Re: [peirce-l] a question

2012-03-14 Thread malgosia askanas
Well, in terms of the quality-fact-law trichotomy, if the present is pure 
quality, then facts only calcify out of that flux of pure qualities once the 
present has passed.

-m

At 11:56 AM -0400 3/14/12, Diane Stephens wrote:
In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows 
concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first is 
quality, a second is fact and a third is law.  I understand all but second as 
past as in:

First - present
Second - past
Third - future

I would appreciate some help.

Thanks.


--
Diane Stephens
Swearingen Chair of Education
Wardlaw 255
College of Education
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
803-777-0502
Fax 803-777-3193


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Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-11 Thread malgosia askanas
Irving wrote, quoting Peirce MS L75:35-39:

Deduction is only of value in tracing out the consequences of
hypotheses, which it regards as pure, or unfounded, hypotheses.
Deduction is divisible into sub-classes in various ways, of which the
most important is into corollarial and theorematic. Corollarial
deduction is where it is only necessary to imagine any case in which
the premisses are true in order to perceive immediately that the
conclusion holds in that case. Ordinary syllogisms and some deductions
in the logic of relatives belong to this class. Theorematic deduction
is deduction in which it is necessary to experiment in the imagination
upon the image of the premiss in order from the result of such
experiment to make corollarial deductions to the truth of the
conclusion. The subdivisions of theorematic deduction are of very high
theoretical importance. But I cannot go into them in this statement.


[...] Peirce's characterization of theorematic and corrolarial
deduction would seem, on the basis of this quote, to have to do with
whether the presumption that the premises of a deductive argument or
proof are true versus whether they require to be established to be
true [...]

I would disagree with this reading of the Peirce passage.  It seems
to me that the distinction he is making is, rather, between (1) the case
where the conclusion can be seen to follow from the premisses
by virtue of the logical form alone, as in A function which is continuous
on a closed interval is continuous on any subinterval of that interval
(whose truth is obvious without requiring us to imagine any continuous
function or any interval), and (2) the case where the deduction of the
conclusions from the premisses requires turning one's imagination
upon, and experimenting with, the actual mathematical objects
of which the theorem speaks, as in A function which is continuous
on a closed interval is bounded on that interval.

-malgosia

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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-05 Thread malgosia askanas
Steven,  could you explain what you mean by sense in your post below (the 
sense for which you trust there is a mechanical explanation)?  In your blurb, 
you seem to use the word in at least 3 different meanings.  

Talking about Aetherometry, I think you might find the Correas' book 
Nanometric Functions of Bioenergy, large parts of which address questions of 
the specificity and logic of the living,  to be of considerable interest and 
relevance to your work.

-malgosia

At 1:15 AM -0800 3/5/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
I will take the strong emotion to be both positive and competitive. It's a 
first draft cover piece and you are right to correct me concerning Frege's 
Sense and Reference, thank you.

The mechanics of sense simply refers to the mechanism characterizing sense 
in biophysics, I assume that there is such a mechanism. Hence, I do not view 
sense as incorporeal, nor do I view the scientific mechanism as facing demise.

You are, I know, an authority on the lack of substance (Aetherometry). :-)

I appreciate your input Malgosia and will certainly consider it.

With respect,
Steven


--
   Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
   Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
   http://iase.info


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Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-04 Thread malgosia askanas
I am sorry, but this inflated piece of vacuous hype would forever discourage me 
from having anything to do with the book.  The only half-way informative tidbit 
is that the book concerns a logic informed by recent advances in biophysics.  
By the way, On Sense and Reference is not a book but a 25-page journal 
article, and it has nothing to do with either the senses (such as sight or 
smell) or with making sense of the world.  And what are the mechanics of 
sense; have we now extended scientific mechanism to incorporeals, just to 
forestall its demise?

-malgosia

At 6:35 PM -0800 3/4/12, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
Dear List,

I am writing the Proemial for my forthcoming book On The Origin Of 
Experience and will appreciate your feedback. In particular, I ask that you 
challenge two things about it.  First, over the years of my work I have 
developed an aversion to using the term consciousness, which seems to me to 
be too overloaded and vague to be useful. On the other hand Debbie (my wife) 
argues that it will interest people more if I use it. Second, the vague 
transhumanism concerns me.

Imagine this is on the back of a book. Does it encourage you to read the book?


Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

Imagine that you could discover something so profound that it would not only 
have a broad impact upon the entire species but the universe itself could not 
proceed, could not evolve, without consideration of it.

This speculation refers to the role an intelligent species capable of 
mastering the science of living systems plays in cosmology. Rather than 
viewing intelligent species as the end product of a developing universe, it 
suggests that they are simply a necessary step along the way. It observes that 
an intelligent species able to place life into environments in which it would 
not otherwise appear plays a role in the unfolding of the world.

Imagine, for example, that future Voyager spacecraft can be constructed with a 
fundamental understanding of what is required to build living, thinking, 
machines, machines that have the capability of any living system to heal and 
reproduce.

The intelligent creation of such machines, machines that experience, may be an 
essential part of nature's unfolding. This thought suggests that intelligent 
species, here and elsewhere in the universe, play a role in the natural 
dynamics of the unfolding world.

Such a species would become the evolved ³intelligent designers² of life, 
extending life beyond the principles and necessities of arbitrary evolution, 
an inevitable part of nature's ³plan² to move life beyond its dependence upon 
the environment in which it first evolves.

If this is the case then our species, along with other such species that may 
appear elsewhere, are not mere spectators but play a role in the unfolding of 
the world.

In recent decades we have made significant advances in understanding the 
science of the living. Modern biophysics has begun to show us the detailed 
composition and dynamics of biophysical structure. For the record, it's 
nothing like a modern computer system.

The results of this global effort are Galilean in their scope and pregnant 
with implication. It is surely only a matter of time before we move to the 
Newtonian stage in the development of our understanding and learn the details 
of how sense is formed and modified, the role that sense plays in our directed 
actions, and how intelligent thought functions.

Today, however, there is only a poor understanding of the mechanics of sense. 
Theorists have had little time to give the new data deep consideration.

Clearly, more biophysical experiments, more observational data, will help us. 
If we look at the history of science this period is analogous to the period 
before Newton, in which experimentalists and observers such as Galileo and 
Copernicus built the foundations of Newton's inquiry. A breakthrough of a kind 
similar to Newton's discovery of gravitation is required.

But to make this breakthrough it is the discipline of the logicians that we 
need to recall. Before the age of sterile twentieth century logic, when 
mathematical logic was first developed and before modern computers were 
invented, it is the logicians that concerned themselves with explaining the 
nature and operation of thought and sense. Recall that George Boole 
(1815-1864) entitled his work on logic The Laws Of Thought[1] and the founder 
of modern logic, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), wrote the book entitled Sense And 
Reference[2]. I know from experience that it is a surprise to many that use 
logic everyday in their education and computing professions that the original 
concern of logicians is the operation of the senses and the mind. If we are to 
uncover the mechanics of sense and thought, if we are to understand the 
biophysical operation of the mind, then it is this earlier inquiry to which we 
must return.

My subject here is logic of the kind that existed before the current era. It