Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

2012-03-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
 
that is intelligible is mere seeming. Vet this seeming has so consistent a 
character that it is for all Intents and purposes the real world; and tills 
seemingly real world is seemingly governed by law, which, Indeed, is the only 
feature hi It which makes it seem like real. This is substantially Kantianism. 
Third, there are those who deny universals in re, ante rem, and post rem, 
holding that association by resemblance is reducible to association by 
contiguity, that generalization takes place only upon paper or in talk, and 
that every fact 1b at bottom unintelligible. In the middle ages, if not at all 
times, the realistic opinion has often been carried too far, the mere 
resemblances of things, which are nothing but the native tendency of the mind 
to associate them, being supposed to indicate more intimate dynamical relations 
than can Justly be Inferred on such a ground alone.

2?. The whole; the system of the universe.

To what end hod the angel been set to keep the entrance into Paradise after 
Adam's expulsion if the universal had been paradise? Raleigh, Hist World. 

Posterioristic and prioristic universals. See posterioristic. 


- Original Message - 
From: Khadimir 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 4:34 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic


Greetings, 


I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general 
question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I.

What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs. 
generals?  How would one argue that universals are not merely merely generals?  
By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created through a process 
of induction or what Locke called abstraction.  I offer an example to 
indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is informal.  I am 
familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy, and I would look 
forward to Peircean and other views on the matter.  Citations and references 
with limited explanation would be a fine way to answer, as I would not ask too 
much of anyone's time.


Best and Thank You,
   Jason Hills

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Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

2012-03-04 Thread Catherine Legg
Dear Jason,

I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as
discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in
the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce.

Here is the abstract:
This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and
Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of
universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether
universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends
to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues
which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which
from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of
scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism
not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent
front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism
should be a position worth fighting for.

If that sounds of interest, the link is here:
http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2918

Cheers, Cathy
And here is the abstract:
The link

On Sun, Mar 4, 2012 at 4:34 PM, Khadimir khadi...@gmail.com wrote:
 Greetings,

 I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general
 question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I.

 What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs.
 generals?  How would one argue that universals are not merely merely
 generals?  By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created
 through a process of induction or what Locke called abstraction.  I offer
 an example to indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is
 informal.  I am familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy,
 and I would look forward to Peircean and other views on the matter.
  Citations and references with limited explanation would be a fine way to
 answer, as I would not ask too much of anyone's time.

 Best and Thank You,
    Jason Hills
 -
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 PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU

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