Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 3
ematical problem won't inspire sociological work to help solve it or similar problems (unless one means that a sociologist helps muster some mathematicians to solve it), and that 'pure' maths and sociology are toward opposite ends of a spectrum. You can see an outline of Peirce's later spectrum or classification of research at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#Sciences. Also http://www.uta.fi/~attove/peirce_syst.PDF (Tommi Vehkavaara's diagrams of Peirce's successive views over the years). A library scientist Birger Hjørland in Denmark wrote on a webpage of his (http://www.iva.dk/bh/Core%20Concepts%20in%20LIS/articles%20a-z/classification_of_the_sciences.htm): "There is not today (2005), to my knowledge, any organized research program about the classification of the sciences in any discipline or in any country. As Miksa (1998) writes, the interest for this question largely died in the beginning of the 20th century." I don't think that that quite applies to mathematicians, but all the same it seems that people interested in Peirce and mathematicians are currently the main two groups with an abiding interest in a classification with some philosophical or logical basis. Anybody, please correct me if I'm wrong. Thanks again for your remarks. Best, Ben - Original Message ----- From: Sally Ness To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Monday, October 17, 2011 11:38 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 3 Ben, list, Thanks very much for this second response--I should say that I did not receive any Peirce posts for about 10 days, due to a change in the email system I use, so I may have missed a post from you--apologies for any lack of acknowledgment if that was the case. Anyway, I appreciate your adding to the record on this paper in such a detailed and thoughtful way. It is interesting, as you point out, that Peirce starts with economics as an example of a social science, and that he makes the connection (which certainly does seem to have ethical and practical aspects) to political economy so explicit in the 1902 quote. I hope that the classificational issues you raise might be addressed by other listers. I am not familiar with this manuscript, but it reads to me as though Peirce saw economics as having different "parts" to it, making it a science that could belong to more than one class of science with regard to differing parts of its character. Certainly, its mathematical "part" is larger, and more elaborately developed, than is the case with at least the main streams of many of the other social sciences. Regarding psychology, your comments led me to realize that the independence Peirce wanted to declare for logic in relation to psychological phenomena may have had consequences for the way in which other social sciences are understood in relation to Perice's logic as well, if psychology is taken as representative of all the social sciences in some way. This is quite a thought, and my first response would be, "hold on a minute!" I wonder if others have reflected on this. In my view, psychology would be the weakest candidate for representing the social sciences in general, focused as it has been on subject- matter that typically, in the mainstreams of the discipline, has been defined as basically individual in character (individual psyches). It would seem to have a special relationship to philosophy and to logic that is not replicated in the other social sciences in this regard. I haven't thought this through enough to say more, but I thank you for bringing it to my attention. Your comment here about mathematical work seems just right: Now, let's say that often enough sociological factors in mathematical work pale to the point that _usual_ sociological factors and explanations offer diminishing returns for sociology about mathematics. Indeed, mathematics would seem to be so "pale" as to be a special case. The spectrum of such paleness it might be understood to sit at the far end of might be worth fleshing out at some point, although I doubt there would be much hope for consensus on that! Your comment at the end of that paragraph is really what I was trying to articulate at a number of points in my posts--thank you for this clarification: So Joe's criticisisms of sociology of science might apply better to actual sociology, at least as he knew it, as actually or potentially abused for political ends, than to sociology at its ideal best. Finally, thanks for the reference to Feynman's work. His perspective does seem akin to a cultural anthropological one. I am not familiar with it, but hope to learn more of it. Thanks again, Sally On Oct 15, 2011, at 12:26 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: -
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 3
t
norms as belonging to a theme in cultural anthropology, it's also hard to
resist mentioning Feynman's view that scientific norms are passed along
implicitly, tacitly, and should be more explicitly understood.
Thanks again for your thoughtful and illuminating discussion.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Sally Ness
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2011 4:50 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
Segment 3
Segment 3
Dear List,
I move on now to the next segment of the paper, "Sciences as Communicational
Communities," as I am dividing it. This segment begins with paragraph 11 and
ends with paragraph 17. It is reproduced in its entirety at the end of the
post. There are a number of subjects addressed in these paragraphs, making
this the most complex segment of the paper, in my view. Several key ideas from
Peirce make their appearance, as JR lays out how he sees scientific communities
organizing themselves in contrast to the negotiational view of the academic
politicians.
In paragraph 11 JR makes a crucial point. He asserts that, what governs
scientific communication (and, so, truth-seeking) are norms that are well
understood in practice but not in critical reflection (either scientists' or
non-scientists'). I wonder if this practice/reflection distinction is possibly
related to the the logica utens/logica docens distinction somehow. In any
case, the reason for this absence of critical reflection in JR's view is that
the norms are so familiar that their significance is rarely a focus of
attention. As a consequence, the understanding of why they are recognized as
they are and how they "carry the burden" of regulating
truth-seeking/objectivity remains vague.
Here, JR identifies the norms in a manner that, as it happens, fits exactly
with the cultural anthropological definition of "culture." Cultural phenomena
generally speaking are defined by anthropologists as phenomena that are passed
on from generation to generation, learned by youngers from elders generally
without critical reflection, and are typically governed by intelligence that is
so familiar as to "go without saying." A whole discipline of social science,
in other words, has grown up around the problem of investigating exactly the
kind of thing JR is here intending to investigate. In this regard, JR is
himself taking up the mantle of the cultural anthropologist (at least from the
perspective of members of that discipline), apparently unintentionally, and
engaging in a kind of inquiry that has defined this particular social science
for over a century.
In paragraph 12, JR elaborates further on the character of the norms he seeks
to better understand, making two further assertions: 1) these norms govern
professional publication and 2) these norms are justified by the positive
("flourishing") condition of the community using them. It would seem that with
regard to 2) especially, the spirit of Peirce is again clearly manifest. The
norms are not somehow essentially significant or inherently true or otherwise
meaningful. Their validity is contingent on the general character of the
collective that sets them to work.
In paragraphs 13, 14, and 15, JR turns his attention to defining publication,
drawing attention to certain features of it so as to be able to reflect
critically on the norms themselves. He notes that the kind of publication he
has in mind (a best case token of what he acknowledges is a more diverse
general type) is one in which what is published provides feedback to the
leading edges of a given field of inquiry. Most important: publication must
be understood as occurring within a "public" that shares a common interest in a
given subject-matter. When publication is understood with these traits in
mind, a range of non-obvious implications can be unpacked that JR asserts will
help reflect critically on the norms at issue.
Paragraph 16 is a key passage in this paper. Here JR underscores the
importance of the subject-matter orientation that drives professional
communication/truth-seeking in his view. He writes, "academic publication is
based on what is minimally essential in maintaining a common and increasingly
adequate reference to the subject-matter of the field of inquiry." JR finds
the hard sciences exemplary in this regard--the special relation of the hard
sciences to pragmaticism is made explicit here. The hard sciences have
identified what is minimally essential to maintain a common/adequate reference:
"controlled observation." This general conception has provided a common and
adequate basis for all professional communication. It has enabled the
scientific community to reference its subject-matter with greater clarity,
accuracy, and trut
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 3
Segment 3
Dear List,
I move on now to the next segment of the paper, "Sciences as
Communicational Communities," as I am dividing it. This segment
begins with paragraph 11 and ends with paragraph 17. It is
reproduced in its entirety at the end of the post. There are a
number of subjects addressed in these paragraphs, making this the
most complex segment of the paper, in my view. Several key ideas from
Peirce make their appearance, as JR lays out how he sees scientific
communities organizing themselves in contrast to the negotiational
view of the academic politicians.
In paragraph 11 JR makes a crucial point. He asserts that, what
governs scientific communication (and, so, truth-seeking) are norms
that are well understood in practice but not in critical reflection
(either scientists' or non-scientists'). I wonder if this
practice/reflection distinction is possibly related to the the logica
utens/logica docens distinction somehow. In any case, the reason for
this absence of critical reflection in JR's view is that the norms
are so familiar that their significance is rarely a focus of
attention. As a consequence, the understanding of why they are
recognized as they are and how they "carry the burden" of regulating
truth-seeking/objectivity remains vague.
Here, JR identifies the norms in a manner that, as it happens, fits
exactly with the cultural anthropological definition of "culture."
Cultural phenomena generally speaking are defined by anthropologists
as phenomena that are passed on from generation to generation,
learned by youngers from elders generally without critical
reflection, and are typically governed by intelligence that is so
familiar as to "go without saying." A whole discipline of social
science, in other words, has grown up around the problem of
investigating exactly the kind of thing JR is here intending to
investigate. In this regard, JR is himself taking up the mantle of
the cultural anthropologist (at least from the perspective of members
of that discipline), apparently unintentionally, and engaging in a
kind of inquiry that has defined this particular social science for
over a century.
In paragraph 12, JR elaborates further on the character of the norms
he seeks to better understand, making two further assertions: 1)
these norms govern professional publication and 2) these norms are
justified by the positive ("flourishing") condition of the community
using them. It would seem that with regard to 2) especially, the
spirit of Peirce is again clearly manifest. The norms are not
somehow essentially significant or inherently true or otherwise
meaningful. Their validity is contingent on the general character of
the collective that sets them to work.
In paragraphs 13, 14, and 15, JR turns his attention to defining
publication, drawing attention to certain features of it so as to be
able to reflect critically on the norms themselves. He notes that
the kind of publication he has in mind (a best case token of what he
acknowledges is a more diverse general type) is one in which what is
published provides feedback to the leading edges of a given field of
inquiry. Most important: publication must be understood as
occurring within a "public" that shares a common interest in a given
subject-matter. When publication is understood with these traits in
mind, a range of non-obvious implications can be unpacked that JR
asserts will help reflect critically on the norms at issue.
Paragraph 16 is a key passage in this paper. Here JR underscores
the importance of the subject-matter orientation that drives
professional communication/truth-seeking in his view. He writes,
"academic publication is based on what is minimally essential in
maintaining a common and increasingly adequate reference to the
subject-matter of the field of inquiry." JR finds the hard sciences
exemplary in this regard--the special relation of the hard sciences
to pragmaticism is made explicit here. The hard sciences have
identified what is minimally essential to maintain a common/adequate
reference: "controlled observation." This general conception has
provided a common and adequate basis for all professional
communication. It has enabled the scientific community to reference
its subject-matter with greater clarity, accuracy, and truth, and
this has generated a flourishing community--evidence that the
conception is one to be valued. The hardness of the hard sciences is
a product of their controlled observation of subject-matter, and the
stability that this methodological principle has tended to bring
about in relation to how its subject-matter has been comprehended.
JR actually uses the term "object" in this paragraph, leaving little
doubt that he has the Object/Sign relation in mind in this
description of how scientific inquiry is governed. The paragraph
stresses the Dynamic Object's (DO's) capacity to determine the
Representamen--so
