Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
I can confirm that last bit about the difficulty of explaining these concepts, though I do so as a Deweyan always wondering exactly how did he borrow and deviate from Peirce's concepts. I do hear a number of people say that they like Peirce, but it is never clear to what they are referring. That might be due to my ignorance of the received view of Peirce. Perhaps someone could enlighten me? Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 4:08 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote: Gary R wrote: * For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. Trichotomic vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier and I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths of movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does *not* follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck me as quite odd. * I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make much sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. Cathy - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos
Ben and list, In part it is a reflection of what I like to talk about, but they tend to reject a variant of your fourth bullet point, especially either the direct or indirect implications of Four Incapacities, Consequences of Four Incapacities, and the continuity of inference and semiotic. However, the discussion never reaches that level of detail. Instead, I ask such questions as--as I did at a conference last weekend to a superbly inviting, mostly analytic audience--why do you think that conscious intentionality must begin as a conscious (noetic/attentive) phenomenon rather than in bodily intentionality? In this case, the interlocutor was treating conscious intentionality as if it were ex nihilo and was insouciant on the point, though one does not need Peircean continuity to answer that question. This is the kind of Cartesian dualism that I see in the wild, i.e., a species of discontinuity. Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 2:17 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: ** I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben - Original Message - Jason, list, That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? - Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such continuity pretty credible. - Idea of espousing continuity of space and time for philosophical reasons instead of physics reasons? - Real infinitesimals? - Continuity of semiosis and of inference process? **Idea that incapacities such as that of a cognition devoid of determination by inference help** prove the reality of the continuous and therefore of the general? (Some Consequences of Four Incapacities) Or if discussions of synechism don't get into such detail, still what do they say is wrong with synechism? Best, Ben - Original Message - *From:* Khadimir *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Sent:* Thursday, March 29, 2012 1:44 PM *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos Steven, This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism). Best, Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear Cathy, Non-Peirceans, if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two camps: 1. the religious dualist, 2. the scientific dualist. Often they are in both. One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls Thirdness (more generally, the mind) in their conception of God, the other does not know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. Peirce's objection to the Russelization of logic is relevant here, because the eradication of psychologism placed the mind (esp. Thirdness) beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called Thirdness, as grounded in both a conception of God and a conception of Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this God conception is not the usual one but one that is really non-theistic in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not the god of popular western conception. This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's Ideality in the physical sciences and in the writings of Charles Peirce. Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although it maintains the passion of the later). So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to the audience unfamiliar with them. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar
Re: [peirce-l] Meeting Peirceans in New York, blogs
Uh oh, I have been called out. I will share the link to my blog, *Immanent Transcendence*: http://immanenttranscedence.blogspot.com/ . The blog covers American, continental, and cross-tradition thought, though I spent many months discussing object-oriented ontology. I tend to write fairly involved, technical posts about American philosophy, especially process metaphysics, phenomenology, and most things pragmatism. There are a lot of Peircean moments, but I am primarily a Dewey scholar and historian as well as writing in realist phenomenology informed by process metaphysics. A review of old posts might be of interest, e.g., discussion with object-oriented ontology, the implications and descriptions of the causal closure of nature, what realist pragmatic phenomenology (per Dewey) is, etc. Of note, I post almost every CFP on American philosophy that I can find, and every post on pragmatism (pragmaticism). The name *Immanent Transcendence *is meant to imply multiple things, including emergent naturalism, ecstatic temporality, self-transcendence, etc. It makes a lot more sense with triadic and modal views of reality, and wherein time and chance are real features ... but we all know that's a minority view in contemporary philosophy in English. I sadly missed SAAP this year--the first time in 6 years. Best, Jason Hills On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 1:09 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote: For my part, I just want to say I enjoyed the SAAP session on Richard Robin very much, and it was particularly lovely to meet in person for the very first time those legendary behind-the-scenes supporters of Arisbe and the Peirce-L: Gary Richmond and Ben Udell! Guys, I never realised before quite how much you were doing to keep alive the Peirce online community, particularly since Joe's passing. Thank you. I know the work you do comes from a genuine passion for Peirce's ideas. 2 more members of this list who I happen to know have philosophical blogs are Jason Hills and Tom Gollier. I wonder whether they might be persuaded to share the URLs with everyone...:-) Cheers, Cathy On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 8:24 AM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.comwrote: Ben, List, I hope to 'file' a brief report to the list on SAAP in the next few days, but wanted to quickly follow up on your remark concerning the philosophical sweethearts attending the conference, at least some of those whose work many list members may be familiar with including, Tom Short, Robert Lane, Jaime Nubiola, and Cathy Legg. I did not get the opportunity to meet him personally, but was able to ask Richard Bernstein a question at the Keynote Panel organized to honor him and his work. He is clearly a sweetheart too. Yes, philosophers can be really nice people! Best, Gary On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:14 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.comwrote: Jon, list, Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it. Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a pragmatist's perspective to linguistics. I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on Thursday and met some of the people whom I slightly know from online. Contrary to the reputations of philosophers in general as mean, they were a bunch of what Gary Richmond called sweethearts. One person self-identified as a linguist and made an interesting statement (but I wasn't taking notes). I wondered whether it was Michael Shapiro. Later I realized that I had omitted Shapiro's five-volume _*Peirce Seminar Series*_ from the Arisbe page of journals and book series. I've added it now http://www.cspeirce.com/journals.htm Some blogs and home pages are listed at http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm The blogs are those of some peirce-l members and, I've notice, aren't always focused on Peirce, but, well, they're blogs, we're not all focused on Peirce all the time. If anybody has a more-or-less Peirce-related blog or a home page that s/he would like to see added, please let me know. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 1:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce Peircers, A recent blog post by Michael Shapiro on “The Pragmatistic Force of Analogy in Language Structure” reminded me of some work I started on “Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce”, parts of which may be of service in our discussions of the “Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction”. Here is the link -- • http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ word press blog 2:
Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
I would agree with the general thrust of the comments that more specificity is needed early. The current text appears to be motivated by a question that it unfolds. I think that is a fine rhetorical device, however, it needs to unroll in a few sentences and then hit us with an answer very quickly. Jason On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: I could not enter the text. The old journalistic *who what where when why and how* would perhaps be useful. Three or four brisk paragraphs addressing these questions. In this *adjective* study* name verb* *What* *Where* = into what stream of thought does this text fit *When* = past present or future *Why* = why is this needed - original - important *How *= The meat of the text - a CSP third - an implementation Cheers, S *ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/ On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 4:15 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.uswrote: I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's Sense and Reference, thank you. The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise. You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-) I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote: I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage me from having anything to do with the book. The only half-way informative tidbit is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent advances in biophysics. By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a book but a 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either the senses (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world. And what are the mechanics of sense; have we now extended scientific mechanism to incorporeals, just to forestall its demise? -malgosia At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear List, I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you challenge two things about it. First, over the years of my work I have developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the vague transhumanism concerns me. Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the book? Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it. This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world. Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and reproduce. The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the natural dynamics of the unfolding world. Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of life, extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its dependence upon the environment in which it first evolves. If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding of the world. In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's nothing like a modern computer system. The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant with implication. It is
Re: [peirce-l] Logic is rooted in the social principle is rooted in logic
Greetings.
Gary, your last point on morpho- vs. teleo-dynamics is excellent.
But is not the distinction relative to analytic perspective? That is,
what is may be described in terms of morphodynamics, but what might
(will) be in terms of teleodynamics? The distinction is more temporal
than substantive?
I would not describe processive teleology as top-down causation, but
bottom-up, and supporting the notion of structural causation.
Aristotle over Plato, in a manner of speaking. Earlier in the thread
top-down was stated.
I have supposed that the potentialities of processes may be integrated
ad infinitum, part and part to new whole, where the morphodynamics
generate teleodynamics. The former on the order of potentiality, what
can be here and now, and the latter of the order of a horizon of
possibility, what might be here and later. This would be bottom-up.
Best,
Jason H.
On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 10:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Gary,
GR: [[ Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this
strikes me as one of those chicken or egg conundrums (I see Deacon
wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be
'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the
result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and
within an Umwelt. ]]
GF: I don't think Deacon really deals with the cosmological question of the
origin of matter and energy, if that's what you're asking here; he just takes
them as the original ground on which emergence built, so to speak, without
asking where that ground came from. He also takes evolution to be emergent,
in other words he doesn't trace it all the way back to the original nothing
as Peirce does. But i don't think Peirce would refer to the not-yet-organized
as a system -- anyway i know i wouldn't, because to me a system is
organized by definition.
The term context is also problematic in this ... um, context. The whole
idea of emergence and self-organization is that one kind of process (e.g.
teleodynamics) can arise from interactions of lower-level processes (e.g.
morphodynamics) even though no teleodynamic process has ever happened before,
so there is no teleodynamic context at that point (though it will evolve from
then on ... and the way it evolves will change the situation, so that the
spontaneous emergence of a *new* teleodynamic process may be precluded in
that environment -- as has very likely happened on this planet). Also it
seems to me that a species and its Umwelt have to co-evolve, so that the
species develops not *within* but *with* its Umwelt. -- But maybe i'm reading
something into your utterance that's not what you intended.
Gary F.
} Everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming.
[Floyd Merrell] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
-Original Message-
Sent: January-11-12 1:58 PM
Gary,
I think that you're right in suggesting that it's probably not a good idea to
mix creation myths and the like--even Peirce's non-scientific
early cosmological musings--with emergent or evolutionary theory. I would
suggest, however, that such ideas do have semiotic and metaphysical
significance for Peirce (say, as much as Big Bang theory has in the physical
theories of some). Nonetheless, I would tend to agree with this statement:
GF: Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in the
constraints imposed by an emergent system on the processes it has emerged
from (and still depends on for its existence). For instance, the
self-organization of the brain emerges from the constant chaotic “firing”
of individual neurons, yet it organizes itself by imposing constraints on
them, and it's the latter part of this circle that is “top-down”.
This is indeed “from the whole to the parts” but not in the sense where the
“whole” is the world of possibilities and actualities are parts.
GR: Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes this
strikes me as one of those chicken or egg conundrums (I see Deacon
wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So, what can be
'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic context (as the
result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and as the system) and
within an Umwelt. In any event, I'll look forward to your further thoughts
regarding the connection between Thirdness and reciprocality.
As to your thoughts as to an approach for reflecting on Deacon's book in the
forum, I think your ideas are excellent. So let's continue to toss this
around a bit and see what we list members come up with. You and I seem in
agreement that *Incomplete Science* represents some extraordinary research
with implications for semiotics generally, and reaching, perhaps, even beyond
biosemiotics. My own sense is that I'll be studying and reflecting on
