[peirce-l] Benjamin Peirce on universal will.

2012-04-30 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
FYI

I eventually found the reference that I had been looking for, and have 
mentioned numerous times here, regarding Benjamin Peirce's comment on 
universal will. I originally saw it in Brent's biography of Charles on page 
19:

Gentleman, as we study the universe we see everywhere the most tremendous 
manifestations of force. In our own experience we know of but one source of 
force, namely will. How then can we help regarding the forces we see in nature 
as due to the will of some omnipresent, ominipotent being? Gentlemen, there 
must be a GOD! BP.

The note 29 cites: Archibald 5, referring to Raymond Clare Archibald's 
Biographical Sketch of Benjamin Peirce. Brent points to the influence of this 
thinking upon Charles' Neglected Argument. 

Despite the common associations in the given language I am reading a broad 
non-theism (anti-personification, non-anthropomorphic) into Benjamin Peirce's 
view cited here and in his presentation in Ideality and the physical sciences 
consistent with the Neglected Argument but in many ways more sophisticated, 
and certainly made with more passion and conviction, than the argument made by 
Charles. 

Anyone care to comment?

It may be worth noting that Eastern non-theistic texts (I'm thinking of 
Buddhist scientific philosophy texts and Taoist texts in particular) were not 
readily available in translation at the time of Benjamin's life, so Benjamin 
may not have been aware of them. Charles refers to Buddhist work a number of 
times in the Collected Papers but does not mention to which text he refers. 
Does anyone know?

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Manifolds of sense and interpretation

2012-04-19 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

The following is the abstract for a presentation that I will be giving on my 
approach to logic and computation at the Stanford University Mathematical Logic 
Seminar on May 8th (4:15pm at the Mathematics Department, Math corner 380-X).

Manifolds Of Sense And Interpretation, Logic And Computation As 
Biophysics (or why logicians are rightly theoretical biophysicists too)
http://iase.info/manifolds-of-sense-and-interpretation-logic-a-72847

Your feedback on the abstract will be appreciated. I'll post the slides and 
maybe a recording of the presentation after the 8th.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] The family of Benjamin Peirce

2012-03-20 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

I have an increasing interest in Benjamin Peirce and his son James, Charles' 
elder brother.  I am curious about Charles' relationship with his brother, who 
continued his father's work teaching mathematics at Harvard. I wonder about the 
relationship for a number of reasons, but it is primarily to fill in the gaps 
for me concerning Charles Peirce's intellectual life and the familial/social 
climate of the time. 

There is a strong indication in the literature that James was gay and 
potentially the author (Prof X) of a particularly powerful and interesting (in 
the sense of advanced and well-considered thinking) piece on the virtues of 
homosexuality (or at least the reasons why there should be no objection to it), 
and I note no disapproval or criticism of this by Charles or his father. Given 
Charles' hardships later in life I also wonder whether James (his brother) 
provided Charles with aid or property. And given the liberal nature of the 
family I wonder about their view of Charles' later marriage. 

I continue to see the roots of many of Charles' ideas in the work of his 
father, although their vocabulary and ways of speaking differ. Benjamin's 
Ideality In The Physical Sciences is an especially interesting read and I 
find myself revising my initial views concerning Charles' religious background, 
that I have previously considered naive from his own writings. Benjamin Peirce 
has an especially sophisticated sensibility for traditional religious concerns 
(Kierkegaardian almost) and the relationship with science, and he speaks 
eloquently about it. His view is certainly suggestive of Charles' unconsidered 
argument and in many ways his view is more sophisticated. Certainly his 
conception of God is not the anthropomorphic conception and it is compatible 
with Charles' view in that I would not expect Benjamin to object to the 
unconsidered argument. I am trying to decipher Benjamin's views on what I 
will call universal will.

As the picture becomes more fleshed out, the family of Benjamin Peirce as a 
whole and Charles' place within it, leads me to expect that a fuller 
understanding of this family, and its combined intellectual life, is necessary 
for an understanding of Charles and his work.

Does anyone have pointers for me or suggestions about where I can find more 
help with this?

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] The family of Benjamin Peirce

2012-03-20 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Thanks for this Ken. I have a copy of His Glassy Essence, but confess I have 
read it only in part. I shall return to it.

Given the homophobia since, and established in the Victorian era, it is 
surprising to me to find this tolerance and, indeed, advocacy of homosexuality 
in New England. It gives me a very different perspective of the time and the 
place.

Regards,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 20, 2012, at 10:08 AM, Kenneth Ketner wrote:

 Steven and group:  I had the same suspicion about the importance of family 
 life in CSP's formative years, and I was able to find quite a bit about it, 
 and show it in HIS GLASSY ESSENCE (available in the web used book sites, such 
 as ADDALL) which is a life of Peirce through about 1867.
 
 Yes, James Peirce was indeed gay -- evidence is now clear (see HGE); the 
 family accepted it; JP and Symonds were closely connected; JP had a career at 
 Harvard despite it being known that he was gay.
 
 Ben Peirce had a long relationship with the Queen of Science, well 
 documented in HGE, including her hitherto unseen photograph; the Queen had an 
 influence on Charley. Other family members likewise influenced him -- Admiral 
 Davis; the  lady who gave him a copy of Schiller's Aesthetische Breife; his 
 brother James who gave him a copy of Whatley's Logic, and his aunt with whom 
 he learned German and read Kant; a cousin who was a playmate. And of course 
 his father, of whom he later said (paraphrase) If I amount to something it 
 will be because of him, for he trained me.  In particular, Ben's Ideality 
 book was a strong influence as was Ben's talk on Genesis (in HGE). Ben's 
 death in 1880 was particularly devastating, because Charley and Ben were a 
 definite team in science and in life. Much more could be said.
 
 That is to state, you are definitely on the right track in looking at family 
 for influence on Peirce's formative years, and for understanding some of his 
 later ideas and accomplishments.
 
 On 20/03/2012 01:54, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
 Dear List,
 
 I have an increasing interest in Benjamin Peirce and his son James, Charles' 
 elder brother.  I am curious about Charles' relationship with his brother, 
 who continued his father's work teaching mathematics at Harvard. I wonder 
 about the relationship for a number of reasons, but it is primarily to fill 
 in the gaps for me concerning Charles Peirce's intellectual life and the 
 familial/social climate of the time.
 
 There is a strong indication in the literature that James was gay and 
 potentially the author (Prof X) of a particularly powerful and interesting 
 (in the sense of advanced and well-considered thinking) piece on the virtues 
 of homosexuality (or at least the reasons why there should be no objection 
 to it), and I note no disapproval or criticism of this by Charles or his 
 father. Given Charles' hardships later in life I also wonder whether James 
 (his brother) provided Charles with aid or property. And given the liberal 
 nature of the family I wonder about their view of Charles' later marriage.
 
 I continue to see the roots of many of Charles' ideas in the work of his 
 father, although their vocabulary and ways of speaking differ. Benjamin's 
 Ideality In The Physical Sciences is an especially interesting read and I 
 find myself revising my initial views concerning Charles' religious 
 background, that I have previously considered naive from his own writings. 
 Benjamin Peirce has an especially sophisticated sensibility for traditional 
 religious concerns (Kierkegaardian almost) and the relationship with 
 science, and he speaks eloquently about it. His view is certainly suggestive 
 of Charles' unconsidered argument and in many ways his view is more 
 sophisticated. Certainly his conception of God is not the anthropomorphic 
 conception and it is compatible with Charles' view in that I would not 
 expect Benjamin to object to the unconsidered argument. I am trying to 
 decipher Benjamin's views on what I will call universal will.
 
 As the picture becomes more fleshed out, the family of Benjamin Peirce as a 
 whole and Charles' place within it, leads me to expect that a fuller 
 understanding of this family, and its combined intellectual life, is 
 necessary for an understanding of Charles and his work.
 
 Does anyone have pointers for me or suggestions about where I can find more 
 help with this?
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 --
  Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
  http://iase.info
 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message.  To post a message

Re: [peirce-l] a question

2012-03-14 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Diane,

I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using 
notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights.

In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking) I 
would prefer: 

1st  = the immediate experience
2nd = the accessible record
3rd = the manifold of unity

In brief: immediacy, record, unification.

It would be important for me to observe that no sequential nature should be 
read into the process suggested by these categories, they covary in what I 
would call the eternal moment. The conception of time is a product of the 
unifying effect of what Peirce calls thirdness.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 14, 2012, at 8:56 AM, Diane Stephens wrote:

 In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows 
 concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first is 
 quality, a second is fact and a third is law.  I understand all but second as 
 past as in: 
 
 First - present 
 Second - past 
 Third - future 
 
 I would appreciate some help.
 
 Thanks.
 
 
 -- 
 Diane Stephens
 Swearingen Chair of Education
 Wardlaw 255
 College of Education
 University of South Carolina
 Columbia, SC 29208
 803-777-0502
 Fax 803-777-3193 
 
 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message. To post a message to the list, send it to 
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-11 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Ben,

There is no inconsistency as I see it, though I may not have stated the case 
clearly enough. In the first I said Peirce is not referring to his categories 
AS predicates of predicates, not that he is not referring to his categories.

As index I am referring to the category itself, not its elements. A category 
stands apart from the elements that it may select by virtue of its properties. 
Apprehended, denoted, the category is indexed; 1st, 2nd, 3rd. You object to my 
saying that a category IS an index, by which I mean that it has the properties 
of an index. You appear to suggest that indices has another level of being, 
that will lead to an infinite recurse. 

Again:

... of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote Categories 
and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very 
promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and 
therefore can only be denoted by Indices.

A year earlier, in 1866, Peirce wrote On A Method Of Searching For The 
Categories in which he lists the categories as Quality, Relation, 
Representation. So it seems clear that in this period he already had his 
categories and is referring to them here.

See p. 520 and p. 524 of the first volume of the chronological edition 
Writings of CSP.

On they cannot be decomposed, in CP 1.299 Peirce writes:

We find then a priori that there are three categories of undecomposable 
elements to be expected in the phaneron: those which are simply positive 
totals, those which involve dependence but not combination, those which involve 
combination.

Predicaments are predicates of predicates for Peirce, Aristotle's 
Categories.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 11, 2012, at 4:35 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

 Dear Steven,
 
 In your previous post, you said,
 
 Although the dialogic makes these passages a little difficult to read, it 
 seems very clear to me that Peirce, in CP 4.549, is explicitly not referring 
 to his own categories as predicated predicates, or assertions on assertions. 
 
 I think the question of what is a category is clearly addressed earlier, 
 in CP 4.544, Peirce says:
 
 ... of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote 
 Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, 
 very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily 
 defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices.
 Now you say,
 
 After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben.
 
 Peirce is indeed referring to his own categories (it is difficult to read 
 the dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question 
 concerning predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to 
 which I referred earlier.
 
 The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, i.e., 
 they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed.
 
 Peirce doesn't say in Prolegomena (CP 4.530-572) that categories _are_ 
 indices, instead he says that, for categories are denotable only by indices, 
 and the reason that he gives is not indecomposibility, but instead their 
 being enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part such 
 that they cannot be satisfactorily defined..  But the supposed 
 indecomposibility of Prolegomena-categories was the only specific positive 
 reason you give for thinking that by Category in Prolegomena he means the 
 same that he means by Category pretty much everywhere else. Meanwhile 
 you've left untouched the positive reasons for thinking that it is not the 
 same Category as everywhere else:
 
 1. He says: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories 
 but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments and which you have 
 explained as predicates of predicates. Peirce usually calls his own 
 categories Categories, not Predicaments, and usually uses Predicaments 
 as an alternate term for Aristotle's categories (substance, quantity, 
 relation, quality, position (attitude), state, time (when), place, action, 
 passion (undergoing).
 
 2. He calls Modes of Being three things whose terms, as the CP editors 
 note, he often enough uses as terms for his own categories - Actuality, 
 Possibility, and Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny) - that is, Secondness, 
 Firstness, and Thirdness, respectively.
 
 3. He says that the divisions so obtained - i.e., 1st-intentional, 
 2nd-intentional, 3rd-intentional - must not be confounded with the different 
 Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On 
 the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates - i.e., the 
 Prolegomena-categories - is different in the different Modes of Being. And 
 on those successions, he says, and remember the year is 1906, his thoughts 
 are not yet harvested. Seems unlikely indeed

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-06 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Thank you Phyllis for the encouraging remarks. 

God is another term that I avoid, for the obvious reasons. I often wonder 
about Benjamin Peirce's influence upon his son's conceptions. He professed what 
strikes me as a similar, though more sophisticated, idea: that the force of 
will is a universal. I think both Peirce's were on the right track but prefer 
to see the inquiry as focused upon the foundations of the world, including 
sense, rather than explaining the mind of God, which is, indeed, an 
anthropomorphic conception. 

I'm not sure I would say that the Mars lander computational analysis of data is 
interpretation. It seems to me to be a further representation, although one 
filtered by a machine imbued with our intelligence. Interpretation would be the 
thing done by scientists on earth.

The constructions I am considering, BTW, are living by any definition of the 
term I think. The distinction would be between those living entities evolved 
purely on the basis of the mechanics I propose and evolutionary theory, and 
those that exist or may evolve from, life produced by the intervention of 
intelligent species such as ours. Of course, noting that placement into 
environments in which life would not otherwise appear is an important criteria.

Thank you for the stimulating response.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 5, 2012, at 12:15 PM, Phyllis Chiasson wrote:

 Steven,
 
 I like this and do not think it at all overblown. I don't have my Peirce
 disk with me here in Tucson, but somewhere in it Peirce states that God
 could not have consciousness because consciousness requires the capability
 for sensation from which to experience and thus be conscious, something that
 Peirce's conception of God does not have. 
 
 However, it seems to me that a machine could be thought to fulfill that
 requirement for a sort of consciousness as long as it possesses prostheses
 that enable it to experience its environment and some way of interpreting
 that experience. For example, the Mars-lander picked up (tactile) and
 analyzed (interpreted) the contents of materials and then provided that
 information (communicated) to scientists on earth. 
 
 Yet, I suspect that you would encounter resistance from readers if you
 termed the sort of possibilities you are addressing as consciousness, as we
 are still a highly anthropomorphic civilization and many (though perhaps not
 your intended readers) may be insulted by the idea that such non-living
 constructions might be construed as conscious.
 
  Regards,
 Phyllis
 
 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 7:36 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
 
 Dear List,
 
 I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of
 Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you
 challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have
 developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me
 to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my
 wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the
 vague transhumanism concerns me. 
 
 Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the
 book?
 
 
 Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
 
 Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only
 have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could
 not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
 
 This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of
 mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than
 viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it
 suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes
 that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it
 would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
 
 Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with
 a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking,
 machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and
 reproduce.
 
 The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be
 an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that
 intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the
 natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
 
 Such a species would become the evolved intelligent designers of life,
 extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution,
 an inevitable part of nature's plan to move life beyond its dependence
 upon the environment in which it first evolves

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-06 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Stephen,

Dover Beach is a beautiful poem, I love it.

I assume that you are referring to Peirce's Preface to The Principles of 
Philosophy in the Collected Papers, correct?

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 6, 2012, at 3:56 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

 This immediately raised the memory of Peirce's remark about surpassing 
 Aristotle. We should probably create a grandiosity line in the sand for the 
 rest of us. :) I recommend the Fugs Dover Beach (Spotify) as the requisite 
 track to induce an appropriate humility without entirely deflating us. 
 Cheers, S
 
 ShortFormContent at Blogger
 
 
 
 On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 10:52 PM, Catherine Legg cl...@waikato.ac.nz wrote:
 Hi Steven,
 
 I'm afraid I must join my voice to those who feel they would not pick
 up the book based on your blurb (or preface - why call it a
 'Proemial'? What is a 'proemial'??) below.
 
 Though many of the component ideas are interesting, your overall
 expression of them seems to display a grandiosity which is a red flag
 to a serious philosopher. In particular there is this sentence which
 you put right upfront:
 
 ...something so profound that it would not only have a broad impact
 upon the entire species but the universe itself could not proceed,
 could not evolve, without consideration of it.
 
 I don't see how you could possibly know this - what scientific
 methodology might deliver this result.
 
 Loving the interesting range of 'hands-on' critical perspectives
 already generously provided by Peirce-listers...
 
 Cheers, Cathy
 
 On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 3:35 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote:
 Dear List,
 
 I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of 
 Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
 challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
 developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me 
 to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my 
 wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the 
 vague transhumanism concerns me.
 
 Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the 
 book?
 
 
 Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
 
 Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
 have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could 
 not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
 
 This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
 mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
 viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
 suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes 
 that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it 
 would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
 
 Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with 
 a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
 machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
 reproduce.
 
 The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be 
 an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that 
 intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the 
 natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
 
 Such a species would become the evolved “intelligent designers” of life, 
 extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
 an inevitable part of nature's “plan” to move life beyond its dependence 
 upon the environment in which it first evolves.
 
 If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
 appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding 
 of the world.
 
 In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
 science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
 composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
 nothing like a modern computer system.
 
 The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
 with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
 Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the 
 details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in 
 our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.
 
 Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of 
 sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep 
 consideration.
 
 Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help 
 us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the 
 period before Newton, in which experimentalists

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
Sense and Reference, thank you. 

The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense in 
biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view sense 
as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise.

You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)

I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 4, 2012, at 10:06 PM, malgosia askanas wrote:

 I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage 
 me from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way informative 
 tidbit is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent advances in 
 biophysics.  By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a book but a 
 25-page journal article, and it has nothing to do with either the senses 
 (such as sight or smell) or with making sense of the world.  And what are the 
 mechanics of sense; have we now extended scientific mechanism to 
 incorporeals, just to forestall its demise?
 
 -malgosia
 
 At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
 Dear List,
 
 I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of 
 Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
 challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
 developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me 
 to be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my 
 wife) argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the 
 vague transhumanism concerns me.
 
 Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the 
 book?
 
 
 Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience
 
 Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
 have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could 
 not proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.
 
 This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
 mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
 viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
 suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes 
 that an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it 
 would not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.
 
 Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with 
 a fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
 machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
 reproduce.
 
 The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be 
 an essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that 
 intelligent species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the 
 natural dynamics of the unfolding world.
 
 Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of life, 
 extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
 an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its dependence 
 upon the environment in which it first evolves.
 
 If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
 appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding 
 of the world.
 
 In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
 science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
 composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
 nothing like a modern computer system.
 
 The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
 with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
 Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the 
 details of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in 
 our directed actions, and how intelligent thought functions.
 
 Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of 
 sense. Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep 
 consideration.
 
 Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help 
 us. If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the 
 period before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as 
 Galileo and Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A 
 breakthrough of a kind similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is 
 required.
 
 But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we 
 need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Malgosia,

By sense I refer to the variety of differentiations of experience, be it the 
text book classifications, pain, electroception, or thought. I have only one 
meaning, one behavior, in mind.

A more extensive summary of the work can be found at http://iase.info. If you 
are interested I will be happy to send you a digital copy of Volume 1 of 
Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic and Apprehension 
that provides more details of my work.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Mar 5, 2012, at 8:37 AM, malgosia askanas wrote:

 Steven,  could you explain what you mean by sense in your post below (the 
 sense for which you trust there is a mechanical explanation)?  In your 
 blurb, you seem to use the word in at least 3 different meanings.  
 
 Talking about Aetherometry, I think you might find the Correas' book 
 Nanometric Functions of Bioenergy, large parts of which address questions 
 of the specificity and logic of the living,  to be of considerable interest 
 and relevance to your work.
 
 -malgosia
 
 At 1:15 AM -0800 3/5/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
 I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
 first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
 Sense and Reference, thank you.
 
 The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense 
 in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view 
 sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing 
 demise.
 
 You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)
 
 I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 --
  Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
  http://iase.info
 
 

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-04 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 that it will 
not only have a broad impact upon the entire species but that the universe 
itself cannot proceed without it, will give philosophers something to talk 
about for generations. It amuses me, in any case. In the meantime we in 
science, and logic in particular, have work to do.


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation, A History

2012-02-14 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Irving,

The answer is maybe. I have not spent enough time with Lesniewski's work to 
say at this point, it's certainly relevant. This and Tarski's work on 
cylindrical logic are only recently upon my horizon and I am not confident that 
I will have anything useful to say about either in June.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info







On Feb 14, 2012, at 5:04 AM, Irving wrote:

 
 Steven,
 
 I only very quickly scanned the abstract that you linked to, and would
 ask: With mereology characterized as a theory of collective sets (in
 opposition to the Cantorian notion of set), and with collective sets
 defined by means of the part of relation, such that mereology can be
 described as a theory of this relation; How relevant might Lesniewski's
 mereology be to this discussion, along with all of the other logicians
 you mention, besides Peirce and Schöder?
 
 Irving
 - Message from ste...@iase.us -
   Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2012 22:48:23 -0800
   From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us
 Reply-To: Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us
 Subject: Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation, A History
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 
 
 Dear List,
 
 I am giving a presentation at CiE 2012 in Cambridge (England) in June
 that may interest list members:
 
 Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation, A History
 http://iase.info/conceptions-of-locality-in-logic-and-computat
 
 Your review welcome.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 --
  Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
  http://iase.info
 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
 PEIRCE-L listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message
 to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in
 the body of the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 
 
 
 - End message from ste...@iase.us -
 
 
 
 Irving H. Anellis
 Visiting Research Associate
 Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought
 902 W. New York St.
 Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
 Indianapolis, IN 46202-5159
 USA
 URL: http://www.irvinganellis.info
 

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation, A History

2012-02-13 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

I am giving a presentation at CiE 2012 in Cambridge (England) in June that may 
interest list members:  

Conceptions Of Locality In Logic And Computation, A History
http://iase.info/conceptions-of-locality-in-logic-and-computat

Your review welcome. 

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

2011-12-16 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
I must say that I share Eugene's concern.

It seems to me that modern computing technology is less Intelligence 
Augmentation and more a poorly contrived manipulation of intelligence, not all 
of which has a beneficial effect and none of the effects of which are well 
understood.

Indeed, when I compare the intellectual efforts of the period before the 
distraction of computing technology, in which the book was the prevailing 
means of intelligence, with the intellectual efforts since, there is a distinct 
and lamentable dumbing down. 

Fewer thinkers read with any depth and more thinkers use superficial Internet 
search to make arguments and draw conclusions. Longer term thinking projects 
are discouraged in favor of a culture of short term guesswork based, feeble 
conceptions and short attention spans to be found on the Internet. Where 
metaphysical fantasy had once been sensibly rejected, scientific fantasy now 
prevails. Better data has been usurped by more elaborate fictional effects 
visualized in contemporary media, deceiving us into a broad acceptance of 
nonsense and a distortion of our existential conceptions.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering








On Dec 16, 2011, at 12:18 PM, Eugene Halton wrote:

Ben Udell asked: ...So, my question, which I find I have trouble 
 posing clearly, is, granting that IA involves an extension of mind in its 
 abilities/competences as well as its cognitions, does it much extend volition 
 and feeling (including emotion)?
 
In my view it clearly does, as does AI. The question for me is to what 
 end? Clearly improved computation can serve scientific advance and human 
 well-being. But the opposite is also true.
 
Human cognition occurs in embodiment and involves that embodiment, 
 regardless of the logic of the cognition. A pure intention to change 
 direction while walking, though unacted upon, will show up in the track sign, 
 because it gets subtly muscularized in the act of simply thinking it. 
 Consider too what Peirce stated about the nominalist outlook that dominates 
 modern mind and culture and science: The nominalist Weltanschauung has 
 become incorporated into what I will venture to call the very flesh and blood 
 of the average modern mind, CP 5.61.
 
So what if that nominalist Weltanschauung has as its telos the 
 progressive absorption of human purpose to the nominalist, materialist telos 
 of alienated purpose, incorporated as the machine: a mythic expansive 
 projection of the automatic that would define the universe itself as a vast 
 machine, earlier a ticking clock, now a calculating computer?
 
Then one might expect the very flesh and blood of the average modern 
 mind to progressively take on characteristics of the schizoid machine. As 
 Lewis Mumford put it, The new attitude toward time and space infected the 
 workshop and the counting house, the army and the city. The tempo became 
 faster, the magnitudes became greater; conceptually, modern culture launched 
 itself into space and gave itself over to movement. What Max Weber called the 
 'romanticism of numbers' grew naturally out of this interest. In timekeeping, 
 in trading, in fighting, men counted numbers, and finally, as the habit grew, 
 only numbers counted (Technics and Civilization, 1934, p. 22). Technique 
 outstrips purposive conduct.
 
Intelligence augmentation is not necessarily the same as the 
 augmentation of intelligence, because, at least as I understand it, the term 
 means technical means, and not the growth of purpose. An ever increasing 
 plethora of devices pour ever more information in today, but for the bulk of 
 people, the likely result is what I term brain suck. One example: Children 
 in the US between 8 and 18 now watch an average of 7 hours 38 minutes of 
 screens per day, 7 days per week. That does not count school time. Some 
 fragment of the information is probably augmenting intelligence, but the 
 overwhelming bulk of it is augmenting the very flesh and blood of their minds 
 by the moral equivalent of embedding emotional computer cookies to know 
 marketed commodities and to desire new commodities permanently.
 
The schizoid machine Weltanschauung works optimally by conditioning 
 though augmenting pleasure, as though sensation were emotion, especially in a 
 society that can redefine the purely commercial process benignly as 
 intelligence augmentation.
 
Gene Halton
 
 
 
 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On 
 Behalf Of Skagestad, Peter
 Sent: Friday, December 16, 2011 9:20 AM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO 
 COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
 
 Ben,
 
 Thank you for your comments, which I have been chewing on. I wish I had some 
 insightful responses

Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-12-05 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
A one word revision to my previous post:

On Dec 4, 2011, at 4:18 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

 ...
 Keeping in mind the various dimensions of experience, I took some pains
 to give an even-handed account of the tensions involved in integration:
 
 On the one hand I am much in favor of seeking deeper-lying continuities ...
 
 On the other hand I cannot help noticing the facts of usage.
 
 Still, I don't think we'll get very far with integrating the humanities
 and the sciences by setting up semiotics as just another isolated silo
 and ignoring the way terms of art are used in the other arts and sciences.

Dear John,

I agree, that for semiotics to be an effective unifying discipline it must 
not isolate itself. Unfortunately, it's too late. By a series of missteps, 
related cross-discipline confusions, and plain term usage, semiotics *is* 
isolated. 

The irony is that semeiotic theory is necessarily first among sciences. Yet its 
current position is worse than last. If you surveyed most scientists today that 
understand the discipline I suspect they would consider it irrelevant, many 
more have never heard of it. 

And I do not think the situation can be rescued. Any serious analysis of the 
situation must, I think, draw this conclusion.

The right approach I have concluded is to drive a resurgence with renewed 
interest in logic and its foundations, expanding the scope of the discipline to 
encompass the concerns that rest within what we call semeiotic theory. Logic 
has a role that is better appreciated and can be driven toward a useful 
expansion and a clarification by semeiotic theory. 

This will seem to many here as the child usurping the parent but I see it as 
the only way forward.

The first challenge in this regard is to undermine the common view that logic, 
as computation (as conceived in Computer Science), is a done deal. And we 
may shake this view by producing significant practical results that demonstrate 
the value of new and advanced general theories that elucidate both the 
operation of biophysical systems and enable the construction of new 
computational machinery. 

If the case can be made that without a renewed effort in the foundations of 
logic that further progress is hampered, then there is hope (for it is surely 
semeiotic theory that can lead us out of the dead end we face in socially 
critical science and engineering).

With respect,
Steven

PS. As an illustration of what I suggest, consider my abstract for The 
Incomputable conference to be held in England next year, found here:

http://www.mathcomp.leeds.ac.uk/turing2012/inc/give-page.php?8

And indeed, this conference generally 
(http://www.mathcomp.leeds.ac.uk/turing2012/inc/give-page.php?1) and the one 
that I am organizing at Stanford University (http://challengingturing.org) are 
examples of the way ahead. These are still very much frontiers events and 
there are many miles to go before the broader consideration that these matters 
require enter the mainstream.


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-04 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

I finish up the slow read with a summary of my remarks and some secondary 
considerations.

The paper was originally delivered orally at a meeting of the Semiotic Society 
of America in Lubbock, Texas in 1980 and first published in Semiotics 1980, 
eds. Michael Herzfeld and Margot Lenhart, New York: Plenum Press, 1982, 
427-438 and lightly revised April 1, 1998, with a promise, unfulfilled, of a 
more extensive revision ... in process. Regrettably, many of us make such 
promises and I think it suggests that the author is not entirely satisfied with 
the results and feels either that there is more to say or that what has been 
said can be better articulated.

In summary, Ransdell proposes that the distinction between empirical and 
non-empirical is unjustified in semeiotic theory and that it leads us to a 
rather shaky and ramshackle categorization scheme for the categories of 
apprehension. We are mislead by this distinction and these categories, he 
suggests, are the product of Western culture, and not the product of rigorous 
and systematic thinking. He asks us to eliminate redundancies in our 
distinctions and to recognize that empiricism is not optional but is rather a 
natural (intrinsic) aspect of any semeiotic theory. We cannot separate the 
process of empirical inquiry from the intuition and reasoning that precedes and 
follows our trying out of our ideas.

As a final comment on the paper, what have we learned? Ransdell is, in 1980, 
addressing an audience that has not yet fully grasped the goals and details of 
either Peircean Semeiotic Theory and is, perhaps, unfamiliar with the 
developments in the philosophy of science in the early 20th Century. And this 
may be illustrated by his choice of example, literary criticism, which he calls 
upon to apply the same systematic rigor in its semeiotic theory as any science 
may. It is an appeal that is essentially Positivist in the sense that it 
implies that the methods of science, as refined by semeiotic theory, can be 
universally applied.

This is not a formal paper in semeiotic theory as such, it makes a social 
observation more than it provides any deep technical insight that would 
surprise Peirce or Peircean scholars, it is more a conversation with colleagues 
about how to proceed. Ransdell is at the helm of a ship transporting fellow 
travelers that he hopes to steer into a deeper understanding of the subject 
that is their shared concern by applying the principles of the subject to 
itself.

And, indeed, this is consistent with my fond recollection of Joe's influence 
upon us all here on Peirce-l. That wise, constant and gentle hand is now, and 
will continue to be, sorely missed.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-30 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

Just a brief note to say how I will proceed and wrap up this slow read.

I plan three more postings relevant to the paper.

1. The remainder of the paper proper.
2. The addendum.
3. Final remarks.

I should be complete with the slow read by the end of the week. Then, of 
course, I'll have more time to return to discussion.

In the meantime, let me thank Ben for his excellent response that accurately 
corrected Gary's perceptions of my reading and made interesting comments on the 
notion of object. I'll have more to say on these postings later.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-25 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Kristi,

By your analysis is there any logical or otherwise substantive distinction, 
aside from the syntax, between the abbreviated statement: 

No distinction is to be drawn between the empirical and the 
nonempirical in semeiotic theory.

And Joe's first sentence?

 The thesis of my paper is that it is doubtful that any distinction 
should be drawn between empirical and nonempirical semiotics or even between 
experimental or nonexperimental semiotics.

In other words, can the first be substituted for the second without making a 
difference. And if it cannot, what exactly is that difference?

With respect,
Steven



--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering



On Nov 24, 2011, at 6:20 PM, Määttänen Kirsti wrote:

 Gary F.,Jon, list,
 
 I'll continue now with slow reading Joe's paper. Along with dealing with the 
 paper, I wish to share at least parts of the method I  I've used in my 
 classes on text interpretation and argument analysis. So I'm just as 
 interested in any comments on the method, as I am in any comments on my 
 interpretations on the text at hand.
 
 I'll start with stating some rules. (Very trivial ones, still to my mind 
 worth stating).-  Any method is about rules.)
 
 First rule: We must always start with what we have. - Not with what we think 
 we have, but what we unequivocally have.
 
 We have a text, a writing. - What else?
 
 Just marks on a paper (or a screen) and our habits of interpretation. 
 
 And we have a task.  - Any method is related to a task.-  That of 
 interpreting (i.e. understanding) the text in a methodical, orderly way. 
 
 Second rule: All interpretations of any text can be divided into five classes 
 (the number of classes may be debatable):
 
 1) Interpretations unequivocally evidenced by the text
 2) Interpretations soundly and convincingly evidenced by the text
 3) Interpretations weakly evidenced by the text
 4) Interpretations poorly or not at all evidenced by the text
 5 Interpretations proved false by the text 
 
 Well, then:  Most of our habits of interpretation are - as I would call them 
 - quasi-instinctual, that it is they take place without awareness. They just 
 occur to our minds. And we act on the basis of them. (Which is a state of 
 things absolutely necessary for survival etc. ) We can't control what occurs 
 to our minds. 
 
 A side tract here: I once made experiments on word association, in 1980's. 
 Back then, I frequently got comments like: What's the point,  people will say 
 whatever comes to their minds. - I then responded: Yes, they do. But there is 
 one thing absolutely certain. No one can say anything which does NOT come to 
 her/his mind. 
 
 Peirce often took up the limits of our abilities with critical thinking in 
 connection with what we can and cannot control. - Here, with this method, one 
 aim is to make ourselves, anyone, better aware of the kinds of 
 interpretations which come to mind as a matter of course, by making the 
 demand of making clear to oneself ( others, if one chooses) how - exactly - 
 the interpretation is evidenced by the text at hand. With the above classes 
 in mind.
 
 In order to do this, a third rule is needed.
 
 Third rule: The text can and must be taken as evidence for (or against) the 
 interpretation in an orderly, sequential manner, taking each unit of the text 
 as answering to a specific subquestion of the (main) question the text as a 
 whole can - on good and valid grounds - be taken as an answer for. 
 
 Mind you, the result of the analysis may quite often turn out to be different 
 from the question possibly stated by the author in the beginning as the 
 question the text is supposed (by him or her) to give an answer. 
 
 Well, with my classes I did not proceed in this - quite boring - manner. Now 
 I'm trying to make explicit the rules I made them follow. I proceeded much 
 more freely and spontaneously. Still sticking strictly to the rules. - And as 
 a rule (pun intended), the students at first, when demanded to really stick 
 to the rules, got annoyed, even exasperated. But soon (a gave very short 
 tasks in the beginning) they got so surprised and delighted over the results 
 of their work, that they became excited and really interested  wanted more. 
 - That's why I took up writing this boring stuff to you listers in the first 
 place. (I'll probably never write on this elsewhere in English.)
 
 Well, then. To the paper  the task at hand:
 
 The first unit of the paper is, of course, the title: On the Paradigm of 
 Experience Appropriate for Semiotic.
 
 Unequivocally evidenced by it is that the focus of the paper to follow is on 
 the concept of experience. Moreover, the title, just as unequivocally, gives 
 a context, which is semiotic. Further, it gives a specification to the 
 concept of experience to be dealt with, when stating
 
 - paradigm of - - for -.
 
 Here I'm using the triad of theme-rheme-seme

Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-25 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
On Nov 18, 2011, at 4:51 AM, Irving wrote:

 ...
 All of this having been said, the best answer I can give is that, the
 points, lines, and planes and tables, chairs, and beer mugs remark
 aside, Hilbert would give different axiomatizations for different parts
 of mathematics. That is to say, there is one set of axioms and
 primitives suitable to develop, say, projective geometry, and another
 for algebraic numbers; there is one suitable for Euclidean geometry and
 another for metageometry. In the case of the latter, for example, one
 needs to devise an axiom set that is powerful enough to develop all of
 the theorems required for the articulation not only required for
 Euclidean geometry, but also for hyperbolic geometry and elliptical
 geometry, but which do not also generate superfluous theorems of other
 theories. Hilbert's axiom system for geometry, then, is not the same
 as that which he erected for physics.
 
 What I think is the correct understanding of Hilbert's off-the-cuff
 remark about points, lines and planes and tables, vs. chairs, and beer
 mugs, is the more profound -- or perhaps more mundane -- idea that
 axiom systems are sets of signs which are meaningless unless and until
 they are interpreted, and by themselves, the only mathematically
 legitimate characteristic of axiom systems is that they be
 proof-theoretically sound, that is, the completeness, consistency, and
 independence of the axiom system, and capable of allowing valid
 derivation of all, and only those, theorems, required for the piece of
 mathematics being investigated.


Dear Irving,

My own interpretation may be substantively different, it may not.  

I take Hilbert's position to be that the formalism is independent of the 
subject matter. That is, I take his view of formal interpretation to be 
mechanistic, specifying valid transformations of the structure under 
consideration, be it logical, geometric or physical. I am confused because you 
use signs instead of marks here. In addition, since the formalism is 
independent of the subject - as suggested by his appeal to Berkeley - a theorem 
of the formalism remains a theorem of the formalism despite the subject. 

In this view, how one selects an appropriate formalism for a given subject - if 
there is a fitness (suitability) requirement as you suggest for the 
different parts of mathematics - appears to be a mystery, unless you think 
empiricism is required at this point.

With respect,
Steven

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-25 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
An adjustment to my email from last night.

I wrongly used the term meaningless, slipping into old habits. The 
distinction, JR suggests, produces a meaning (by the more rigorous use of that 
term): the separation of concerns that concerns him.  I should have said: *in 
semeiotic theory* the distinction is misleading because to draw the 
distinction causes an undue separation of concerns.

With respect,
Steven





On Nov 25, 2011, at 2:27 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

 Dear Jon,
 
 It's important to note that in his opening statement JR is not making a 
 general statement about the distinctions of empirical and non-empirical, but 
 rather is making the statement that *in semeiotic theory* the distinction is 
 meaningless because to draw the distinction causes an undue separation of 
 concerns.
 
 My apologies for the discontinuity in leadership of this reading. The 
 Supercomputing conference demanded more of my attention than I expected and I 
 returned with a virus that has occupied me since my return. I will continue 
 tomorrow (Friday).
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 
 
 On Nov 24, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
 
 * Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
 On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic,
 http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
 
 Re: Comments by Auke van Breemen (AB)
 
 Auke  All,
 
 By way of recalling our present engagement,
 let's review Joe's statement of his thesis:
 
 JR: The thesis of my paper is that it is doubtful that any distinction
   should be drawn between empirical and nonempirical semiotics or even
   between experimental and nonexperimental semiotics. Doing so tends to
   reproduce within the semiotics movement the present academic distinction
   between the sciences and the humanities which semiotics should aim at
   discouraging, rather than reinforcing. But to overcome this undesirable
   dichotomy, it is necessary to disentangle the conceptions of the
   experiential, the experimental and the empirical from certain other
   complexes of ideas with which they have become associated by accident
   rather than necessity.
 
 The thoughts that occur to me on reading this statement are as follows.
 
 On the one hand I am much in favor of seeking deeper-lying continuities
 where only divisions appear to rule the superficial aspects of phenomena.
 That is one of the things that attracts me to Peirce's theory of inquiry,
 that succeeds in connecting our everyday problem-solving activities with
 the more deliberate and disciplined methodologies of scientific research.
 
 On the other hand I cannot help noticing the facts of usage. For example,
 even though the words experiential, empirical, and experimental may
 be near enough synonyms in some contexts, in other contexts a person will
 tend to use empirical to emphasize a shade of distinction between casual
 experience and the deliberate collection of data, perhaps even bearing the
 motive of testing a specific array of hypotheses. In that empirical setting,
 a person will tend to use experimental to suggest an even more deliberate
 manipulation of events for the purpose of generating data that can serve to
 sift the likely from the unlikely stories in the heap of hypotheses in view.
 
 Sufficient unto the day ...
 
 Jon
 
 AB: It would be handy if 'reply' gives a reply to the
   list message instead of a reply to the sender.
 
 Yes, it seems that different browsers handle that differently.
 I try to remember always to hit reply to all, but often don't.
 
 AB: You wrote a sentence that raises some questions, at least in my mind.
 
 JA1: An equivocation is a variation in meaning, or a manifold of sign senses,
and so Peirce's claim that three categories are sufficient amounts to an
assertion that all manifolds of meaning can be unified in just three 
 steps.
 
 AB: In comparison with the sentence you wrote earlier in the same mail
   there are two differences:
 
 JA2: Peirce's claim that three categories are necessary and sufficient
for the purposes of logic says that a properly designed system of
logic can resolve all equivocation in just three levels or steps.
 
 AB: a. unification of all manifolds of meaning is not without further
  qualifications the same as disambiguation. So, in principle at
  least I could support JA2 and not support JA1.
 
 AB: b. In JA1 the problem of the meaning of 'meaning' presses itself
  upon the reader, in JA2 meaning is given, the only problem
  that remains is to make a choice between alternatives that
  are supposed to be given.
 
 AB: So, JA1 is a much stronger claim than JA2. Since you wrote in JA2
   about levels or steps, but in JA1 just about steps, your claim seems
   to amount to the proposition that all manifolds of meaning can be unified
   in a single run of a procedure that consists of three steps. Of course
   unification can be taken as quite empty (for instance as signs

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-10 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
, the 
concept of an hallucination itself, as that is now generally understand, is a 
post-Cartesian artifact which is connected, in the popular mind at least, with 
vague ideas of insanity and the like which are as constantly in flux as are 
the pop psychologies which give this idea whatever substance it has at any 
given time. ...

[SEZ] The entire goal of this first part of Ransdell's paper focusing upon what 
seems most obvious in Semeiotic Theory from John Locke onward, and that has not 
even yet penetrated philosophy let alone risen to awareness in the wider 
world: common words are overloaded and our categorizations often redundant.

[4]
... Or consider the idea of a dream. Dreaming is now usually regarded as a sort 
of mental excretion or projection, the dream itself being regarded as the 
activity of dreaming reified. Yet as late as Plato, the Greek word onar was 
regularly used not to refer to a mental activity or its product (i.e. the 
dreaming activity reified), but rather to the thing or things which appear to 
one while one is asleep, which might be more real and independent of one's 
thought processes than the things which appear to one while awake: the gods, 
for example, who — in Plato's time at least — characteristically chose the time 
of sleeping rather than waking to communicate with mortals. Or again, consider 
the idea of memory, in the sense of recall. It is now usually taken for granted 
that the recall is something like the viewing of a mental photograph or 
cinematograph of an earlier occurrence, though it might be equally as plausible 
to regard recall as being a perception of its object quite as direct or 
immediate as a sense-perception, were it not for the connection of the idea of 
memory, in the popular mind, with a certain conception of time which is, in 
fact, no longer regarded as valid in physics, and perhaps also because of a 
connection with a long outmoded belief about the impossibility of action at a 
distance.

[SEZ] By mentioning Plato at this point we are reminded of an earlier passage 
in human history and the nature of its categorization. Just as the Greeks 
categorized their dreaming experiences as communications with the gods, we 
continue to believe that ... recall is something like the viewing of a mental 
photograph or cinematograph of an earlier occurrence. This dualism, that sense 
must always have an external subject, is deeply intuitive because is is so 
familiar in our awake state. 

Ransdell is, of course, right about the long outmoded belief about the 
impossibility of action at a distance. After all, even if Newton's conception 
of the action of gravity is not strictly correct, Einstein goes on to explain 
how that spooky action at a distance actually occurs. This should lead us to 
review our notions of locality generally.

Our memories and our dreams arise from the conformations of the biophysical 
structure, no dualism is required. As a rock falls through space the world 
intersects with us and intrudes upon that structure, upon that experience, and 
modifies it.

[5] 
The point to mentioning these considerations is not to argue that the 
classification of phenomena under these typical Western categories of 
apprehension is either arbitrary or valueless, for I do not doubt that the 
various categories each have some useful role to play in helping us to organize 
our experience on the practical level, even though, taken as a whole, this 
categorization scheme does seem to me to be a rather shaky and ramshackle 
affair. The point is rather to suggest, first, that it is neither necessary nor 
desirable for us to work within its confines on the theoretical level: it is 
not necessary because all of these categories, and the more general idea of the 
mental which includes them, are clearly historical artifacts rather than 
inescapably human ways of categorizing things; and it is not desirable because, 
although they doubtless have some value and are not simply arbitrary, they are 
nevertheless far from being stable, perspicuously conceived, and systematically 
well-organized. Moreover, to work within their limits is to confine ourselves 
within an ethnocentrism which tends to corrupt our attempts at understanding 
human life as such.

[SEZ] Our categorizations can be useful and social manifestations. But it isn't 
clear to me at this point at which theoretical level Ransdell is referring 
to. Although I assume he refers to Semeiotic Theory, it seems to me that his 
statement applies more broadly, to all rigorous thinking.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE

Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic”

2011-11-08 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

I am presenting a new proposed computing paradigm Computing With Structure 
based upon my work at the Supercomputing 2011 Disruptive Technologies exhibit 
next week. Don't panic, this exhibit is aimed at technologies that may have an 
impact on large scale computing architectures and problems in the next 10-15 
year timeframe. However, it does mean that I will be a little distracted over 
the next two weeks, so I plead for forgiveness in advance. 

It is my intention to continue the slow read without interruption but there 
will probably be a lag in my responses. Expect me to continue with the next few 
paragraphs of the paper shortly.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-08 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Irving,

Thank you for the correction regarding the source of Hilbert's remarks. I 
believe I read it in Unger's translation of The Foundations of Geometry, 
perhaps in the foreword or annotations, but I still have to check this. I 
assume that Hilbert is making a remark that appeals to Berkeley's similar 
comments in stating the case of idealism. Suggesting he was familiar with 
Berkeley.

It isn't clear to me how you can/must infer that there is or is not 
experiential inference in the distinction between must and can. Must and 
will appear to me to speak to the over confidence of 1900. But, again, I 
appreciate both the point and the correction.

With respect,
Steven


On Nov 8, 2011, at 7:43 AM, Irving wrote:

 In response to posts and queries from Steven, Jon, and Jerry,
 
 (1) Regarding Steven's initial post: My initial discomfort stemmed from
 associating Hilbert's remark with the Peircean idea of logic as an
 experiential or positive science, since Hilbert as a strict formalist
 did not regard mathematics (or logic) as in any sense an empirical
 endeavor. I suggest that the quote from Kant with which Hilbert began
 his _Grundlagen der Geometrie_ had the dual purpose of paying homage to
 his fellow Königsberger and, more significantly, to suggest that,
 although geometry begins with spatial intuition, it is, as a
 discipline, twice removed from intuition by a series of abstractions.
 Whether he held space to be a priori or a posteriori, I cannot say for
 certain, but my strong inclination is to hold that he conceived
 geometry to be a symbolic science, with points as the most basic of the
 primitives, in the same sense that he held the natural numbers to be,
 not mental constructs, but symbols.
 
 (Incidentally, the precise formulation of the quote from Hilbert is:
 Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden wissen. Which should be translated as:
 We must know. We will know. There is no can in this quote; so no
 experiential inference would seem to be indicated.)
 
 (2) Hilbert did not himself include the comment on tables, chairs, and
 beer mugs in G.d.G. It was reported by Blumenthal in his 1935 obituary
 of Hilbert, recorded as a part of a conversation. If it does appear in
 G.d.G., it does so in an edition that includes a reprint of Otto
 Blumenthal's obit of Hilbert.
 
 (3) Regarding the points made by Jon Awbrey and Jerry Chandler: In
 attempting to sort out the various notions of formal, whether it
 applies to Peirce and to Hilbert, to logical positivism, formalism,
 intuitionism, logicism, or to any of the philosophy of logic isms, as
 well as how to treat logical inference, I suggest that it helps to keep
 in mind Jean van Heijenoort's useful, if somewhat controversial,
 classification of logic of logic as calculus and logic as language and
 the properties associated with these.
 
 I will preface what I have to say about that, admittedly sketchily
 here, by noting, as a mere curiosity, of no obvious significance other
 than biographical, that van Heijenoort, who was my Doktorvater, resided
 in the house, at 4 Kirkland Place, Cambridge, formerly owned by members
 of the Peirce family, including Charles's father Benjamin, Charles's
 brother, James Mills, and Charles's Aunt Lizzie. I first learned of
 the Peirce association of the house from Quine. I cannot imagine that
 Quine would not have told Van, since they were good friends as well as
 colleagues. What is ironic, then, is that Van had so little to say
 about Peirce and his logic. What little Van said, in his intros to a
 few of the works published in From Frege to Gödel and his subsequent
 handful of articles, offers barely hints at the connections that
 Gerladine Brady exhaustively unraveled in _From Peirce to Skolem_. Most
 of the very little that Van had to say about Peirce's work in logic
 classified him as dealing with logic as a calculus, rather than as a
 language, and places him, quite naturally, in the company of De Morgan,
 Boole, Jevons, Schroeder, the very early (pre-_Principia_) Whitehead,
 despite himself and his protestations to the contrary, the
 pre-_Principles of Mathematics_ Russell, and, I would add, the American
 Postulate Theorists, such as Huntington and Eliakim H. Moore, who were
 jointly influenced and inspired by both Peirce on the one hand and
 Hilbert on the other.
 
 For van Heijenoort, the characteristics distinguishing logic as
 calculus from logic as language are that (a) the former is syntactic,
 or formal, the latter has both a syntax and a semantic; (b) the former
 is restricted to a pre-determined universe of discourse, the latter
 enjoys the universal domain (i.e. the universe -- Frege's Universum;
 and (c) the former is model-theoretic, in which proofs are concerned
 exclusively with validity, the latter set-theoretic, in which validity
 and satisfiability are related. (Some writers would contest my
 interpretation of Van on the relation of model-theoretic with logic as
 calculus and of the set-theoretic 

Re: [peirce-l] FW: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-07 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Irving,

I did not intend to draw the association between Peirce and Hilbert that 
concerns you. My use of Hilbert's well-known line, thought now to be a matter 
of some embarrassment after Goedel's result, is only a reflection of my own 
view and not that of Peirce. I acknowledge the context of Hilbert's original 
statement. In the years after that context I have come to believe that the 
statement gained a broader context, that of what was widely described as 
Hilbert's Program - in which all science is tractable to mathematics. 

I cannot tell if Peirce would have agreed with Hilbert.

I personally believe that Hilbert was right but too optimistic in 1900, and 
this should caution us. I certainly do not think we should give up on the 
program, though clearly new ways of thinking about mathematics and epistemology 
are required and I personally believe that Peirce and Semeiotic Theory more 
generally can eventually get us there.

In the context of the current slow read I suspect that Hilbert would have 
agreed with the position that Joe Ransdell outline (though surely with 
insufficient rigor to satisfy Hilbert), and then to the degree that this view 
reflects that of Peirce it reflects that of Hilbert.

Hilbert certainly knew of Peirce and gave him the highest praise in the 
introduction to his work on Mathematical Logic with Ackermann. 

Hilbert's reference to Bar Stools and Beer Mugs appears in his Foundations 
of Geometry as I recall (I do not immediately have access to my copy of the 
work). I agree that Hilbert's remark reflects his formal view, echoed in his 
and Ackermann's work on mathematical logic, but I am unclear as to whether this 
reflects his view of Logic in general as a subject of study (esp. given his 
appreciation of Peirce). 

Perhaps you can clarify for me the Kantian phrase that Google translates as: 
Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to 
concepts and ends with ideas. What are the distinctions that Kant seeks though 
the notions of cognition, intuition, concept and idea. I'll accept both 
that Google's translation is imperfect and that my appreciation of Kant is 
lacking a good understanding of German.

From the point of view of the argument given in Joe Ransdell's paper (and 
consistent with my own view) these notions are ways of speaking about one and 
the same thing and Kant's statement on the face of it would appear to be empty 
(or, at least, redundant).

I agree when you say:

 I think that what is wanted is a deep clarification of what Peirce may
 or may not have meant in asserting that logic is an experiential, or
 positive science.

I can't say that I am in a position to perform this deep clarification but I 
suspect a simplistic analysis is not far from the truth. For Peirce, Logic 
relies upon Semeiotic Theory and not merely the syntax of Symbolic Logic and 
it's semantic rules. While Hilbert was no doubt the great formalist, I have 
never believed from my reading of him and his biography that Hilbert ignored 
semeiotic considerations. 

Indeed, I either read or I dreamed that I read that Hilbert rather wished that 
Tarski had used the notion of valid rather than truth - which reflects a 
concern with matters of apprehension. This is one of two references - the other 
being a reference to something that Benjamin Peirce said about Will in an 
astronomy lecture at Harvard - that I can no longer find and that cause me to 
be more disciplined in future scholarship. I also recall that Hilbert wanted at 
various times to return to these matters but that the war and the more 
tractable formal exercise always got in the way. Although my recall of dreaming 
analysis of Hilbert and the immediate study of Hilbert need to be confirmed by 
hard references*.

*I make this point in the context of Joe Ransdell's paper. 

With respect,
Steven





On Nov 6, 2011, at 1:44 PM, Irving wrote:

 
 Steven,
 
 You quote Peirce as saying in CP 7.526 that Logic is a branch of
 philosophy. That is to say it is an experiential, or positive science,
 but a science which rests on no special observations, made by special
 observational means, but on phenomena which lie open to the observation
 of every man, every day and hour. There are two main branches of
 philosophy, Logic, or the philosophy of thought, and Metaphysics, or
 the philosophy of being. Still more general than these is High
 Philosophy which brings to light certain truths applicable alike to
 logic and to metaphysics. It is with this high philosophy that we have
 at first to deal.
 
 A few paragraphs later, you then say:
 
 'To echo Hilbert, We can know, we will know. Only it is not
 mathematics alone that will inform us (and a revolution in the
 Foundations of Logic is required).'
 
 
 I do not think that Hilbert would have accepted the interpretation that
 seems to be implied in placing his remark in juxtaposition with the
 quote from Peirce calling logic an experiential or positive science. 

Re: [peirce-l] FW: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-11-06 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
On Nov 6, 2011, at 8:39 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

 Steven, thanks for getting our next slow read started – i have a couple of 
 questions and a comment on your first post.
 
 In your comments on JR's opening, you say that “Semeiotic Theory is, for me, 
 the first activity of scientific thinking.” I take “Semeiotic Theory” to be 
 your shorthand for “development of Semeiotic Theory” (since “Theory” is not 
 in itself an “activity”).

When I say that Semeiotic Theory is the first activity of scientific thinking 
I mean that Semeiotic Theory is the subject of that activity. Your 
interpretation of my, admittedly idiosyncratic phraseology at times, is 
correct. You may be more comfortable using the term Semeiotics wherever I use 
Semeiotic Theory, as Joe does.

 Given the usual Peircean concept of “philosophy” as “an experiential, or 
 positive science, but a science which rests on no special observations, made 
 by special observational means, but on phenomena which lie open to the 
 observation of every man, every day and hour” (CP 7.526), the proposition 
 that “the development of Semeiotic Theory is the first activity of scientific 
 thinking” would seem to imply that it *is* the activity of philosophers (as 
 well as thinkers in more specialized sciences). Yet you say that you “do not 
 think this.” Should we infer then that the term “philosopher” for you denotes 
 something other than a practitioner of “philosophy” as Peirce defined it? Or 
 did you mean to say that Semeiotic theorizing is the first activity *not 
 only* of philosophers but of all scientific thinkers?

Peirce says in CP 7.526: Logic is a branch of philosophy. That is to say it is 
an experiential, or positive science, but a science which rests on no special 
observations, made by special observational means, but on phenomena which lie 
open to the observation of every man, every day and hour. There are two main 
branches of philosophy, Logic, or the philosophy of thought, and Metaphysics, 
or the philosophy of being. Still more general than these is High Philosophy 
which brings to light certain truths applicable alike to logic and to 
metaphysics. It is with this high philosophy that we have at first to deal. 

I do not use this definition, and nor do most philosophers. It's not exactly 
a disagreement with Peirce, it's more of a refinement.

For me, Logic is a branch of Semeiotic Theory (speaking of it as a subject). 
Semeiotic Theory deals with Logic and Apprehension and is (or should be IMHO) 
the foundation of the disciplines we call Mathematics and Physics at their 
broadest. Mathematics deals with ways of speaking about structure and its 
transformation. Physics deals ways of speaking of observed behavior in order to 
provide explanation (the identification of causes). Combined one may refer to 
this as Existential Thinking or Thinking About Existence. 

Indeed, as a Positivist (aka a Pragmaticist in Semeiotic), I believe that 
this discipline must eventually underpin all of our thinking - including 
medicine, economics and other social science (where it is sadly absent today). 
I shouldn't hesitate to say in the context of this paper that all criticism, 
literary or otherwise, all passion, all art and all thinking from intuition to 
formal structure must eventually become a part of this thinking.

This is a position, expressed most often by Logical Positivist and 
Existentialist thinkers, that rejects the broad manifest, and mostly 
unsystematic, activity of Philosophy (as opposed to Peirce's definition)  and 
Metaphysics in general.

To echo Hilbert, We can know, we will know. Only it is not mathematics alone 
that will inform us (and a revolution in the Foundations of Logic is required).


 One comment on your paraphrase of JR's opening:
 [[ Semeiotic Theory, he says, must avoid the distinction between the 
 empirical and the nonempirical, between experimental and the nonexperimental. 
 ]] Yet JR does make this distinction explicitly, in paragraphs 9 and 10, in 
 order that it may be “possible for us to regard *all* applied semiotics as 
 empirical semiotics” [8 -- emphasis JR's]. This latter claim would be 
 meaningless if there were no difference between empirical and non-empirical. 
 JR's point, then, is not that Semeiotic Theory must avoid the distinction 
 altogether, but that we must “disentangle the conceptions of the 
 experiential, the experimental and the empirical from certain other complexes 
 of ideas with which they have become associated” [1]. And that is what JR 
 proceeds to do – after several paragraphs of beating about the bush of 
 entanglements from which he wishes to free those conceptions.

Indeed, and we will get there, you are skipping to the punchline. My comments 
relate here not to paragraphs [9] and [10] but to paragraph [1]. You'll note 
that I said on the face of it.

 
 One more question, regarding “Semeiotic Theory”: would you characterize your 
 “technical excursion” on JR's paragraph [2] as an 

Re: [peirce-l] community of inquiry

2011-11-02 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
You may consider the whole passage, CP 5.265 in SOME CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR 
INCAPACITIES: THE SPIRIT OF CARTESIANISM. In particular:

We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which 
we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. 
Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to 
accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory 
himself.

In the entire passage (I've avoided coping it because it is quite long) Peirce 
addresses this matter at length.

With respect,
Steven



On Nov 1, 2011, at 3:24 PM, John Quay wrote:

 Thank you very much for sharing these Michael - they are very helpful.
 
 One thought that has been with me lately is that such references do not
 merely point to a community of inquiry, but rather to a community of
 practice for which inquiry is indispensible, whether this community is
 limited to a particular community or expanded to a generalized community
 (issue of truth). 
 
 I suppose I am raising as a question Peirce's meaning of the term
 community as this connects with inquiry and practice - ?
 
 Does anyone else perceive such an issue?
 
 Kind regards
 
 John Quay
 
 
 
 
 On 1/11/11 11:55 PM, Michael J. DeLaurentis michael...@comcast.net
 wrote:
 
 By no means based on an exhaustive search, John, here are three passages
 which spring to mind, though not using the very phrase community of
 inquiry. (1) On the Doctrine of Chances... : passim, including the
 following -- ...three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite
 community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made
 supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of the intellectual activity,
 as indispensable requirements of logic. (2) Some Consequences of Four
 Incapacities: Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
 that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY [caps in
 original], without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in
 knowledge.  (3) Critical Review of Berkeley's Idealism: And the catholic
 consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in
 this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion
 of minds to which we belong  You may be well aware of these already, in
 which case, my apologies. But these are the passages (in addition to what
 you cite below) I have found frequently cited in connection with the
 community of inquiry.  Ben Udell is usually quite adept at scouring the
 entire oeuvre and coming up with relevant passages, so I expect, if he has
 the time, he may again come up with an exhaustive sourcing.
 
 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of John Quay
 Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 5:59 AM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: [peirce-l] community of inquiry
 
 Hi Peirce-listers
 
 Just wondering if anyone can help me.
 
 The phrase community of inquiry is often attributed to Peirce and yet I
 cannot find any instance of his actually using this phrase. Sources of this
 attribution can be drawn to Matthew Lipman (amongst others), associated with
 his work in Philosophy for Children
 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Lipman)
 
 Peirce definitely speaks often of the importance of community and of
 inquiry, but does not tend to use these words in close association.
 
 I was wondering if anyone knew of a passage (or passages) in Peirce's work
 that would speak clearly to the association between community and inquiry?
 
 I understand that Peirce draws a close connection between notions of
 community and scientific or pragmatic truth, for example when he states that
 “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
 investigate, is what we mean by the truth”  (Peirce, 1878, p. 299, CP
 5.407). But is this the main source of the phrase community of inquiry?
 
 Any help appreciated.
 
 Kind regards
 
 -- 
 John Quay, PhD
 Lecturer
 Melbourne Graduate School of Education
 234 Queensberry Street
 The University of Melbourne
 VIC, 3010, Australia
 T: +61 3 8344 8533 / M: 0438 048 955
 E: jq...@unimelb.edu.au
 http://www.edfac.unimelb.edu.au/profile/John.Quay
 www.education.unimelb.edu.au
 CRICO Provider code 00116K
 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to 
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF 

Re: [peirce-l] Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semioic

2011-10-30 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Nathan,

I'm glad that you have given a historical context to this paper written in 1976 
and have highlighted the role that Joe played in helping us understand the 
importance of Peirce's conception of Semeiotic Theory. On reviewing the 
conversation this past month I regret that a discussion of Peirce's political 
view distracted us from the general thrust of the paper. Whilst I clearly 
disagree with the content of Peirce's political pragmatism, and this may 
contribute toward  the historical suppression of his view, at this juncture it 
is beside the point. His essentially Positivist approach was the right one and 
his political view may well be as naive as my own. It shares a quest for the 
truth of the matter. The particulars of which must not distract us from the 
merit of Peirce's contribution in general or of the Positivist approach. 

Eventually, Joe was right and it led to contemporary thinkers like myself and 
Soren Brier in very different disciplines advocating that semeiotic theory, and 
not physics, is necessarily first in science. And it continues the Positivist 
debate that may eventually lead us to a Positivist politics. That is a 
difficult discussion that must eventually overcome our emotional attachment to 
social ideals.

It seems to me that Joe was right in this paper to highlight first the 
biophysical observations that Peirce made and I will seek to echo this in the 
slow read ahead of us. 

With respect,
Steven


On Oct 29, 2011, at 7:03 PM, Houser, Nathan R. wrote:

 I will be traveling without email access for four days starting early 
 tomorrow morning and during this time the forum will move on to a new slow 
 read article. “Some Leading Ideas” did not stimulate much discussion, perhaps 
 because the em-cee did not try hard enough to generate interest, but I think 
 it was also because JR’s main concern, at least one of his main concerns, was 
 to demonstrate that Peirce’s general semiotic could provide a unifying 
 theoretical basis for a wide range of disciplines (and also, of course, for 
 the major part of Peirce’s own thought). This was not widely accepted in 
 1976, when JR wrote this paper, and he was one of a small group of early 
 Peirceans to take this up. Joe was one of the most astute and effective 
 champions of Peirce’s general semiotic and his work played an important part 
 in winning wide acceptance of the view he was promoting in “Some Leading 
 Ideas.” When we look at this early paper now, in 2011, it seems mainly to be 
 a review of what is already widely accepted, but that was not the case in 
 1976. If you reflect more on this paper and new ideas come to mind, we can of 
 course carry on a bit into November, but I encourage you to move on to the 
 new slow read paper as soon as it is introduced.
  
 Nathan
  
  
 _­­
 Nathan Houser
 Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
 Senior Fellow, Institute for American Thought
 Indiana University at Indianapolis
  
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message. To post a message to the list, send it to 
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


[peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-10-25 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear List,

This is a brief note to remind you that during November I will be leading the 
slow read of 

On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic by Joseph 
Ransdell
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm

In honor of Joe.

Joe was instrumental in easing my own path through the work of Charles Peirce. 
He always encouraged me in my own work and there was a great deal of respect 
that developed between us quickly.

In a Peirce-l posting of the 25th of January 2009, Joe wrote:

 In another message, not yet composed, I want to explain something about
 Steven Ericsson-Zenith's relationship to Peirce as a theorist with
 philosophical ambitions remarkably similar to Peirce's though not conceived
 by him as a continuation of Peirce's work but rather of Rudolf Carnap's
 instead.  I think that someone with an extensive acquaintance with Peirce
 will be inclined at first to think of Steven's project as Peirce modified
 (for good or ill) by Carnap, though Steven would probably want to correct
 that immediately by saying it would be closer to the truth to regard his
 theory as Carnap modified by Peirce, though Steven may or may not have
 actually derived its Peircean aspects from Peirce but arrived at them quite
 independently. (This is of course an exaggerated description but intended
 only to be suggestive: it testifies to the quality of Steven's thought that
 such a comparison can profitably be made.)  I characterize Steven's
 theoretical work in this way in order to be able to convey in a few words
 why a good many people on the list may -- I am inclined to say should --
 want to investigate Steven's theory further, if for no other reason than as
 an opportunity to sharpen their understanding of what Peirce is all about.
 This is not to be construed as patronizing Steven in any way.  One thing one
 can learn from this is why Peirce regarded the derivation of the categories
 in the New List as being of fundamental importance: Steven is clearly
 laboring at much the same task.  To anyone interested I recommend taking a
 look at work in progress by Steven, called Explaining experience in nature
 


http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/5196

I hope that you will not consider it too self serving to repeat this here, I 
present it only to illustrate the high mutual regard that we felt for each 
other. 

As far as I am aware, Joe never composed the message to which he refers and he 
never sent a message of this kind to me directly. I am greatly saddened by this 
because I would surely have learned a great deal from it. As it is, I shall 
always be appreciative of his wisdom, support and encouragement. 

I will begin the slow read in a little over one week from now. Since the term 
Experience plays a central role in my own theory, this paper seems a most 
appropriate choice for me to review.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Academic Capitalism

2011-09-30 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sadly I agree with Jon's sense of despondency concerning the war on science. 

The problem, however, is the product of central planning. As a consequence we 
are Serfs (Hayek). Looking for a prescriptive solution that is other than the 
simple devolution of this centralized system will only make matters worse. 

With respect,
Steven


On Sep 30, 2011, at 7:06 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

 Sally, Gene,  All,
 
 In relation to the purpose of a university and what's been happening to it 
 lately,
 I earlier mentioned the themes of academic capitalism and the war on 
 science.
 
 JA 30 Aug 2011
 I think it is reasonable to be concerned with distorting influences
 on research and scholarship, whether we find them in the sciences or
 in the other disciplines.  Looking around, the conflicts of interest
 appear to grow more pushy and more pervasive every day.  I'm thinking
 of cautionary tales like Slaughter and Leslie on Academic Capitalism,
 or Chris Mooney in The Republican War on Science, just to name two
 that other contexts of discussion are constantly bringing to mind.
 
 But the question was:  What to do about it?
 
 It appears that further inquiry is called for.
 /JA
 
 Here is a paper that summarizes the issues of academic capitalism:
 
 Susan M. Awbrey,
 Making the 'Invisible Hand' Visible:
 The Case for Dialogue About Academic Capitalism
 http://www2.oakland.edu/oujournal/files/5_Awbrey.pdf
 
 I fear that the situation has grown far worse since the time that
 paper was written, but it depresses me too much to talk about it,
 so I'll just leave it at that until I recover some trace of hope.
 
 Regards,
 
 Jon
 
 -- 
 
 facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
 policy mic: www.policymic.com/profile/show?id=1110
 inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
 mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
 knol: http://knol.google.com/k/-/-/3fkwvf69kridz/1
 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to 
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Jerry Dozoretz

2011-08-21 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
I am very sorry to hear this. 

Jerry and I exchanged email in January. He was open and kind, generous with his 
support and friendship. He was greatly effected by Joe's passing and wanted 
very much to ensure the future of peirce-l and related materials. It had been 
on my todo list to follow up with him.

My best wishes and condolences to Jerry's friends and family.

Sincerely,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://senses.info




On Aug 21, 2011, at 1:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

 List,
  
 Jerry Dozoretz passed away earlier this month. Condolences to his beloved 
 wife Ann and family. Ann emailed Nathan Houser, Gary Richmond, and me about 
 it today.
  
 Denver Post obituary 
 http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/denverpost/obituary.aspx?n=jerry-dozoretzpid=153047257
  (August 12-14).
  
 Jerry had a Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Californis, Santa Barbara. 
 He was an Instructor and Assisstant Professor of Philosophy from 1970 to 
 1983. An article of his was published in _Peirce Studies_ 1. Starting in 1983 
 he worked in the private sector, eventually going into business for himself. 
 He had five children.
  
 Jerry was the chief operating officer of the Peirce Group, which owns the 
 Arisbe website and peirce-l, and was working on their relocation from Texas 
 Tech to the Institute for American Thought at IUPUI. He was also working on 
 the relocation of Joseph Ransdell's papers and library to the IAT.
  
 He was a pleasure to work with.  I'm at a loss for words.  In our last phone 
 conversation Jerry told me that he and Joe had been friends since childhood.  
 As usual he sounded well and upbeat and 20 years younger than he was.
  
 Ben Udell
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message. To post a message to the list, send it to 
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-10 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Not wishing to be contrarian Ben, but it seems to me that in the early passages 
you cite Peirce holds a view not dissimilar from his later view. In the whole 
of his Science and Immortality piece of 1887 he is as skeptical as he is 
later. Only on a superficial reading could one conclude otherwise. What he 
alludes to I believe is his belief in a necessary universal basis of mind and 
the spiritual consciousness to which he refers is the non-carnal embodied 
state in which the universal is manifest.

With respect,
Steven

On Aug 9, 2011, at 8:10 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

 Gary F., Stephen, Steven,
  
 In Immortality in the Light of Synechism (1893, retitled Immortality and 
 Synechism by the CP editors), Peirce says.
 CP 7.576. Nor is this, by any means, all. A man is capable of a spiritual 
 consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is 
 embodied in the universe as a whole. This as an archetypal idea can never 
 fail; and in the world to come is destined to a special spiritual embodiment.
  
 CP 7.577 [] In the same manner, when the carnal consciousness passes away 
 in death, we shall at once perceive that we have had all along a lively 
 spiritual consciousness which we have been confusing with something different.
 But it's clear as all of you point out, that in 1906 (in CP 6.520-21), Peirce 
 was much less sure about immortality.
  
 1887 - contributes a chapter 
 http://books.google.com/books?id=V9wPYAAJpg=PA69 to a symposium on 
 Science and Immortality. Doubtful about immortality. CP 6.548-56.
 1893 - Immortality in the Light of Synechism, immortality  survival after 
 carnal death. CP 7.565-78, EP 2:1-3
 1906 - Immortality (in Answers to Questions concerning My Belief in God) 
 - Not sure about immortality or life after death content to be in God's 
 hands CP 6.519-21.
  
 Best, Ben
  
  
 - Original Message -
 From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2011 12:31 PM
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the 
 Semiosis Process
 
 I can't say that I've seen anything to this effect either. Earlier in the 
 passage Gary cites he states his position quite clearly:
 
 CP 6.519. Do you believe in a future life? Some kind of a future life there 
 can be no doubt of. A man of character leaves an influence living after him. 
 It is living: it is personal. In my opinion, it is quite proper to call that 
 a future life. Jesus so spoke of it when he said he would always be with us. 
 It is in some respects more fit to be made the subject of a promise than any 
 other kind of future life. For it is something we all desire; while other 
 kinds present nothing alluring that is not excessively vague or else 
 unwholesome and antipractical. In the next place its vivacity and endurance 
 are proportional to the spirituality of the man. How many instances have we 
 seen of that! Beyond that, I simply am content to be in God's hands. If I am 
 in another life it is sure to be most interesting; but I cannot imagine how 
 it is going to be me. At the same time, I really don't know anything about it.
 
 Given his analysis of the God concept elsewhere, I think we can conclude 
 that he did not hold a view stronger than the above. He appears to find it 
 very hard to let go of the notion of God and this is, I think, the 
 influence of his father who saw in the notion of Will something universal 
 that led him to affirm the existence of God. Reading Benjamin Peirce helps 
 us understand much of Charles' thinking in these matters and both derive much 
 influence from the European Enlightenment.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 On Aug 9, 2011, at 4:08 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
 
  Ben, you wrote:
   
  [[Peirce believed in a spiritual consciousness, a soul-consciousness, 
  confusable with social and carnal kinds of consciousness but becoming clear 
  to one, as Peirce came to believe, in surviving the body's death. ]]
   
  Can you cite a text where Peirce says this? He does speak of a “spiritual 
  consciousness” but i haven’t seen any place where he speaks of this as the 
  consciousness of an individual soul surviving the body’s death, or 
  expresses belief in that kind of afterlife. He argues rather against it in 
  CP 6.548-52 (1887), and again in CP 6.520-21 (c.1906), though he also says 
  that the possibility can’t be ruled out, precisely because it’s virtually 
  impossible to investigate. The “immortality” of which he speaks “in the 
  light of synechism” is of a very different kind, it seems to me, to which 
  the survival of the individual consciousness or ‘soul’ is quite irrelevant.
   
  Gary F.
   
  } Every man is tasked to make his life, even in its details, worthy of the 
  contemplation of his most elevated and critical hour. [Thoreau] {
   
  www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ home
   
   
   
  From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On 
  Behalf Of Benjamin

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-04 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Context is everything:

CP 1.171 If I were to attempt to describe to you in full all the scientific 
beauty and truth that I find in the principle of continuity, I might say in the 
simple language of Matilda the Engaged, the tomb would close over me e'er the 
entrancing topic were exhausted -- but not before my audience was exhausted. 
So I will just drop it here. Only, in doing so, let me call your attention to 
the natural affinity of this principle to the doctrine of fallibilism. The 
principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism objectified.
...



On Aug 4, 2011, at 5:04 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote:

 Steven, List,
 
 - Falliblism as such speaks about the validity of scientific statements, 
 not statements in general.
 
 I'm in doubt about that. 
 
 [[  For fallibilism is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but 
 always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy. 
CP 1.171]]
 
 If it was like you say, should Peirce then not write scientific knowledge 
 in place of our knowledge? Is the fallbility of knowledge limited to 
 knowledge produced by one method of fixing belief? Isn't the knowledge 
 produced by other methods also fallible?
 
 So, from my point of view it is interesting to ask what Peirce means by 
 scientific. In my opinion he means by it an ethos of argueing, something like 
 the socratic logon didonai. Following this ethos makes it possible to produce 
 knowledge less fallible, but still fallible.
 
 This ethos trains us to resist the doxa! Since i am not at the zenith of 
 peirce exegesis, everything i have written is fallible.
 
 
 Best
 Stefan
 
 Am 05.08.2011 00:20, schrieb Steven Ericsson-Zenith:
 There is a clear distinction between Peircean Falliblism, what Popper 
 called Falsification, which is a part of scientific methodology, and 
 making informal statements that may be false or confused. Falliblism as 
 such speaks about the validity of scientific statements, not statements in 
 general.
 
 The full context of Wittgenstein's quote :
 
 Philosophical Investigations (I.43): “For a large class of cases—though not 
 for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the 
 meaning of a word is its use in the language.” 
 
 Adds an important qualification and that qualification may not be obvious. 
 It is in which we employ the word. He is not presenting a standalone 
 definition of the term but rather commenting upon the common usage of the 
 term. Hence, when the term is employed, in a large class of use cases he 
 says, this is indeed how it is defined. Wittgenstein is referring to the 
 use case.
 
 This does not make the common usage a good or logical definition. 
 
 I leave the remainder to Joe:
 
 It is implicit in this that we never bestow meaning on signs by acts of 
 sheer will or intention or stipulative fiat. There is no creation of 
 meaning ex nihilo. Meaning creation and change is primarily a function of 
 the dispositions and spontaneities of the signs themselves; and although we 
 may develop our skills of artful production, the result of our efforts is 
 never due solely or primarily to what we do: man proposes, but the sign 
 disposes. We can indeed successfully stipulate meaning (lay down a rule of 
 meaning, establish a meaning by convention), if that only means that we 
 can, for example, say something like Let X mean such-and-such! and then 
 make it come about--sometimes--that X actually does acquire that meaning, 
 provided we are clear-headed enough to know what we are doing, skillful 
 enough to know how to do it, and resolute enough to follow through on our 
 original resolve. But there is no such thing as a stipulation of meaning or 
 an act of establishment of a
 meaning convention or of a rule of meaning which has any logical--as 
 distinct from causal--force or effect.
 
 Incidentally, it seems to me that my views are entirely in accord with Joe's 
 paper and Peirce in general since this is the view Joe presents. It is my 
 intension only to defend his position and seek clarity.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 
 
 
 On Aug 4, 2011, at 9:23 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
 
 
 List and Steven,
 
 I'm replying here to Steven's post, and will do so directly below, but i'm 
 addressing the list first (and changing the subject line) because i think 
 Steven's cryptic remarks furnish a good illustration of what happens when 
 the fallibilism implied in the Ransdell paper is forgotten. Here i'm 
 referring specifically to paragraph 2:
 
 [[ Let us note to begin with that to regard semiosis--the generation of the 
 interpretant--as always due primarily to the agency of the sign itself 
 rather than to the agency of an interpreter, human or otherwise, does not 
 deny that human agency has an important role in the occurrence of meaning 
 phenomena, in changes in meaning, in the creation of meaning, and so forth. 
 It does mean, though, that an interpreter's interpretation is to be 
 regarded as being

[peirce-l] Wittgenstein on meaning

2011-08-03 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
On Aug 3, 2011, at 10:11 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
 
 } The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein] {
  


There is a usage of words in the language, but if the meaning of a word is 
merely a reference to that usage then meaning is a faint and arbitrary thing 
that hangs loose upon the poetic wind and scars each of us in its passing. 

And I'm quite sure that Peirce would have none of it.

With respect,
Steven



--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://senses.info

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU


Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-03 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Dear Gary,

I find your references to biosemiotic here vey distracting. In your enthusiasm 
you have provided multiple links yet have excluded the essential link to Joe's 
paper. It can be found here:

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/autonomy.htm

It would be useful to also enable the proper citation:

This paper was originally delivered at a conference of the International 
Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) which was held in Barcelona and 
Perpignan in March/April 1989. It has subsequently been published in Signs of 
Humanity/L'homme et ses signes, vol. 1, eds. Michel Balat and Janice 
Deledalle-Rhodes, General Editor Gerard Deledalle (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 
1992)

The question of whether generative power in semeiosis is an ‘action’ (as Joe 
suggests) or a kind of ‘influence’ seems, to me, irrelevant to Joe's paper. 
Joe is clear in stating that this generative power is the independent action 
of the sign and that is it this action that forms the basis of semeiosis. 

I do not think he would approve of the metaphysics introduced by the notion you 
suggest.

With respect,
Steven


--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://senses.info




On Jul 31, 2011, at 1:06 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

 List,
  
 In my last post I introduced “Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis 
 Process” in a rather cursory way. Here begins an analysis of the first 5 
 paragraphs of the 16 that go to make up the paper.
  
 Section 1. “Semiosis represents the productive power of a sign to generate an 
 interpretant” [paragraphs 1 – 5]
  
 [1] Ransdell introduces his paper by remarking that semiosis, being the power 
 of the sign to generate an interpretant of itself (and the interpretant, 
 itself being a sign so also having that generative power), it follows that 
 there are semiosic processes and that “such processes are both teleological 
 and autonomous (self-governed).”
  
 But what exactly do we mean when we speak of the ‘generative power of the 
 sign’? Is it an ‘action’ (as Joe suggests) or a kind of ‘influence’ (as 
 Eliseo Fernández suggests in the snippet I quoted in my ‘preamble’ to this 
 read), one which flows through the sign to the interpretant? Or is it 
 something else again? And what is its connection to there being a ‘life of 
 the sign’ (which is not a metaphor), a real vitality in semiosis, something 
 which Peirce fairly insists on in several places? Finally, how is this 
 putative power connected to that of natural systems? (The last is a question 
 with which biosemioticians are currently struggling.)
  
 The reference to teleology in the paper being to the ‘tendendial’ rather than 
 the ‘intentional’ kind, it occurs to me that “the life of the sign” 
 quasi-necessarily involves as well its coming more and more to express the 
 meaning—the truth—of reality in the long run. Not only has a sign the 
 potential for growth, but we’ve all seen that some signs actually do grow. 
 So, the ‘generative power’ of semiosis also seems to relate to the 
 possibility of the growth (the evolution) of signs.
  
 As for ‘autonomy’, I couldn’t help but notice that the opening of Eliseo 
 Fernández’s biosemiotics conference paper, “Energy, Semiosis and Emergence: 
 The Place of Biosemiotics in an Evolutionary Conception of Nature,” quoted in 
 my report on the conference, also emphasizes that theme. Indeed, a not 
 infrequent reference in the conference was to Maturana’s idea of 
 ‘autopoeisis’, interpreted by some to mean that the organism tends towards 
 ‘self-organizization’ (although, in places, Maturana himself seems not to see 
 it this way). One should also note that for Maturana an autopoietic system is 
 operationally closed, while Joe’s understanding of the autonomy of the sign 
 is that it is semiosically open. In any case, the idea of self-organization 
 has increasingly played an important role in both the sciences (for example, 
 in consideration of the ‘attractor’ in physical systems) and the humanities.
  
 [2] So, assuming for now that semiosic processes are the consequence of the 
 power of a sign to generate an interpretant meaning, our role, our 
 interpretation is, thus, limited to “an observation of the meaning exhibited 
 by the sign itself” in its spontaneity and growth. Consequently, Joe remarks, 
 we have about as much control in the ‘order of meaning’ as we have in the 
 ‘material order’, that is, some, but not nearly as much as we might imagine 
 that we have. Of course individuals have greater or lesser skill (as well as 
 various kinds of skill) at setting meaning phenomena “in action with one 
 another in the compositional process in ways favorable to some desired 
 result” (that last phrase bringing to my mind the pragmatic maxim), but our 
 interpretive role remains severely limited in Joe’s view.
  
 [3] Again, this is to say that “meaning creation and change is primarily a 
 function

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Is Peirce a Phenomenologist? - Concept of category?

2011-07-22 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
I can live with this if you can provide a concise definition of the 
distinctions between each, i.e., point to the distinctions that each of these 
authors made for the term. 

By your approach a further break down by author is required in mathematica 
categories. I'm not saying the approach is bad. Peirce (and I) would agree 
that all such usage must be tied to their authors.

With respect,
Steven


On Jul 22, 2011, at 9:40 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

 List:
 
 The recent proposals on this listserv for distinguishing among the potential 
 ostensive usages of the term category are, in my opinion, insufficient for 
 the purposes of clear communication.
 
 The term category has ancient roots and is many philosophers since 
 Aristotle (Kant, Hegel, Whitehead, among others) have devised specific 
 classifications of putative importance.
 
 Mathematical categories are of recent origin (Eilenberg / MacLean, 1940? ) 
 and are not even remotely related to the philosophical terms.  Mathematical 
 categories, even if one accepts Irving's definitions, are fully plasticized 
 mathematics (symbolic narratives composed from artificial symbols without 
 phenomenological meaning outside an extremely narrow usage of mathematical 
 terms.)
 
 Thus, I would recommend that if one wishes to communicate clearly, then the 
 various usages of the term category should be preceded by a descriptive 
 adjective that grammatically distinguishes the origins of the terms.
 
 Examples:
 mathematical categories
 Peircean categories
 Whiteheadean categories
 Kantian categories 
 and of course, the grandaddy of them all (except the mathematical anomaly)
 Aristotelian categories.
 
 Just my opinion.
 
 Cheers
 
 Jerry
 
 Research Professor
 Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
 703-790-1651
 
 -
 You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
 listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
 lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of 
 the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to 
 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the 
message.  To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU