Re: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce

2012-05-02 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Isn't there someone who could assemble from the many good contributions to
the list a short book designed for reading beyond academe that would be
aimed at rectifying each area in which Peirce has unrecognized prominence,
importance, panache, whatever?  I am sure the answer is yes. It could even
be a group effort Best, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Wed, May 2, 2012 at 3:20 PM, Jack Rooney johnphilipda...@hotmail.comwrote:

 picky, picky, picky ;)
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Re: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce

2012-05-02 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Hi Kirsti - I think what I was really thinking of was things where there is
a sense of clear injustice - where Peirce is the origin who gets little or
no credit or has been the victim of theft or suppression.  Also what
Peirce's influence has created already and what it might create in the
future. I see great relevance of both Nietzsche and Peirce to any serious
advance in the resuscitation of values to an ontological status. I see this
as a sort of hidden aspect of Peirce which is not given much credence even
by his main apologists. I would say whoever comes up with what is seen as
the best outline plus existing texts that could fit it would be a good
start. I am sure there are folk here who could do that either individually
or as a community of inquiry. Cheers, S

PS. In reference to my initial remarks I would be interested too in a
reprise in retrospect of Peirce's academic misfortunes. The need for a
biography to supplement and perhaps supersede what has already been done is
clear as well. Brent understands threes but is Manichean in his treatment
of Peirce. It will take a youngish Robert Caro to write a proper biography
and run to volumes I suspect. It should be clear that I think Peirce is
vastly more influential than would be perceived even if his scientific and
logical work was justly acknowledged, Should we somehow survive this
century better than we started it I would grant credit to both Peirce and
Neitzsche for achievements of which even they were not completely aware.



*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Wed, May 2, 2012 at 5:47 PM, Määttänen Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fiwrote:

 A very good idea, Stephen! - Though I think quite many problems will arise
 with such an enterprise. For one thing the wealth of such contributions
 through the history of the list. And how to select amongst them?

 You presented two criteria. Unrecognized areas of prominence etc in
 Peirce, for one. - That's about the whole of the history of the list! - So
 that does not help. - The other criteria was 'beyond academe'. - That could
 do, for a start.

 If you wish something to happen, you could start with  taking up some of
 your favorites according to your 'beyond academia' - criterion.

 Jon has been taking up some of his earlier contributions to the list, in
 connection to current topics. I've been very glad to re-read them  refresh
 my memories.

 The purpose of finding out was Peirce's most prominent purpose, always. -
 So I think the best you could do would be to make a start and then see what
 happens. - Then you can see, whether there is a fertile ground for your
 idea.

 If the ground is not fertile for the time being, it may turn up that it
 will be, later on. So lack of immediate response does not mean your idea
 was not good. - Which was the case with Peirce's unrecognized ideas just as
 well:)

 Best,

 Kirsti


 On 2.5.2012, at 22.45, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

 Isn't there someone who could assemble from the many good contributions to
 the list a short book designed for reading beyond academe that would be
 aimed at rectifying each area in which Peirce has unrecognized prominence,
 importance, panache, whatever?  I am sure the answer is yes. It could even
 be a group effort Best, S

 *ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



 On Wed, May 2, 2012 at 3:20 PM, Jack Rooney 
 johnphilipda...@hotmail.comwrote:

 picky, picky, picky ;)
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Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION, now Nietzsche

2012-04-30 Thread Stephen C. Rose
 technique:
 http://sites.google.com/site/jamesivanporter/
 and
 http://sites.google.com/site/jamesivanporter/articles
 and

 http://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Philology-Future-James-Porter/dp/0804736987/ref=sr_1_1?s=booksie=UTF8qid=1335769347sr=1-1
 Regards,
 Gary Moore


*From:* Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
 *To:* Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
 *Cc:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
 *Sent:* Sunday, April 29, 2012 11:05 AM
 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

 You mention Nietzsche. My theory is that he went mad in part because his
 own values and those he excoriated  left him unable to complete revaluation
 of values of which Antichrist was the first of five intended works. I
 arrived independently (and pragmatically) at the values I now see as
 ontological about 30 years ago and then, after encountering Nietzsche in
 the 2000s  (actually visiting Sils-Maria), wrote Abba's Way as a potential
 continuation of the revaluation. It is only in the last few years I have
 encountered Peirce. While I have no expertise regarding Peirce and
 Neitzsche, I think it is virtually impossible to come to some comprehensive
 understanding without integrating their insights.It was N mainly who
 created the basis for a notion of values being ontological within the
 immanent frame. And Peirce the basis for a reastic answer to nominalism.
 Dealing with this momentous achievement seems to me now to be what's
 happening. Best, S

 *ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/




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Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

2012-04-26 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Thanks for elevating me to the realm of the academically enabled . No
doctor I. A mere lapsed MDiv. As to your concluding question, my answer is
why not? At least in the realm of dreams and musement. It seems to me that
Peirce has a sense of benignity that when tied to his sense of continuity
and fallibility excludes no possibility that can be proved out. Bring on
the dolphins and therapy dogs. Cheers, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 2:38 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote:

 Dear Doctor Rose,**
 Thank you for your reply! 
 --
 The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it
 potentially referred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal
 characters of the subject”. 
 ---
 Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there
 are times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more
 ‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse
 itself – which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS
 triumphs over philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption
 to ‘ordinary discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy
 insignificant] – but rather refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does
 here. 
 
 Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce
 quote into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the
 theological ‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing
 high regard for Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor
 Heidegger would accept literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive
 internal characters of the subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly
 and almost uniquely recognizes the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something
 I was lucky enough to see in Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the
 categories of John Duns Scotus whom Peirce admired]. 
 
 Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal”
 and to “subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of
 experience presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is
 completely ‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem
 to me Peirce would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience
 is an undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this
 for Peirce.
 
 Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since
 such a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language
 as either ‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be
 approached obliquely or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J.
 Richardson SJ does this with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems
 anyway, Deely disapproves of. The point is, it seems with both Heidegger
 and Peirce, the popular phrase “What you see is what you get” is taken in a
 strict and radical sense. I think also both consider the ‘unconscious’ as a
 matter of historicity being logically being teased out of the long dream of
 language which completely overwhelms any one individual.
 -
 Another issue with Deely and Heidegger related to this is Deely’s
 seemingly strict separation between human consciousness, which dreams the
 dream of language, and the ‘animal’ which largely does not do so. Heidegger
 also separates the two but simply as an observation and method of trying to
 delimit language within manageable bounds, and not because of a religious
 agenda since he explicitly holds for an “atheistic methodology”. In other
 words, if he had found another animal than human being he could converse
 with, he would have no ideological or theological problem, being more
 attuned to Nietzsche in this matter.
 
 Therefore I raise another question: “Does Peirce raise a distinct
 separation between the human being as the only linguistic animal, and if
 so, where, and if not, where?”
 -
 Gary C. Moore




  - Forwarded Message -
 *From:* Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
 *To:* Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
 *Cc:* PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
 *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 6:36 AM
 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY
 LOCATION

 The wonders of Google,

  Commens Peirce Dictionary: Thirdness, Third [as a 
 category]http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/thirdness.html:
 
 Thirdness, Third [as a category]
 (see also Firstness, Secondness, Categories)


 Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
 indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
 predicates. Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of
 the subject in itself; secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of
 one subject or substance on another, regardless of law

Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

2012-04-25 Thread Stephen C. Rose
The wonders of Google,

Commens Peirce Dictionary: Thirdness, Third [as a
category]http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/thirdness.html:


Thirdness, Third [as a category]

(see also Firstness, Secondness, Categories)



Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
predicates. Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of
the subject in itself; secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of
one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third
subject; thirdly comes thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental
influence of one subject on another relatively to a third. ('Pragmatism',
CP 5.469, 1907)


'via Blog 
this'https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk


I didn't realize that Steven was quoting this in his most interesting post.


Cheers. S
*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 3:17 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote:



  - Forwarded Message -
 *From:* Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
 *To:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com
 *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:14 AM
 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

   Thank you! I was expecting more. But it just seems to be passing
 phraseology.
 GCM

   *From:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com
 *To:* Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
 *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:09 AM

 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION


 It's there, second sentence of the second paragraph.


 Steven

 --
 Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
 http://iase.info







 On Apr 24, 2012, at 11:30 PM, Gary Moore wrote:

  Dear Doctor Ericsson-Zenith,
  Thank you for the reply! However, unless my brain is far too fuzy, I do
 not find John Deely's quotation the positive internal characters of the
 subject in itself. Did Doctor Deely misquote? Did the quote come from
 elsewhere?
  -
  It is an intriguing statement possibly subtantualizing both internal
 and subject which, in Deely and Poinsot's terminology would mean they are
 foundational terminals in a Peircean Triad would it not?
  -
  Does anyone have suggestions, referrences, or information?
 
  Thank you for your consideration,
  Gary C. Moore
 
  P. S. If I have done anything improper please tell me. I am new to the
 group.
  From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com
  To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
  Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 1:12 AM
  Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
 
  FYI
 
  CP 5.469 This illustration has much more pertinence to pragmatism than
 appears at first sight; since my researches into the logic of relatives
 have shown beyond all sane doubt that in one respect combinations of
 concepts exhibit a remarkable analogy with chemical combinations; every
 concept having a strict valency. (This must be taken to mean that of
 several forms of expression that are logically equivalent, that one or ones
 whose analytical accuracy is least open to question, owing to the
 introduction of the relation of joint identity, follows the law of
 valency.) Thus, the predicate is blue is univalent, the predicate kills
 is bivalent (for the direct and indirect objects are, grammar aside, as
 much subjects as is the subject nominative); the predicate gives is
 trivalent, since A gives B to C, etc. Just as the valency of chemistry is
 an atomic character, so indecomposable concepts may be bivalent or
 trivalent. Indeed, definitions being scrupulously observed, it will be seen
 to be a truism to assert that no compound of univalent and bivalent
 concepts alone can be trivalent, although a compound of any concept with a
 trivalent concept can have at pleasure, a valency higher or lower by one
 than that of the former concept. Less obvious, yet demonstrable, is the
 fact that no indecomposable concept has a higher valency. Among my papers
 are actual analyses of a number greater than I care to state. They are
 mostly more complex than would be supposed. Thus, the relation between the
 four bonds of an unsymmetrical carbon atom consists of twenty-four triadic
 relations.
 
  Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
 indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
 predicates. Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of
 the subject in itself; secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of
 one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third
 subject; thirdly comes thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental
 influence of one subject on another relatively to a third. Since the
 demonstration of this proposition is too stiff for the infantile logic of
 our time (which is rapidly awakening, however), I have preferred to state
 it problematically, as a 

[peirce-l] Peirce for a wider audience

2012-03-27 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Here is an example:

Fallibilism applies to both scientists and religionists http://ping.fm/a5wzV


*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/

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Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

2012-03-27 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I am waiting for the day when values replaces ethics as a base term for
discussing morality and, if a hierarchy is pertinent, when ontological
values would be right up there wherever thought (musement) begins. I think
we have confused virtues and characteristics with values from the gitgo.
(See the Bard on honor.) And we have made ethics synonymous with morality
and managed to devalue the entire exercise. My cottoning to Peirce relates
somewhat to the probability that he might agree which is why I second the
sense that Peirce failed in this respect during his lifetime,  while
leaving a foundation for us to adapt and build on. Best, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 8:14 AM, Frances Kelly
frances.ke...@sympatico.cawrote:

 Jon and others...
 This overview of mine on your idea is merely a curiosity, yet it
 is also a thorn for me, and my overview may be off base, but let
 me thrash it out.

 There could be a difference to note in the giving or getting of
 the categories in regard to determinacy and dependency. (This
 topic was slightly dealt with in messages some months back.) The
 gist of the topic was that any lower category is determinant of
 its next higher category, and that any higher category is
 dependent on its next lower category. For example, objects as a
 second determine representamen as a first and interpretants as a
 third depend on their objects and representamen.

 The hierarchy of the normative sciences to be consistent with
 this take on the categories may therefore be more dependently
 regressive than determinately progressive as a matter of fact, in
 that ethics seems to be applied aesthetics and logics seems to be
 applied ethics.

 Incidentally, the sketch outlining the normative sciences built
 up in an architectonic way seems correct, but the higher logics
 would likely have the majority of inner compartments with
 aesthetics having only one whole compartment and ethics having
 just two main compartments. This approach of course implies that
 dependent higher categories are more say divided or detailed,
 although nonetheless with greater simplicity, if that is not a
 contradiction with the assumed complexity of determinant lower
 categories.


 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list
 [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
 Sent: Tuesday, 27 March, 2012 12:48 AM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

 Peircers,

 I found the figure I used to draw to explain that pragmatic
 ordering of the normative sciences --

 Re: The Pragmatic Cosmos
 At: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000879.html

 o-o
 | |
 |o|
 |   / \   |
 |  /   \  |
 | / \ |
 |o---o|
 |   /| Logic |\   |
 |  / |   | \  |
 | /  |   |  \ |
 |o---o|
 |   /|   | Ethic |   |\   |
 |  / |   |   |   | \  |
 | /  |   |   |   |  \ |
 |o---o|
 |   /|   |   Aesthetic   |   |\   |
 |  / |   |   |   |   |   | \  |
 | /  |   |   |   |   |   |  \ |
 |o---o---o---o---o---o---o---o|
 | |
 o-o
 Figure 1.  The Pragmatic Cosmos

 Here is the Figure that goes with this description of the
 Pragmatic Cosmos, or the pragmatically ordered normative
 sciences:  Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic.  The arrangement is
 best viewed as a planar projection of a solid geometric
 configuration, as three cylinders on concentric circular bases,
 all subtending an overarching cone.  This way of viewing the
 situation brings into focus the two independent or orthogonal
 order relations that exist among the normative sciences.  In
 regard to their bases, logic is a special case of ethics and
 aesthetics, and ethics is a special case of aesthetics,
 understanding these concepts in their broadest senses.  In
 respect of their altitudes, logic exercises a critical
 perspective on ethics and aesthetics, and ethics exercises a
 critical perspective on aesthetics.


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Re: [peirce-l] Peirce-L's ends

2012-03-26 Thread Stephen C. Rose
What is currently working well on the list? What, if anything, could be
improved?


 If we should promote it, it would help to have a paragraph with succinct
directions that all could use.  I have been very impressed with the quality
of posts and the civility here.


What are our goals with this list?


 I have assumed the goal was/is to help all be more clear about Peirce and
his contributions and to suggest to a wide audience the relevance of Peirce
now and in the future.


Would it be right to say it is a community of inquiry? If so, how is the
inquiry going?


 Yes but not to the exclusion of a wider goal  It goes well  when
contributions add to the general sense of Peirce's relevance and the means
of expressing it.


If it is not right to see the goal of the list as primarily a community of
inquiry, what goals does it have? And how might they be best realized?


 The main goal would be to keep the flame alive and add fuel to it. I
think this is being realized. For example the recent Deacon interchange led
me to the PDF which shows that Deacon did indeed study Pierce. I intend to
do what I can to spread some of his insights.  Such posts as Gene's most
recent will appeal to a a wider audience than this list.   I see this list
as a force in the effort to move beyond the binary of Dawkins-speak and
religion-speak to a Peirce-informed worldview. The goal would thus be
articulating and spreading the relevance of Peirce. The means are are the
same with the Web where this gets done.


*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 2:35 AM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote:

 Hello all!



 Some stimulating discussions at the SAAP regarding this list have
 encouraged me to start a thread not with any particular goal in mind, but
 to see where it might lead.



 What I’m interested to pursue is of the nature of a “check-in” regarding
 this list.



 As a loosely affiliated group of Peirce enthusiasts, are we getting the
 most out of the list that we could be?



 What is currently working well on the list?

 What, if anything, could be improved?

 What are our goals with this list? Would it be right to say it is a
 community of inquiry? If so, how is the inquiry going?

 If it is not right to see the goal of the list as primarily a community of
 inquiry, what goals does it have? And how might they be best realized?



 Sharp observers may spot a certain encouragement towards communal critical
 self-reflection in the above.



 Cheers everyone, Cathy



 Catherine Legg

 Senior Lecturer, Philosophy Programme

 University of Waikato

 Private Bag 3105

 3240, Hamilton, New Zealand

 *http://waikato.academia.edu/CathyLegg*



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Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism

2012-03-23 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Here is a somewhat corrected version of my reply to Terry.

Best, S


I have little place for ethics in such a system as I have. I see ethics as
secondary to the willed application of values to the making of decisions.
To me the question is what are the ontological values. My pragmatic answer
came in the 1970s when a colleague and I taught a group of teenagers the
Gospel of Mark (the text of which I had turned into songs) and saw the
actual results of this process in events in their lives and those related
to them. I concluded that the ontological values can be described by the
words tolerance, democracy, helpfulness and that the overarching value in
which these rest is non-idolatry. I feel these are a reasonable
approximation of the active, accessible realities that - when activated by
individual will - create history. Insofar as history is a vale of tears it
is because we do not honor these values. Non-idolatry incidentally is the
basis of scientific method IMO. The good and justice are descriptions
of the goals of living, but the values I have named can be explicitly
willed by the individual. Insofar as they are understood and willed
together, they create a somewhat iconoclastic sort who is pragmatic and at
the same time actively promoting tolerance, democracy and helpfulness. All
of the movers of history on the just and good side have cleaved to these
values. Since individuals do possess will and this the freedom to embrace
these values, they can be spread by ... identifying them and activated in a
process that certainly can include reason but also involves what we call
passion or commitment or conscience or even impulse. When I resigned from
my fraternity at Williams in 1958 it was the result of a triad 1. My
experience of racial unity 2. The resistance of St. Anthony Hall to
considering an applicant from Jamaica and 3. My resignation when I was
told, If I believed that, I did not belong there. This helped set off a
train of events which led to the removal of fraternities from Williams.
Such an event resides in the realm of willed values not ethics. Ethics
would be the consideration of what course of action would yield up whatever
one designated as the goal of ethics - the good, justice. In other words,
ethics is secondary to the exercise of willed values which is essentially
impulsive. It is a corrective exercise.
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Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism

2012-03-22 Thread Stephen C. Rose
If the way history is made is through willed values, those values were
there before we were. They are ontological. I think the confusion in Peirce
is his relegation of ethics to the aesthetic. Kierkegaard did a similar
thing when he essentially sidelined the ethical. I muse that the semiotic
realm is infused with ontological values (the foundation of ethics) and
that history is made by the values we will. By our fruits  we are known.
Why is it I feel I understand Peirce when I have a dunce's capacity for
math and science? It is because he fits in to my evolving understanding of
 how to see the world and particularly how to identify and deal with the
nominalist binary consciousness that essentially has allowed us to arrive
at the ethical morass we are in. This is the century when we have t advance
out of that and achieve what Derrida called the unprecedented.

*ShortFormContent at Blogger http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/*



On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 4:23 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.comwrote:

 Michael, Cathy, List,

 Michael, I also want to thank you  for posting the link to Nathan
 Houser's review of Forster's *Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism*.

 I had begun reading the book a few week's before you sent the review
 and had gotten a bit bogged down, mainly in the style, I think. There
 is, in my opinion, a tendency in it towards unnecessary repetition,
 for example.

 I also think Nathan' criticisms in the last paragraph of his mainly
 positive review are on target: namely, that Forster mixes references
 to Peirce's early and late work, neglects some of his more developed
 ideas (such as the work he did in semeiotic in the 20th century),
 centering his argumentation around the icon/index/symbol distinction,
 while neglecting the two later trichotomies of signs (so neglecting
 arguments as well as other types of qualisigns). Nathan also correctly
 notes that Forster concentrates almost exclusively on Peirce's
 earliest proof of pragmatism in that discussion.

 Still, the review encouraged me to finish reading the book, and I'm
 certainly glad that I did! One sees, finally, just how central the
 nominalism/realism question is for Peirce--and, I'd hold, ought to be
 for us.

 I want to conclude this note with a passage near the end of the book
 which I very much liked and have been reflecting on since. Forster
 writes:

 On [Peirce's] view, human beings are not cogs in a vast cosmic
 mechanism, but rather are free, creative agents capable of
 transforming the world though the active realization of intelligent
 ideals. The ultimate fate of the world is indeterminate and there is
 no guarantee that the forces of reasonableness will triumph.
 Nevertheless, the potential for victory is there. All it requires, he
 thinks, is a community of individuals who devote their energy to the
 pursuit of truth and goodness, a community united, not by mutual
 self-interest, but by a common love of reasonableness (Forster, op.
 cit., 245).

 Cathy, this brought to my mind the discussion of Peirce's esthetics
 following Tom Short's fine talk in the Robin session at SAAP. Any
 thoughts on that in this connection?

 Best,

 Gary

 On 3/13/12, Michael DeLaurentis michael...@comcast.net wrote:
  Glad to hear, Cathy - thanks. I agree with your assessment and, based
 only
  on what Houser presents, his criticisms. The book itself is probably a
  worthwhile read, perhaps worthy of further review here.
 
 
 
  From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
  Behalf Of Catherine Legg
  Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 4:43 PM
  To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
  Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of
 Nominalism
 
 
 
  Michael I just read the book review from Nathan Houser you shared - it is
  lucidly written over 6 pages and gives a commanding overview of Peirce's
  realism. I really enjoyed reading it, thanks for posting it.
 
  Cathy
 
  On Fri, Mar 9, 2012 at 6:13 PM, Michael DeLaurentis 
 michael...@comcast.net
  wrote:
 
  If there has already been a post about this, my apologies. Book review
 just
  in on CSP and nominalism.
 
 
 
  Michael J DeLaurentis
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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_
 
  No 

Re: [peirce-l] Book Review: Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism

2012-03-22 Thread Stephen C. Rose
It seems to me that if there is a conflict between nominalism and
realism/idealism which plays out in history that it is important to delve
deeper. Peirce made spiritual or transcendent or musement matters subject
to experiment - human progress had to be real. Where I think I disagree is
in not venturing to say what the ethical values are that are ontological
and that therefore might we seen as an image of where we are meant to go.
The plan is not invariant but the values may be - and the good is not a
value but a description of what happens when these values are enacted. If
as I maintain we do not learn, we already know. The values are not novel.
Nor are they characteristics or virtues. The construction of the good has
always been possible in every generation because the values are ontological
and universal. I think this rises as much from what can be drawn from
Pierce as anything else.



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On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 8:54 PM, Terry Bristol bris...@isepp.org wrote:

 A couple of comments on this passage from Forster and relating to S.
 Rose's response:
 1.  The 'plan' by which the universal intelligence works is not a 'fixed'
 or time(-space)-invariant 'plan'; (cf. likewise in Plato's Timaeus).
 There is no way to reason forward to 'deduce' a better world without
 experimenting. We learn was is more valuable (better) only by a sort of
 blind effort.

 What is 'really' valuable – the good – is inherently, by its very nature,
 incomprehensible. (Kantian insight)
 (Incomprehensible because it develops qualitatively; the good keeps
 getting better. Socrates speech in Symposium: Love is never satisfied
 (closed).

 2. The ultimate fate is not 'indeterminate' just locally 'underdetermined'
 – which is tied up with the developmental framework.
 Each stage enables the exploration of the next possible stage of
 betterment.
 The 'plan' and the 'intellect' self-referentially and recursively develop.
 They  emerge so that the important problems and questions for each
 generation are new and different yet built on previous advances. Like
 intellectual history – each advance is a sort of convergence and yet it
 opens new 'types of questions' and so is qualitatively emergent.

 So the issues facing each generation are always qualitatively different.
 The continuity of the narrative – what holds it (each generation and each
 era) together is what Hegel called the 'unfolding of an idea' – and the
 idea is freedom.
 Freedom is the ability to bring novel value into the world – to make the
 world better.

 Dewey later called this – the construction of the good.'

 Terry

 On Mar 22, 2012, at 1:23 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

 On [Peirce's] view, human beings are not cogs in a vast cosmic
 mechanism, but rather are free, creative agents capable of
 transforming the world though the active realization of intelligent
 ideals. The ultimate fate of the world is indeterminate and there is
 no guarantee that the forces of reasonableness will triumph.
 Nevertheless, the potential for victory is there. All it requires, he
 thinks, is a community of individuals who devote their energy to the
 pursuit of truth and goodness, a community united, not by mutual
 self-interest, but by a common love of reasonableness (Forster, op.
 cit., 245).


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[peirce-l] Have you ever heard of Charles Sanders Peirce?

2012-03-06 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I asked this question on Quora. It then occured to me that folk here might
want to weigh in. Quora is an interesting venture based entirely on
answering questions. Here's the url for the CSP question -
http://www.quora.com/Have-you-ever-heard-of-Charles-Sanders-Peirce

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Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-02 Thread Stephen C. Rose
1. Hypothesis (Abduction)

2. Induction  3.   Deduction
But isn't it also the case that we can mix firsts, seconds and thirds if we
think it appropriate. As in Terms Propositions Symbols.
Best, S
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On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 12:25 PM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote:

 Thanks for the thoughtful reply, Gary!

 The issue you raise about how deduction and induction should be
 categorised is an interesting one. I had always thought of deduction
 as falling clearly under secondness, due to the compulsion involved.
 But you are right to note that in theorematic deduction the mind is
 not passive but active, and that this form of reasoning was very
 important to Peirce.

 I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.
 Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of
 surprise due to error. H...

 Cheers, Cathy

 On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
 wrote:
  Cathy, list,
 
  When I first read your remark suggesting that the birth, growth and
  development of new hypostatic abstractions should be in the position
  of 3ns rather than argumentative proof of the validity of the
  mathematics as I had earlier abduced, I thought this might be another
  case of the kind of difficulty in assigning the terms of 2ns and 3ns
  in genuine triadic relations which had Peirce, albeit for a very short
  time in his career, associating 3ns with induction (while before and
  after that time he put deduction in the place of 3ns as necessary
  reasoning--I have discussed this several times before on the list and
  so will now only refer those interested to the passage, deleted from
  the 1903 Harvard Lectures--276-7 in Patricia Turrisi's edition--where
  Peirce discusses that categorial matter).
 
  I think his revision of his revision to his original position may have
  been brought about by the clarification resulting from thinking of
  abduction/deduction/induction beyond critical logic (where they are
  first analyzed as distinct patterns of inference), then in methodeutic
  where a complete inquiry--in which  hypothesis formation is 1ns, the
  deduction of the implications of the hypothesis for testing is 3ns,
  and, finally, the actual inductive testing is 2ns--provides a kind of
  whetstone for categorial thinking about these three. (Yet, even in
  that 1903 passage he remarks that he will leave the question open.)
 
  Be that as it may, I am beginning to think that you are clearly on to
  something and that that transforming of a predicate into a relation
  which we call hypostatic abstraction certainly ought to be in the
  place of 3ns. Re-reading parts of Jay Zeman's famous and fine article
  on hypostatic abstraction further strengthened that opinion. See:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/jzeman/peirce_on_abstraction.htm  Zeman
  writes:
 
  It is hypostatic or subjectal abstraction that Peirce is interested
  in; a hint as to why he is interested in it is given in his allusions
  in these passages to mathematical reasoning [. . .] Jaakko Hintikka
  has done us the great service of bringing to our attention and tying
  to contemporary experience one of Peirce's central observations about
  necessary—which is to say mathematical—reasoning: this is that
  nontrivial deductive reasoning, even in areas where explicit
  postulates are employed, always considers something not implied in the
  conceptions so far gained [in the particular course of reasoning in
  question], which neither the definition of the object of research nor
  anything yet known about could of themselves suggest, although they
  give room for it.
 
  As is well known, Peirce calls this kind of reasoning theorematic
  (in contrast to corollarial reasoning) because it introduces novel
  elements into the reasoning process in the form of icons, which are
  then 'experimented upon in imagination.' 
 
  Zeman quotes Hintikka to the effect that Peirce himself seems to have
  considered a vindication of the concept of abstraction as the most
  important application of his discovery [of the theorematic/corollarial
  distinction] and then remarks that Peirce would indeed have agreed
  that the light shed on necessary reasoning by this distinction helps
  greatly to illuminate the role of abstraction. . .
 
  See, also: EP2:394  where Peirce comments that it is hypostatic
  abstraction that leads to the generalizality of a predicate and, of
  course, what is general is 3ns. In short, I think you are quite right
  Cathy to have suggested that correction of my categorial assignments.
  As Peirce notes near the end of the Additament to the Neglected
  Argument, hypothetic abstraction concerns itself with that which
  necessarily would be *if* certain conditions were established
  (EP2:450).
 
  Best,
 
  Gary
 
  On 2/21/12, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote:
  Gary wrote:
 
 
  For the moment I am 

[peirce-l] Poem

2012-02-22 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Would this qualify as a Peircean poem?

How about no war in Iran http://ping.fm/kCcFs

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Re: [peirce-l] Poem

2012-02-22 Thread Stephen C. Rose
The main thing that interests me is whether this simple appropriation of
Peirce - as one to whom we can refer powerful arguments against binary (you
versus me) thinking and for triadic thought (always tending toward a
positive resolution even if it takes try after try) - is important to
advance. Does it improve on current cultural and political patterns. Is it
true? I personally feel comfortable with that sort of thinking but I would
hardly be able to give it the armor it would need (if it exists). To cut to
the second (blunt truth), what does one make of Peirce's seeming approval
of the idea that virtually every unhappy event contains a silver lining? Or
even of the notion that realism is naive. All this suggests to me is that
there is a good deal of work to do.

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On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 7:24 PM, Victoria N. Alexander alexan...@dactyl.org
 wrote:


 On Feb 22, 2012, at 6:45 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:

 I think I can remember BUDHA'S WAY OF THE MIDDLE (mediation, third..)


 I would rather question the efficacy of Buddha's Way of the Middle against
 fascist regimes, such as those of Nazi Germany, Stalin's USSR or
 present-day North Korea or Iran

 or the US?

 Steve,

 I also like the poem, esp  Of the fatal binary
 That has never reached a third.  Two parties become two sides of the same
 coin without a third.

 Tori


 .

 -malgosia


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 _
 Victoria N. Alexander, PhD
 www.dactylfoundation.org
 www.torialexander.com





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Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

2012-02-06 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Thanks Gene.

I think I meant that striving for the right interpretation is unable in
itself to add to what has been thought though it may aid understanding. The
addiing comes via use until one has done more than an interpretation. For
example Peirce does not do that much with ethics and perhaps nothing with
values but for me both Peirce and Nietzsche are spurs to the revaluation of
values which I see as the main task of intellectuals in this century. I
think both Peirce and Nietzsche wanted that sort of engagement from their
readers.  Cheers, S

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On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 1:59 PM, Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.eduwrote:

 “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the
 point is to change it.” Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach.

 ** **

 Dear Stephen, 

 It seems to me Marx’s words could be taken as a variant of your statement:
 “It seems to me we would do well to frame (at least) non-scientific
 inquiry not as interpretation but as use.” So could Wittgenstein’s “meaning
 as use.” It might be interesting in this context to consider Peirce’s
 understanding of science as essentially useless, though you do state that
 you mean non-scientific. Still, semiosis as inferential interpretation,
 Peirce’s understanding, is broader than use. Pragmatic meaning as
 conceivable consequence is more than use. 

 ** **

 But let me throw back another perspective. A symbol has a life of its own,
 more than simply the use we put it to. Of what use is a literary symbol, if
 not that it is a portal to interpretation? Consider D. H. Lawrence’s view
 of symbols: “Symbols are organic units of consciousness with a life of
 their own, and you can never explain them away, because their value is
 dynamic, emotional, belonging to the sense-consciousness of the body and
 soul, and not simply mental. An allegorical image has a *meaning*. Mr.
 Facing-both-ways has a meaning. But I defy you to lay your finger on the
 full meaning of Janus, who is a symbol.” 

 ** **

 Gene Halton

 ** **

 *From:* C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] *On
 Behalf Of *Stephen C. Rose
 *Sent:* Saturday, February 04, 2012 1:24 PM
 *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

 ** **

 For what it may be worth, else ignore. I have just started Peter's book
 which is now 30 years old which seems young to me as most of mine were
 published before the 80's. I want to make what may be a cliched observation
 or a simplistic one. It seems to me we would do well to frame (at least)
 non-scientific inquiry not as interpretation but as use. I am serious.
 Interpretation is inherently unsatisfactory and need not be claimed as an
 objective. Use is what I think Pierce might have wanted. Meaning we do not
 present our thoughts as apt interpretations of Peirce or attempts to argue
 for this or that system. But as our own thoughts where our debt is to
 Peirce but our thoughts have the temerity to stand naked before whoever
 encounters them, to be accepted or rejected. Let them be misinterpreted as
 they would be anyway - inevitably. Peirce would say they are not final. Why
 do you think he never finished a system? Does he not leave clues? I seize
 on things I derive from Peirce to claim that are ideal or ontological
 values and to name them. And to claim that history is the cumulative
 exercise of willed values. And that ontological values can be experienced
 and when they are we make better history than when they are not.  I feel
 the task of creating a cadre of public intellectuals (at some point) would
 be advanced by championing the idea that it is not the necessary function
 of scholars to interpret (come up with the right take on) Peirce. Perish
 the thought. It is tu use Peirce to take the strands and improve on them,
 use them, profit from them. Best, S


 

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Re: [peirce-l] Knowledge Workers of the World, Unite !

2012-02-04 Thread Stephen C. Rose
For what it may be worth, else ignore. I have just started Peter's book
which is now 30 years old which seems young to me as most of mine were
published before the 80's. I want to make what may be a cliched observation
or a simplistic one. It seems to me we would do well to frame (at least)
non-scientific inquiry not as interpretation but as use. I am serious.
Interpretation is inherently unsatisfactory and need not be claimed as an
objective. Use is what I think Pierce might have wanted. Meaning we do not
present our thoughts as apt interpretations of Peirce or attempts to argue
for this or that system. But as our own thoughts where our debt is to
Peirce but our thoughts have the temerity to stand naked before whoever
encounters them, to be accepted or rejected. Let them be misinterpreted as
they would be anyway - inevitably. Peirce would say they are not final. Why
do you think he never finished a system? Does he not leave clues? I seize
on things I derive from Peirce to claim that are ideal or ontological
values and to name them. And to claim that history is the cumulative
exercise of willed values. And that ontological values can be experienced
and when they are we make better history than when they are not.  I feel
the task of creating a cadre of public intellectuals (at some point) would
be advanced by championing the idea that it is not the necessary function
of scholars to interpret (come up with the right take on) Peirce. Perish
the thought. It is tu use Peirce to take the strands and improve on them,
use them, profit from them. Best, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 12:40 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 Peircers,

 A few reflections that I posted on Gowers's Weblog that may be pertinent
 here --

 Re: What’s wrong with electronic journals?
 At: http://gowers.wordpress.com/**2012/01/29/whats-wrong-with-**
 electronic-journals/http://gowers.wordpress.com/2012/01/29/whats-wrong-with-electronic-journals/

 Having spent a good part of the 1990s writing about what the New
 Millennium would bring to our intellectual endeavours, it is only fair that
 I should have spent the last dozen years wondering why the New Millennium
 is so late in arriving. With all due reflection I think it is time to face
 up to the fact that the fault, [Dear Reader], is not in our technology, but
 in ourselves.

 Here is one of my last, best attempts to get at the root of the matter:

 • 
 http://org.sagepub.com/**content/8/2/269.abstracthttp://org.sagepub.com/content/8/2/269.abstract
 • 
 http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/**library/aboutcsp/awbrey/**integrat.htmhttp://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/integrat.htm

 There are indeed Big Picture questions that open up here — the future of
 knowledge and inquiry, the extent to which their progress will be catalyzed
 or inhibited by collaborative versus corporate-controlled information
 technologies, the stance of knowledge workers, vigilant or acquiescent,
 against the ongoing march of global corporate feudalism — and maybe this is
 not the place or time to pursue these questions, but in my experience
 discussion, like love and gold, is where you find it.  Being questions of
 this magnitude, they will of course arise again. The question is — who will
 settle them, and to whose satisfaction?

 Re: Abstract thoughts about online review systems
 At: http://gowers.wordpress.com/**2012/02/02/abstract-thoughts-**
 about-online-review-systems/http://gowers.wordpress.com/2012/02/02/abstract-thoughts-about-online-review-systems/

 What is inquiry? And how can we tell if a potential contribution makes an
 actual contribution to it?  Questions like these often arise, as far as
 mathematical inquiry goes, in trying to build heuristic problem solvers,
 theorem-provers, and other sorts of mathematical amanuenses.

 Charles S. Peirce, who pursued the ways of inquiry more doggedly than any
 thinker I have ever read, sifted the methods of “fixing belief” into four
 main types — Tenacity, Authority, Plausibility (à priori pleasingness), and
 full-fledged Scientific Inquiry.

 I posed the question — “What part do arguments from authority play in
 mathematical reasoning?” — on MathOverFlow some time ago and received a
 number of interesting answers.

 • http://mathoverflow.net/**questions/28089/what-part-do-**
 arguments-from-authority-play-**in-mathematical-reasoninghttp://mathoverflow.net/questions/28089/what-part-do-arguments-from-authority-play-in-mathematical-reasoning

 Regards,

 Jon

 --

 academia: 
 http://independent.academia.**edu/JonAwbreyhttp://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
 inquiry list: 
 http://stderr.org/pipermail/**inquiry/http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
 mwb: 
 http://www.mywikibiz.com/**Directory:Jon_Awbreyhttp://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
 oeiswiki: 
 http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:**Jon_Awbreyhttp://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
 word press blog 1: 
 

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

2011-12-16 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I shall with fear and trembling venture a short explanation of the movement
to cyberfy the world. It signaled the end, bitter and ongoing, of oil and
the car. The PC became the new car, with requisite lingo about speed and so
forth. And availability to all. It was a market force toward the affordable
which had revolutionary implications for the future shape of society and
possibly the moral evolution of humankind.

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On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 9:19 AM, Skagestad, Peter
peter_skages...@uml.eduwrote:

 Ben,

 Thank you for your comments, which I have been chewing on. I wish I had
 some insightful responses, but this is all I come up with.

 You wrote:
 “I find it very hard to believe that the second computer revolution could
 have very easily failed to take place soon enough after the first one,
 given the potential market, though as you say below, you were mainly
 concerned (and I agree with you) to reject a monocausal technological
 determinism.”

 PS: We are in the realm of speculation here, and I cannot claim to be an
 economic historian, but I do not believe the evolution of either
 interactive or personal computing was market-driven. When you read, for
 instance, the Licklider biography “The Dream Machine” (I forget the
 author’s name), you find Licklider knocking his head against the wall
 trying to persuade IBM to provide time-sharing, the first major
 breakthrough in interactive computing. Eventually there emerged
 entrepreneurs – notably Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and Mitch Kapor – who
 recognized the market potential of the new technology. But by then
 networking, word-processing, email, and GUIs had already been developed,
 mostly by government-funded researchers guided by the augmentationist
 vision. What would have happened if Licklider, Engelbart, and Sutherland
 had not been guided by this vision, or if they had not obtained government
 funding? I think the answer is that we simply do not know.

 This may be the place to add that, when I wrote “Thinking With Machines”
 and “The Mind’s Machines”, I did not yet recognize Sutherland’s
 significance. Bush, Licklider, and Engelbart were the theoreticians and
 advocates for IA, but arguably – and in fact argued by Howard Rheingold –
 Sutherland’s “Sketchpad” was the single most important technological
 breakthrough. I was privately rebuked by Arthur Burks for this omission.


 You continue:

 “I know almost nothing about computer programming, but I was a Word and
 PowerPoint guru for some years. It's just that I think that some
 relevantly able people would soon enough have recognized the tremendous
 potential for personal computers. As the 1990s wore on, companies ended up
 stocking their cubicles with computers although most users never heard of,
 much less learned to use, more than 1/10 of the power of such programs as
 Word and PowerPoint, and workplace pressures tend to lock people into
 short-sighted views of the value of developing skills on word processors,
 spreadsheets, etc. (quick and dirty is the motto). Well, 1/10 is just
 my subjective impression, but whatever the vague fraction, it was small but
 enough to make the companies' investment worthwhile. (And probably the
 added value per added power doesn't equal one and involves diminishing
 returns, especially in terms of empowering collaboration beyond
 interaction).”

 PS: I think this is absolutely true, and I just want to add that
 Engelbart’s particular vision of IA has largely failed to materialize, due
 to the general unwillingness of corporations to provide training for their
 employees. Engelbart never set much store by user-friendliness; his project
 was to provide intellectual leverage through machinery and training.
 Probably his most cherished input device was not the mouse, but the keyset,
 with ten keys on which the user could enter chords.  It never went
 anywhere, as it would take about three weeks of training to gain
 proficiency with it.

 Moving on, you say:

 “Looking over Joe's paper, I'd guess that he wasn't aware of the
 interaction-collaboration distinction, or didn't remember it while writing
 the paper, and that by interactive he meant interactive and collaborative
 alike. I'm not all that clear on the distinction myself. I tend to think of
 it not only in terms of people and computers but also in terms of various
 programs or computer systems (with attendent interoperability challenges)
 interacting (requesting and receiving data) and collaborating (asking each
 other to work on solving problems).”

 PS: I think this is true, and my disagreement with Joe here may be purely
 verbal; i.e. by “interactive” he probably meant to include the
 collaborative aspect.

 Finally, you raise this question:

 “Thinking, actively cogitating, is even less pure cognition than are
 looking (in order to see) and listening (in order to hear). The idea of
 reasoning, as _deliberate_ self-controlled inference, evokes 

[peirce-l] Popularizing Peirce

2011-10-18 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I would be interested in reactions to my various efforts to popularize or
apply the thinking ogf CSP to ongoing events. I am not looking so much for
reactions to my opinions or POV as the question of how a figure like Peirce
comes to influence events and whether and how the process inevitably changes
perceptions of CSP.  You will see from this short piece that I link Obama to
Peirce - and in fact I came to Peirce through my sense of Obama.  All the
best, S

http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/2011/10/why-obama-is-not-wall-street.html



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Re: [peirce-l] Occupy Evolution

2011-10-16 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I assume drawing from the same text that this is CSP's considered
conclusion, wherewith he trumps these seductive  notions in his defense of
sentimentality. (Dorry the quote seems to wish to narrow itself a bit.)

*

 Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress comes
from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his
neighbors. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is
that progress takes place by virtue of every individual's striving for
himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor under foot whenever he
gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the Gospel of Greed.

*

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On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 10:22 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 So a miser is a beneficent power in a community, is he?
 With the same reason precisely, only in a much higher degree,
 you might pronounce the Wall Street sharp to be a good angel,
 who takes money from heedless persons not likely to guard it
 properly, who wrecks feeble enterprises better stopped, and
 who administers wholesome lessons to unwary scientific men,
 by passing worthless checks upon them -- as you did, the other
 day, to me, my millionaire Master in glomery, when you thought
 you saw your way to using my process without paying for it, and of
 so bequeathing to your children something to boast about of their
 father -- and who by a thousand wiles puts money at the service of
 intelligent greed, in his own person. Bernard Mandeville, in his
 Fable of the Bees, maintains that private vices of all descriptions
 are public benefits, and proves it, too, quite as cogently as the
 economist proves his point concerning the miser. He even argues, with
 no slight force, that but for vice civilization would never have existed.
 In the same spirit, it has been strongly maintained and is today widely
 believed that all acts of charity and benevolence, private and public,
 go seriously to degrade the human race.

 Charles S. Peirce, Evolutionary Love,
 'The Monist', vol. 3, pp. 176-200 (1893)

 http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/**library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.**htmhttp://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.htm

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Re: [peirce-l] intelligent slaves

2011-10-05 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Thanks for this Eugene. If you credit Brent, the most serious thing IMO on
Peirce's moral ledger would be violence. That is where my problem with
Pierce would be more than with his nativism/racism.  Someone wrote in a
study of Pierce that James was a saint who longed to be a sinner and Peirce
a sinner who longed to be a saint.

Cheers, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 2:44 PM, Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.eduwrote:

 Dear Stephen, 

 In support of what you say concerning that we are all a
 spectrum, including less than admirable things as well as admirable things,
 let me quote something I find admirable from near the beginning of the very
 same letter of 1908, where Peirce says:

 ** **

 “Unless truth be recognized as *public*, - as that of which
 any person would come to be convinced if he carried his inquiry, his sincere
 search for immovable belief, far enough, - then there will be nothing to
 prevent each one of us from adopting an utterly futile belief of his own
 which all the rest will disbelieve. Each one will set himself up as a little
 prophet; that is, a little ‘crank,’ a half-witted victim of his own
 narrowness.
 But if Truth be something public, it must mean that to the
 acceptance of which as a basis of conduct any person you please would
 ultimately come if he pursued his inquiries far enough; - yes, every
 rational being, however prejudiced he might be at the outset.”

 ** **

 Luckily for Peirce, his own definition suggests his prejudiced
 political views could be subject to criticism and correction. That is what I
 am attempting to do for him here. But there is still blood on his lab coat
 as far as I can see. 

 ** **

 Gene

 ** **

 ** **

 *From:* C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] *On
 Behalf Of *Stephen C. Rose
 *Sent:* Wednesday, October 05, 2011 2:31 PM
 *To:* PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] intelligent slaves

 ** **

 Let me spare you the difficulty of reading the part of my note that was
 unintelligible.  It should read:

 ** **

 First in this universe is his threes and next his convincing case for
 realism. I could cite less than admirable things about numerous heroes of
 our time and all it would end up being would be proof that we are all a
 spectrum and that somewhere in each of us there are things that are not
 noted merely because they are not known or no one cares or they have been
 hidden.


 

 *ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



 

 On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 2:16 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

 Ha!

 Apart from the possibility of irony, which I commonly find in Peirce
 more than others do, I think it is clear that matters of society and
 judgment of character were some of Peirce's weakest points, which is
 why I switch to Dewey when it comes to practical wit on those scores.

 Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Academic Capitalism

2011-09-30 Thread Stephen C. Rose
As a confirmed long-term exile from academia and professional existence, I
see Peirce as a role model for nomads of the universe - he might pluralize
universe.  I think the best thing Peirce-inclined academics can do is
demonstrate in readable prose - as here of late - ways Peirce anticipated
precisely the issues with which we are wrestling now. Such pieces can be
widely circulated and begin to tilt scales of public opinion and wake up the
comatose. Gary F. does this in an exemplary manner. I try in my way. Anyone
can do this.

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On Fri, Sep 30, 2011 at 5:55 PM, Sally Ness sally.n...@ucr.edu wrote:

 Jon,

 Thank you for this reminder Jon--I should have mentioned it specifically in
 the last post.  And thanks also for identifying the additional resources.

 I wish I had some word of consolation for you.  However, Peirce also faced
 very depressing circumstances and still managed to do the work he did.
  Perhaps his example might provide a trace of hope.

 Best,
 Sally



  Sally, Gene,  All,

 In relation to the purpose of a university and what's been happening to
 it lately,
 I earlier mentioned the themes of academic capitalism and the war on
 science.

 JA 30 Aug 2011
 I think it is reasonable to be concerned with distorting influences
 on research and scholarship, whether we find them in the sciences or
 in the other disciplines.  Looking around, the conflicts of interest
 appear to grow more pushy and more pervasive every day.  I'm thinking
 of cautionary tales like Slaughter and Leslie on Academic Capitalism,
 or Chris Mooney in The Republican War on Science, just to name two
 that other contexts of discussion are constantly bringing to mind.

 But the question was:  What to do about it?

 It appears that further inquiry is called for.
 /JA

 Here is a paper that summarizes the issues of academic capitalism:

 Susan M. Awbrey,
 Making the 'Invisible Hand' Visible:
 The Case for Dialogue About Academic Capitalism
 http://www2.oakland.edu/**oujournal/files/5_Awbrey.pdfhttp://www2.oakland.edu/oujournal/files/5_Awbrey.pdf

 I fear that the situation has grown far worse since the time that
 paper was written, but it depresses me too much to talk about it,
 so I'll just leave it at that until I recover some trace of hope.

 Regards,

 Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Peirce and Hölderlin

2011-09-18 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I think CP evidences a certain mild disdain toward the transcendentalists
and is not much enamored of Emerson, not to the extent that Nietzsche was
for example. I probably could reference this if it is not generally agreed
that this is the case. Cheers, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Sun, Sep 18, 2011 at 3:17 PM, ama...@euphorika.net wrote:

 Greetings!

 I haven't any forensic evidence of formative influence, Hölderlin—Peirce,
 sorry; but since you also touch on the question of a semeiotic link, I'd
 like to suggest a couple of leads towards a grander, evolutive and
 collateral view.

 P—Jakobson—Heidegger—H.

 Jakobson and Lübbe-Grothues, Ein Blick auf Die Aussicht von Hölderlin.
 Heidegger's 1942/3? lectures around Hölderlin's poem, Der Ister.

 P—Emerson—H.

 I seem to recall Peirce mentioning Emerson. Were the two acquainted? I see
 they were both members of the Saturday Club in Boston. Not much generally
 familiar with Emerson, but I have read an essay of his, entitled Prudence,
 in which he describes 3 classes of attitudes to life, roughly 1.
 utilitarian, 2. aesthetic, 3. truthful, which bear comparison with Peirce's
 notions of 1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness. Emerson remarks that few people
 comprehend the full the full gamut.

 One or two curious points worth mentioning about Hölderlin. He was a
 radically literalist translator of Ancient Greek poetry, which is to say
 that he understood/felt individual words to be highly complex/rich signs.
 Related is a rather abstract phase in Hölderlin's approach to poetic
 composition, which somewhat resembles Peirce's morphological arrangement of
 triads. There are notes surviving in which Hölderlin works out poem
 compositions in the following way:

 WISTFULNESS WISTFULNESS PLAYFULNESS PLAYFULNESS
 WISTFULNESS SORROW SORROW WISTFULNESS
 LONGING WISTFULNESS WISTFULNESS LONGING
 ...

 And so on. In fact, I can't recall any particular composition; this is a 25
 year old memory from my early student days. Now, if you put the two points
 together, in perspective of the finished poetry and other writing, the
 ordering of moods turns up a logic of semantic morphism, however
 casual/intuitive.

 Good luck. I'd be very curious about any explicit links you turn up.

 Cheers!
 Ozan

 On Aug 31, 2011, at 1:46 AM, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues wrote:

 Hello list:

 Does anyone know whether Peirce knew anything by Friedrich Hölderlin?
 I'm thinking specifically about Hölderlins poem called Mnemosyne, where the
 image of man as sign appears. I found this link to the poem:

 http://publish.uwo.ca/~rparke3/documents/mnemosynedrafttrans.pdf

 And also this quote from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (I couldn't make
 sure yet whether or not it's from The Death of Empedocles/ Der Tod des
 Empedokles, by Hölderlin):
 Der Pathos des Sängers ist nicht die betäubende Naturmacht, sondern die
 Mnemosyne, die Besinnung und gewordeneInnerlichkeit, die Erinnerung des
 unmittelbaren Wesens. (sorry, I can't translate that into English and
 couldn't find the translation online, but it's from the Phenomenology of
 Spirit, VII.B.c: The Spiritual Work of Art).  This quote seems to indicate
 to the same general philosophical point as CSP does in his 1868 papers on
 cognition: the impossibility of an imediate knowledge. Anyway, just a point
 of historical curiosity; but the Hölderlin case seems more interesting, to
 me at least.
 All the very best to all,
 cass.

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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-04 Thread Stephen C. Rose
As a lifetime generalist communicator with always much to learn and amend, I
find this a salient bit of advice to any and all. I mean the part about
being aware of ones own fallibility and further taking to heart what it
signifies if one does not take the community as the rationale for
communication in the first place. I had no trouble with Steven's initial
post though I do not pretend to have understood it. It is clear that
whatever he thought, he was pretty certain. Maybe we all are permitted like
Walker Percy to take what we wish. We will anyway.


On Thu, Aug 4, 2011 at 12:23 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

 List and Steven,

 ** **

 I'm replying here to Steven's post, and will do so directly below, but i'm
 addressing the list first (and changing the subject line) because i think
 Steven's cryptic remarks furnish a good illustration of what happens when
 the fallibilism implied in the Ransdell paper is forgotten. Here i'm
 referring specifically to paragraph 2:

 ** **

 [[ Let us note to begin with that to regard semiosis--the generation of the
 interpretant--as always due primarily to the agency of the sign itself
 rather than to the agency of an interpreter, human or otherwise, does not
 deny that human agency has an important role in the occurrence of meaning
 phenomena, in changes in meaning, in the creation of meaning, and so forth.
 It does mean, though, that an interpreter's interpretation is to be regarded
 as being primarily a *perception* or *observation* of the meaning
 exhibited by the sign itself--for the limited purposes of this paper we can
 equate the meaning of a sign with the interpretants it generates--and that
 such control as we do have over the powers of signs (thus over meaning
 phenomena in general) lies in our skill at setting them in interaction with
 one another in the compositional process in ways favorable to some desired
 result. But we can predict such results only to a limited extent, owing both
 to our typically incomplete understanding of what the generative powers of a
 given sign actually are and to the spontaneity of the signs themselves. ]]
 

 ** **

 If we look at semiosis in terms of the dialogue between Utterer and
 Interpreter (which Peirce frequently did circa 1906-8), the last sentence of
 this excerpt refers to the fallibility of the Utterer by saying that the
 results of even a skillful utterance are not fully predictable. But the
 Interpreter is also fallible, and this is clearly implied in the second
 sentence. If the meaning of a sign is the series of interpretants it
 generates, then the meaning is *in futuro*, with the ultimate logical
 interpretant completing itself only at the very end of the semiotic process.
 It follows that “a perception or observation of the meaning exhibited by the
 sign itself”, insofar as it is actualized, is really a prediction, since
 there is no direct perception of something that does not presently exist. In
 practice, therefore, interpretation is just as fallible as utterance. This
 is already implied in Joe's first sentence, and indeed is so obvious that he
 probably saw no need to make it more explicit.

 ** **

 It should also be obvious that successful communication depends not only on
 respecting the autonomy of the semiotic process (which is Joe's main point)
 but also on making allowances for our own fallibility as utterers and
 interpreters. This fallibility entails that any actual interpretant can be a
 misinterpretant. If we don't recognize our own fallibility, we don't respect
 the honest (albeit fallible) attempts of others to contribute to the growth
 of meaning and reasonableness.

 ** **

 Turning to the meaning of *words* – which was the specific subject of the
 “Wittgenstein” thread launched by Steven – we must all recognize that our
 interpretive acts involving words are necessarily based on habits informed
 by our previous experience with use of those words. But since any one
 person's experience is limited, his habits are to some degree idiosyncratic;
 while the meaning of words must be considered public property, ideally the
 property of an infinite community. That is a regulative principle, not a
 historical fact. Communication consists of finite individuals trying to
 contribute to the development of meaning. Using words to communicate
 involves an attempt to harmonize and synchronize our fallible habits of
 usage. This means weeding out idiosyncratic usages when we find them, which
 we can't do if we overlook our own idiosyncrasies. It also means
 disambiguating when we can, but also recognizing that ambiguity can never be
 totally eliminated from communication. (It can be eliminated from an
 artificial language, perhaps, but not while it's being used to communicate.)
 

 ** **

 Now to the specific example of how communicative dialogue breaks down when
 the utterer and interpreter ignores his own fallibility.

 ** **

 Steven, you wrote that

 [[ 

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Is Peirce a Phenomenologist? - Concept of category?

2011-07-22 Thread Stephen C. Rose
As a non-academic writer and editor I agree. One term cannot fit all. Best,
S

Stephen C. Rose
*My Associated 
Contenthttp://www.associatedcontent.com/user/815562/stephen_c_rose.html
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On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:40 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote:

 List:

 The recent proposals on this listserv for distinguishing among the
 potential ostensive usages of the term category are, in my opinion,
 insufficient for the purposes of clear communication.

 The term category has ancient roots and is many philosophers since
 Aristotle (Kant, Hegel, Whitehead, among others) have devised specific
 classifications of putative importance.

 Mathematical categories are of recent origin (Eilenberg / MacLean, 1940? )
 and are not even remotely related to the philosophical terms.  Mathematical
 categories, even if one accepts Irving's definitions, are fully plasticized
 mathematics (symbolic narratives composed from artificial symbols without
 phenomenological meaning outside an extremely narrow usage of mathematical
 terms.)

 Thus, I would recommend that if one wishes to communicate clearly, then the
 various usages of the term category should be preceded by a descriptive
 adjective that grammatically distinguishes the origins of the terms.

 Examples:
 mathematical categories
 Peircean categories
 Whiteheadean categories
 Kantian categories
 and of course, the grandaddy of them all (except the mathematical anomaly)
 Aristotelian categories.

 Just my opinion.

 Cheers

 Jerry

 Research Professor
 Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
 703-790-1651


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Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Is Peirce a Phenomenologist? part 5

2011-07-18 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I am dumb to say anything save that I agree with the thrust of this from a
simple apprehension of firstness as first and perhaps identical with a
number of terms that P
uses to describe a slippery  vagueness, excitation, confusion.
Phenomenolology and logic (which I sense he makes prior to phenomenology)
would relate to thought about this vague thing and would look more like the
second. A reaction. That could still make Pierce  among many other (some
prior) things a phenomenologist.  There now, in Rem's diction, I've said too
much.
Stephen C. Rose



On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 10:23 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

 My final post as emcee of JR's paper “Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?” deals
 with the final (and, i think, the weightiest) section of this paper, from
 [22] on, which deals with “Peirce's phenomenology proper.” There are some
 discrepancies between Peirce's own remarks on “phenomenology” (and
 “phaneroscopy”) and JR's account of it here, but rather than consider these
 discrepancies one at a time, i'll focus here on the key factor which makes
 JR's treatment of the subject distinctive. To me, it all follows naturally
 from his statement in [1] which identifies Peirce's phenomenology with “the
 doctrine of categories” – which for JR appears to denote what Gary Richmond
 calls “category theory.”

 ** **

 By this i mean not the branch of pure mathematics which goes by that name,
 but the applications of Peirce's categorial concepts (Firstness, Secondness
 and Thirdness) to the analysis and classification of concepts and other
 phenomena. Peirce's own “Guess at the Riddle” would thus be an extended
 example of category theory, and so would much of his later work on
 semiotics. JR does not use the term in this paper, but as Gary has said, he
 did apply the term to some of Gary's own work, and this led to Gary's later
 analysis of phenomenology according to this trichotomy:

 phaneroscopy (firstness)

 | category theory (thirdness)

 iconoscopy(?) (secondness)

 ** **

 But for JR, at least in the paper we are slow-reading, category theory is
 really all there is to Peircean phenomenology. My own study in
 www.gnusystems.ca/PeircePhenom.htm differs from Gary's in taking
 “phaneroscopy” to be *synonymous* with “phenomenology” rather than a part
 of it, but agrees with Gary's trichotomy in taking phaneroscopy to be
 different from and prior to category theory. JR, on the other hand, does not
 recognize what Gary calls “phaneroscopy”, nor does he acknowledge what
 Peirce calls “observation” in texts like this one: “I found Logic largely on
 a study which I call Phaneroscopy, which is the keen observation of and
 generalization from the direct Perception of what we are immediately aware
 of” (EP2:501, 1909). 

 ** **

 The crux of the matter here is that “generalization” can easily be seen as
 part of logic or semiotic, but “observation” of the Phaneron must be seen as
 prior to Logic in order for the latter to be “founded” on Phaneroscopy.
 Category theory is a *logical extension* of the phaneroscopic analysis
 which identifies Peirce's triad of categories as elements of the phaneron.
 JR's exclusion of “phaneroscopy” and consequent identification of
 “phenomenology” with category theory prompts him to say in this paper that
 “most of what Peirce himself did along these lines would properly be
 regarded as a part of semiotic” [22] – since Peirce's “categories” are
 indeed intimately entwined with his semiotic, even in the 1867 “New List of
 Categories” (long before Peirce used either “semiotic” or “phenomenology” as
 specifying terms). Thus it is the “New List of Categories” itself that JR
 takes to be “foundational” [1]. But can this be reconciled with the
 foundational role which Peirce assigns to Phaneroscopy in the quote above,
 and assigned to “phenomenology” as early as 1902?

 ** **

 JR does seem to acknowledge this foundational role in [24]:

 [[ what phenomenology primarily meant to him was the idea that the
 objects of phenomenological study as such are not studied with any implicit
 or explicit assumptions, presuppositions, or assertions as to their reality
 status, which made it possible to develop semiotic or logic (in the broad
 sense) in a way that presupposes no metaphysical framework, and therefore
 involves no a priori assumptions about, say, the mental or physical status
 of the phenomenal entities. ]]

 I wouldn't argue with anything in that statement, and i don't think Gary
 would either. But it raises a question which, as far as i can see, JR's
 paper does not answer: How can a study which “would properly be regarded as
 a part of semiotic” *make it “possible* to develop semiotic or logic”
 along the lines JR describes – or indeed along any lines? Can a part make
 the development of the whole “possible”?

 ** **

 If i am misunderstanding or misrepresenting JR on this point, i hope
 someone will correct me. But if not, the key