RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Jeff, Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in the earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what I'd suspected, that Peirce is referring to organic compounds as "such active substances." But I still don't know what he's referring to as "those

[PEIRCE-L] Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

John, I'll rephrase my point (which you seem to have missed). We started from your post saying: JFS The distinction between a verb form such as 'asserting' and a noun such as 'assertion' is what Peirce called *hypostatic abstraction*. To illustrate the point, Peirce used a term that Molière

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Edwina, All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was working in, and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its implications for the reader might differ from the implications of a

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Edwina, a few responses, ET: “this is simply how YOU choose to read Peirce.” GF: Yes. That is exactly what I said in my post, and I gave my reasons for choosing to read that way, and said explicitly that people who read differently have a right to do so. ET: “you cannot claim that your

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Gary F, list I disagree with you. I don't think that you have a right to assert that 'all I ask of an interpreter of Peirce' is. You and I are equal - and this sentence of yours denies that equality and instead inserts you as The Authority on How To Read and Understand

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

List, Peirce did not just "refer to" some well-established "facts" of his time; he has all the time been developing a whole theory. All good and true theories go beyond any number of "facts" (id est: array of empirical findings). It could be called 'hypo-determination' (just a coined word,

Re: Towards welcoming newcomers to Peirce, was, [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Gary, I thought meliorism was a term introduced by William James, not CSP. I believe James discusses it in his latter Pragmatism lectures, and references his son as providing the term to him. It appears to have the same meaning that you say CSP ascribed to it. Did CSP also adopt this term?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.1

Gary f, A kind remark on a typo in lecture 3, which you may wish to correct. It is in short paragraph consisting of three lines. It begins: "A quality, or Firstness, has mere logical..." Third sentence thereof should begin with a capital, but it does not. It should be: "A fact, or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

Kirsti, My point is that both Peirce and Molière ridiculed the question - answer sequence... Molière ridiculed it, but Peirce was very serious. He discussed that example and others like it in many of his writings. See for example, CP 4.463. As another example,"A pear is ripe." Therefore,

[PEIRCE-L] Irony and style in CSP (Was: Peirce's adjectives...)

Cassiano, Jon, list I have been studying style in connection with argument analysis for a long time. Recognizing textual markers of irony forms a part of the method I developed in 1990's in my university lectures in Finland. In 2000's I started a slow read on Kaina Stoicheia (New Elements)

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Peirce is intelligible in the way anyone else is -- randomly and imperfectly. See Shakespeare scholarship over time. My favorite example of the miasm that applies to comprehension is the typical greeting one gets after a sermon. On examination what the person is lauding is her own hearing which

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

I meant fallible! amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > Peirce is intelligible in the way anyone else is -- randomly and > imperfectly. See Shakespeare scholarship over time. My favorite example of > the miasm that applies

Re: RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Gary, list Gary, you wrote: "All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was working in, and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its implications for the reader might differ from

[PEIRCE-L] Theodore Parker • The Moral Universe

o~o~o~o~o~o~o I do not pretend to understand the moral universe; the arc is a long one, my eye reaches but little ways; I cannot calculate the curve and complete the figure by the experience of sight; I can divine it by conscience. And from what I

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.5

Continuing from Lowell 3.4, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13889 As to the common aversion to recognizing thought as an active factor in the real world, some of its causes are easily traced. In the first place,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triads and the meaning triangle ( was Lowell Lecture 3.4

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I don't think that Peirce drew the triadic sign as a triangle - [he used the triangle, as we've noted, in the Lady Welby sign classes but that's different]. But he writes, in 1.346, The Categories in Detail, in

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Triads and the meaning triangle ( was Lowell Lecture 3.4

John, responses inserted below as GF: Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 13-Dec-17 16:39 Gary F, I changed the title to focus on the more specific issues. Gary > I dug out my copy of The Meaning of Meaning, and found no triangle

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Theodore Parker • The Moral Universe

Jon, List, I think, this post is about the naturalistic fallacy, is it? I want to recomment a writing by Lawrence Kohlberg, whose book "The philosophy of moral development" I have read, and the writing that surely suits to this topic, but which I have not yet read, is called "From is to ought".

[PEIRCE-L] Hypostatic Abstraction and Continuous Predicate

Peircers, There is of course more to hypostatic abstraction than converting adjectives and verbs into nouns, or predicates into subjects. It also analyzes a predicate of one arity into an extra subject and a predicate of a higher arity. Continuation of that analysis to its ultimate limit ends