Dear Howard, lists -
I certainly do not think Howard's considerations in this sub-thread are
irrelevant to the book. When I have not interfered it is because in this matter
I largely agree with Howard (until now, that is!).
At 09:21 AM 5/1/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
I've got my own book to
Dear Franklin, lists -
OK, we're getting closer to agreeing about what to disagree about, at least!
Frederik: Hm, I am not sure. How could we know this? This is a bit of a
catch-22 because one of the classic riddles of abduction is exactly how to
select the better hypothesis among many
List,
I wonder if it is possible to have semiotics interpreted universally as
opposed to globally. What might the implications be if we went
universal? What new interpretations might this require of us?
Most of us have heard of the Fermi paradox. That is to say, if there are so
many stars
Dear Frederik, lists,
Frederik: Something like that. P seldom used the word empiricist.
Sometimes he refers to the British empiricists, sometimes to James'
radical empiricism which he equated with pragmatism. I do not remember
seeing him using it about himself. Of course the later version of
Frederik, you wrote,
[So here I agree with Howard (and I guess P would do so as well) that the right
direction is to generalize the observer-phenomenon distinction so as to cover
all biological organisms.]
I agree about the right direction, but I don’t see that Howard does, because he
Harry,
Welcome to the forum!
You can find a page linking to information about the Peirce forum including
the Archives at the top left of the Arisbe home page.
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/
Here it is directly (scroll down a bit):
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
Best,
Gary
At 11:32 AM 5/1/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Howard, I don't see why a rock's
hitting the ground on a lifeless planet shouldn't be taken as occasioning
a measurement.
HP: If one thinks this way, then every physical event is a measurement.
That won't work for an empiricist.
BU: That's the sense
Frederik, lists,
It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal structure
af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a matter of
necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain B) does not
explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many
