Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
Steven,

I like this and do not think it at all overblown. I don't have my Peirce
disk with me here in Tucson, but somewhere in it Peirce states that God
could not have consciousness because consciousness requires the capability
for sensation from which to experience and thus be conscious, something that
Peirce's conception of God does not have. 

However, it seems to me that a machine could be thought to fulfill that
requirement for a sort of consciousness as long as it possesses prostheses
that enable it to experience its environment and some way of interpreting
that experience. For example, the Mars-lander picked up (tactile) and
analyzed (interpreted) the contents of materials and then provided that
information (communicated) to scientists on earth. 

Yet, I suspect that you would encounter resistance from readers if you
termed the sort of possibilities you are addressing as consciousness, as we
are still a highly anthropomorphic civilization and many (though perhaps not
your intended readers) may be insulted by the idea that such non-living
constructions might be construed as conscious.

  Regards,
Phyllis

-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 7:36 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Dear List,

I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of
Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you
challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me
to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
vague transhumanism concerns me. 

Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the
book?


Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only
have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could
not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.

This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it
would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.

Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with
a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking,
machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and
reproduce.

The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be
an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
natural dynamics of the unfolding world.

Such a species would become the evolved intelligent designers of life,
extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution,
an inevitable part of nature's plan to move life beyond its dependence
upon the environment in which it first evolves.

If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may
appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding
of the world.

In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the
science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed
composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's
nothing like a modern computer system.

The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant
with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the
Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the
details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in
our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.

Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of
sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep
consideration.

Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help
us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the
period before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as
Galileo and Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A
breakthrough of a kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is
required.

But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we
need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when
mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were
invented, it is the logicians that concerned themselves with 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
-Original Message-
From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM
To: 'Catherine Legg'
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

Gary, Cathy and Listers,

I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
my next book and send it in.

Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
computational modeling. 

This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
carry on this work.

Regards,
Phyllis

BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

-Original Message-
From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] 
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-03 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April
from IGI Global). 

When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
(automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be
represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining
a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all
of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the
general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
derivative. 

Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and
apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to
representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of
something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given
sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
students in many fields. 


-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore

JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
 think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
 fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
 will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
 under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
 there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
 to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
 thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
 use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
 it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative
terms,
that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a
phenomenon,
then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of
reasoning,
are basically category three.

Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the
formal sense
that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties
relatively
well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the
categorical
question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal
scientific means.

Regards,

Jon

-- 

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