Re: [peirce-l] Sciences as Communicational Communities -- Segment 1
Sally & All, I think it is reasonable to be concerned with distorting influences on research and scholarship, whether we find them in the sciences or in the other disciplines. Looking around, the conflicts of interest appear to grow more pushy and more pervasive every day. I'm thinking of cautionary tales like Slaughter and Leslie on Academic Capitalism, or Chris Mooney in "The Republican War on Science", just to name two that other contexts of discussion are constantly bringing to mind. But the question was: What to do about it? It appears that further inquiry is called for. Jon Sally Ness wrote: Lastly, JR's solution to the problems of politicization is clearly stated in paragraph 4: scientists must get clear on the meaning of "truth", "objectivity", and similarly important concepts. The benefit of this is identified in paragraph 5: it will prevent scientists from forgetting who they are -- which is not politicians -- and it will enable them to point out why they are best qualified to determine how their scientific work is to be conducted. The logic JR is using here would seem to have a few gaps at this point. How, for example, does getting clear on these concepts lead to preventing the unwanted infiltration of outsiders? and why can't non-scientists get equally clear on these concepts as well (it is not as though their meaning is mysterious to non-scientists) and then be qualified to share in the control of discovery processes? Filling in these gaps constitutes the main work of the rest of the paper. However, it appears that JR at this point is already seeking to convince the scientists in the audience that, if they can, for example, define themselves as "objective" in relation to their subject matter because and only because of how they investigate it, then they can define all those who do not engage in such work as less objective about it or as not objective at all, hence excluding them from legitimate participation in the governance of their inquiry. By the same token, they can define all non-scientists as less truthful, less knowledgeable, less realistic, and so on, on the basis of a relative lack of experience with their brand of scientific inquiry. This does seem to be a pragmatic approach to coping with the alleged invasion, particularly with regard to the role that it assigns to research experience. Perhaps, however, my reading is off the mark? -- facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey knol: http://knol.google.com/k/-/-/3fkwvf69kridz/1 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Segment 1
Sally & All, As I recall, one of Joe's abiding concerns was the idea that science refers to an objective world of real things, perhaps real "possibles", as opposed to any kind of radical constructivism, Sophistic relativism, or so-called "consensual theory of truth". So say we all, I'm guessing. However much we construct or invent our humanly erratic signs of reality, the reality itself is "independent" of our vagaries and our vicissitudes. That would be just my guess at this point. Jon Sally Ness wrote: Jon, List, Thanks much for this response. With regard to the first question, since it is most likely not a dualism between discovery and invention that JR had in mind, what would be the alternative. He wouldn't have italicized "discovery" had he not meant to contrast it with something else. Or, perhaps, there is a better way to read this passage? With regard to the second question, the logic/rhetoric distinction you mention would seem to fit. Thanks for bringing this out. Sally -- facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey knol: http://knol.google.com/k/-/-/3fkwvf69kridz/1 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Segment 1
Jon, List, Thanks much for this response. With regard to the first question, since it is most likely not a dualism between discovery and invention that JR had in mind, what would be the alternative. He wouldn't have italicized "discovery" had he not meant to contrast it with something else. Or, perhaps, there is a better way to read this passage? With regard to the second question, the logic/rhetoric distinction you mention would seem to fit. Thanks for bringing this out. Sally Peircers, Let me pick it up here: SN: The main idea or "real issue" that JR seeks to present via Kleinman's paper is brought out in paragraph 3: "whether scientific inquiry is to continue to be recognized institutionally as a discovery process, guided ideally by the norms implicit in such ideas as that of truth, knowledge, reality, objectivity, and so forth, or is to be controlled instead by the principles of persuasion and accommodation that are used in negotiational and political activity" (emphasis in JR's text). JR wants to argue in the rest of the paper that scientific inquiry should be guided by said norms. The either/or construction of JR's sentence seems worth pondering, as is the emphatic formatting of the term, "discovery." Two questions come to mind in this regard: 1) Why does JR put stress on this concept of "discovery"? What is the implicit contrast to it (discovery/found vs inventive/made)? Is this a reference to some idea of Peirce here? 2) Perhaps more important: Are the two different ways that JR identifies of governing such discovery processes really, fundamentally, discrete alternatives? are they as completely separable and interchangeable as JR seems to think they are? In sum, is this really a "Plan A or Plan B" situation? I'm skeptical about it being accurate to think of discovery processes as guided either (and simply) by "norms" on the one hand, or by "principles" of the kind JR identifies on the other? I'm surprised to see JR even use the term "principle" in relation to the strategies and tactics of political activity he references (I'm not sure what JR has in mind by "negotiational" activity). It sounds as though JR's view of political life is very negative, lacking in norms implicit in its own ideas of truth, knowledge, reality, not to mention honor. Perhaps JR is simply saying that science ought to be governed by ideals that rise above the historical contingencies within which any given practice must be situated, ideals that relate to subject matter that is itself relatively enduring, general, and transcendent. Any thoughts about how to sort out this passage? For (1), I don't think we find the usual suspect dualism between discovery and invention in Peirce's account of the inquiry process. Haack made a recent attempt to characterize the pragmatic synthesis as "foundherentism", but I think it's better to realize from the outset that working in sign-relational framework means never having to murder to dissect, that the object-referent aspect and the sign-processing aspect are mere projections from the whole sign relation in which we are participating at any given moment. For (2), I think this spectrum of difference reflects the classical distinction between logic (reasoning that proceeds independently of the peculiar conditions of interpreters) and rhetoric (reasoning that is tailored to the peculiar conditions of its interpreter). Jon -- facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey knol: http://knol.google.com/k/-/-/3fkwvf69kridz/1 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Segment 1
Peircers, Let me pick it up here: SN: The main idea or "real issue" that JR seeks to present via Kleinman's paper is brought out in paragraph 3: "whether scientific inquiry is to continue to be recognized institutionally as a discovery process, guided ideally by the norms implicit in such ideas as that of truth, knowledge, reality, objectivity, and so forth, or is to be controlled instead by the principles of persuasion and accommodation that are used in negotiational and political activity" (emphasis in JR's text). JR wants to argue in the rest of the paper that scientific inquiry should be guided by said norms. The either/or construction of JR's sentence seems worth pondering, as is the emphatic formatting of the term, "discovery." Two questions come to mind in this regard: 1) Why does JR put stress on this concept of "discovery"? What is the implicit contrast to it (discovery/found vs inventive/made)? Is this a reference to some idea of Peirce here? 2) Perhaps more important: Are the two different ways that JR identifies of governing such discovery processes really, fundamentally, discrete alternatives? are they as completely separable and interchangeable as JR seems to think they are? In sum, is this really a "Plan A or Plan B" situation? I'm skeptical about it being accurate to think of discovery processes as guided either (and simply) by "norms" on the one hand, or by "principles" of the kind JR identifies on the other? I'm surprised to see JR even use the term "principle" in relation to the strategies and tactics of political activity he references (I'm not sure what JR has in mind by "negotiational" activity). It sounds as though JR's view of political life is very negative, lacking in norms implicit in its own ideas of truth, knowledge, reality, not to mention honor. Perhaps JR is simply saying that science ought to be governed by ideals that rise above the historical contingencies within which any given practice must be situated, ideals that relate to subject matter that is itself relatively enduring, general, and transcendent. Any thoughts about how to sort out this passage? For (1), I don't think we find the usual suspect dualism between discovery and invention in Peirce's account of the inquiry process. Haack made a recent attempt to characterize the pragmatic synthesis as "foundherentism", but I think it's better to realize from the outset that working in sign-relational framework means never having to murder to dissect, that the object-referent aspect and the sign-processing aspect are mere projections from the whole sign relation in which we are participating at any given moment. For (2), I think this spectrum of difference reflects the classical distinction between logic (reasoning that proceeds independently of the peculiar conditions of interpreters) and rhetoric (reasoning that is tailored to the peculiar conditions of its interpreter). Jon -- facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey knol: http://knol.google.com/k/-/-/3fkwvf69kridz/1 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
