[peirce-l] Re:Category Theory & CSP
I think that it is important not to confuse category theory as a mathematical field of study with what philosophers since Aristotle have meant by category theory. The concept of a copula, and even of a relation, is also too narrow to apply in the case of mathematical category theory, which works with morphismsms, and especically homomorphisms in algebra, homeomorphisms, or continuous functions, in topology, and in effect allows us to consider in general, any mathematical structure and its order-preserving functions with any other mathematical structure and its order-preserving functions. We're not interested in just any relations for a mathematical structure, but just in those in order-preserving functions that work in those structures. To express in somewhat different terminology what I initially said about [mathematical] categories: it permits us to map entire classes of mathematical structures (algebras, topological spaces, etc) as well as the mappings that hold within those structures to one another. That is why I consider category theory to be a generalization of CSP's efforts to classify linear algebras in terms of the logic of relations, and of Klein's classification of geometries according to their group structures. (To put it colloquially, mathematical category theory makes it possible to compare apples to oranges.) The question of what connection, if any Aristotle's categories or Kant's Kategorienlehre may have with the mathematical category theory as I have understood it probably remains an open question, but one that should be worth investigating by logicians and philosophers, by those mathematicians who are interested in using category theory, rather than set theory or logic, as a foundation of mathematics. What CSP might have thought about this relation will probably have to remain speculative, since the mathematical category theory is rather new as far as mathematical specialties go; but perhaps we can attempt to guess, on the basis of what he thought about Klein's Erlangen Programme and from his own appendix to his father's work in linear algebras and his classification therein of linear algebras in terms of the logic of relatives. Irving Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]http://www.peircepublishing.com > - Original Message - > From: "Jerry LR Chandler" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" > Subject: [peirce-l] Re:Category Theory & CSP > Date: Sat, 06 May 2006 19:50:43 -0400 > > > Jim: > > > On May 2, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: > > >> Irving: > >> > >> On May 1, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: > >> > >>> A _category_ is the class of all members of some = > >>> kind of abstract mathematical entity (sets, groups, rings, fields > >>> topologic= > >>> al spaces, etc.) and all the functions that hold between the class > >>> mathema= > >>> tical entity or structure being studied. > >> > >> I find category theory to be somewhat of a conundrum. > >> > >> From the perspective of language, how is it possible to conceptualize > >> both the subject and the copula for a category? > >> > >> If so defined, would you say that category theory is a sort of sortal > >> logic over mathematical objects? Even metaphorically? > >> > >> Cheers > >> > >> Jerry > > > > Dear Folks, > > > > Yes, this is what is puzzling me -- seems that the fundamental rules or > > notions that relate the categories are in effect a definition of the > > categories themselves. So for me the question becomes as I think Jerry is > > asking -- how do we have both entities and relations. Seems to me that one > > or the other is not fundamental. I think the Piercean approach that all > > being is merely relations is more satisfying. Some of these relations (of > > relations) we relate to as objects, collateral objects, etc. The fundamental > > categories are themselves relations. I take that to be one of Peirce's main > > contributions to the theory of categories. > > > > Sort of . . . > > > > Cheers, > > Jim Piat > > I purposefully stated my sentence in ordinary language (grammar) to > avoid the possible confusion in technical language. > > It seems to me that category theory bears a different relation to > language than does ordinary calculations. > > I have not found a way to express this sentiment but I feel it deeply. > > The deeply checkered philosophical history of the concept of a > "category" does not provide significant guidance to me. > > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Irving H. Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.peircepublishing.com -- ___ Search for businesses by name, location, or phone number. -Lycos Yellow Pages http://yp.lycos.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION)
Joe, list, >[Joe] CORRECTED VERSION OF PREVIOUS POST : >[Joe] Ben quotes Peirce as follows: >>66~ >>A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:-- >>1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it >>represents; >>2d, Its reference to its ground through its object, or the common characters >>of those objects; >>3d, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts >>known about its object. >>What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, are:-- >>1st, The informed _breadth_ of the symbol; >>2d, The informed _depth_ of the symbol; >>3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or >>predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol. >>~99 >[Joe] And then says: >>[Ben] "Information" may in some sense incorporates that which involves >>representational relations, but I don't think that that's the dimension of >>represenational relations per se. >[Joe] MY RESPONSE: >[Joe] Well, why not, Ben? Think of "information" in terms of an informing of >something, or of becoming informed by something or about something; .think of >it as an impression of form on something that thus becomes informed by it, >i.e.takes on a certain form in virtue of that. (I am reminded of the locution >"It impresses me (or him or her)"-- or perhaps "he or she is impressed by >such-and-such.") The predicate brings form to the subject, in-forms the >subject. Infomation could be regarded as a certain aspect of representation, >i.e. the dimension of representation as regarded in a certain special way. >Predication is a synthesizing of predicate and subject, as information is a >synthesizing of breadth and depth, an informing of breadth with depth. Peirce also says "comprehension x denotation = information." Would anybody think "iconicity x indexicality = symbolicity"? That would just be false. Or "quality x reaction = representation"? That doesn't look true either. Whence this idea that 1stness & 2ndness would be two dimensions of a planar 3rdness? "Comprehension x denotation = information" has the varieties of possible attribution and distribution already built into the left side of the equation, unseen, all we see is a flat "x" like a bare copula. The propositions are not the predicative relations but the information, the result of predication. Somebody devised the concept of the lambda function to stand for the original idea of the function as the relationship rather than as the output. So maybe I'll need to start talking about a "lambda predication." Attributions and distributions of predicates to subjects, affirmative, negative, probable, logically conditioned -- these simply don't represent the same idea, the same interest and focus, as Peirce's idea of "synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol." Again it's the multiplication symbol in "comprehension x denotation = information" which looks like the predication relation, but it's unchanging, a final neat little copula. Yet in fact the predicative relation -- as the attribution, frequency, distribution, apportionment, etc. of modifications/outcomes/etc. to substantives/objects/etc. (which can also be expressed as probability values of propositions for instance) -- is a deep and various thing. Deductive mathematical theories of logic, information, probability, etc., have it for their core subject matter. That's a lot of research. They aren't about haecceitous concrete world's substantial things (the pre-eminent metaphysical counterpart to the grammatical subject) and they aren't about general phenomena's suchnesses, common modifications (the pre-eminent metaphysical counterpart to the grammatical predicate.) They aren't special sciences or statistical theory or cenoscopic. It is the very structures of the alternatives involved in attributing, distributing, apportioning across a totality, which are of interest. They're about what can be deduced from the given parameters of a universe of discourse, a total population, etc. One abstracts away not only from the haecceitous facts and substantial things of the concrete world but also from the "suchnesses" and common modifications of positive phenomena in general. These attributions, distributions, etc., are such as "indeed," "not," "very probably," "novelly," "if & only if," etc. They get very complicated in ways that often aren't worth the trouble to express through syntactical innovation (which makes people uncomfortable anyway), so we resort early and often to abstractions, often extensionally defined, while any invented syntactic words are forgotten in an old file. Now, as is well known, a deduction adds no information. Yet a good deduction will bring premissed information under a "novel aspect," in Peirce's phrase. Evidently there's some sort of informativeness there in some sense. I've se
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION)
- Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, May 06, 2006 7:16 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION) CORRECTED VERSION OF PREVIOUS POST : Ben quotes Peirce as follows: 66~ A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:-- 1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it represents; 2d, Its reference to its ground through its object, or the common characters of those objects; 3d, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts known about its object. What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, are:-- 1st, The informed _breadth_ of the symbol; 2d, The informed _depth_ of the symbol; 3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol. ~99 And then says: "Information" may in some sense incorporates that which involves representational relations, but I don't think that that's the dimension of represenational relations per se. MY RESPONSE: Well, why not, Ben? Think of "information" in terms of an informing of something, or of becoming informed by something or about something; .think of it as an impression of form on something that thus becomes informed by it, i.e.takes on a certain form in virtue of that. (I am reminded of the locution "It impresses me (or him or her)"-- or perhaps "he or she is impressed by such-and-such.") The predicate brings form to the subject, in-forms the subject. Infomation could be regarded as a certain aspect of representation, i.e. the dimension of representation as regarded in a certain special way. Predication is a synthesizing of predicate and subject, as information is a synthesizing of breadth and depth, an informing of breadth with depth. I'll continue with your response later, Ben.. But this seemed worth remarking by itself. (Sorry for the sloppiness of the uncorrected copy originally posted.) Joe Dear Joe, Ben-- I'm talking too much and promise to make this my last comment for the day -- but I want to say that I think representation of meaning is a commonly held implicit definition of information though it may seldom be expressed in those words. I look in the dictionary and find "information: something told or facts learned; news or knowledge". To me all of these definitions imply the meaning of some event has been represented to someone. I think that for Peirce to represent is to inform. And I might add I think Peirce in some ways also anticipated Shannon's measure of information when he analyzed the fixation of belief in terms of removing doubt or reducing uncertainty.I look forward to your further exchanges. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re:Category Theory & CSP
Jim: On May 2, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: Irving: On May 1, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: A _category_ is the class of all members of some = kind of abstract mathematical entity (sets, groups, rings, fields topologic= al spaces, etc.) and all the functions that hold between the class mathema= tical entity or structure being studied. I find category theory to be somewhat of a conundrum. From the perspective of language, how is it possible to conceptualize both the subject and the copula for a category? If so defined, would you say that category theory is a sort of sortal logic over mathematical objects? Even metaphorically? Cheers Jerry Dear Folks, Yes, this is what is puzzling me -- seems that the fundamental rules or notions that relate the categories are in effect a definition of the categories themselves. So for me the question becomes as I think Jerry is asking -- how do we have both entities and relations. Seems to me that one or the other is not fundamental. I think the Piercean approach that all being is merely relations is more satisfying. Some of these relations (of relations) we relate to as objects, collateral objects, etc. The fundamental categories are themselves relations. I take that to be one of Peirce's main contributions to the theory of categories. Sort of . . . Cheers, Jim Piat I purposefully stated my sentence in ordinary language (grammar) to avoid the possible confusion in technical language. It seems to me that category theory bears a different relation to language than does ordinary calculations. I have not found a way to express this sentiment but I feel it deeply. The deeply checkered philosophical history of the concept of a "category" does not provide significant guidance to me. Cheers Jerry --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Ben: My comment is from a chemical perspective. It may or may not be of help to you. On May 6, 2006, at 1:06 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: But first, on a general note, let me say that among the issues driving = my current display of confusion & error, is the question: if = comprehension is for quality & predicate, while denotation is for = objects (resistances/reactions), then what dimension is for = representational and logical relations themselves? Words like "not," = "probably," "if," etc. do not designate either qualities or objects, nor = do they represent objects as having this or that quality. Names of chemical substances are always a subject of a chemical sentence. A chemical sentence can express existence. Water exists. This is in the imperative mood. A chemical name connotes the properties; the properties are context dependent. (Thermodynamics, for example, describes the context dependency of the variables of temperature, pressure and volume.) What, then, do = they connote? What do they denote? The particular properties denote a specific substance; the particular properties create the identity of the species in chemical logic. (Of course, one must keep in mind that the chemical name always refers to the pure substance. The problems of mixtures (like a biological cell) are vastly more complicated with respect to connotation and denotation. The concept of purity is difficult enough in its own right!)) Of course, if one is philosophically opposed to the notion of material existence, the expressions of chemistry are a linguistic challenge! Cheers Jerry --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Gary, Enjoyed your remarks below! How would you account for the fact that word such as conjunctions and prepositions can stand by themselves as sentences? I'll grant you they serve primarily to indicate structural relationships among the various parts of sentences (and are so frequently employed that it is not surprising they would be short and few in number) but I still think they function as signs. They represent meaning and this is preeminently the domain of signs. On the other hand I think an agrument can be made that syntax is a form of representation and not merely a collection structural features that serve to hold the parts of a sentence together.What I mean is that in some languages (english for example) syntax is used to convey meaning. For example in the sentence "The boy hit the ball" the position of boy (a syntactical feature) indicates that it was the boy that hit the ball and not vice versa. So, in my view one could perhaps make a case that syntax is in this case being used as a sign to convey a specific meaning (agent vs patient or subject verses direct object). In fact it is my view that all syntax is really just a short cut for expressing common meanings (such as who is the agent and who the patient) that are embedded in nearly all sentences. Conveying these meaning with syntax (or syntactical signs) is more economical that using more words to accomplish the same thing. For example: The boy hit the ball. As opposed to: There was a ball. There was a boy. One struck the other. The boy was the agent. The ball was the object of the boy's agency. Granted I've overdone my example but hopefully clarified my point. I offer these views not to be agrumentative but because your comments touch on something I too have wondered about but reached a somewhat different conclusion. Actually I don't think the substance of our two accounts is all that different but I am a little uneasy about not considering prepositions and conjunctions signs. I think you are quite right about their fundamentally important sytactical function but as I said I think syntax is a form of structural semantics -- semantics embedded in structure. I much enjoyed your remarks and recognize of course that your view may well be right and mine wrong. I also recognize that I've over simplified your position and made it seem more one sided that it is. So I want to acknowledge that I'm not so much reacting to your balanced comments as I am to a straw man that I've concocted from a rather one sided and somewhat tortured reading of your remarks. Best wishes, Jim Piat I've been following this thread with great interest -- "following" in the sense that it's always a step or two ahead of me! But i'd like to insert something with reference to Ben's question about words like "not," "probably," "if," etc. I don't think it is helpful to consider such words as signs; rather they constitute part of a sign's internal structure, the sign proper being a statement, sentence, or proposition -- or minimally, what Peirce calls a "term". In linguistics, words like "if" are sometimes called "structure" words as opposed to "content" words, a distinction that is sharper than it may appear at first glance. Structure words, such as conjunctions, appear in closed classes with a relatively small membership. In English, for instance, there are probably less than a hundred prepositions (even counting those no longer in current use), and the addition of a new preposition to the language is extremely rare, compared to the frequency with which we add new nouns, verbs and adjectives (those being open classes). Another relevant distinction from linguistics is between semantics and syntax. If we want to study what (or how) how closed-class words mean, then we have to focus mainly on syntax, or the structure of utterances as determined not by objects denoted or qualities signified but by the structure of the language itself. Having said that, though, i think the line between syntactic and semantic has become fuzzier in recent decades, for instance in Leonard Talmy's work in cognitive semantics. He's shown how prepositions (for instance) not only lend structure to utterances but also reveal conceptual structures which are very deep aspects of meaning. And as i think Jim suggested, those aspects are most easily specified in terms of relations between objects. gary F. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? (CORRECTION)
CORRECTED VERSION OF PREVIOUS POST : Ben quotes Peirce as follows: 66~ A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:-- 1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it represents; 2d, Its reference to its ground through its object, or the common characters of those objects; 3d, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts known about its object. What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, are:-- 1st, The informed _breadth_ of the symbol; 2d, The informed _depth_ of the symbol; 3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol. ~99 And then says: "Information" may in some sense incorporates that which involves representational relations, but I don't think that that's the dimension of represenational relations per se. MY RESPONSE: Well, why not, Ben? Think of "information" in terms of an informing of something, or of becoming informed by something or about something; .think of it as an impression of form on something that thus becomes informed by it, i.e.takes on a certain form in virtue of that. (I am reminded of the locution "It impresses me (or him or her)"-- or perhaps "he or she is impressed by such-and-such.") The predicate brings form to the subject, in-forms the subject. Infomation could be regarded as a certain aspect of representation, i.e. the dimension of representation as regarded in a certain special way. Predication is a synthesizing of predicate and subject, as information is a synthesizing of breadth and depth, an informing of breadth with depth. I'll continue with your response later, Ben.. But this seemed worth remarking by itself. (Sorry for the sloppiness of the uncorrected copy originally posted.) Joe . -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.5/333 - Release Date: 5/5/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
I've been following this thread with great interest -- "following" in the sense that it's always a step or two ahead of me! But i'd like to insert something with reference to Ben's question about words like "not," "probably," "if," etc. I don't think it is helpful to consider such words as signs; rather they constitute part of a sign's internal structure, the sign proper being a statement, sentence, or proposition -- or minimally, what Peirce calls a "term". In linguistics, words like "if" are sometimes called "structure" words as opposed to "content" words, a distinction that is sharper than it may appear at first glance. Structure words, such as conjunctions, appear in closed classes with a relatively small membership. In English, for instance, there are probably less than a hundred prepositions (even counting those no longer in current use), and the addition of a new preposition to the language is extremely rare, compared to the frequency with which we add new nouns, verbs and adjectives (those being open classes). Another relevant distinction from linguistics is between semantics and syntax. If we want to study what (or how) how closed-class words mean, then we have to focus mainly on syntax, or the structure of utterances as determined not by objects denoted or qualities signified but by the structure of the language itself. Having said that, though, i think the line between syntactic and semantic has become fuzzier in recent decades, for instance in Leonard Talmy's work in cognitive semantics. He's shown how prepositions (for instance) not only lend structure to utterances but also reveal conceptual structures which are very deep aspects of meaning. And as i think Jim suggested, those aspects are most easily specified in terms of relations between objects. gary F. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Ben quotes Peirce as follows: 66~ A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:-- 1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it represents; 2d, Its reference to its ground through its object, or the common characters of those objects; 3d, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts known about its object. What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, are:-- 1st, The informed _breadth_ of the symbol; 2d, The informed _depth_ of the symbol; 3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol. ~99 And then says: "Information" may in some sense incorporates that which involves representational relations, but I don't think that that's the dimension of represenational relations per se. Well, why not, Ben? Think of "information" in terms of an informing of something, or of becoming informed by somethingof or about something.think of it as an impression of form on something that thus becomes informed by it, i.e.takes on a certain form in virtue of thatt. I am reminded of the locution "It impresses me (or him or her)"-- or perhaps he or she -- is impressed by such-and-such.") The predicate brings form to the subject, in-forms the subject. Infomation could be regarded as a certain aspect of representation, i.e. the diminsion of represeentation as regarded in a certain special way. Predication is a synthesizing of predicate and subject, as informationis is a synthesizing of breadth and depth, and informing of breadth with depth. I'll continue with your response later, Ben.. But this seemed worth remarking by itself. Joe . -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.5/333 - Release Date: 5/5/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Joe, Gary, Neal, Thanx a lot for this info. It is for now very sufficient also because I myself also thought that perfection of being belongs to the notion of entelechy according to Peirce. The passages stated also really help me because they prove that. Would be interested however in more insights in entelechy. So if other people could contribute I would be very interested to hear! Kind regards, Wilfred -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: zaterdag 6 mei 2006 16:44 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy Just one point to add to what Gary says, namely, that the word "perfection", as used by Peirce in this context (and wherever the concept of a process is pertinent) should be understood as implying completion. Joe Ransdell -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Question concerning Peirce and Chemical Logic
To List: Thank you, Gary, for the reference to the following paragraph in the introduction: http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v1/v1intro.htm "Throughout those thirty and a half years and on beyond them, however, when he had occasion to state his profession, or even his occupation, he continued to call himself a chemist. His first professional publication, in 1863 at the age of twenty-three, was on "The Chemical Theory of Interpenetration." In later years he found in Mendeleev's work on the periodic law and table of the elements the most complete illustration of the methods of inductive science. And he took satisfaction in having, in June 1869, when he was not yet thirty, published a table of the elements that went far in Mendeleev's direction, before Mendeleev's announcement of the law, a little earlier in the same year, became known in western Europe and America." Does anyone know if either of these two publications are available electronically? The introduction itself implies that Peirce first developed an understanding of chemical principles as known at that time and then sought to create a logical framework for the observations. The debate between John Dalton's composition of signs into relationhoods and the use of letters as symbols for elements existed during Peirce's lifetime. The logical categorization of chemical relations remains partially open today, although the foundation of a simple chemical bond as a pair of electrons binding two nuclei together is widely used. For those of the list interested in the logical origins of chemical signs, the book by M. P. Crosland: Historical Studies in the Language of Chemistry (Dover, 1978) is a good starting point. Part 4 of this book, Chemical Symbolism, provides insight into the history of chemical symbolism. Does anyone think that these usages of symbols and Dalton's composition of symbols influenced Peirce? Can anyone provide a reasonable conjecture on how the logic of chemical symbols could be approximated by the notions of firstness, secondness and thirdness? I would note that chemical logic centers itself on the concept of identity. After "purification", that is, separatinga single unique form of of matter, encoding of analytical and synthetic cues generate an identity with a name composed from elemental names. Cheers Jerry --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy
Dear Wilfred: Do you have 6.341, noted as from "Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity," (c. 1909)? 341 The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as the knowledge of such reality. It is the /entelechy/, or perfection of being. Neal Bruss (new to the list English department University of Massachusetts Boston) -Original Message- From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat 5/6/2006 4:23 AM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: Subject:[peirce-l] Entelechy Dear list, I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of "entelechy" in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether Peirce might have defined this term in other sources than the Century Dictionary (where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources. Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek (?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle. Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek (?)language ? Kind regards, Wilfred -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Just one point to add to what Gary says, namely, that the word "perfection",
as used by Peirce in this context (and wherever the concept of a process is
pertinent) should be understood as implying completion.
Joe Ransdell
- Original Message -
From: "gnusystems" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"
Sent: Saturday, May 06, 2006 7:07 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Wilfred,
I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with
a little information.
Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders it as "actuality."
It is sometimes transliterated "entelechia" and sometimes "entelecheia"
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.
As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his "New Elements"
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]
Another term he gives as equivalent to it is "perfection of being" (CP
6.341).
I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.
gary F.
}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation.
[The Bab]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Ben, Folks-- I'm just back from a walk and thought a bit more about what we are discussing. I'd like to try to clear up a couple of things I presently poorly. First, I said "whew" in response to one of your comments. I meant something more like "Wow"! Objects are refered to in terms of either their properties or their locations. Alone, neither definition adequately conveys the meaning of an object. In the case of location what is missing is an account of an object's qualities and what they connote. Obviously knowing that we are refering to an object that is located at such and such a place tells us very little about the meaning of that object unless we have collateral experience with the object itself. On the other hand the meaning or consequences of an object does depend in part on its context or location. A police officer located in a squad car seen from your rear view mirror as you are speeding down the highway means something quite different than that same officer located a the local dunkin donuts having coffee. Symbols are objects that perform a very special function. They represent other objects. For one object to represent another the lst object called a sign must accomplish two distinct functions. First the sign must indicate which or what object it is representing. As discussed above, two aspects of the object being represented must be refered to or indicated. First the location of the object being represented must be indicated. Second the properties or qualites of the object being represented must be identified. The usual way of indicating the location of an object is by somehow calling attention to this location. This can be done in a number of ways but the common element they all share is directing our senses to the location of the object. The most common way of refering to the qualities or properties of an object is by presentting a second object (in a different location) which shares the properties of the first object. Such a second object is called an icon or image of the first object. Of course both locations and qualities can be conveyed more abstractly thought the use of other symbols but what I'm trying to establish here is how symbols themselves can come to refer and this must be done using mechanisms that do not rely on the phenomenon we are trying to explain. So, what I'm saying is that symbols indicate both the locations of objects and the qualities of these objects. Some have called these two aspects reference (location) and sense (connotation). In some cases the objects that represent other objects accomplish the function of refering to the location and quality of the represented object by very direct means. For example a sign can actually look, sound, smell or feel like the object it is intended to represent. Such a sign is usually refered to as a iconic representation. Likewise a sign's occurance can actually be correlated in time or space with that of the object whose location it represents. Such a sign is usually called an index. The material object that serves as a sign can have varying degrees of material similarity or spatial temporal correlation with the object it represents. However some signs have no ostensible material similarity or spatial temporal correlation to the objects they represent. Such symbols accomplish the twin functions of refering to both the qualities and location of the objects they represent by virtue of having been adopted for this purpose by a symbols using community. In other words such signs (called symbols) have no intrinsic material connection to the objects they represent (as do iconic and indexical signs) but are able to perform these functions only because some community of symbols users have learned to employ them in this fashion. It is a matter of community habit or convention that these symbols are understood and used in this fashion. A matter of imputation. Still this account leaves untouched the matter of symbols standing for the meaning of objects. The indexical and iconic functions of symbols tell us what meaning is being refered to but they do not shed any light upon how the function of standing for is accomplished. My hunch is that on a material level (to begin with the simplest case) the act of taking one object to stand for another is a case of mistaken identity. In effect, the simplest case is when an icon is actually mistaken for the object it portrays. Without getting into details it is my guess that symbolic or imputed "standing for" evolved as a matter of habit from this prototypical example. And I believe this occurred because there are marked advantages in being able to use objects as tools for representing or standing for other objects. Especially if the objects being used to do the representing are much lighter and easier to manipulate than the objects themselves, because in such cases one can then use the stand in ob
[peirce-l] Fw: CFP Graduate Conference at SIUC
Forwarded by Joseph Ransdell : - Original Message - From: "Kelly Booth" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 8:55 PM Subject: CFP Graduate Conference at SIUC Joseph, Could you please post this CFP to the Peirce List? Thanks. Kelly Booth Department of Philosophy Southern Illinois University Carbondale IL 62901 CALL FOR PAPERS: “THE SELF IN AMERICAN AND CONTINENTAL THOUGHT” NINTH ANNUAL “BUILDING BRIDGES” GRADUATE PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE: Southern Illinois University Carbondale November 3 – 4, 2006 Keynote Speaker: Mitchell Aboulafia. (Chair, Department of Liberal Arts, Juilliard) Deadline for Submissions: September 23, 2006 The purpose of this conference is to bring various strands of Continental thought, from the late Nineteenth Century onward, into dialogue with the American tradition from Transcendentalism and Pragmatism to contemporary philosophy. The theme is “The Self.” We welcome any paper that brings together at least one thinker from each of these two broadly defined traditions. Submission Guidelines: Papers should not exceed 3000 words and should be prepared for blind review. Do not include any personal information in the paper. On a separate cover page include the following items: 1) The paper’s title 2) Author’s name 3) Institutional affiliation 4( Email address 5) Telephone number 6) Word count (3000 words maximum) 7) An abstract (150 word maximum) Email your paper and cover sheet as a Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text (.rtf) attachment to [EMAIL PROTECTED], subject line “Building Bridges.” Label the attachment with a shortened paper title. Some papers may be selected for publication in Kinesis: Graduate Journal in Philosophy. Deadline for Submissions: September 23, 2006 For further information, contact: Kelvin Booth, Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale IL 62901 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ph. 618-536-6641 Conference Statement: The purpose of “Building Bridges” is to bring into dialogue diverse elements not commonly associated. We seek interdisciplinary as well as intra-disciplinary themes that address problems from multiple philosophical standpoints, from different traditions, or in which two or more thinkers not customarily brought into conversation are compared. Our goal is to provide a pluralistic forum for constructive and critical communication across boundaries. -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.5/333 - Release Date: 5/5/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.5/333 - Release Date: 5/5/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Wilfred,
I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with
a little information.
Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders it as "actuality."
It is sometimes transliterated "entelechia" and sometimes "entelecheia"
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.
As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his "New Elements"
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]
Another term he gives as equivalent to it is "perfection of being" (CP
6.341).
I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.
gary F.
}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation.
[The Bab]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Ben, Gary, Folks-- Ben wrote: The center of gravity is not always the center of compelling interest. A tall boat with big sails, you may point at its mid-height in order to point it out. Its center of gravity may be lower. And there are physical forces besides gravitation.>> My response: Right. I wish I had not confused the issue by adding these comments about the center of gravity. The reason I did was because I was trying to distinguish (in my own mind) between the form and inertial mass of an object. I had in mind a physical metaphor. Form is how the mass of an object is organized in space and location is its center of gravity. But, I agree that in a larger sense one's focus of interest may be other than the physical center of gravity. (Though if you you'll forgive me your example reminds me of how fast President Reagan's metaphor about a ship or plan being dead in the water spread like wildfire and now every man of substance has gravitas.) Ben wrote: (Beginning with a quote from my earlier remarks) "One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center of gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One can not readily point to the quality or form an object because form is not a matter of the object's location but of how the object is organized in space and time". To the contrary, I think that one can and does point out a form, run one's finger around it, and point out qualities, shine lights on them, and so forth. One can point things out in music while the music is playing. Spatial form is especially subject to being traced out. And the presentation of an icon requires pointing out the icon itself. "It was greenish-blue -- like this thing here." My response: Well, here we differ. I maintain that it is extremely important to keep in mind the conceptual distinction between Peircean firstness (quality or form) and secondness (reaction or inertia). I further believe that all those aspects of an object which we refer to as its qualities are a manifestation of the object's form which in turn I believe is equivalent to the object's organization in space and time. In turn I contend that an object's inertia mass or resistance to movement is in effect a matter of its location in space and time. I think this analogy works both figuratively and literally. But apart from whether one accepts this physical analogy there remains a concpetual distinction between form and location which I think you have conflated in your example above. In your example of "pointing out" an objects form musically or spatially what you have illustrated in not form per se but the location of an object whose form you wish to highlight. One locates an object that has form but form itself can not be pointed to as having a specific location because form is a matter of organziation not merely location. Form refers to the relative location of parts of whole not to the overall location of the whole itself. Conversely location is not a matter of form because location can have a unique center of gravity or focus which can be pointed to or denoted. On the other hand, the essence of form can not be captured by mere denotation and must instead be conveyed or refered to by connotation, implication or illustration. One can of cource say an object with the form I wish to convey is located there and thus denote a particular form in that sense. But denoting is not connoting. Indexes denote, icons connote. The crux of denoting is to locate an object (of whatever form) in space and time. The crux of iconizing is to present the form of an object regardless of where it might be located in space or time. It is generally agreed that in everyday experience different objects may have the same form but can not have the same location and that the same object can have different locations. But there is less agreement as to whether or not an object can change its form and remain essentially the same object. All of which is to argue that form and location are conceptually distinct notions which can be used to cross reference one another but ought not be conflated in ones thinking. Ben wrote: What the iconic presentation of appearances makes possible is the representation of things that are too remote or otherwise inconvenient to be pointing at, and the representing of things with more generality.>> My response: Yes, this is true. but I don't think is contrary to what I'm saying above. Ben wrote (begining with a quote from my earlier remarks) [Jim] However one can illustrate the form or quality of an object by providing a copy of another object that has similar properties. An object that performs this function is called an icon. To adequately represent or stand for an object's meaning we must refer to both its connotation and location. Moreover, I think it is a mistake to restrict the notion of objects to concr
[peirce-l] Entelechy
Dear list, I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of "entelechy" in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether Peirce might have defined this term in other sources than the Century Dictionary (where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources. Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek (?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle. Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek (?)language ? Kind regards, Wilfred -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
