Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-13 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

I think it's true that some of the difficulties of this discussion may be due to
different concepts of predicates, or different ways of using the word 
predicate
in different applications, communities, and contexts.

If I think back to the variety of different communities of interpretation
that I've had the fortune or misfortune of passing through over the years,
I can reckon up at least this many ways of thinking about predicates:

1.  In purely syntactic contexts, a predicate is just a symbol,
a syntactic element that is subject to specified rules of
combination and transformation.

As we pass to contexts where predicate symbols are meant to have meaning,
most disciplines of interpretation will be very careful, at first, about
drawing a firm distinction between a predicate symbol and the object it
is intended to denote.  For example, in computer science, people tend
to use forms like constant name, function name, predicate name,
type name, variable name, and so on, for the names that denote
the corresponding abstract objects.

When it comes to what information a predicate name conveys,
what kind of object the predicate name denotes, or finally,
what kind of object the predicate itself is imagined to be,
we find that we still have a number of choices:

2.  Predicate = property, the intension a concept or term.
3.  Predicate = collection, the extension of a concept or term.
4.  Predicate = function from a universe domain to a boolean domain.

It doesn't really matter all that much in ordinary applications which you 
prefer,
and there is some advantage to keeping all the options open, using whichever one
appears most helpful at a given moment, just so long as you have a way of moving
consistently among the alternatives and maintaining the information each 
conveys.

Regards,

Jon

SE = Steven Ericsson-Zenith

SE: Ben and I appear to be speaking across each other and, possibly, agreeing 
fiercely.

SE: Recall that in the 1906 dialectic Peirce is drawing a distinction between 
the wider usage
of Category at the time, i.e., Aristotle's Categories considered by you 
in the dialog,
and saying that he prefers to call these Predicaments.  Having made this 
distinction he
then speaks about the indices that are his categories.

SE: As I said earlier, the index in this case does not point to the elements of 
the category
but the category itself. There is Firstness as opposed to x is a first. 
 The confusion
may be that Ben thinks I am saying that a category is some set of indices 
to its members.
That is not the case, a category stands alone and we can point to it 
(index).  Icons are
the selection mechanisms of properties of classes, not indices.

SE: Predicaments are higher order, assertions about assertions, predicates of 
predicates,
I prefer to say predicated predicates or assertions about assertions 
which is more
generally understood today.

SE: Being as careful as he is, I see no evidence to cause us to suppose that 
the categories that
Peirce attributes to himself in 1906 are different than those he identifies 
as early as 1866.

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-12 Thread Jon Awbrey

GF: Good point, Jon -- we should not neglect the element of performance art in 
philosophy! :-)

GF: However I'm not sure it's right to say that the metaphysical order is more 
fundamental than the
phenomenological. It doesn't seem to jibe with Peirce's classification of 
the sciences, either.

JA: Yes, we always have the choice between first in nature and first for us.
I have no strong feelings about which first comes first -- I was just going
by Peirce's statement:

CSP: Besides, it would be illogical to rely upon the categories to decide so 
fundamental a question.

JA: But you are right, one could just as well say that independent foundations 
are both fundamental
without one foundation being more fundamental than the other.

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-12 Thread Jon Awbrey

Ben, Steven,  All ...

I may have missed a few posts but I don't understand the fuss about indices.
The types of signs not in one-to-one correspondence with the types of objects.
You can refer to the same object by means of a pronoun or some other index --
for example, Looky there!, Voila!, or I don't know what it is, but there
it goes again -- or you can refer to it by means of a noun, or some figure of
speech with iconic properties.  It is simply a matter of convenience in certain
cases that we use an index or icon when a more definitive symbol might take a 
lot
of work to fashion.

Regards,

Jon

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
Ben and I appear to be speaking across each other and, possibly, agreeing fiercely. 

Recall that in the 1906 dialectic Peirce is drawing a distinction between the wider usage of Category at the time, i.e., Aristotle's Categories considered by you in the dialog, and saying that he prefers to call these Predicaments. Having made this distinction he then speaks about the indices that are his categories. 


As I said earlier, the index in this case does not point to the elements of the category but the 
category itself. There is Firstness as opposed to x is a first. The 
confusion may be that Ben thinks I am saying that a category is some set of indices to its members. 
That is not the case, a category stands alone and we can point to it (index). Icons are the 
selection mechanisms of properties of classes, not indices.

Predicaments are higher order, assertions about assertions, predicates of predicates, I prefer to 
say predicated predicates or assertions about assertions which is more 
generally understood today.

Being as careful as he is, I see no evidence to cause us to suppose that the 
categories that Peirce attributes to himself in 1906 are different than those 
he identifies as early as 1866.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering
http://iase.info


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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Dear Steven,

In your previous post, you said,

  Although the dialogic makes these passages a little difficult to read, it 
seems very clear to me that Peirce, in CP 4.549, is explicitly not referring to 
his own categories as predicated predicates, or assertions on assertions. 

  I think the question of what is a category is clearly addressed earlier, 
in CP 4.544, Peirce says:

  ... of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote 
Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very 
promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and 
therefore can only be denoted by Indices.
Now you say, 

  After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben.

  Peirce is indeed referring to his own categories (it is difficult to read 
the dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning 
predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred 
earlier.

  The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, i.e., 
they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed. 

Peirce doesn't say in Prolegomena (CP 4.530-572) that categories _are_ 
indices, instead he says that, for categories are denotable only by indices, 
and the reason that he gives is not indecomposibility, but instead their being 
enormously large, very promiscuous, and known but in small part such that 
they cannot be satisfactorily defined..  But the supposed indecomposibility 
of Prolegomena-categories was the only specific positive reason you give for 
thinking that by Category in Prolegomena he means the same that he means by 
Category pretty much everywhere else. Meanwhile you've left untouched the 
positive reasons for thinking that it is not the same Category as everywhere 
else:

1. He says: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories 
but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments and which you have 
explained as predicates of predicates. Peirce usually calls his own categories 
Categories, not Predicaments, and usually uses Predicaments as an 
alternate term for Aristotle's categories (substance, quantity, relation, 
quality, position (attitude), state, time (when), place, action, passion 
(undergoing).

2. He calls Modes of Being three things whose terms, as the CP editors note, 
he often enough uses as terms for his own categories - Actuality, Possibility, 
and Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny) - that is, Secondness, Firstness, and 
Thirdness, respectively.

3. He says that the divisions so obtained - i.e., 1st-intentional, 
2nd-intentional, 3rd-intentional - must not be confounded with the different 
Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On 
the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates - i.e., the 
Prolegomena-categories - is different in the different Modes of Being. And on 
those successions, he says, and remember the year is 1906, his thoughts are 
not yet harvested. Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categories are 
the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Cc: Benjamin Udell 
Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2012 5:20 PM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction 

Dear Ben,

After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben. 

Peirce is indeed referring to his own categories (it is difficult to read the 
dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning 
predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred 
earlier. The categories stand alone in his view, independent and identifiable, 
i.e., they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be decomposed. 

In my terms, Peirce argues that they are necessary distinctions. The world 
forces them upon us, we do not force them upon the world.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering 
http://iase.info

On Mar 9, 2012, at 2:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-11 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 that the Prolegomena-categories 
 are the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867.
 
 Best, Ben
 
 - Original Message - 
 From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
 Cc: Benjamin Udell 
 Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2012 5:20 PM 
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
 
 Dear Ben,
 
 After some consideration I think this is an incorrect interpretation Ben.
 
 Peirce is indeed referring to his own categories (it is difficult to read 
 the dialogic and to see how he is not) and he answers the question concerning 
 predicates of predicates' in the text of the Prolegomena to which I referred 
 earlier. The categories stand alone in his view, independent and 
 identifiable, i.e., they are indices, we can point to them and they cannot be 
 decomposed.
 
 In my terms, Peirce argues that they are necessary distinctions. The world 
 forces them upon us, we do not force them upon the world.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 --
 Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
 Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering 
 http://iase.info
 
 On Mar 9, 2012, at 2:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
 
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http://iase.info

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-10 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Jon,

I've been reading the section of the Minute Logic that you've been posting bits 
of (i don't think i've read it before) and i'm looking forward to your way of 
connecting it to the category of categories ... if that's what you're doing ... 
but i agree with Gary R. and Ben that it would be easier to follow if you put 
it together into one message, or at least collect all the Peirce quotes into 
one and your argument or comments into another one.

Gary F.

-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: March-10-12 11:20 AM

Peircers,

This passage from Peirce has intrigued me, too, for at least a dozen years, 
just going by the first discussions that I can remember having about it, and 
still find scattered about on the web.  I am less concerned about the terms of 
art from Aristotle -- predicables, predicaments, etc. -- than I am about the 
nature and function of categories in general, with especial reference to the 
status of Peirce's 3 categories.

The larger interest of this question for me is this -- that I see a certain 
continuity of purpose and uberty that extends from Aristotle's categories, up 
through Peirce's, and through one potential, as yet unrealized, but perhaps 
inevitable future development of category theory as it is understood and used 
in most mathematical work today, either as a practical tool, as most will admit 
it, or as a foundation more natural and more sure than set theory, as others 
are inclined to recommend it.

But it's Saturday, and I'm due for a bit of RR ...

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-09 Thread Gary Richmond
Gary, Ben, Jon,

Gary, I think you got this just right.

Best,

Gary R.

On 3/9/12, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 Ben, Jon and list,

 I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me
 that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in
 question, Peirce does NOT use the term Categories in reference to what he
 elsewhere calls categories, or elements of the phaneron, or even sometimes
 universes -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.

 The Prolegomena is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs,
 and the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of
 propositions. The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP
 4.544-5:

 [[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs
 fail But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote
 Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large,
 very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily
 defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a
 single instance, is the collection of all things in the Physical
 Universe

 Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category
 are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of
 Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of
 Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe
 the two correctly is a question for careful study. ]]]

 Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to
 Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying
 that he prefers the term Predicaments for classes of predicates, no doubt
 because this avoids confusing them with the different Modes of Being which
 are elsewhere called categories. And indeed he never mentions Categories
 again in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in
 the whole article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only conclude
 that the passage you quoted from it, Jon, tells us nothing about *those*
 categories, which i guess are the ones you referred to as Peirce's
 categories. The connection between them and the triad of first, second and
 third *intentions* is very tenuous, as i think Peirce indicates by saying
 that his thoughts about the latter triad are not yet harvested --
 something he could hardly say in 1906 about his phaneroscopic categories.

 Gary F.

 } We are circumveiloped by obscuritads. [Finnegans Wake 244] {

 www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce


 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
 Sent: March-08-12 11:05 PM

 Ben  All,

 I see that I omitted to give my initial thoughts on that last paragraph of
 yours, so let me do that now.

 BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are
  different in the different Modes of Being?  Where in his other
  writings does he call his own categories predicates of predicates?
  It's hard not to think that by Predicates of Predicates he does not
  mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional,
  2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that
  his thoughts are not yet harvested, will end up being treated by him
  as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds — instances or applications of his
 categories.

 There is nothing very exotic about predicates of predicates.  We use them
 all the time without taking much notice of the fact or bothering to describe
 them as such.
 For example, terms like monadic, dyadic, triadic are predicates of
 predicates.
 When a phenomenon requires a k-adic predicate or a k-adic relation for its
 adequate description, we say that the phenomenon has k-ness.  So category
 k is the category of phenomena that need k-adic predicates or relations for
 their adequate description.

 When it comes to what Peirce means here by Modes of Being, I guess I had
 assumed from the words he used — Actuality, Possibility, Destiny — that he
 was talking about the traditional triad of modalities, but I'm not so sure
 about that now.  At any rate, those would not be the first words that come
 to mind when I think of the categories.  I am more used to the paradigm of
 Quality, Reaction, Representation and its later variants, and the only way I
 could force an association would be by interpreting those modes of being, or
 modalities, if that is what they are, in relational terms.  Shy of that, I
 have the feeling that Peirce could talk us into any given order he chose on
 any given day ex tempore.

 But maybe my readings will bring more light tomorrow ...

 Regards,

 Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary F., Jon, Gary R. list,

I agree, Gary F., all your points are good. Also I did a search on 
predicament in the CP and usually it turned out to be when he discussed 
Aristotle's Categories, or Predicaments. I don't think that he means his own 
categories by Category in the Prolegomena. And the Modes of Being in 
Prolegomena correspond to what he says of his own categories elsewhere:

Firstness, quality, possibility, chance, some, vagueness, etc.
Secondness, reaction, actuality, brute fact, this, determinateness, etc.
Thirdness,  representation, necessity/destiny, habit, rule, all, generality, 
etc.

Still, Jon, I have to agree with you that it's hard to see why Peirce would 
refuse to see his categories as predicates of predicates - not predicates as 
merely grammatical entities but as _accidentia_, just as Peirce tended to 
regard subject and _substantia_ as nearly the same thing. Peirce even calls his 
categories accidents (not coincidences but descriptive attributes), see 
Section 11 in both A New List of Categories (1867) and corresponding section 
in his rewrite The Categories (1893) (both papers interleaved at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm).

Peirce also has his own Universes correlated to Firstness, Secondness, 
Thirdness - the Universes of (1) Ideas, (2) Brute facts, (3) Habits. So the 
idea of Universes and Categories being not so very different is not what makes 
it hard to believe that the Prolegomena's Categories are not his own 
Categories, though the Prolegomena's idea that one needs indices to distinguish 
Categories (Predicaments) does make it seem unlikely that the Prolegomena's 
Categories are Peirce's own Categories.

Your point about looking for arity or valence because of the mathematical 
underpinnings of the categories is well taken.

Regarding the Prolegomena's Modes of Being and their lack of perspicuous arity, 
Peirce's use of the word Destiny in place of Necessity suggests that he is 
not thinking quite about the classical three modalities, or even the simplest 
Booleanized version (with a hypothetical necessity a la the hypothetical 
universal) but instead where the hypothetical or conditional necessity or 
destiny is not simply A(G-H) but something a little more complicated.

So one might get closer, if not all the way, to arity or valence by thinking of 
it a la the classical concept/judgment/reasoning trichotomy, as
Possibility  - Blue   (term, rheme)
Actuality   - Socrates was a man. (proposition, dicisign)
Destiny   - If you do X, then Y will result. (argument, more or less).

I also agree with Gary R. about all those Objective Logic posts. Sending on 
one day post after post with nothing but quotes is a bit much. Can't you just 
send a bunch of quotes together like Joe used to do, then in a next post 
proceed to a discussion?

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU 
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 10:40 AM 
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Ben, Jon and list, 

I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me 
that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in 
question, Peirce does NOT use the term Categories in reference to what he 
elsewhere calls categories, or elements of the phaneron, or even sometimes 
universes -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. 

The Prolegomena is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs, and 
the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of propositions. 
The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP 4.544-5:

[[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs fail 
But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote Categories 
and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, very 
promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily defined, and 
therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a single instance, 
is the collection of all things in the Physical Universe 

Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category 
are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of 
Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of Predicates. I 
never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe the two correctly 
is a question for careful study. ]]]

Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to 
Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying that 
he prefers the term Predicaments for classes of predicates, no doubt because 
this avoids confusing them with the different Modes of Being which are 
elsewhere called categories. And indeed he never mentions Categories again 
in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in the whole 
article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-08 Thread Jon Awbrey

Ben  All,

At any rate, there is no particular hurry to come to a decision.
As I get time, I'll go back and review the passage in the context
of that paper and others.  For now, let me make a first pass over
your comments and say what I can say off the cuff, subject to the
usual risk of backtracking later.

BU = Ben Udell
JA = Jon Awbrey

BU: The passage by Peirce that you quoted below has nagged at me for some time.
On your mywikibiz page to which you linked, as regards that passage, you
said The first thing to extract from this passage is the fact that
Peirce's Categories, or 'Predicaments', are predicates of predicates.

Let us call that H_1.  Categories = Predicates of Predicates.

I was tempted into that interpretation, despite the possibility
of becoming the foil of a subsequent aporia, by the simple fact
that it appears to help me make sense, not only of what Peirce
might mean by a category, but of all the other claims that he
makes for their properties.

As a general rule, I interpret Peirce's categories as categories of relations.
I suppose I am led to do this by the fact that Peirce makes very strong claims
about his categories -- the claim that three are necessary and sufficient, etc. 
--
and I see nothing else that could anchor these claims except the extremely hard
facts of mathematics that he emphasizes throughout his work under the heading of
triadic irreducibility.

If Peirce intends to explain his categories by means of words like
Actuality, Possibility, Destiny -- words whose meanings are hardly
fixed across traditions of interpretation but range from the fluid
to the flighty and fanciful -- then I can but take him at his word,
at any given moment, whether he means the same thing by them as he
means by First, Last, Middle, in that order or some other, or then
again Quality, Reaction, Representation, or any of the other terms.

But if he means to turn it about, and explain those arrays of highly variable
and traditionally volatile terms by means of mathematical relations, where we
have some hope of probating, proving or disproving, the properties attributed
to these categories, then that is reason to think we are moving in a positive
direction, clarifying obscure words in the light of more determinate concepts.

BU: In the editors' footnote to CP 4.549, the editors say that what there
Peirce calls the Modes of Being are Usually called categories by Peirce.
See vol. 1, bk. III.  Maybe they're wrong, but what here he calls the
Modes of Being -- Actuality, Possibility, and Destiny (or Freedom from
Destiny) do at least comprise one of his formulations of his categories,
even if not the definitive formulation.

BU: Peirce says [...] what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer
the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of
predicates ... Peirce everywhere else prefers the name Categories for his
own categories and who is the you who would have been speaking of Peirce's
own categories?

In Peirce's dialogue, formally speaking, you addresses the Reader.
I initially read you as referring to Peirce's alter ego in a dialogue
with himself, but it occurs to me that another possibility might be Hegel.

BU: Peirce says,

CSP: [...] the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different
 Modes of Being:  Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny).
 On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in
 the different Modes of Being.

Given what I said above, I am content to leave it open at present whether 
Categories,
Modalities, Modes of Being, Predicaments, Predicates of Predicates, and all the 
rest
are exemplifying the same formal structure or not.  What is less variable for 
me is
the fact that no other reason is given anywhere in Peirce's work for claiming 
the
necessity and sufficiency of three categories except the mathematical facts 
about
the valences of relations.

Regards,

Jon

BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are
different in the different Modes of Being?  Where in his other
writings does he call his own categories predicates of predicates?
It's hard not to think that by Predicates of Predicates he does not
mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional,
2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that
his thoughts are not yet harvested, will end up being treated by him
as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds -- instances or applications of his categories.

JA: We have of course discussed the bearing of Peirce's categories on his
other triads several times before, even to the point of going through
his early writings in excruciating detail.  I do not think I have the
strength to do that again, but it may be possible to recover the gist
of those examinations from various archives here and there on the web.

JA: One of the nagging things 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
-Original Message-
From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM
To: 'Catherine Legg'
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

Gary, Cathy and Listers,

I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
my next book and send it in.

Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
computational modeling. 

This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
carry on this work.

Regards,
Phyllis

BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

-Original Message-
From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] 
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Catherine Legg
Very interesting - thanks, Phyllis!
Cathy

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 Gary, Cathy and Listers,

 I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
 discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
 allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
 my next book and send it in.

 Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
 settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
 applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
 site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
 validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
 Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
 reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
 too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
 Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
 non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
 paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

 However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
 evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
 Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
 computational modeling.

 This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
 models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
 on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
 Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
 to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
 require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
 research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
 carry on this work.

 Regards,
 Phyllis

 BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
 Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
 during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of Catherine Legg
 Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
 Induction

 Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

 The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
 below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
 you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
 human subjects, but how / where /when?

 Best regards, Cathy

 On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
 April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
 be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
 determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
 all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
 the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
 and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor analytical

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-05 Thread Jon Awbrey

Hi Phyllis,

Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty?

| Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000),
| The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown,
| (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis,
| Philadelphia, PA.

We had been discussing this on The Wikipedia Review a few years ago,
so there will be a few excerpts and additional links on this thread:

http://wikipediareview.com/index.php?showtopic=15318

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his original 
opinion
about the connections of the three categories with the principal types of 
signs and
the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third 
guessing
had settled down, and yet leaves the question undecided in his own mind at that 
time.

Working from the understanding that all semiotic phenomena are irreducibly 
triadic,
taking irreducibile in the strictest sense of the word, specific reasons must 
be
given for assigning any number less than 3 to the arity of any aspect or 
component
of a semiotic species, for example, a type of sign relation or a type of 
inference,
in effect, exhibiting an approximate reduction in some looser sense of 
reduction.

There are plenty of examples in Peirce's early work where he demonstrates the 
form
of reasoning that he uses to make these categorical associations and 
connections,
and I had intended to go hunt a few of these up, but the niche of the web where
I last copied them out is down right now, so I will have to try again later.

Regards,

Jon

CL = Cathy Legg
GR = Gary Richmond

CL: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though.
Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of
surprise due to error.

GR: And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career
(with the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented
on by him in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

CSP: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference 
through an Icon,
 and is thus connected with Firstness;  Induction, or trying how things 
will act, is
 inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness;  
Deduction, or
 recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a 
Symbol, and
 is thus connected with Thirdness. ... [My] connection of Abduction with 
Firstness,
 Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by 
my finding
 no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction split, at once, 
into the
 Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities.

 CSP, ''Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking :
 The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism'', Turrisi (ed.), 276-277.

GR: Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the 
matter.

CSP: [In] the book called ''Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins 
University'',
 while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused 
Abduction with
 the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities.  
Subsequently,
 writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that 
book
 but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of 
Induction
 in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here 
in Cambridge
 I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and 
Deduction with the
 Second [op. cit., 277].

GR: [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling
At the time I first published this division of inference
and 'Peirce'.]

GR: So, as he sees here, for those few years Peirce was confused about
these categorial associations. In that sense Peirce is certainly at least
partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many a thinker
about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns.  Still,
he continues in that section by stating:

GR: At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question undecided.
Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with anything but thirdness,
nor induction with anything but 2ns.

GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but 
thirdness,
nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to 
that
way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three 
categories
together in consideration of a complete inquiry — as he does, for 
example, very
late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the 
section the
CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468–6.473; also, EP 
2:440–442] —
he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction' of the 
hypothesis) with 1ns,
deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising 
tests of it)
with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns.

GR: But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently proved 
confusing
even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few tricategorial matters in 
which
he changed his mind (and, then, back again!), I too will at least try to 
leave
the question undecided (for now).

--

academia: 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Jon Awbrey

Peircers,

Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of
information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and
the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the Logic of 
Science
at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute (1866).

• 
http://mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Here is a link to an archival copy in case the current web page goes off-line 
again:

• 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100702011126/http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/Papers/Information_=_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-04 Thread Catherine Legg
Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net wrote:
 This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
 issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April
 from IGI Global).

 When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
 (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
 Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
 exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
 juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
 phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
 re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
 phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be
 represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
 and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
 non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
 them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

 On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
 nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
 quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining
 a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
 the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all
 of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
 achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
 except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the
 general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
 abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
 derivative.

 Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and
 apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
 exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to
 representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of
 something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given
 sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
 students in many fields.


 -Original Message-
 From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
 Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
 Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
 To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
 Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
 Induction

 GR = Gary Richmond
 JD = Jonathan DeVore

 JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
     think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
     fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
     will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
     under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

 JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
     there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
     to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
     thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
     use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
     it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

 GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

 I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

 If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative
 terms,
 that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a
 phenomenon,
 then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of
 reasoning,
 are basically category three.

 Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the
 formal sense
 that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties
 relatively
 well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the
 categorical
 question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal
 scientific means.

 Regards,

 Jon

 --

 academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
 inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
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 lists

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-03 Thread Phyllis Chiasson
This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April
from IGI Global). 

When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
(automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be
represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.

On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining
a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all
of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the
general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
derivative. 

Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and
apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to
representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of
something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given
sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
students in many fields. 


-Original Message-
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore

JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
 think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
 fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
 will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
 under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
 there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
 to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
 thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
 use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
 it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative
terms,
that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a
phenomenon,
then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of
reasoning,
are basically category three.

Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the
formal sense
that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties
relatively
well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the
categorical
question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal
scientific means.

Regards,

Jon

-- 

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-03 Thread Gary Richmond
Jon, All,

Jon, I'm glad my post was for a helpful summary for you in the matter
of at least Peirce's changing views of the three inference patterns in
relation to the categories.

Just a brief comment on your 'Subject' line. Ben and I would like to
encourage you and everyone here to follow Joe Ransdell's advice when
changing a subject line (and I think it was quite proper for you to
change this one, Jon) that after the change that one adds was,
[whatever the former Subject was] including enough of the former
Subject line for identicatory purposes. This will be helpful in any
number of ways for use of whatever archive or folder may end up
containing these posts in the future.

Best,

Gary and Ben

On 3/2/12, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:
 Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary.

 Jon

 cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

 Gary Richmond wrote:
 Cathy, Stephen, list,

 Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as
 secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the
 secondness of surprise due to error.

 And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with
 the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented on by him
 in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

 Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference
 through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or
 trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus
 connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations
 of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected
 with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,
 Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed
 by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion
 split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of
 Qualities. . .  (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right
 Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.
 276-7).

 Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the
 matter.

 [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns
 Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty
 well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is
 the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh
 volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite
 understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction
 in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures
 here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the
 third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277].

 [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time
 I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.]

 So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about
 these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at
 least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many
 a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference
 patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating:

 At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
 original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question
 undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with
 anything but thirdness,  nor induction with anything but 2ns.

 I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but
 thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I
 mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in
 methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in
 consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very
 late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the
 section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468
 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction
 (here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the
 retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it)
 with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with
 2ns.

 But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently
 proved confusing  even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few
 tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back
 again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for
 now).

 Best,

 Gary

 --

 academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
 inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
 mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
 word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
 word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/



-- 
Gary Richmond
Humanities Department
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College--City University of New York


Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary.

Jon

cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

Gary Richmond wrote:

Cathy, Stephen, list,

Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as
secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the
secondness of surprise due to error.

And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with
the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented on by him
in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference
through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or
trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus
connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations
of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected
with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,
Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed
by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion
split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of
Qualities. . .  (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right
Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.
276-7).

Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter.

[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns
Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty
well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is
the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh
volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite
understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction
in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures
here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the
third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277].

[You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time
I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.]

So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about
these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at
least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many
a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference
patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating:

At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question
undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with
anything but thirdness,  nor induction with anything but 2ns.

I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but
thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I
mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in
methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in
consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very
late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the
section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468
- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction
(here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the
retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it)
with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with
2ns.

But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently
proved confusing  even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few
tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back
again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for
now).

Best,

Gary


--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
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word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

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Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-02 Thread Gary Richmond
Jonathan, list,

I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

Best,

Gary

On 3/2/12, Jonathan DeVore devor...@umich.edu wrote:
 Dear List,

 It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about
 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion.  Peirce might
 have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent
 according to the phenomenon under consideration--without being
 mutually exclusive.

 So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, there is
 also an element of compulsion by which one is forced to a particular
 conclusion.  That compulsive element could be thought of as the
 2ndness of deduction--which is put to good use by the predominantly
 mediated character of deduction:  i.e., it serves as the sheriff to
 the court (of law).

 Best,
 Jonathan


 Quoting Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net:

 Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary.

 Jon

 cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

 Gary Richmond wrote:
 Cathy, Stephen, list,

 Cathy, you wrote: I don't see how one might interpret induction as
 secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the
 secondness of surprise due to error.

 And yet that's exactly how Peirce saw it for most of his career (with
 the brief lapse mentioned in my earlier  post and commented on by him
 in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism). There he wrote:

 Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference
 through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or
 trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus
 connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations
 of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected
 with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,
 Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed
 by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Inducion
 split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of
 Qualities. . .  (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right
 Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.
 276-7).

 Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion
 in the matter.

 [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns
 Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty
 well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is
 the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh
 volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite
 understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction
 in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures
 here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the
 third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277].

 [You can also read the entire deleted section by googling At the time
 I first published this division of inference and 'Peirce'.]

 So, as he sees he, for those few years Peirce was confused about
 these categorial associations. In that sensePeirce is certainly at
 least partially at fault in creating a confusion in the minds of many
 a thinker about the categorial associations of the three inference
 patterns. Still, he continues in that section by stating:

 At present [that is, in 1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my
 original opinion yet adds that he will leave the question
 undecided. Still, after 1903 he never associates deduction with
 anything but thirdness,  nor induction with anything but 2ns.

 I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but
 thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I
 mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in
 methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in
 consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very
 late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the
 section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468
 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction
 (here, 'retroduction' of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the
 retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it)
 with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with
 2ns.

 But again, as these particular categorial associations apparently
 proved confusing  even for Peirce, constituting one of the very few
 tricategorial matters in which he changed his mind (and, then, back
 again!), I too will at least try to leave the question undecided (for
 now).

 Best,

 Gary

 --

 academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
 inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
 mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
 word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
 word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/

 

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-02 Thread Jon Awbrey

GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore

JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.

JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).

GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.

I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.

If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative 
terms,
that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a phenomenon,
then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of reasoning,
are basically category three.

Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be degenerate in the formal 
sense
that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties 
relatively
well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the 
categorical
question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal scientific 
means.

Regards,

Jon

--

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inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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