[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Cassiano wrote, >It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.>I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: >entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range).>In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. >Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process.>I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. >All the best to all,>Cassiano>(from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).I tend to see an entelechy as something which is stable but not merely exhausted, but instead "in working order" to do more. In its stability, it's not just a form but a structure, and it can serve as a foundation and basis for more, as for instance we say that knowledge is a basis and a grounding. So it's a settledness yet it contributes to a process, helps ground it more securely, sometimes precisely in order for the process not just to repeat but to evolve (through learning). It supports us, is our human supportedness by reality. So I tend to see entelechy as the confirmation, the solidification, of that action or culmination which is an end or is supposed to be an end -- but which may or may not hold up. If it holds up, stands stably, then it is, in that sense, confirmed. It's the difference between coming to an end, and being ended, being settled, settled in a constructive sense, ready for more. In a broader sense, I regard intelligent experience, formed as collateral to sign & interpretant in respect of the object, as the entelechy of semiosis as such. And they all keep on going, and cannot culminate except as "energy" or solidify except as basis -- energy and basis, for _more_ of themselves. Charles Olson once said that Edward Dahlberg pounded it into his head as a poet that "every perception leads DIRECTLY and IMMEDIATELY to another perception." Culmination & entelechy. It's also the difference between the Thomistic "necessaries for the beautiful" -- "claritas" (which Joyce well translated as "radiance," as of a culmination, a bloom, the bright colors of flowers, the shiny colors of fish, etc.,) and "integritas sive perfectio" (which Joyce sonorously translated as "wholeness" but misunderstood as simple unity as provided by a bounding line drawn around an object. Aquinas instead meant structural integrity, as of something not "diminuta" (dashed to pieces or destructively violated) and thereby "turpia" (base, disgusting, "gross"). Diminuta http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2314023 turpia http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?turpis But in my emphasis on entelechy as something cognitive and even epistemic, as confirmation, confirmed value, etc., (as opposed to a telos or teleiosis as more affective, a culmination, a value), I part with Aristotle, Aquinas, Peirce, and everybody but myself. I also think of entelechy as a causal principle like telos, in a sense like the formal cause, but deepened, just as a vital telos is something deeper than mere thermodynamic decay. With entelechy, there is dependence, often complex dependence, on sign and evidentiary conditions. E.g., knowledge & expectations are causes in markets. This is not "instead" of telic influence, nor does it leave teleology behind -- but it does take things to a new level, a level of ongoing evolution (mental, social), which distinguishes a human from, say, a vegetable organism which, in its way, is quite telically governed, but certainly does not evolve in its own lifetime. So those are just my o
[peirce-l] Entelechy, friends of wisdom, nanomanagement
Dear Cassiano, list, I regard the below message as very interesting. Cassiano, your English is definitely not poor. And for me it adds for sure to the understanding of the very interesting notion of Entelechy. Which I also regard a very interesting subject. But, till now I only know the sources of Peirce and Aristotle for this notion. Maybe some people here now some other sources where interesting statements about entelechy are made? Besides this I would like to mention some initiative I take part in now and that might be worthwhile to subscribe to for some members of this list. It is the initiative called “friends of wisdom”. The official website being http://www.knowledgetowisdom.org/. The most interesting thing is, we currently have 2 mailing lists there. One for the initiative itself, and one for discussions. The discussions there are very interesting to me. And I think there will be enough people here who would also be interested. Besides this initiative, I once again would like to mention my own initiative on www.nanomanagement.info. Would like to request people from here again to enlist on that website. But actually it is just there but not very active yet. Also because of the small group of members yet, unfortunately. But I will surely add more means for communication and, more interesting, more useful info and insights there. Much more. In some months or so (first have to complete my PhD research which is taking most of my time now). In some months my initiative on www.nanomanagement.info will be much more interesting for sure. But to enable this, I need more people taking part. As soon as possible. So once again, I would request people to view and enlist. Kind regards, Wilfred Van: Cassiano Terra Rodrigues [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: maandag 5 juni 2006 3:51 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me. I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range). In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process. I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all, Cassiano (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.1/355 - Release Date: 2-6-2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.1/355 - Release Date: 2-6-2006
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Gary, Jim, list, >[Gary] I've been wanting to address some of the issues of this post of Ben's >but, feeling under the weather, I can't yet tackle it with any certainty that >I'll contribute to clarifying any of these. I did come across an interesting >passage today which, however, might shed some light--or at least stimulate >additional thinking--about one consideration. Ben writes: >>[Ben] If comprehension is always comprehension of a quality, and denotation >>always denotation of an object, then there's no corresponding mode of >>standing for a representational relation, yet terms such as "not" and "and" >>do not stand for logical relations cast or "disguised" as either objects or >>qualities. >[Gary] But I think that even such terms as "not" and "and" do represent >simple diagram-like signs in the sense in which which Peirce writes that all >reasoning is diagrammatic and that even a "noun" can be seen as like a simple >diagram. I do think that they represent representational relations. They just don't represent them as objects or as qualities. Diagrams are constructible to represent more manipulably that which "not" & "probably" & "and" etc. represent. >[Gary quoting Pierce] "[S]omething of the nature of a diagram, be it only an >imaginary skeleton proposition, or even a mere noun with the ideas of its >application and signification is needed in all necessary reasoning. Indeed one >may say that something of this kind is needed in all reasoning whatsoever, >although in induction it is the real experiences that serves as diagram." >(from MS 459, The Lowell Lectures, in Stuhr, ed., Classical American >Philosophy, p 50) >[Gary] One can certainly agree with Peirce that 'diagram' so used is employed >"in a wider sense than usual." He continues: >[Gary quoting Pierce] "A Diagram in my sense, is in the first place a Token, >or singular Object used as a Sign; it is essential that it should be capable >of being perceived and observed. It is, however, what is called a General >sign, that is, it denotes a general Object." [MS 293] >[Gary] "Not" and "and" and other logical functors, to use your term, seen as >diagrammatic and iconic in this sense need not be "cast or "disguised" as >either objects of qualities" as you perhaps suggested Mats was doing. They >simply are iconic representations (in the sense just analyzed) of the form of >logical relations, pure relational symbols to be used in reasoning. They >certainly cannot--as tokens--be meaningfully divorced from any actual >reasoning. "Not" and "and" seen as iconic are cast as qualities or as qualia (qua = objects referenced by their qualities). I'm not talking about divorcing them from actual reasoning or logical relations of any kind. >>[Ben] . . .a symbol is supposed to lead to a mental icon, and that a >>particular semiosis or inquiry process finds an ending (but not a resting -- >>there I part with Peirce) in an icon, not a symbol. A symbol is also a >>carrier of comprehensional meaning such that it doensn't seem clear or >>obvious that mental icons are _the_ principal carriers of comprehensional >>meaning in communication. >[Gary] Ben, I'm interested in how you "part with Peirce"--I don't quite get >your meaning re: "a resting.". This is the same thing that I've discussed in the past. But I made it a bit murky by talking about an inquiry process culminating in "an icon" rather than, as I should have said, in an interpretant which involves both icon and index. I was thinking, "an interpretant icon (along with an attached index)." So there I'm agreeing that symbols should lead to icons (with indices attached.) And then I'm at the question of whether inquiry ever comes to rest with an interpretant. An interpretant is a construal, a tentative ending. Inquiry never comes to reasonable rest, doubt never comes to be reasonably quelled, with a mere construal no matter how elucidatory. It comes to rest with evidence, corroboration, confirmation. Intelligent experience is not dyadic but tetradic, formed as collateral to sign & interpretant in respect of the object, and is the entelechy of semiosis as such. Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Joe, Gary R. Mats, list, >[Joe] I don't know that it helps much in clarification of the >"significance"/"signification" distinction, but you'll find below the >definitions of "sign", "significance", and "signification" in the Century >Dictionary. I've included only the statements of definition in the entries >since it is simply too time-consuming to present the entire entries here, >given all of the problems of transliteration, etc.; but I've made a few >comments in brackets that might help. They do help and are quite interesting. As far as I can figure out at the moment, I can't figure out whether Mats' phrase "connotational significance" is redundant in Peircean terms (assuming Mats' "connotational" = Peircean "comprehensional"). I suspect that it is not redundant, though I'm still not sure that it's a right thing to say. http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/MARTY/76defeng.htm 21 - 1903 - C.P. 5-138 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture V . 66~~ I call a representamen which is determined by another representamen, an interpretant of the latter. Every representamen is related or is capable of being related to a reacting thing, its object, and every representamen embodies, in some sense, some quality, which may be called its signification, what in the case of a common name J.S. Mill call its connotation, a particularly objectionable expression. ~~99 The sign's in-some-sense,-embodied quality = signification = Millsian "connotation" (i.e., comprehension?) Is this the same thing as the significance formed into the interpretant? In "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension" http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm, Peirce says 66~ A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference:-- 1st, Its direct reference to its object, or the real things which it represents; 2d, Its reference to its ground through its object, or the common characters of those objects; 3d, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts known about its object. What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, are:-- 1st, The informed _breadth_ of the symbol; 2d, The informed _depth_ of the symbol; 3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the _information_ concerning the symbol. ~99 1st, the denotation, 2nd. the comprehension, 3rd, the information Peirce: CP 2.434 Cross-Ref:?? 66~~ A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the characters which it signifies; J. S. Mill uses, in place of signifies, the term connotes, a word which he or his father picked up in Ockham. But signify has been in uninterrupted use in this sense since the twelfth century, when John of Salisbury spoke of "quod fere in omnium ore celebre est aliud scilicet esse appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod, nominant. Nominantur singularia; sed universalia significantur."?1 Nothing can be clearer. There is no known occurrence of connote as early as this. Alexander of Hales (Summa Theol., I. liii) makes nomen connotans the equivalent of appellatio relativa, and takes the relation itself as the accusative object of connotare, speaking of "creator" as connoting the relation of creator to creature. So Aquinas, In sentent., I. dist. viii. q. 1, Art. 1. Subsequently, because adjectives were looked upon as relative terms, white being defined as "having whiteness," etc., the adjective was looked upon as connoting the abstraction, but never unless its supposed relative character was under consideration. Tataretus, for example, who wrote when the usage was fully established, will be found using such phraseology as the following: "Nulla relativa secundum se habent contrarium, cum non sint qualitates primae, sed solum relativa secundum dici, et hoc secundum esse absolutum et significatum principale eorum et non secundum esse respectivum et connotativum." Chauvin ?2 (1st ed.) says: "Connotativum illud est cuius significatum non sistit in se, sed necessario ad aliud refertur, vel aliud connotat. V. g. Rex, magister, primus." ~~99 Even if "nothing can be clearer" than glossless Medieval Latin, still "quod fere in omnium ore celebre est aliud scilicet esse appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod, nominant" is not particularly clear to me, it's syntactically too idiomatic and some long marks may be missing. Anyway, "Nominantur singularia; sed universalia significantur" is clear enough: Singulars are named; but universals are signified." Peirce: CP 2.431 Cross-Ref:?? 66~~ 431. These are substitute terms for what are called by Mill and others connotation and denotation; for (1) the previously well-established use of connote was somewhat warped by Mill and his followers, and (2) these words may be applied to the corresponding properties of propositions as well as terms. The application of a term is the collection of objects which it refers to; of a proposition it is th
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Ben, Joe, Jim, Mats, list,
I've been wanting to address some of the issues of this post of Ben's
but, feeling under the weather, I can't yet tackle it with any
certainty that I'll contribute to clarifying any of these. I did come
across an interesting passage today which, however, might shed some
light--or at least stimulate additional thinking--about one
consideration. Ben writes:
If comprehension is always comprehension of a quality, and denotation always denotation of an object, then there's no corresponding mode of standing for a representational relation, yet terms such as "not" and "and" do not stand for logical relations cast or "disguised" as either objects or qualities.
But I think that even such terms as "not" and "and" do represent simple
diagram-like signs in the sense in which which Peirce writes that all
reasoning is diagrammatic and that even a "noun" can be seen as like a
simple diagram.
"[S]omething of the nature of a diagram, be it only an imaginary
skeleton proposition, or even a mere noun with the ideas of its
application and signification is needed in all necessary reasoning.
Indeed one may say that something of this kind is needed in all
reasoning whatsoever, although in induction it is the real experiences
that serves as diagram." (from MS 459, The Lowell Lectures, in Stuhr,
ed., Classical American Philosophy, p 50)
One can certainly agree with Peirce that 'diagram' so used is employed
"in a wider sense than usual." He continues:
"A Diagram in my sense, is in the first place a Token, or singular
Object used as a Sign; it is essential that it should be capable of
being perceived and observed. It is, however, what is called a General
sign, that is, it denotes a general Object." [MS 293]
"Not" and "and" and other logical functors, to use your term, seen as
diagrammatic and iconic in this sense need not be "cast or "disguised"
as either objects of qualities" as you perhaps suggested Mats was
doing. They simply are iconic representations (in the sense just
analyzed) of the form of logical relations, pure relational symbols to
be used in reasoning. They certainly cannot--as tokens--be meaningfully
divorced from any actual reasoning.
Ben writes:
. . .a symbol is supposed to lead to a mental icon, and that a particular semiosis or inquiry process finds an ending (but not a resting -- there I part with Peirce) in an icon, not a symbol. A symbol is also a carrier of comprehensional meaning such that it doensn't seem clear or obvious that mental icons are _the_ principal carriers of comprehensional meaning in communication.
Ben, I'm interested in how you "part with Peirce"--I don't quite get
your meaning re: "a resting.".
Gary
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Joe, Gary R., Mats, list
Once again I've tripped up over the difference between "signification" & "significance." In addition to tripping up often simply because of trying to think through ideas of comprehension, denotation, etc., in regard to qualities, representational relations, etc., I have located one case in "The New Elements" where Peirce used the word "signification" to mean "meaning" (what's formed into the interpretant) instead of "comprehension" (a ground as referenced), and it probably worked its way into my mind in past readings.
". every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or meaning. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, that is, in accordance with the 'Truth,' even though it, B, denotes but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's, characters, I call an _interpretant_ of A." ('New Elements', EP 2:304, 1904?) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html
Anyway, if one can, unlike me, keep straight the more usual terminology (ground, comprehension, connotation, signification versus interpretant, meaning, significance), Mats' assertion that mental icons are _the_ carriers of connotative meaning in communication makes a lot more sense.
As an icon refers to a ground (the ground of the quality which the icon presents), it could be said to have comprehension a.k.a. connotation, at least by some of Peirce's characterizations (unless those characterizations involved implicit and unstated qualifications limiting comprehension to being a property of symbols). And as the function of an asserted icon is to evoke a mental icon, the mental icons can be said to be -- well, here, I still part with Mats -- not the "carriers" but the decodings, or just say it plain, the interpretants, of connotative meaning in communication. As decodings, interpretants, they are also encodings, signs, carriers; it's a difference of emphasis, yet an important one, I think, relating to the fact, in which Joe Ransdell has been particularly interested in the past, that a symbol is supposed to lead to a mental icon, and that a particular semiosis or inquiry process finds an ending (but not a
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Hello list: It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me. I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range). In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process. I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all, Cassiano (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil). --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
I believe my note to the 3rd sense of "significance" was misunderstood -- though in a creatively relevant way! -- as intended to raise the question about the meaning of "D.C.L.". Actually, though, all I was intending to do was to convey that in that definition Peirce was illustrating that sense of the word by using as an example the meaning of an abbreviation. I should have phrased the note in some less misleading way. I mention this only to stave off a possible confusion: the misunderstanding was not, as it turned out, irrelevant to the topic; but it could take us afield from Ben's concern about what Peirce understood by "significance" and "signification". What is especially interesting about the Century definitions is that Peirce seems clearly to have felt obligated to provide there, first of all, definitions which convey a reliable understanding, as far as that is possible, of the colloquial or popular or general public nontechnical understanding of these terms, without regard for whether or not these understandings of colloquial usage are self-consistent or coherent, which is something he could not permit when it comes to the quite different attempt to formulate scientifically or philosophically consistent definitions of such terms for technical or theoretical purposes. One would have expected him to use the opportunity to promote his theoretical understanding in some way, but he refused to do anything that even looks like the kind of definition we expect of him when he is putting something forth as a theoretical understanding of their meaning. Yet the two kinds of definitional enterprises -- the attempt to define terms for technical purposes and the attempt (as in the Century Dictionary) to define the same terms for popular purposes -- cannot be regarded as simply impertinent to one another either. Tracing out the connections, though, is going to be very risky interpretationally. It also occurs to me that in reflecting on this we may understand better why we seem to find so many formulations that seem, at least at first, to be so erratically inconsistent in usage if we bear in mind that he had to be able to talk both in the popular and in the technical senses at times if he was to bring his readers to a more exact and useful understanding of things, and we are frequently in position, in interpreting his work, of trying to understand passages which appear to us outside of their original context of occurrence, much of which may be quite unknown to us. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 2:58 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science Jim & List,Jim Piat wrote: My Websters gives D. Cn. L. as doctor of cannon law. Well, I know Peirce used a few military metaphors, but "cannon law"? :-) All kidding aside, the American Heritage Dictionary offers this: DCLabbr. Doctor of Canon Law Doctor of Civil LawThe Berkeley review includes this interesting observation on the development of law in the West including a mention of both Canon and Civil Law. [A]bout the end of the twelfth century a great revolution of thought took place in Europe. What the influences were which produced it requires new historical researches to say. No doubt, it was partly due to the Crusades. But a great awakening of intelligence did take place at that time. It requires, it is true, some examination to distinguish this particular movement from a general awakening which had begun a century earlier, and had been growing ever since. But now there was an accelerated impulse. Commerce was attaining new importance, and was inventing some of her chief conveniences and safeguards. Law, which had hitherto been utterly barbaric, began to be a profession. The civil law was adopted in Europe, the canon law was digested; the common law took some form. [emphasis added] [JP] I notice Peirce mentions Canadian law in these entries as well. Elswhere I believe he uses the lawyer/client relationship as an illustration of "standing for" or representation.In this connection (where the "standing for" are letters used by lawyers as relative pronouns), I found this interesting excerpt [from CP 2.287] . . . Lawyers use A, B, C, practically as very effective relative pronouns. To show how effective they are, we may note that Messrs. Allen and Greenough, in their admirable (though in the edition of 1877 [?], too small) Latin Grammar, declare that no conceivable syntax could wholly remove the ambiguity of the following sentence, "A replied to B that he thought C (his brother) more unjust to himself than to his own friend." Now, any lawyer would state that with perfect clearness, by using A, B, C, as relatives,
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
I have not yet been able to find the source of this notion "that the meaning of something lies in its consequences" was explicitly connected to legal thinking in Peirce, but would be very interested if any lister has located it.Best,Gary Dear Gary, In Max Fisch's introduction to Volume 3 of the Writings of Charles S Peirce (1872-1878) begining on pages xxix is a section entitled _The Metaphysical Club and the Birth of Prgamatism_ .In this section Fisch discusses some of the influence legal thinkers had on the development of Peirce's pragmatism. I could not find a specific reference in which Peirce makes the attribution I alledged and my guess is I'm probably wrong. But I think there is general support for the considerable influence of Peirce's legal friends on his early thinking about pragmatism. Max Fisch passage from page xxxi: The most striking fact about the eleven members named by Peirce is that more than half of them were lawyers. (snip) And the most remark that Peirce later makes about the birth of pragmatism in the Club is that, while acknowledging the paternity that James had already ascribe to him, he calls lawyer Green its grandfather , because Green had so often urged the importance of applying Alexander Bain's definition of belief as "that upon which a man is prepared to act," from which "pramatism is scarce more than a corollary". END PASSAGE. I believe Bain was a lawyer. Fisch also suggest that the the pragmatic maxim may have derived from disussions in the Club. Best, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] On "Some Views of Russell and Russell's Logic by his Contemporaries, ..." on Arisbe
Please note that the electronic version on Arisbe of my "Some Views of Russell and Russell's Logic by his Contemporaries, with particular reference to Peirce" (http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/anellis/views.pdf )has recently appeared in print as "Some Views of Russell and Russells Logic by His Early Contemporaries", Review of Modern Logic 10 (2004-05), 6797 and that for reference purposes you may probably prefer to cite the latter. Irving H. Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.peircepublishing.com -- ___ Search for businesses by name, location, or phone number. -Lycos Yellow Pages http://yp.lycos.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Jim & List, Jim Piat wrote: My Websters gives D. Cn. L. as doctor of cannon law. Well, I know Peirce used a few military metaphors, but "cannon law"? :-) All kidding aside, the American Heritage Dictionary offers this: DCL abbr. Doctor of Canon Law Doctor of Civil Law The Berkeley review includes this interesting observation on the development of law in the West including a mention of both Canon and Civil Law. [A]bout the end of the twelfth century a great revolution of thought took place in Europe. What the influences were which produced it requires new historical researches to say. No doubt, it was partly due to the Crusades. But a great awakening of intelligence did take place at that time. It requires, it is true, some examination to distinguish this particular movement from a general awakening which had begun a century earlier, and had been growing ever since. But now there was an accelerated impulse. Commerce was attaining new importance, and was inventing some of her chief conveniences and safeguards. Law, which had hitherto been utterly barbaric, began to be a profession. The civil law was adopted in Europe, the canon law was digested; the common law took some form. [emphasis added] [JP] I notice Peirce mentions Canadian law in these entries as well. Elswhere I believe he uses the lawyer/client relationship as an illustration of "standing for" or representation. In this connection (where the "standing for" are letters used by lawyers as relative pronouns), I found this interesting excerpt [from CP 2.287] . . . Lawyers use A, B, C, practically as very effective relative pronouns. To show how effective they are, we may note that Messrs. Allen and Greenough, in their admirable (though in the edition of 1877 [?], too small) Latin Grammar, declare that no conceivable syntax could wholly remove the ambiguity of the following sentence, "A replied to B that he thought C (his brother) more unjust to himself than to his own friend." Now, any lawyer would state that with perfect clearness, by using A, B, C, as relatives, thus: (A) A replied to B that he (B), thought C (A's) (A) (his (B's), brother) more unjust to himself, (B) than to his (C) (A's) (B's) own friend.The terminations which in any inflected (C's) language are attached to words "governed" by other words, and which serve to show which the governing word is, by repeating what is elsewhere expressed in the same form, are likewise indices of the same relative pronoun character. Jim, you also commented: I think Peirce's legal friends had an important influence on his thinking -- no doubt mutual. Especially the notion that the meaning of something lies in its consequences. I believe that he specifically makes this acknowledgment somewhere. I have not yet been able to find the source of this notion "that the meaning of something lies in its consequences" was explicitly connected to legal thinking in Peirce, but would be very interested if any lister has located it. Best, Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
D.C.L could also be "doctor of canon law." Gary Dear Gary, My Websters gives D. Cn. L. as doctor of cannon law. I notice Peirce mentions Canadian law in these entries as well. Elswhere I believe he uses the lawyer/client relationship as an illustration of "standing for" or representation. I think Peirce's legal friends had an important influence on his thinking -- no doubt mutual. Especially the notion that the meaning of something lies in its consequences. I believe that he specifically makes this acknowledgment somewhere. Sorry about including the whole message, and thanks for the reminder. Best, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Jim, Joe, D.C.L could also be "doctor of canon law." Gary PS A gentle reminder not to include whole message, especially long quotations, in responses :-) Jim Piat wrote: Dear Joe, In my Websters the meaning of D.C.L. is given as "doctor of civil law", but I don't find it in Black's Law dictionary. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Dear Joe, In my Websters the meaning of D.C.L. is given as "doctor of civil law", but I don't find it in Black's Law dictionary. Jim Piat - Original Message - From: "Joseph Ransdell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 9:33 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science Ben: I don't know that it helps much in clarification of the "significance"/"signification" distinction, but you'll find below the definitions of "sign", "significance", and "signification" in the Century Dictionary. I've included only the statements of definition in the entries since it is simply too time-consuming to present the entire entries here, given all of the problems of transliteration, etc.; but I've made a few comments in brackets that might help. What I find remarkable is that Peirce amde no attempt whatever to convey even so much as a hint as to how he would define any of these terms for technical philosophical purposes. One could not possibly infer his own view even hypothetically from the definitions he provides. Do the definitions he provides correspond to his own colloquail rather than technical understanding of these terms? Presumably yes, so we can perhaps learn something from them if we bear in mind that they do not purport to be anything more than a report of what orinary or common usage is. And even there we should also bear in mind that the entries in the Century are often based largely upon the entries in a still older dictionary, the Imperial, as I believe it is called. So what we find here is apparently provided by Peirce but perhaps -- to some extent at least -- only approved of by him rather than created by him. I am not well acquainted with the Century as a whole. I had simply neglected its importance until quite recently. But my understanding is that he does in some cases do some fairly extensive creative work, going beyond mere approval of pre-existing accounts of popular usage; yet there is no trace of that sort of thing in his definitions of "sign". I assume his refusal to take advantage of the opportunity to grind his own axe in these definitions is due to and indicative of his commitment to an ethics of terminology, Joe Ransdell SIGN [used as a noun] 1. A visible mark or impress, whether natural or artificial, accidental or purposed, serving to convey information, suggest an idea, or assist inference; a distinctive guiding indication to the eye. [NOTE BY JR: It seems odd that the first sense listed would be restricted to visual signs.] 2. An arbitrary or conventional mark used as an abbreviation for a known meaning; a figure written technically instead of the word or words which it represents, according to prescription or usage: (as, mathematical, astronomical, medical, botanical, or musical signs; occult signs; an artist's sign. [NOTE BY JR: The examples he gives suggest that this would also include as a special case what we we now think of as being acronyms. At any rate, what he has in mind seem all to be special cases of symbols.] 3. Something displayed to announce the presence of any one; a cognizance; a standard; a banner. [NOTE BY JR: again, a remarkably narrow sense.] 4. An inscribed board, plate, or space, or a symbolical representation or figure, serving for guidance or information, as on or before a place of business or of public resort, or along a road: as, a merchant's or shopman's sign; a Swinging Sign, style of 18th century. tavern-sign; a swinging sign; a tin sign; a sign-board. 5. A symbolical representation; a symbol; hence, in absolute use, symbolical significance; allusive representation: [NOTE BY JR: as sometimes used with "in", e.g. "And on her head a crowne of purest gold Is set, in sign of highest soveraignty"] 6. A representative or indicative thing; a tangible, audible, or historical token, symbol, or memento; an exponent or indicator: as, words are the signs of thought; the ruin is a sign of past grandeur. [NOTE BY JR: His first example of philosophical usage occurs here. It is a quotation from John Locke: "This would be to make them [words] signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas. (Locke, Human Understanding III, ii, 2.)" All of the examples seem to suggest that he means things that are construed as symbols in their occurrence, even when they are natural occurences construed theologically, functioning evidentially, hence indexically.] 7. In general, anything which serves to manifest, stand for, or call up the idea of another thing to the mind of the person perceiving it; evidence of something past, present, or future; a symptom. [NOTE BY JR: This seems to be the most general sense of the word he provides, but note that it seems to be emphasizing the evidential value of it as an actually occurring entity.] 8. In Biblical use: (a) That by which a person or thing is known, espe
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Ben: I don't know that it helps much in clarification of the "significance"/"signification" distinction, but you'll find below the definitions of "sign", "significance", and "signification" in the Century Dictionary. I've included only the statements of definition in the entries since it is simply too time-consuming to present the entire entries here, given all of the problems of transliteration, etc.; but I've made a few comments in brackets that might help. What I find remarkable is that Peirce amde no attempt whatever to convey even so much as a hint as to how he would define any of these terms for technical philosophical purposes. One could not possibly infer his own view even hypothetically from the definitions he provides. Do the definitions he provides correspond to his own colloquail rather than technical understanding of these terms? Presumably yes, so we can perhaps learn something from them if we bear in mind that they do not purport to be anything more than a report of what orinary or common usage is. And even there we should also bear in mind that the entries in the Century are often based largely upon the entries in a still older dictionary, the Imperial, as I believe it is called. So what we find here is apparently provided by Peirce but perhaps -- to some extent at least -- only approved of by him rather than created by him. I am not well acquainted with the Century as a whole. I had simply neglected its importance until quite recently. But my understanding is that he does in some cases do some fairly extensive creative work, going beyond mere approval of pre-existing accounts of popular usage; yet there is no trace of that sort of thing in his definitions of "sign". I assume his refusal to take advantage of the opportunity to grind his own axe in these definitions is due to and indicative of his commitment to an ethics of terminology, Joe Ransdell SIGN [used as a noun] 1. A visible mark or impress, whether natural or artificial, accidental or purposed, serving to convey information, suggest an idea, or assist inference; a distinctive guiding indication to the eye. [NOTE BY JR: It seems odd that the first sense listed would be restricted to visual signs.] 2. An arbitrary or conventional mark used as an abbreviation for a known meaning; a figure written technically instead of the word or words which it represents, according to prescription or usage: (as, mathematical, astronomical, medical, botanical, or musical signs; occult signs; an artist's sign. [NOTE BY JR: The examples he gives suggest that this would also include as a special case what we we now think of as being acronyms. At any rate, what he has in mind seem all to be special cases of symbols.] 3. Something displayed to announce the presence of any one; a cognizance; a standard; a banner. [NOTE BY JR: again, a remarkably narrow sense.] 4. An inscribed board, plate, or space, or a symbolical representation or figure, serving for guidance or information, as on or before a place of business or of public resort, or along a road: as, a merchant's or shopman's sign; a Swinging Sign, style of 18th century. tavern-sign; a swinging sign; a tin sign; a sign-board. 5. A symbolical representation; a symbol; hence, in absolute use, symbolical significance; allusive representation: [NOTE BY JR: as sometimes used with "in", e.g. "And on her head a crowne of purest gold Is set, in sign of highest soveraignty"] 6. A representative or indicative thing; a tangible, audible, or historical token, symbol, or memento; an exponent or indicator: as, words are the signs of thought; the ruin is a sign of past grandeur. [NOTE BY JR: His first example of philosophical usage occurs here. It is a quotation from John Locke: "This would be to make them [words] signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas. (Locke, Human Understanding III, ii, 2.)" All of the examples seem to suggest that he means things that are construed as symbols in their occurrence, even when they are natural occurences construed theologically, functioning evidentially, hence indexically.] 7. In general, anything which serves to manifest, stand for, or call up the idea of another thing to the mind of the person perceiving it; evidence of something past, present, or future; a symptom. [NOTE BY JR: This seems to be the most general sense of the word he provides, but note that it seems to be emphasizing the evidential value of it as an actually occurring entity.] 8. In Biblical use: (a) That by which a person or thing is known, especially as divinely distinguished .. Hence--(b) Especially, an appearance or occurrence indicative of the divine presence or power, and authenticating a message or messenger a miraculous manifestation or warning; a portent; an omen. 9. A motion or gesture intended to express thought or convey an idea; a movement of the hand or some other part of the body having a natural or con
