic_Live

I was experimenting with a distributed architecture of a sorts,
hoping to incite developments across a number of different wikis
where I had been working at the time.  In my mind I had an image
of Inquiry Live and Logic Live as the two foci of an ellipse,
about which a group of other topics would revolve in their orbit.
The epithet Live is partly a reflection of my intention to use
more and more semiotic animations as the work proceeds.

These are works in progress, as ever, and I would be interested
in any reactions to my expository trials that anyone might have,
either on the Peirce List, or on the talk pages of the articles.
On reflection, I probably ought to change the subject line, not
wishing to hijack Steven's thread.

Regards,

Jon

cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

Stephen C. Rose wrote:

I think one key to this is to create arguments that are comprehensible to
people like me.  I do not mean that they should not be mathematical, etc.,
only that they be applicable generally, universally.  I am a case study in
mathematical inability, vastly more the case than anything you can imagine.
But my grasp of the triadic is just as tangible as if I could understand
Fermat or whoever.  Triadic thinking is culturally and intellectually
relevant to everything there is.  We need to find more ways of buttressing
the philosophical salience of triadic thinking. Regards, S


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Re: [peirce-l] Philosophia Mathematica articles of interest

2012-02-15 Thread Jon Awbrey

Irving,

All I get when I follow that link is an IU Webmail login page,
but I don't have an account.

Regards,

Jon

Irving wrote:
The newest issue of Philosophia Mathematica, vol. 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2012) 
has some items that may be of interest to members of PEIRCE-L; in 
particular:


Catherine Legg, The Hardness of the Iconic Must: Can Peirce's 
Existential Graphs Assist Modal Epistemology?, pp. 1-24


Philip Catton  Clemency Montelle, To Diagram, to Demonstrate: To Do, 
To See, and to Judge in Greek Geometry, pp. 25-27


[the title alone of this one puts me in mind of Reviel Netz's book, The 
Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive 
History,  which argues that the demonstrations in Euclid's  Elements 
involved diagrammatic reasoning, rather than logical deductions, using 
proof to mean argumentation rather than, say, syllogistic logic, and 
I suspect that Peirce would have loved to have read this and Netz's book];


and

Thomas McLaughlin's review of Matthew Moore's edition of Philosophy of 
Mathematics: Selected Writings of Charles S. Peirce, pp. 122-128.


You can find the preview at: 
https://webmail.iu.edu/horde/imp/view.php?popup_view=1index=17992mailbox=INBOXactionID=view_attachid=1mimecache=c8c67315bb4e056828f0a08507e94ea0 


Irving H. Anellis
Visiting Research Associate
Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought
902 W. New York St.
Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
Indianapolis, IN 46202-5159
USA
URL: http://www.irvinganellis.info


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Re: [peirce-l] Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation

2012-02-14 Thread Jon Awbrey

Steven,

Having only your abstract to go on, I can certainly recognize
perennial themes out of Peirce's school, but they have been just
as perennially met with incomprehension as they have been brought
to the general lack of attention.  Most notable among those themes
is no doubt the irreducibility of triadic relations, a formal fact
that flies in the face of naive reductionism and nominal thinking,
no matter how often the fashion in philosophy will resort to them.
Then again, having exhausted several decades trying to get these
basic facts across, what can I do but repeat what you recited?

| The criticism which I make on that algebra of dyadic relations …
| is that the very triadic relations which it does not recognize
| it does itself employ.  For every combination of relatives to
| make a new relative is a triadic relation irreducible to
| dyadic relations.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, Letter to Victoria Welby, October, 1904

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

Dear List,

I am giving a presentation at CiE 2012 in Cambridge (England) in June that may interest list members:  


Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation, A History
http://iase.info/conceptions-of-locality-in-logic-and-computat

Your review welcome. 


With respect,
Steven


--
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Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info


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[peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

2012-02-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

A few reflections that I posted on Gowers's Weblog that may be pertinent here --

Re: What’s wrong with electronic journals?
At: http://gowers.wordpress.com/2012/01/29/whats-wrong-with-electronic-journals/

Having spent a good part of the 1990s writing about what the New Millennium would bring to our intellectual endeavours, 
it is only fair that I should have spent the last dozen years wondering why the New Millennium is so late in arriving. 
With all due reflection I think it is time to face up to the fact that the fault, [Dear Reader], is not in our 
technology, but in ourselves.


Here is one of my last, best attempts to get at the root of the matter:

• http://org.sagepub.com/content/8/2/269.abstract
• http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/integrat.htm

There are indeed Big Picture questions that open up here — the future of knowledge and inquiry, the extent to which 
their progress will be catalyzed or inhibited by collaborative versus corporate-controlled information technologies, the 
stance of knowledge workers, vigilant or acquiescent, against the ongoing march of global corporate feudalism — and 
maybe this is not the place or time to pursue these questions, but in my experience discussion, like love and gold, is 
where you find it.  Being questions of this magnitude, they will of course arise again. The question is — who will 
settle them, and to whose satisfaction?


Re: Abstract thoughts about online review systems
At: 
http://gowers.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/abstract-thoughts-about-online-review-systems/

What is inquiry? And how can we tell if a potential contribution makes an actual contribution to it?  Questions like 
these often arise, as far as mathematical inquiry goes, in trying to build heuristic problem solvers, theorem-provers, 
and other sorts of mathematical amanuenses.


Charles S. Peirce, who pursued the ways of inquiry more doggedly than any thinker I have ever read, sifted the methods 
of “fixing belief” into four main types — Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility (à priori pleasingness), and full-fledged 
Scientific Inquiry.


I posed the question — “What part do arguments from authority play in mathematical reasoning?” — on MathOverFlow some 
time ago and received a number of interesting answers.


• 
http://mathoverflow.net/questions/28089/what-part-do-arguments-from-authority-play-in-mathematical-reasoning

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

2012-02-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

I added the following comment on Gowers's Weblog —

The late Joseph Ransdell (1931–2010), who did more to keep C.S. Peirce's 
thought alive on the Web than
anyone else I know, had a particular interest in the issues surrounding open 
peerage and publication.
Synchronicity being what it is, the members of the Peirce List have being 
conducting a slow reading
of one of Joe's papers on the subject, where he examined the work of Paul 
Ginsparg on open access
and Peter Skagestad on intelligence augmentation in the light of Peirce's 
theory of signs, a.k.a.
semiotic.  Here is the paper:

The Relevance Of Peircean Semiotic To Computational Intelligence Augmentation
• http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/ia.htm

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

2012-02-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Ben  All,

My own interest in this topic has more to do with the ways that
economic, social, and technological systems facilitate or inhibit
the dynamics of inquiry -- and only incidentally with publication
and publishers per se -- but one has to play the ball of concrete
application where it lies ...

Yes, I've struggled to find the most felicitous one-word description of the 3rd 
method,
hoping to find one that fills out the rhyme by ending in y, so I've 
experimented with
words like a priori, apriority (ugh), agreeability, congruity, confluity 
(borrowing that
one from the Gestalt psychologists), and so on.  This time I tried to draw on 
the link
of plausible to pleasing and praiseworthy and the archaic senses of 
plausive
as pleasing but with a hint of specious.

The quest continues ...

Jon

BU: I hope I don't seem pedantic, but this post is about Peirce's methods of 
inquiry
in The Fixation of Belief. (I know next to nothing about professional or 
academic
journals, so I've little to say about them.)

JA: Charles S. Peirce, who pursued the ways of inquiry more doggedly than any 
thinker
I have ever read, sifted the methods of “fixing belief” into four main 
types —
Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility (à priori pleasingness), and full-fledged
Scientific Inquiry.

BU: There is a certain striking similarity between the focus of the third method
and valuing of plausibility.  Still I think that Peirce would oppose calling
the third method that of Plausibility, and I'd agree with him.

CSP: By plausibility, I mean the degree to which a theory ought to recommend 
itself to our belief
 independently of any kind of evidence other than our instinct urging us to 
regard it favorably.
 (Peirce, A Letter to Paul Carus 1910, Collected Papers v. 8, see paragraph 
223).

BU: In A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm#na0
Peirce discusses plausibility and instinctual appeal at some length in Sections 
III  IV,
identifies it with Galileo's natural light of reason, and says:

CSP: it is the simpler hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, 
the one
 that instinct suggests, that must be preferred This plausibility is a 
question
 of the critique of arguments and of abductive inference in particular.

BU: The third method of inquiry a question of inquiry's methodology 
(methodeutic), and not of assessing
whether a given abductive inference is plausible and worth drawing prior to 
or apart from inductive
tests and observations. Peirce calls the third method the method of 
congruity or the a priori or the
dilettante or 'what is agreeable to reason.'

CSP: It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but 
taste, unfortunately, is always
 more or less a matter of fashion, and accordingly metaphysicians have 
never come to any fixed agreement,
 but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material 
and a more spiritual philosophy,
 from the earliest times to the latest. (Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, 
1878
 http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html).

BU: In a sense it _is_ a matter of taste and fashion — not about clothes, food, 
music, etc. —
but instead about that which we now call 'paradigms' of inquiry - and the 
key point is that
it involves a preference for the _pleasing_ paradigm, the tasteful 
paradigm, etc. But proper
abductive plausibility depends on a preference for the pleasing _only to 
the extent_ that one's
pleasure depends on the plausibility of an explanation of a phenomenon. The 
dependence simply
circles back to the plausibility as the determining variable.

BU: A method of plausibility extended to arguments in general seems a 
non-starter.
As extended to inquirial methodology in general, such that it would be a 
method
of inquiry on a level with those of tenacity, authority, congruity, and 
science,
it might be a method of devil-may-care gambling rather than one of taste 
and fashion
in paradigms.

BU: I grant the striking similarity nevertheless. It's interesting to pursue 
the resemblances
of the methods. I've tended in the past to think of the first three methods 
as involving
mis-embodied Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.

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Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

2012-02-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Gary Fuhrman wrote:

GF: I would agree that Peirce's third method of fixing belief is the most 
difficult to give a suitable name to,
but I think Peirce's own choice eventually fell on fermentation of ideas, 
based on this paragraph dated
c. 1906:

CSP: [[[ My paper of November 1877, setting out from the proposition that the 
agitation of a question ceases
 when satisfaction is attained with the settlement of belief, and then 
only, goes on to consider how the
 conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the 
action of experience; beginning with
 willful belief, or self-mendacity, the most degraded of all intellectual 
conditions; thence rising to the
 imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society; then to the 
idea of a settlement of opinion
 as the result of a fermentation of ideas; and finally reaching the idea of 
truth as overwhelmingly forced
 upon the mind in experience as the effect of an independent reality. ]] CP 
5.564 ]

GF: Fermentation of ideas is not very elegant -- i prefer simply dialogue 
-- but it does imply that the
third method is fully social, and both more reasonable and more democratic 
than the method of authority;
the only thing that stops it from being scientific is the lack of appeal to 
direct experience. Indeed
I think the Ransdell conception of peer review implies that it is a 
prerequisite to a fully developed
science (note the developmental approach Peirce takes in the paragraph 
above).

Fermentality would preserve the rhyme among reasons,
bringing to mind the venerable motto: In Vino Veritas.
Was it Peirce who spoke of the solera method, or was
it some other sommelier?  We know the truth we find in
wine must be taken with a grain of salt, not to mention
the hair of the dogma that inspired it, later on in sober
reflection, so all those connotations are fitting cautions
vis-a-vis the wrath of grapes.

Among other y-words I remember using, there is sagacity,
which is kin in folk etymology to sapience and good taste,
but allusions to etymology tend to go flat after a while.
There is also salubrity, if we think to drink to the
health of ideas.  And on that note what can I say but,

Cheers,

Jon

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[peirce-l] Paul Ginsparg • “Can Peer Review Be Better Focused?”

2012-02-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here is an essay from arXiv.org blurb 
(http://people.ccmr.cornell.edu/~ginsparg/blurb/)
that Joe Ransdell recommended in one of his notes to “The Relevance Of Peircean 
Semiotic
To Computational Intelligence Augmentation”, and that I am seeing pop up more 
and more in
current discussions across the blogosphere:

Paul Ginsparg • “Can Peer Review Be Better Focused?”
http://people.ccmr.cornell.edu/~ginsparg/blurb/pg02pr.html

Regards,

Jon

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[peirce-l] Logical Graphs

2012-02-01 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here are links to a couple of articles on Logical Graphs, newly migrated from 
Google Knol to WordPress.
The first is meant as an informal tour of essential points and selected 
sidelights, focusing on motivation.
The second presents the subject more formally.  I took some pains to clarify a 
number of distinctions that
are often the source of much confusion, namely;

1. The relation between arithmetic and algebra in logical systems.
2. The relation between entitative and existential interpretations.
3. The relation between equational and implicational proof systems.

Logical Graphs : 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/07/29/logical-graphs-1/

Logical Graphs : 2
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/09/19/logical-graphs-2/

By the way, there are extended treatments of Logical Graphs in progress on 
MyWikiBiz.
These are still a bit rough, but they include many more examples of proof 
animations:

Logical Graph
http://mywikibiz.com/Logical_graph

Propositional Equation Reasoning Systems
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Propositional_Equation_Reasoning_Systems

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

2012-01-29 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

There have been some related developments occurring in the mathematical 
community lately.
It is beyond my powers to summarize the issues, so here are just a couple of 
recent links
that may serve to give onlookers a hint of what's afoot:

http://cameroncounts.wordpress.com/2012/01/29/publishers-wars/
http://gowers.wordpress.com/2012/01/29/whats-wrong-with-electronic-journals/

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

2012-01-18 Thread Jon Awbrey

Looks interesting ...

I created a topic for Peirce —

http://www.researchgate.net/topic/Charles_Sanders_Peirce/

I can nominate any other curators who will serve if nominated ...

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Timeless law or lawness time? That´s the question!

2012-01-16 Thread Jon Awbrey

Friends, Romanini, Peircers ...

Re: http://pirsa.org/11100113

The archetype whose avatar we find in The Holographic Universe (THU)
is one that recurs eternally all through the arcana and mystical lore
I used to read in the 60s and 70s, for instance, in the hermetic or
neoplatonistic theme expressed in the words, as above, so below.
One of the writers I follow most avidly of late has taken notice
of it and written as follows:

• http://theodoragoss.com/2011/12/29/the-holographic-universe/

For my part I am reminded of the pregnant line from Leibniz:

| It is one of the rules of my system of general harmony,
| that _the present is big with the future_, and that he
| who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be.

• http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/2011/12/29/the-present-is-big-with-the-future/

Regards,

Jon

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Vinícius Romanini wrote:

I always had the same impression, Tori.
I have been musing for some time if his holographic principle should not be called a semeiotic principle. 
What would be like to describe a black hole in semeiotic terms? It would be wounderful if Smolin tried it someday.


best,

 
Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.

Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
www.minutesemeiotic.org
www.semeiosis.com.br

 De: Tori Alexander vnalexan...@gmail.com
Para: Vinícius Romanini vinir...@yahoo.com 
Cc: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Enviadas: Quinta-feira, 12 de Janeiro de 2012 17:45

Assunto: Re: [peirce-l] Timeless law or lawness time? That´s  the question!

Thank Vinicius for that. 

 Lee Smolin is the speaker in the conference link you provided.  When I read his books I always hear Peirce in the background.  So glad you confirmed the relationship.  In my last book I made a causal guess that it was so.  

Best, 
Tori



Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D.
www.biologistsmistress.com
www.torialexander.com 


On Jan 12, 2012, at 12:58 PM, Vinícius Romanini wrote:

What if a group of modern theoretical Physicists interested in quantum gravity 
gather to discuss a Peirce idea?


see:
http://pirsa.org/11100113 
 
Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D.

Professor of Communication Studies
School of Communications and Arts 
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil

www.minutesemeiotic.org
www.semeiosis.com.br


Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D.
www.biologistsmistress.com
www.torialexander.com 


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Re: [peirce-l] Knol --- Annotum -- WordPress

2012-01-11 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

I gave up trying to convert my Knol articles into Annotom articles.
The latter platform is too undeveloped at the present time to allow
for continued development of the imported articles.  The best I could
manage was archiving static copies of the Knol articles on one blog,
then starting a new blog under a standard WordPress theme as a place
to keep working on their content.

Here's the blog where I'll keep the archived articles:

http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/

The articles that I converted into standard WordPress posts are here:

Differential Logic
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/07/29/differential-logic/

Hypostatic Abstraction
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/08/hypostatic-abstraction/

Logical Graphs : 1
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/07/29/logical-graphs-1/

Logical Graphs : 2
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/09/19/logical-graphs-2/

Logic of Relatives
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/07/31/logic-of-relatives/

Peirce's Law
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/10/06/peirce-s-law/

Praeclarum Theorema
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/10/05/praeclarum-theorema/

Pragmatic Maxim
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Semeiotic
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/07/30/semeiotic/

Regards,

Jon Awbrey
http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/about/

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[peirce-l] Pathemata : Affections or Impressions of the Soul

2011-12-16 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Recall that Aristotle makes the cognitive aspect of signs
derivative of their affections or impressions on the soul.

Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions 
(pathemata) of
the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken.  As writing, so 
also is
speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, 
of which
these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of 
mankind, as are
also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or 
likenesses,
images, copies (homoiomata). (Aristotle, On Interpretation, i.16a4–9)

As for Peirce, the irritation of doubt that instigates inquiry
is an affective tension that we suffer in the mind on account of
entropy or uncertainty, statistically speaking, distributions of
options for action or expression that are distressingly uniform.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Doctrine Of Individuals

2011-12-11 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here's one gloss on what Peirce meant by the term division --

CSP: The moment, then, that we pass from nothing and the vacuity of being to
 any content or sphere, we come at once to a composite content and sphere.
 In fact, extension and comprehension — like space and time — are quantities
 which are not composed of ultimate elements; but every part however small 
is
 divisible.

CSP: The consequence of this fact is that when we wish to enumerate the sphere 
of a term —
 a process termed division — or when we wish to run over the content of a 
term —
 a process called definition — since we cannot take the elements of our 
enumeration
 singly but must take them in groups, there is danger that we shall take 
some element
 twice over, or that we shall omit some. Hence the extension and 
comprehension which we
 know will be somewhat indeterminate. But we must distinguish two kinds of 
these quantities.
 If we were to subtilize we might make other distinctions but I shall be 
content with two.
 They are the extension and comprehension relatively to our actual 
knowledge, and what these
 would be were our knowledge perfect.

CSP: Logicians have hitherto left the doctrine of extension and comprehension 
in a very imperfect
 state owing to the blinding influence of a psychological treatment of the 
matter. They have,
 therefore, not made this distinction and have reduced the comprehension of 
a term to what
 it would be if we had no knowledge of fact at all. I mention this because 
if you should
 come across the matter I am now discussing in any book, you would find the 
matter left
 in quite a different state.

CSP: Peirce 1866, Lowell Lecture 7, Chron. Ed. 1, p. 462.

Cf: 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension#Selection_12

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[peirce-l] Doctrine Of Individuals

2011-12-08 Thread Jon Awbrey
, and it is of such a nature that it
| might react, or have reacted, against my will.
|
| This is the stoical definition of a reality;  but since the Stoics were
| individualistic nominalists, this rather favours the satisfactoriness
| of the definition than otherwise.
|
| It may be objected that it is unintelligible;  but in the sense
| in which this is true, it is a merit, since an individual is
| unintelligible in that sense.  It is a brute fact that the
| moon exists, and all explanations suppose the existence
| of that same matter.  That existence is unintelligible
| in the sense in which the definition is so.  That is
| to say, a reaction may be experienced, but it cannot
| be conceived in its character of a reaction;  for
| that element evaporates from every general idea.
|
| According to this definition, that which alone immediately presents itself as
| an individual is a reaction against the will.  But everything whose identity
| consists in a continuity of reactions will be a single logical individual.
| Thus any portion of space, so far as it can be regarded as reacting, is
| for logic a single individual;  its spatial extension is no objection.
|
| With this definition there is no difficulty about the truth that whatever
| exists is individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are
| essentially the same thing;  and whatever fulfills the present definition
| equally fulfills the former definition by virtue of the principles of
| contradiction and excluded middle, regarded as mere definitions of
| the relation expressed by not.
|
| As for the principle of indiscernibles, if two individual things are
| exactly alike in all other respects, they must, according to this
| definition, differ in their spatial relations, since space is
| nothing but the intuitional presentation of the conditions of
| reaction, or of some of them.  But there will be no logical
| hindrance to two things being exactly alike in all other
| respects;  and if they are never so, that is a physical
| law, not a neccesity of logic.  This second definition,
| therefore, seems to be the preferable one.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.613
|
|'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology',
| J.M. Baldwin (ed.), Macmillan, New York, NY,
| Volume 1, pp. 537-538, 2nd edition 1911.

o~o~o~o~o~o

DOI.  Doctrine of Individuals -- 2002

00.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd24.html#04332
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04332.html
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04348.html
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04352.html
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04353.html
05.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04354.html
06.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04363.html

o~o~o~o~o~o

DOI.  Doctrine of Individuals -- 2003

Ontology List

00.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/thrd24.html#04754
01.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04754.html
02.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04756.html
03.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04757.html
04.  http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg04758.html

Inquiry List

00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/thread.html#408
01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000408.html
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000410.html
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000411.html
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000412.html

o~o~o~o~o~o

DOI.  Doctrine of Individuals -- 2005

00.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/thread.html#2320
01.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002320.html
02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002321.html
03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002322.html
04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-January/002323.html

o~o~o~o~o~o

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Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-05 Thread Jon Awbrey
Yes, 1-Dimensional Man and 2 Cultures were part of the canon on the 60s. Later 
I would encounter Polanyi in Personal Tacit Knowledge and Raymond Wilder on 
Mathematics as a Cultural System.

Jon

On Dec 4, 2011, at 10:20 AM, Irving ianel...@iupui.edu wrote:

 Jon,
 
 Just out of curiosity, how, if at all, does C P Snow's work on the two 
 cultures and his argument against the asserted artificial separation between 
 science and the humanities play into this? There is also Snow's rather crude 
 dismissal of mathematics education at Cambridge University, likening the 
 Mathematics Tripos to a horse race.
 
 I recall Judith V. Field's book The invention of Infinity: Mathematics and 
 Art in the Renaissance going far beyond the typical mathematics history 
 textbooks, going in a -- pardon the pun --
 surface skimming way, to show how Renaissance artists used projective 
 geometry to obtain visual perspective in their work.
 
 
 
 - Message from jawb...@att.net -
   Date: Sun, 04 Dec 2011 07:18:24 -0500
   From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
 Reply-To: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ?On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for 
 Semiotic?
 To: Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@semeiosis.org
 
 
 Steven ( All),
 
 I am sympathetic with any effort to bring the humanities and
 the full variety of the sciences, special or unspecial, into
 cross-cultural dialogue with each other. As a matter of fact,
 Susan Awbrey and I have written at length on the scholarship
 of integration and the architectonic difficulties that stand
 in its way, for instance, here:
 
 Awbrey, S.M., and Awbrey, J.L. (May 1991),
 ?An Architecture for Inquiry : Building Computer Platforms for Discovery?,
 Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Technology and
 Education,
 Toronto, Canada, pp. 874?875. Online at
 http://www.abccommunity.org/tmp-a.html

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-12-05 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Peircers,

I would like to return to an earlier point in the discussion
and continue with the thoughts that I had in mind at the time.

JA: One of the things we do in empirical science is collect data.

JA: Data is often collected in the form of relational data bases.
Relational data bases, at their most basic level, are simply
finite sets of relation elements or elementary relations,
which are finite sequences, k-tuples, of a given data type.
It is usual to visualize such a data base as arranged in the
form of a rectangular table with columns and rows, with each
row recording one relation element (k-tuple) and each column
headed by a name for the type of datum that goes in the j-th
place of the k-tuple.

JA: If we ask ourselves: What is the paradigm or pattern of data
appropriate for semiotic? -- the answer is a data table with
three columns, headed Object, Sign, Interpretant. (The
order of the columns does not matter so long as we know what
it is.)

My mind is drawn back to the decade of the 1980s, when at long last
I completed a Master's degree in Mathematics, concentrating as much
as the department would let me on the eminently fascinating and fun
subjects of combinatorics, graph theory, and group theory, and I found
my mind wandering, as it had a habit of doing, back to old interests in
psychology, computation, and artificial intelligence. I spent that decade
cycling through that array of interests at a number of universities in the
Midwest, working a while at the Institute for Social Research in Ann Arbor,
and spending my spare time developing a computer program that was designed
to integrate basic functions of learning and reasoning, that is, empirical
and rational faculties, over a core set of algorithms and data structures.

To be continued ...

Jon

CC: Arisbe, CG, Inquiry, Peirce List

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[peirce-l] “The Relevance Of Peircean Semiotic To Computational Intelligence Augmentation”

2011-12-03 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peter, Peircers, ...

How exciting to return to this topic !

Seeing as how this falls within my chief area of interest for the
past several decades I would like to archive the full discussions
at the old Arisbe-Dev List and also at the Inquiry List that I've
been using to collect my musements on cabbages and kings, et alia,
both of which lists Elijah Wright set up and currently maintains.
So if no one has any objection, I will just go ahead and do that?

Regards,

Jon

CC: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

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[peirce-l] Mathematics, Phenomenology, Normative Science, Metaphysics

2011-11-30 Thread Jon Awbrey

o-o
| |
|  o Metaphysics  |
| /|  |
|/ |  |
|   /  |  |
|Normative Science o   |  |
| / \  |  |
|/   \ |  |
|   / \|  |
|  Mathematics o   o Phenomenology|
| |
| Normative science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;|
| metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science.  |
| |
| Charles Sanders Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 1.186 (1903) |
| |
o-o

Cf. http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2010-June/003640.html

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-26 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Re: Comments by Auke van Breemen

Auke,

I thought it best to go back and recover the context before attempting
to address your comments. The subject of Peirce's categories arose this
time around in connection with Claudio Guerri's comments on the remarks
I made about the paradigm or pattern of data appropriate for semiotic.
For ease of reference that note is recorded here:

http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2011-November/003720.html

Claudio raised an issue that often arises in our discussions of sign relations,
namely, whether there is a correspondence between the roles in a sign relation
(Object, Sign, Interpretant Sign) and Peirce's categories (First, Second, Third)
or whatever names we find most evocative for them.

Although the definition of a sign relation is so highly abstract and general 
that
it certainly leaves room for all sorts of additional relationships to exist 
among
the components and elements of an arbitrary sign relation, it is only those 
extra
relationships that follow logically from the bare definition itself that can 
rank
as essential or necessary properties of sign relations.

Regards,

Jon

AB: You wrote a sentence that raises some questions, at least in my mind.

JA1: An equivocation is a variation in meaning, or a manifold of sign senses,
 and so Peirce's claim that three categories are sufficient amounts to an
 assertion that all manifolds of meaning can be unified in just three steps.

AB: In comparison with the sentence you wrote earlier in the same mail
there are two differences:

JA2: Peirce's claim that three categories are necessary and sufficient
 for the purposes of logic says that a properly designed system of
 logic can resolve all equivocation in just three levels or steps.

AB: a. unification of all manifolds of meaning is not without further
   qualifications the same as disambiguation. So, in principle at
   least I could support JA2 and not support JA1.

AB: b. In JA1 the problem of the meaning of 'meaning' presses itself
   upon the reader, in JA2 meaning is given, the only problem
   that remains is to make a choice between alternatives that
   are supposed to be given.

AB: So, JA1 is a much stronger claim than JA2. Since you wrote in JA2
about levels or steps, but in JA1 just about steps, your claim seems
to amount to the proposition that all manifolds of meaning can be unified
in a single run of a procedure that consists of three steps. Of course
unification can be taken as quite empty (for instance as signs written
on the same sheet are unified, but then unification of all manifolds
of meaning, is rather unsatisfying on the meaning side of the issue.

AB: I am inclined to reason that, given:

JA3: Peirce's distinctive claim is that a type hierarchy of three levels
 is generative of all that we need in logic.

AB: It is possible to design a procedure with the three steps of
JA1 that unifies all manifolds of meaning, not in three steps.

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[peirce-l] Thoughts On Normative Sciences

2011-11-26 Thread Jon Awbrey

A distinction can be made between prescriptive ethics,
which advises what a person should do in absolute terms,
and normative or pragmatic ethics, which advises what
a person should do in order to achieve the admirable or the
good in itself that is determined by a prior consideration
of esthetics. People of the prescriptive persuasion typically
criticize people of the pragmatic persuasion for being misled
by notions of ethics that are far too relative and utilitarian.
Be that as it may, one observes from the pragmatic perspective
that logic is a special case of ethics that provides the norms
for guiding the conduct of our thought in the most optimal way.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] [Inquiry] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-23 Thread Jon Awbrey
 is that a type hierarchy of three levels is generative of all that we need
in logic.

Part of the justification for Peirce's claim that three categories are both
necessary and sufficient appears to arise from mathematical facts about the
reducibility of k-adic relations. With regard to necessity, triadic relations
cannot be completely analyzed in terms or monadic and dyadic predicates. With
regard to sufficiency, all higher arity k-adic relations can be analyzed in
terms of triadic and lower arity relations.

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-22 Thread Jon Awbrey

Claudio, List ...

I realize that many of us have been through these sorts of discussions
many times before, so let me just highlight what I consider to be some
of the most important points.

1. We must not confuse the roles in a sign relation or the components
   of a sign relational 3-tuple, that is, Object, Sign, Interpretant,
   with the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness.
   These two sets of concepts reside at very different logical levels,
   as one can tell from the fact that Peirce described his Categories
   as Predicaments, that is, predicates of predicates.

Cf. http://mywikibiz.com/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Theory_of_categories

Sorry, I have to break here ...

Jon

CG = Claudio Guerri

CG: I apologize for not having participated in slow reading yet...
I have a very 'heavy' year...
but just by chance I have read Jon's post...

CG: Of course, I agree on the need of collecting data, but since we are in
Semiotics, and in a Peirce List, I consider more important to organize
data in an explicit, logic, and relational way.

CG: The double entry, three column, data table is of course a good way of
presenting it, and there is already a long experience on that devise
called: the Semiotic Nonagon (I have written already about this subject
on this List, I have to admit... with very low success).
But the order of the columns and rows should not be changed from the
logical sequence of 1ness, 2ness, and 3ness or we will lose the logical
relation of the parts.

CG: Of course, Peirce was not fond of that idea... or he would have draw
that table himself, since he worked out the 10 classes 'triangle' and
worked on existential graphs. The construction of a 9 square grid means
a 'flattening' of Peirce's very complex philosophical proposal... but
also, the possibility of a practical use of the very fruitful Peircean
semiotic proposal.

CG: I don't know if the SN that follows can be seen, but something SIMILAR
was already shown by different scholars, beginning by Max Bense in the
60's, but with a very wrong idea, that is: to show the 9 aspects of the
sign in 'some graphical order'... If the purpose is limited to this
intention, it is a severe distortion of Peirce's philosophical proposal,
that should probably been represented in an hiperspatial diagram... but
then, very difficult or impossible for practical use.

...

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-14 Thread Jon Awbrey

Jerry,

As far as grammar goes, I read semiotic as formed on the pattern of logic
and I read semiotics as formed on the pattern of mathematics.  US speakers
typically abbreviate mathematics as math while UK speakers call it maths.
I have no idea what to make of that.

The definition of a sign relation that Peirce gives is highly general.
The concept of determination implied in it is a formal determination,
much like the sense of determination in x points determine y lines.
It covers all the species of informational and causal determination
that I can imagine, but who knows what species might evolve one day?

Taking the question of one or many more substantially than grammatically,
the definition of a sign relation is much like the definition of another
very important species of triadic relations that arises in mathematics,
namely, the axioms that define a mathematical group. They are alike in
the sense that many different sign relations satisfy the definition of
a sign relation, just as many different groups satisfy the definition
of a group.

When it comes to the idiomatic expressions that we can scarcely help using
even in formal definitions, I wouldn't try to make too much hay out of them.

Jon

JA: Peirce's most detailed definition of a sign relation,
namely, the one given in 2 variants in NEM 4, 20-21  54.

CSP: Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will 
be
 given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a 
line
 as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of 
time.
 Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its 
interpretant sign
 determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with 
something, C,
 its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this 
definition, together
 with a definition of formal, that I deduce mathematically the principles 
of logic.

JC: My question is simple and regards the singular and the plural as 
grammatical units.

JC: In the sentence, Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic.,
is the term 'semiotic' singular or plural?

JC: Did CSP assert that only one formal semiotic exists?
Or, does this sentence allow for multiple formal semiotics?

JC: For example, would the formal semiotic of Aristotelian causality
be necessarily the same as the formal semiotic of material causality?
By extension, signs for music, dance, electrical circuits, genetics,...;
the same formal semiotic or different?

JC: This sentence reflects on the meaning of the following sentence:

CSP: Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B,...

JC: In short, what is the nature of the active process of brings -
the same meaning for all formal semiotic, or is the fetching
process tailor-made for the category of the sign?

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-13 Thread Jon Awbrey

Kirsti,

I was of course thinking of the pragmatic maxim,
which is a regulative principle whose function
is to guide the conduct of thought toward the
object of its aim, advising the addressee on
a way to “attain clearness of apprehension”.

http://knol.google.com/k/pragmatic-maxim

That is why Peirce calls it a maxim of logic,
in other words, placing it among the norms of
the normative science whose objective is truth.

As abstractions from the concrete experience of inquiry,
descriptive and normative aspects of inquiry are united
in the act itself, since the normative rules of inquiry
are precepts for clarifying descriptions and concepts.

Jon

P.S. I don't know if you were signed on for the earlier posts
of this slow reading, but I archived most of what I had to say
with regard to descriptive and normative faces of semiotics at
this site:

http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2011-November/thread.html

Määttänen Kirsti wrote:

 Jon,

 Thanks for bringing into my attention 'maxim', in relation to 'precept'.

 I'm not so sure, though, that 'precept' and 'maxim' are interchangeable.
 So-called synonyms seldom, if ever, are. The relation between synonyms
 I view as something depicted in Venn's diagrams. There is an overlap,
 but always partial.

 To my mind, with precept, the meaning 'rule of conduct' is the dominant one,
 while with maxim 'a well-known truth (etc), comes to the fore. - I may be 
wrong,
 of course.

 You are interested in the distinction between 'concept' and 'precept',
 as well as in the distinction between descriptive and normative.
 I, for my part, am not so much interested in the distinction.
 Rather, I'm interested in the nature of the relation between
 these. - Which, of course, are interrelated.

 Could you be a bit more explicit with taking this bringing us
 to the distinction between descriptive and normative. -
 Do you think concepts are descriptive?

 Kirsti

 On 13.11.2011, at 6.00, Jon Awbrey wrote:

 Kirsti,

 Another word for precept is maxim.

 The distinction between concept and precept
 brings us again to the distinction between
 descriptive and normative.

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-12 Thread Jon Awbrey

Kirsti,

Another word for precept is maxim.

The distinction between concept and precept
brings us again to the distinction between
descriptive and normative.

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Peirce List,

Here is the reply I made to John Sowa's earlier remarks on the CG List:

I am not saying that Peirce didn't use the word formal in
the same sense as *some* 20th century logicians. But not all
subsequent philosophers of logic and mathematics used the word
formal in the same sense as that, or even all the time, and it
often becomes necessary in certain discussions to point that out.

It is clear that one of the connotations of formal for Peirce
is non-psychological, but that is precisely to differentiate
the normative science of logic from the descriptive science
of psychology.

It is also necessary to distinguish Peirce's use of formal semiotics,
referring to the forms of sign relations that connect objects with signs
and their interpretant signs, from any use of formal to suggest wholly
detached from all connection to meanings or objects or purposes outside the
sheer game of manipulating meaningless tokens according to arbitrary rules,
because there have arisen now and again tendencies to use formal that way.

Jon

---

JA = Jon Awbrey
JS = John Sowa

JA: Those remarks were tailored to the ears of a particular body of readers
who are accustomed to hearing the word formal used as something akin
to a pejorative term, as in mere formalism or merely formalistic.

JS: But note the date of 1869 -- that was a year before Peirce's famous
paper on relatives.  It was also ten years before Frege's famous
Begriffsschrift, which everybody cites as the first complete version
of FOL with the first complete *formal* rules of inference.

CSP (1869):
All that the formal logician has to say is, that if facts capable
of expression in such and such forms of words are true, another
fact whose expression is related in a certain way to the expression
of these others is also true The proposition ‘If A, then B’ may
conveniently be regarded as equivalent to ‘Every case of the truth
of A is a case of the truth of B.’”

JS: See http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html for the full article.

JS: He used the word 'formal' several times in that article, and in
each case, he used it in the same sense as the 20th century logicians.
He also contrasted that use with psychological discussions of 'thought'.

JA: But Peirce also used the word formal in another, more specialized sense,
in which it became the practical equivalent of normative. In that sense,
his definition of logic as formal semiotic places logic within the sphere
of the normative sciences, where it normally belongs.

JS: Peirce was very precise in his choice of worlds.  He often referred to
logic as normative.  Since he frequently used both words, one should not
assume that he might sometimes use one of them to mean the same as the
other.  In the following statement, he would have written 'normative'
if that had been the point he was trying to make:

CSP: Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will 
be
 given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a 
line
 as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of 
time.

JS: Here he is using the word 'formal' in contrast with a psychological 
interpretation.
He makes a similar contrast in his earlier article of 1869.  Since he is 
trying to
make a similar point both articles, the most reasonable interpretation is 
that he
is using the word 'formal' in the same sense.

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Peirce List,

I copied some of my earlier comments on the current slow reading to
the Conceptual Graphs list, and John Sowa made a number of pertinent
remarks that he asked me to forward, so I will include the CG List on
my copy list for the time being.

Here is John's first reply:

On 11/7/2011 2:30 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

One of the continuing problems that we have in reading Peirce is the fact that
logical atomists, logical positivists, and later writers tend to attach rather
different meanings to words like formal, logical atom, and positive than
Peirce did himself.

The meaning of formal is especially critical for the present discussion,
since it figures most prominently in Peirce's most detailed definition of
a sign relation, namely, the one given in 2 variants in NEM 4, 20-21  54.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line
as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.


I agree that Peirce often used words in ways that are different from
common current usage.  But in this example, he used the word 'formal'
in the same sense as modern logicians and computer scientists.

Following is another quotation by CSP, in which he uses the word
'formal' in the modern sense.  And he wrote it in 1869.  Compare
that to what Tarski wrote in 1936:


Peirce (1869):  “All that the formal logician has to say is, that
if facts capable of expression in such and such forms of words are
true, another fact whose expression is related in a certain way
to the expression of these others is also true The proposition
‘If A, then B’ may conveniently be regarded as equivalent to
‘Every case of the truth of A is a case of the truth of B.’”

Tarski (1936):  “In terms of these concepts [of model],
we can define the concept of logical consequence as follows:
The sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the class K
if and only if every model of the class K is also a model of the class X.”


John

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Peirce List,

Here is John Sowa's second reply to comments shared on the CG List:

On 11/8/2011 12:18 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
 Those remarks were tailored to the ears of a particular body of readers
 who are accustomed to hearing the word formal used as something akin
 to a pejorative term, as in mere formalism or merely formalistic.

But note the date of 1869 -- that was a year before Peirce's famous
paper on relatives.  It was also ten years before Frege's famous
Begriffsschrift, which everybody cites as the first complete version
of FOL with the first complete *formal* rules of inference.

CSP (1869)
 All that the formal logician has to say is, that if facts capable
 of expression in such and such forms of words are true, another
 fact whose expression is related in a certain way to the expression
 of these others is also true The proposition ‘If A, then B’ may
 conveniently be regarded as equivalent to ‘Every case of the truth
 of A is a case of the truth of B.’”

See http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html for the full article.

He used the word 'formal' several times in that article, and in each
case, he used it in the same sense as the 20th c logicians.  He also
contrasted that use with psychological discussions of 'thought'.

JA
 But Peirce also used the word formal in another, more specialized sense,
 in which it became the practical equivalent of normative. In that sense,
 his definition of logic as formal semiotic places logic within the sphere
 of the normative sciences, where it normally belongs.

Peirce was very precise in his choice of worlds.  He often referred to
logic as normative.  Since he frequently used both words, one should not
assume that he might sometimes use one of them to mean the same as the
other.  In the following statement, he would have written 'normative'
if that had been the point he was trying to make:

CSP
 Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
 given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line
 as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.

Here he is using the word 'formal' in contrast with a psychological
interpretation.  He makes a similar contrast in his earlier article
of 1869.  Since he is trying to make a similar point both articles,
the most reasonable interpretation is that he is using the word
'formal' in the same sense.

John

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Peirce List, CG List,

It's a little too late for Halloween, but probably about time to revisit our 
old friend,
Peirce's skeleton diagram, that often pops up in connection with his use of 
formal.

CSP: Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another 
name for
 semiotic (Greek semeiotike), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of 
signs.
 By describing the doctrine as quasi-necessary, or formal, I mean that we 
observe
 the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by 
a process
 which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, 
eminently
 fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what 
must be the
 characters of all signs used by a scientific intelligence, that is to 
say, by an
 intelligence capable of learning by experience. As to that process of 
abstraction,
 it is itself a sort of observation.

CSP: The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which ordinary 
people perfectly
 recognize, but for which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly 
leave room. It is
 a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something quite 
beyond his present
 means, and to follow that wish by the question, Should I wish for that 
thing just the same,
 if I had ample means to gratify it? To answer that question, he searches 
his heart, and in
 doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He makes in his 
imagination a sort of
 skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what 
modifications the hypothetical
 state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then 
examines it, that is, observes
 what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be 
discerned. By such a
 process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we can 
reach conclusions as
 to what would be true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence 
using them was scientific.

C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 2.227. (Eds. Note. From an unidentified fragment, 
c. 1897)

Cf. 
http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory_talk:Jon_Awbrey/Projects/Notes_And_Queries#Excerpt_1.__Peirce_.28CP_2.227.29

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
  On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
  http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

Peirce List, CG List,

Without meaning to jump ahead of the slow reading, let me just give
a preview of coming attractions by way of justifying the time a few
of us have been spending trying to tease out the shades of meaning
in Peirce's concept of the formal.

JR: Let me now explain why I think the ideas of the empirical,
the experiential, and the experimental can be disentangled
from the complex of dubious distinctions and restrictions we
usually associate with them, such that it is possible for us
to regard all applied semiotics as empirical semiotics, which
means, in effect, that the term empirical semiotics can cease
to function as a term of contrast, and the semiotics movement in
general thereby take a further step in the direction of unity. [8]

JR: Now let us note three ideas which are implicit in
the ideas of learning from trying out or attempting.

JR: First, there is the idea of a certain possibility which is entertained
seriously enough by the tryer to warrant actually making trial of it to
see if there is any truth in it: in other words, there is implicit here
the idea of a question to be answered, or a hypothesis to be verified or
disverified.

JR: Second, there is the idea of something other than or external to the tryer
and his/her hypothesis, something with a being of its own which may turn out
to be in agreement with what the tryer is trying to do or is testing, but 
which
may turn out to be obstinately other than the tryer anticipates it as being;
something stubborn, autonomous, independent: in short, the root idea of the
brute fact against which the hypothesis may be dashed and perhaps destroyed
or modified.

JR: Then, third, there is the idea of learning which takes place in virtue of
the trial, a modification of the learner and his or her ideas which results
from the attempt, be it a success or a failure: the root idea of 
verification
and disverification, not in the rarefied formal logical sense but rather in 
the
more basic sense that the attempt will in fact tend to reinforce or to 
alter or
to weaken the tryer's confidence or belief in the actuality of the 
possibility
entertained and acted upon. [9]

We have the assertion that it is possible for us to regard all applied 
semiotics as
empirical semiotics, in other words, the study of semiosis as a process of 
learning
to accept or reject hypotheses through concrete interaction with external 
realities,
as opposed to inference in a rarefied formal logical sense.

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-07 Thread Jon Awbrey

Jerry,

I remember NEM listing for something like a King's Ransom,
like a lot of books out of Hyperborea.  I was lucky enough
to find all but the 1st volume in a used bookstore years ago,
but I do not know if there are any online alternatives today.

The analogy that connects the arity of relations and relative terms with
the valence of chemical atoms is one that Peirce exploited to good effect
in his logical graphs, entitative and existential, but all good analogies
must come to their breaking points sooner or later, frequently cracking on
both sides of the equation, and I can remember that valence bond theory was
already giving way to molecular orbital theory way back when I was in school.

In the section where I quoted Peirce's NEM 4 definition of the sign relation,
I saw a need to flesh out his text with the necessary glosses on the meanings
of the other terms he invoked, especially the notions of correspondence and
and determination that he used elsewhere and that it would take to complete
the sense of what he wrote.

Regards,

Jon


Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Irving, Jon, List:

Thanks for your posts on CSP and Logic.

Irving: after reading your recent papers and your post here, I am curious about 
a two questions:

Do you have a crisp exposition on what factors separate CSP's notion of logic 
from Hilbert's formalizations?

Do you have a personal definition of inference?

Jon:

Thanks for posting NEM 4, 20-21.
I do not have NEM in my library and now wonder if I should purchase it.

In reading CSPs various writings, I find that he had a deep understanding of 
the logic of chemistry and his rhetoric about logic was consistent with the 
understanding of chemistry as it stood in his time. This includes the quote 
from NEM 4, 20-21.

In reading your website, 
Cf. http://mywikibiz.com/Sign_relation#Definition


I find that your narrative is not consistent with chemical signs in the sense 
of Things - Representation - Form and the calculations used by CSP to relate 
empirical observations to iconic representations.
Thus, I conclude that you are adding something to CSPs meanings. 


Cheers

Jerry


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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-07 Thread Jon Awbrey

JR = Joe Ransdell
SE = Steven Ericsson-Zenith

Joseph Ransdell,
On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

JR: The thesis of my paper is that it is doubtful that any distinction
should be drawn between empirical and nonempirical semiotics or even
between experimental and nonexperimental semiotics. Doing so tends to
reproduce within the semiotics movement the present academic distinction
between the sciences and the humanities which semiotics should aim at
discouraging, rather than reinforcing. But to overcome this undesirable
dichotomy, it is necessary to disentangle the conceptions of the 
experiential,
the experimental and the empirical from certain other complexes of ideas 
with
which they have become associated by accident rather than necessity.

SE: I confess that on first reading the phrase it is doubtful that caused me 
some problems.
I think it dilutes the impact of the paper and reveals a caution that I 
think is unnecessary.
This is, I believe, because Ransdell is addressing a community of American 
philosophers,
a European thinker would have been more confidently assertive.

One of my favorite (philosophical) activities all throughout my undergrad years
was a mental exercise I called erasing distinctions or seeing coincidences,
and in that old spirit I found myself initially sympathetic with the project of
seeking continuities between the humanities and the sciences, especially with
regard to the spectrum of semiotic studies.

But I lack the skill at erasing distinctions that I used to have, and one that
I can remember trying to smudge as best I could to no truly long-lasting avail
was the distinction between policy and theory, ought and is, in short, the
difference between normative sciences and descriptive sciences.

I'll be reading descriptive, empirical, positive, and special
as near enough synonyms in regard to sciences and fields of study as
will permit us to ignore the slight shades of difference among them.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-07 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peirce used the word formal in a couple of senses, the first of which
is closer to its general meaning of concerned with form, and here he
can mean either the forms of objects or the forms of syntax, whereas
the tradition following Russell tends to focus on syntax exclusively.
In that sense of formal, Peirce's concept of logic as formal semiotic
would incorporate both the syntactic or proof-theoretic forms of Russell
and the semantic or model-theoretic forms of Tarski.

But Peirce also used the word formal in another, more specialized sense,
in which it became the practical equivalent of normative. In that sense,
his definition of logic as formal semiotic places logic within the sphere
of the normative sciences, where it normally belongs.

Jon

CC: Arisbe, Inquiry, Conceptual Graphs, Peirce List

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Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-07 Thread Jon Awbrey

Good One!

That reminds me, I should probably correct what I wrote before to say
that the definition of formal figures prominently in the definition
of logic as formal semiotics, but not essentially in the definition of
semiotics itself, which has both descriptive and normative subdivisions.

Jon

Benjamin Udell wrote:

Aye, and let's recall Peirce's definition of normal

...the 'normal' is not the average (or any other kind of mean) of what 
actually occurs,

 but of what _would_, in the long run, occur under certain circumstances.
 - c. 1909 MS, _Collected Papers_ v. 6, paragraph 327.


Best, Ben

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Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2011 12:30 AM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”



Peirce used the word formal in a couple of senses, the first of which 
is closer to its general meaning of concerned with form, and here he 
can mean either the forms of objects or the forms of syntax, whereas 
the tradition following Russell tends to focus on syntax exclusively. 
In that sense of formal, Peirce's concept of logic as formal semiotic 
would incorporate both the syntactic or proof-theoretic forms of Russell 
and the semantic or model-theoretic forms of Tarski.


But Peirce also used the word formal in another, more specialized sense, 
in which it became the practical equivalent of normative. In that sense, 
his definition of logic as formal semiotic places logic within the sphere 
of the normative sciences, where it normally belongs. 


Jon

CC: Arisbe, Inquiry, Conceptual Graphs, Peirce List


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Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-06 Thread Jon Awbrey

Gary, Irving, Steven, and All,

One of the continuing problems that we have in reading Peirce is the fact that
logical atomists, logical positivists, and later writers tend to attach rather
different meanings to words like formal logical atom, and positive than
Peirce did himself.

The meaning of formal is especially critical for the present discussion,
since it figures most prominently in Peirce's most detailed definition of
a sign relation, namely, the one given in 2 variants in NEM 4, 20-21  54.

Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. A definition of a sign will be
given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line
as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time.
Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with 
something, C,
its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, 
together
with a definition of formal, that I deduce mathematically the principles of 
logic.
I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of 
logic, and
show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological
conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not 
generally
recognized. (C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, 20–21).

Cf. http://mywikibiz.com/Sign_relation#Definition

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Re: [peirce-l] community of inquiry

2011-11-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

John,

I have missed all the earlier messages on this thread due to some
changes in my email service, but I think I recall Royce using the
phrase community of interpretation.

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities

2011-10-19 Thread Jon Awbrey

SN = Sally Ness

SN: Regarding psychology, your comments led me to realize that the independence
Peirce wanted to declare for logic in relation to psychological phenomena
may have had consequences for the way in which other social sciences are
understood in relation to Perice's logic as well, if psychology is taken
as representative of all the social sciences in some way.  This is quite
a thought, and my first response would be, hold on a minute!  I wonder
if others have reflected on this.

The critical distinction is that between a descriptive science and a normative 
science,
psychology being one example of many descriptive sciences and logic being one 
of the
Big Three normative sciences, along with Ethics and Aesthetics.  Even though 
Logic
and Psychology have a large degree of overlap in the phenomena they treat, they
view it with very distinct aims in mind.

SN: In my view, psychology would be the weakest candidate for
representing the social sciences in general, focused as it
has been on subject-matter that typically, in the mainstreams
of the discipline, has been defined as basically individual in
character (individual psyches).  It would seem to have a special
relationship to philosophy and to logic that is not replicated in
the other social sciences in this regard. I haven't thought this
through enough to say more, but I thank you for bringing it to
my attention.

I did once get a Masters in Psychology from a College of Social Science.
We used to call it the Octopus because there were eight specializations
that one could choose from. I was in Quantitative, which was mostly just
statistics and systems theory, but I took a well-tempered mix of Clinical,
Cognitive, and Industrial-Organizational. There was also Developmental,
Experimental-General, Humanistic, and Social-Personality Psychology.

Regards,

Jon

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[peirce-l] Occupy Evolution

2011-10-16 Thread Jon Awbrey

So a miser is a beneficent power in a community, is he?
With the same reason precisely, only in a much higher degree,
you might pronounce the Wall Street sharp to be a good angel,
who takes money from heedless persons not likely to guard it
properly, who wrecks feeble enterprises better stopped, and
who administers wholesome lessons to unwary scientific men,
by passing worthless checks upon them -- as you did, the other
day, to me, my millionaire Master in glomery, when you thought
you saw your way to using my process without paying for it, and of
so bequeathing to your children something to boast about of their
father -- and who by a thousand wiles puts money at the service of
intelligent greed, in his own person. Bernard Mandeville, in his
Fable of the Bees, maintains that private vices of all descriptions
are public benefits, and proves it, too, quite as cogently as the
economist proves his point concerning the miser. He even argues, with
no slight force, that but for vice civilization would never have existed.
In the same spirit, it has been strongly maintained and is today widely
believed that all acts of charity and benevolence, private and public,
go seriously to degrade the human race.

Charles S. Peirce, Evolutionary Love,
'The Monist', vol. 3, pp. 176-200 (1893)

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.htm

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Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic”

2011-10-06 Thread Jon Awbrey

NH: But eventually we'll want to push on and one interesting question we may 
want
to consider is what JR means by Peirce's basic semiotic model. He refers to 
this,
although in different terms, on pp. 2, 3, and 8, and maybe elsewhere. 
Frequently
it is supposed that the basic semiotic model is the triadic relational 
structure
derived from mathematics but on p. 8 JR says that Peirce's basic model is 
derived
from the truth-seeking tendency in human life.

Nathan,

Just off hand I do not see a conflict here.  It was my impression from reading 
Peirce's
early papers, especially the Harvard and Lowell lectures from 1865-1866, that 
Peirce was
trying to understand the logic that informed scientific modes of inquiry, set 
implicitly
within a theory of inquiry in general, and that it was pursuant to the task of 
analyzing
the process of inquiry, truth-seeking, that he found himself having to 
investigate the
nature of signs.

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 6

2011-10-05 Thread Jon Awbrey

Steven, Jerry, and All --

Re: Communicational Communities

The etymology of community tells us that munus means duty, gift, or service,
so the original idea seems rooted in concepts of common duty and shared service.

http://depthome.brooklyn.cuny.edu/classics/gladiatr/origins.htm

Our notion of communication appears to be a derivative of that, referring
to the sort of signaling we do in order to coordinate collaborative work.
So it doesn't seem like a complete tautology to reconnect those two ideas.

Jon

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

I agree with Jerry's concern here and have a similar internal debate going on. Mine centers on the very notion of 
communication which appears to me to be a way of speaking about the pair: expression and apprehension. So that when 
speaking of communication in communities (or any other sense) one may be speaking about these pairs as they effect 
individuals in the information theoretic sense. Communities infers communication between a group of 
individuals and so I do see the notion of Communicational Communities as redundant.

I can conceive of distributive as a property of expression within a community and 
collective as the sum of expression by a community but otherwise I cannot associate these notions 
with communication.

With respect,
Steven  

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Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic”

2011-10-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

NH = Nathan Houser
JR = Joe Ransdell

NH: Let me make a quick reply and later when I have more time I'll go back to
Joe's paper to see if he may have had something like what you say in mind.
I suppose a lot depends on precisely what Joe meant by directly concerned
with semiotic when he wrote that 90% of Peirce's philosophical output was
directly concerned with semiotic. And also on how much he was limiting the
scope of his claim by his qualifying reference to Peirce's philosophical
output. It would seem that to be directly concerned with semiotic is to
be about semiotic, not just involved with sign usage. We wouldn't normally
say, for example, that in completing one's tax return one is directly
concerned with mathematics. I certainly think it is plausible to regard
all of Peirce's writings about normative logic as semiotic works (I do not
include the mathematical theory of relations in normative logic) but it 
seems
to me that the rationale for Peirce's classification of the sciences 
precludes
counting writings about phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics as belonging to
semiotic proper, and this goes as well for the sciences that come after 
logic,
including his metaphysical writings. Since mathematics, psychology, and 
physics
are not philosophical sciences, presumably Joe was not including Peirce's
considerable contributions in those areas.

NH: Having said this, I nevertheless agree that a great deal of Peirce's 
philosophical output
does, at least in part, deal directly with semiotic but I believe it is 
considerably less
that 90%. I suspect this is in part because I do not believe that the bulk 
of Peirce's
metaphysical writings can correctly be said to be directly concerned with 
semiotic.
But, as I said, when I get more time I'll look at this question more 
carefully with more
consideration of the breakdown between works on philosophy and works in 
other sciences and
I'll see if I can get a better sense of how Joe defended, or would have 
defended, his claim.
Perhaps there has been relevant discussion in earlier slow reads.

Nathan,

I suppose I read the phrase his prodigious philosophical output to be a 
general way
of saying his thought and work rather than focusing on the more restrictive 
meanings
of the word philosophy, as in works falling under particular numbers of a 
catalog, say.
But reading Ransdell's note 2, I see both senses appearing again under the 
designations of
philosophical interest and on philosophy, so I despair of drawing any hard 
and fast line.

JR: [Note 2] The manuscript material now (1997) comes to more than a hundred 
thousand pages.
These contain many pages of no philosophical interest, but the number of 
pages on philosophy
certainly number much more than half of that. Also, a significant but 
unknown number of
manuscripts have been lost.

I see -- now -- the other sense of concerned with that you are indicating 
here.
Still, a channel swimmer must be as concerned with the waters in which she swims
as she is with the farther shore.  So I guess it comes down to word directly,
which I confess I probably just sloughed over in my casual reading.  Then again:

JR: For Peirce, everything was grist for semiotic

That makes of semiotic neither wheat or chaff but the mill.

Oh well ...

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities

2011-10-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Sally,

Thanks for all your detailed work on this reading.
I can't imagine that our meta-debate on the meaning
of the word debate will dissipate entirely, since
it appears to be yet another one of those perennial
recurrences. I know a person who would often object
to my use of the word discussion instead of his
preference for conversation or dialogue on the
grounds that its etymology meant to shake apart
and he thought that implied an excess of violence.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic”

2011-10-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

NH = Nathan Houser

NH: JR began this paper by pointing out that Peirce conceived of semiotics
as a foundational theory capable of unifying sub-theories dealing with
communication, meaning, and inference.  This may call for some discussion.
He then claims that 90% of Peirce's prodigious philosophical output is
directly concerned with semiotic.  This is an odd claim in a way since it
does not seem to be straightforwardly true. How can we make sense of it?

From my sense of Peirce's work, I would have say that I agree with the claim
that Joe makes on this point, even if I can't say whether it would be for any
of the same reasons he had in mind.  Understanding Peirce's pragmatism depends
on understanding sign relations, triadic relations, and relations in general,
all of which forms the conceptual framework of his theory of inquiry and his
theory of signs.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Academic Capitalism

2011-10-01 Thread Jon Awbrey

Gene,

Thank you for the link to your insightful essay.
The paragraph from C. Wright Mills was so striking
that I couldn't resist re-citing it in another context
where we have been discussing these ever-recurring issues.

PolicyMic : The Next Credit Crisis : Mary Dowell-Jones
http://www.policymic.com/group/showCompetition/id/1806#comment-18643

Regards,

Jon

Eugene Halton wrote:

Here is something I wrote earlier this week on centralized power that relates 
at another angle:
http://www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/2011/09/the-megapower-elite/

Gene

-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2011 3:28 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Academic 
Capitalism

Sadly I agree with Jon's sense of despondency concerning the war on science. 

The problem, however, is the product of central planning. As a consequence we are Serfs (Hayek). Looking for a prescriptive solution that is other than the simple devolution of this centralized system will only make matters worse. 


With respect,
Steven


On Sep 30, 2011, at 7:06 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:


Sally, Gene,  All,

In relation to the purpose of a university and what's been happening to it 
lately,
I earlier mentioned the themes of academic capitalism and the war on 
science.

JA 30 Aug 2011
I think it is reasonable to be concerned with distorting influences
on research and scholarship, whether we find them in the sciences or
in the other disciplines.  Looking around, the conflicts of interest
appear to grow more pushy and more pervasive every day.  I'm thinking
of cautionary tales like Slaughter and Leslie on Academic Capitalism,
or Chris Mooney in The Republican War on Science, just to name two
that other contexts of discussion are constantly bringing to mind.

But the question was:  What to do about it?

It appears that further inquiry is called for.
/JA

Here is a paper that summarizes the issues of academic capitalism:

Susan M. Awbrey,
Making the 'Invisible Hand' Visible:
The Case for Dialogue About Academic Capitalism
http://www2.oakland.edu/oujournal/files/5_Awbrey.pdf

I fear that the situation has grown far worse since the time that
paper was written, but it depresses me too much to talk about it,
so I'll just leave it at that until I recover some trace of hope.

Regards,

Jon


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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Sincerity

2011-09-20 Thread Jon Awbrey

Sally  All,

Just a brief note on the question of sincerity. A useful set of concepts for 
discussing
this issue can be found in the work of Argyris and Schön, where they make a 
distinction
between espoused goals, values, etc. and enacted or actual goals, values, 
etc.
In these terms, honesty, integrity, sincerity, etc. would be measures of 
coherence
or consistency between the espoused and the enacted.

Jon

Sally Ness wrote:

Segment 4

Dear List,

This post will address paragraphs 18 to 21 of the paper, Sciences as 
Communicational Communities.  The paragraphs are reproduced below in 
their entirety.  As I have mentioned before, this segment appears to be 
the crux of the paper, where JR lays out his vision of scientific 
communication (similar in most respects to that already discussed in 
this slow read in relation to the paper, Peirce and the Socratic 
Tradition).  He then formulates his understanding of the relation of 
scientific communication to academia, and delivers his key insight 
regarding how, in practice, scientific communication can be maintained, 
despite the realities confronted in academic institutions.


JR makes four important points in these paragraphs about the character 
of scientific communication:


1) [P18] Scientific communication must be sincere.  Otherwise multiple 
perspectives on the subject-matter will fail to cohere in a coordinated 
manner, and the subject-matter will cease to control inquiry.


2) [P19] Scientific communication must be about subject-matter that is 
unitary and real.  Otherwise, the subject-matter itself will fail to 
produce a coherence of perspectives.


3) [P19] Scientific communication must evidence objectivity, which can 
be defined both as an attitude of the inquirer and as a formal feature 
of the inquiry process.   Otherwise, communication will tend toward chaos.


4) [P20] Scientific communication must regard all (sincere) participants 
as being peers, equal with respect to both the shared public 
understanding of the community's subject matter and with regard to being 
entitled to respect in relation to the perspectives they contribute to 
the community's communication.  Otherwise the coordination of 
perspectives will become deranged (fail to cohere as the subject-matter, 
in truth, would dictate).


JR then concludes with a final point about the relation between 
scientific communication and academia:


5) [P21] While the fundamentally hierarchical character of academia 
inevitably plagues the sciences, corrupting and compromising its 
practices, the norms of science remain unchanged by this corruption and 
stand in enduring opposition to those of academia.


In this section, JR sets forward an alternative to the academic 
politician's negotiational view of the relation between scientific 
inquiry and academia.  He grants that science is generally situated in 
academic contexts that disease and deform it politically. However, JR 
does not recognize the same degree of integration occurring at the 
science/academic interface that the sociologist of knowledge does.  In 
JR's view, this interface does not permeate the sciences so completely 
as to have modified the community's basic norms of conduct.  As a 
result, it is still possible to conceive of living a scientific life 
while also maintaining a separate status as a professor.  The two 
identities may come into conflict when their norms are not in harmony, 
but they nonetheless each have their own discrete character.


In this final point, JR is able to explain how the authoritarian, 
hierarchically-oriented, politically-governed behavior that scientists 
have been accurately documented as occasionally (even habitually) 
exhibiting can be seen to occur while science in general can remain 
apolitical.  Because scientific norms remain uncorrupted and 
uninfluenced by academia, it is possible for scientists, even if they 
are also professors, to engage in scientific inquiry according to the 
norms of a scientific life proper.  If they fail to do so, it is because 
they fail to conduct themselves according to the norms of science, not 
because science is nothing but a negotiational endeavor.


A few questions arise in relation to JR's views presented in this segment:

*  How distinctly is JR speaking in the spirit of Peirce here, with 
regard to his 4-fold definition of scientific communication?  Does 
Peirce place the same kind of stress on each of these four points as JR 
does?  Is there any deviation or inclination, however subtle, that might 
identify a Ransdellian take on Peirce here?  Would Short, or Ketner, or 
Houser, or de Tienne, or Apel, or deWaal, or even Eco, or other 
interpreters of Peirce put it quite the same way?


* What, exactly, is unitary subject-matter as JR employs the term? A 
great deal is hanging on this concept, it would seem. Is inorganic 
subject-matter more unitary than organic subject-matter?  If so, that 
would explain why the hard sciences have the superior 

Re: [peirce-l] Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Objectivity

2011-09-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

Sally  All,

Some of us are slower readers than others ...

To tell the truth, I haven't been having much time to do more than skim,
so let me just mention a few thoughts that come to mind while doing that.

I am constantly reminded of this favorite line from Peirce:

No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.

-- C.S. Peirce (1861), My Life, (Chron. Ed. 1, p. 3)

The question of Objects, Objectives, and Objectivity is a persistent one.

The Latin-rooted English object springs from deeper roots in the Greek 
pragma.
It was a personal revelation to me on first looking into Liddell and Scott and
reading all the meanings and ramifications of that pragmatic semantic complex:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma

It is especially the senses of the word object that refer to aims and 
purposes,
in other words, intentional objects and objects of intention, that we are likely
to miss if we don't remind ourselves of their pertinence to pragmatic thinking.

Regards,

Jon

--

Jon Awbrey wrote:

Sally  All,

As I recall, one of Joe's abiding concerns was the idea that science
refers to an objective world of real things, perhaps real possibles,
as opposed to any kind of radical constructivism, Sophistic relativism,
or so-called consensual theory of truth.  So say we all, I'm guessing.
However much we construct or invent our humanly erratic signs of reality,
the reality itself is independent of our vagaries and our vicissitudes.

That would be just my guess at this point.

Jon

Sally Ness wrote:

Jon, List,

Thanks much for this response.

With regard to the first question, since it is most likely not a 
dualism between discovery and invention that JR had in mind, what 
would be the alternative.  He wouldn't have italicized discovery had 
he not meant to contrast it with something else.  Or, perhaps, there 
is a better way to read this passage?


With regard to the second question, the logic/rhetoric distinction you 
mention would seem to fit.  Thanks for bringing this out.


Sally


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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Objectivity

2011-09-09 Thread Jon Awbrey

Bill  All,

That definition of objective merges well with the definition
of real that Peirce derived from Scholastic sources, namely,
the real is that which has properties. The full strength of
this definition is clear if we stress the sense of proper
in properties, that which is proper to a thing, its own.

It is no coincidence that this very sense of proper is
conveyed by the German function word eigen. In physics,
the operation of making a particular type of measurement
or observation is represented by an algebraic matrix, and
the possible results of that measurement or observation are
given by real numbers called the eigenvalues of that matrix.

Jon

William R. Everdell wrote:

Peirce's contemporary Frege defined objective as being perceivable

 by more than one observer as the same thing.  I've always liked that.


-Bill Everdell
Vive la Republique!
St Ann's School, Brooklyn

On Sep 9, 2011, at 1:56 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:


Sally  All,

Some of us are slower readers than others ...

To tell the truth, I haven't been having much time to do more than skim,
so let me just mention a few thoughts that come to mind while doing that.

I am constantly reminded of this favorite line from Peirce:

No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.

-- C.S. Peirce (1861), My Life, (Chron. Ed. 1, p. 3)

The question of Objects, Objectives, and Objectivity is a persistent one.

The Latin-rooted English object springs from deeper roots in the Greek 
pragma.
It was a personal revelation to me on first looking into Liddell and Scott and
reading all the meanings and ramifications of that pragmatic semantic complex:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma

It is especially the senses of the word object that refer to aims and 
purposes,
in other words, intentional objects and objects of intention, that we are likely
to miss if we don't remind ourselves of their pertinence to pragmatic thinking.

Regards,

Jon


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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Segment 1

2011-08-30 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Let me pick it up here:

SN: The main idea or real issue that JR seeks to present via Kleinman's
paper is  brought out in paragraph 3:  whether scientific inquiry is to 
continue to be recognized institutionally as a discovery process, guided 
ideally by the norms implicit in such ideas as that of truth, knowledge, 
reality, objectivity, and so forth, or is to be controlled instead by 
the principles of persuasion and accommodation that are used in 
negotiational and political activity (emphasis in JR's text).  JR wants 
to argue in the rest of the paper that scientific inquiry should be 
guided by said norms.  The either/or construction of JR's sentence seems 
worth pondering, as is the emphatic formatting of the term, 
discovery.  Two questions come to mind in this regard:


1) Why does JR put stress on this concept of discovery?  What is the 
implicit contrast to it (discovery/found vs inventive/made)? Is this a 
reference to some idea of Peirce here?


2) Perhaps more important: Are the two different ways that JR identifies 
of governing such discovery processes really, fundamentally, discrete 
alternatives? are they as completely separable and interchangeable as JR 
seems to think they are?  In sum, is this really a Plan A or Plan B 
situation?   I'm skeptical about it being accurate to think of discovery 
processes as guided either (and simply) by norms on the one hand, or 
by principles of the kind JR identifies on the other?  I'm surprised 
to see JR even use the term principle in relation to the strategies 
and tactics of political activity he references (I'm not sure what JR 
has in mind by negotiational activity).   It sounds as though JR's 
view of political life is very negative, lacking in norms implicit in 
its own ideas of truth, knowledge, reality, not to mention honor.   
Perhaps JR is simply saying that science ought to be governed by ideals 
that rise above the historical contingencies within which any given 
practice must be situated, ideals that relate to subject matter that is 
itself relatively enduring, general, and transcendent.  Any thoughts 
about how to sort out this passage?


For (1), I don't think we find the usual suspect dualism between discovery and 
invention
in Peirce's account of the inquiry process.  Haack made a recent attempt to 
characterize
the pragmatic synthesis as foundherentism, but I think it's better to realize 
from the
outset that working in sign-relational framework means never having to murder 
to dissect,
that the object-referent aspect and the sign-processing aspect are mere 
projections from
the whole sign relation in which we are participating at any given moment.

For (2), I think this spectrum of difference reflects the classical distinction 
between
logic (reasoning that proceeds independently of the peculiar conditions of 
interpreters)
and rhetoric (reasoning that is tailored to the peculiar conditions of its 
interpreter).

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Segment 1

2011-08-30 Thread Jon Awbrey

Sally  All,

I think it is reasonable to be concerned with distorting influences
on research and scholarship, whether we find them in the sciences or
in the other disciplines.  Looking around, the conflicts of interest
appear to grow more pushy and more pervasive every day.  I'm thinking
of cautionary tales like Slaughter and Leslie on Academic Capitalism,
or Chris Mooney in The Republican War on Science, just to name two
that other contexts of discussion are constantly bringing to mind.

But the question was:  What to do about it?

It appears that further inquiry is called for.

Jon

Sally Ness wrote:


Lastly, JR's solution to the problems of politicization is clearly 
stated in paragraph 4: scientists must get clear on the meaning of 
truth, objectivity, and similarly important concepts.  The benefit 
of this is identified in paragraph 5: it will prevent scientists from 
forgetting who they are -- which is not politicians -- and it will enable 
them to point out why they are best qualified to determine how their 
scientific work is to be conducted. The logic JR is using here would 
seem to have a few gaps at this point. How, for example, does getting 
clear on these concepts lead to preventing the unwanted infiltration of 
outsiders?  and why can't non-scientists get equally clear on these 
concepts as well  (it is not as though their meaning is mysterious to 
non-scientists) and then be qualified to share in the control of 
discovery processes?  Filling in these gaps constitutes the main work of 
the rest of the paper. However, it appears that JR at this point is 
already seeking to convince the scientists in the audience that, if they 
can, for example, define themselves as objective in relation to their 
subject matter because and only because of how they investigate it, then 
they can define all those who do not engage in such work as less 
objective about it or as not objective at all, hence excluding them from 
legitimate participation in the governance of their inquiry.  By the 
same token, they can define all non-scientists as less truthful, less 
knowledgeable, less realistic, and so on, on the basis of a relative 
lack of  experience with their brand of scientific inquiry. This does 
seem to be a pragmatic approach to coping with the alleged invasion, 
particularly with regard to the role that it assigns to research 
experience.   Perhaps, however, my reading is off the mark?


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Re: [peirce-l] Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process --- Signs and Inquiry

2011-08-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peirce List,

There is a brief discussion of the relation between the theory of signs and the 
theory of inquiry,
as illuminated by selections from Aristotle, Peirce, Dewey, and others, in the 
following paper:

http://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html

Jon

Eugene Halton wrote:

 Dear Rafe,

 Yes, there are many similarities to be sure. But one problem in saying
 there is a parallel conjectural turn is that Peirce actually did
 develop a logic of conjecture, that is, abduction, whereas Popper,
 whose book ''Logik der Forschung'' was strangely translated into
 English as ''The Logic of Discovery'', did not have a logic of
 discovery, abduction, or conjecture.

 In Popper's words: The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a 
theory,
 seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it 
...
 my view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing 
as a
 logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this 
process.
 My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains 'an 
irrational
 element' or a 'creative intuition,' in Bergson's sense (Popper 1968: 31-32).

 Here Popper expresses the common idea shared by rationalists and positivists 
alike,
 as I put it in my book ''Meaning and Modernity'', that inquiry begins with an 
irrational
 intuition, a creative insight that is not an inference from observed facts, 
and whose
 consequences somehow provide the guiding idea of an inquiry, despite the fact 
that the
 idea itself is utterly illogical. Peirce, by contrast, demonstrates that 
conjecture
 can be taken as reasonable, logical inference, and subject to further testing.

 Dewey also developed a theory of inquiry with similarities to Peirce's 
abduction,
 where inquiry is the progressive determination of a problem and its 
solution,
 beginning in the indeterminate situation.

 Gene

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