Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

2017-02-06 Thread John F Sowa
On 2/6/2017 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I myself tend to view causality as more economic and population-size driven than ideologically driven. I agree. In fact, that's a major reason why the Homo saps were so far ahead of the neanderthals in technology: they had a warmer climate in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-27 Thread John F Sowa
On 1/26/2017 6:13 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: the putative distinction between the semeiotic triad seen /as a single triadic entity/ /versus/ the triad *as expressing three relations* seems to me to one worth entertaining in considering what is really a fundamental aspect of Peircean semeiotics.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

2017-01-30 Thread John F Sowa
John C and Edwina, JC Nominalism is a weaker hypothesis than Realism, so if something is consistent with realism, then it is consistent with nominalism. Locke, for example, distinguished between the nominal essence and the real essence. The former tells us what we think something is like, while

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Nominalism vs. Realism

2017-01-29 Thread John F Sowa
On 1/29/2017 1:00 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: The distinction between nominal thinking and real thinking is distinct from the distinction between extensional thinking and intensional thinking, as one can see from the fact that extreme nominalists do not admit sets as entities. Quine was as extreme

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

2017-01-29 Thread John F Sowa
Eric and list, EC My initial inclination is to say that everything you pointed to does seem important, but doesn't seem obviously to hinge on anything I can easily understand as a difference between nominalists and realists The simplest explanation I have ever read was by Alonzo Church -- in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-25 Thread John F Sowa
On 1/25/2017 10:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction... You're not along in that reaction. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-25 Thread John F Sowa
On 1/25/2017 10:42 PM, John F Sowa wrote: On 1/25/2017 10:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction... You're not along in that reaction. Sorry for the typo. I meant 'alone'. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cyclical Systems and Continuity

2017-02-22 Thread John F Sowa
Jeff and Gary, JBD I'm wondering if anyone can explain in greater detail what Peirce is suggesting in this passage in making the comparison between the atomic weight of oxygen and the continuity of Time GF I think the claim is that our experience of time is the prototype for all conceptions

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

2017-02-09 Thread John F Sowa
On 2/8/2017 12:31 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: The three triads of CSP, qualisign, sinsign, legisign; icon, index, symbol; rhema, dicisign, argument, can be, in my opinion, a “recipe” for realism; that is, the logical association of antecedent observations (Qualisigns with logical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-17 Thread John F Sowa
Jerry and Clark, In mathematics, logic, computer science, physics, engineering..., precision in measurement, reasoning, and communication is essential. I am not denying that. But I also believe that Peirce's point that "symbols grow", Wittgenstein's language games, and Sue Atkins' remark that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-16 Thread John F Sowa
On 1/16/2017 3:32 PM, Clark Goble wrote: I think one can still manage how symbols grow. That is consider them bundles of process. The question ends up being what the limits of the symbol are. Of course that becomes a complex topic too. I don't believe that it's possible or desirable to put any

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between

2017-01-15 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A., Edwina, Kirsti, Jon A.S., list, The issues about universals and essences have been with us for a couple of millennia, and nobody has a proposed useful definition that everyone can accept. Peirce developed his semiotic as a foundation that *avoids* those terms. JA I find it more useful

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universal/General/Continuous and Particular/Singular/Individual

2017-01-19 Thread John F Sowa
On 1/19/2017 10:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote: consider the following sentence: "I think that Tom believes Superman is real, but Mary knows he's just a character in a story." This sentence would have four UoDs: (1) the world that includes Tom, Mary, and me; (2) the UoD of my th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/4/2016 12:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: JFS: But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter, there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret that existence. But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic pre-semiosis. ET: I don't know that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-09 Thread John F Sowa
Edwina, Kirsti, list, ET I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail. I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the issues. See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2 of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-10 Thread John F Sowa
Edwina, Jon A, Jeff, Jerry, Jon AS, Kirsti, This topic has so many ramifications that it's impossible to say anything complete and definitive. The observation I considered important was Bateson's remark about stories as a natural way for minds or quasi-minds to think, talk, and reason about

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

2016-10-22 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/22/2016 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: both explanations are based on belief; I really don't think either is open to empirical evidence. Peirce encouraged reasoning by hypothesis (abduction), but he insisted that the implications of those hypotheses be evaluated by testing (purposive

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-10-21 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/21/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: The role of efficient causality is extremely perplex in life and in the chemical sciences. That is true of all the sciences, especially physics. When I used the word 'modern', I meant the informal use by Hume. But as early as the 17th century,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-10-21 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/21/2016 1:09 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: By "scientific causality," do you mean /efficient/ causality (i.e., brute reactions), /final/ causality (i.e., laws of nature), both, or something else altogether? Scientific causality is not so constrained as your question suggests. In

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cause-maulogy

2016-10-21 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/21/2016 4:16 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: Thanks for summarizing the issue so clearly. This has traditionally been one of the most difficult points to get across both on this List and within the wider spheres of Peirce readership. Thanks for the note of support. For some related issues, see

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-12 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/12/2016 12:55 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: You wrote: "Different languages have different options for the grammatical forms that express such relations. The number of options could lead to a combinatorial explosion, but the practical number is limited by human memory." I take your

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-25 Thread John F Sowa
Kirsti, We are in violent agreement. I looked at the slides you provided. With as good as all of them, was mark 'wrong', wrong, and again wrong. I have been doing R & D in AI for years, and the point I'm trying to make is that current AI research is *on the wrong track* . I presented an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Time, Topology, Differential Logic

2016-11-21 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A., Jerry, Jeffrey, list In any notation for logic, we have to distinguish the ontology from the base logic. Peirce's basic existential graphs (Alpha + Beta) make minimal assumptions about ontology. They can be mapped to and from FOL in Peirce-Schröder-Peano algebraic notation. Peirce's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Time, Topology, Differential Logic

2016-11-15 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/15/2016 8:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: Differential logic is simply the qualitative analogue of the differential and integral calculus. That's an analogy that might inspire an abduction. But abductions are hypotheses or guesses that may be useful -- or not. In any case, their acceptance

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-11-19 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/19/2016 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I don't think that democracy 'is human destiny', and I don't believe that we are moving 'in the direction of goodness'. I agree. Just look at history. Greece and Rome had democracies. But both of those democracies were toppled by tyrants (AKA

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Time, Topology, Differential Logic

2016-11-11 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/11/2016 9:36 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: These are raw text copies right now but I'm in the process of segmenting them for ease of study and retrieving WayBak links for the discussion pages that are no longer live on the web. What do you mean by "segmenting"? Does that mean chopping them up

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-10-31 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/29/2016 11:55 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: I think that [Peirce] was a non-traditional Christian--he once referred to his views as buddheo-Christian Those two traditions are not necessarily in conflict. Note, for example, the writings of Thomas Merton. For an overview, see

Re: CSP and Spinoza (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

2016-10-31 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/30/2016 10:37 AM, jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: see: http://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/eip_15/15th_imp_shannon_dea_peirce-and_spinozas_pragmaticist_methaphysics.pdf for a very nice paper on CSP wrt Spinoza. I agree that it's "a very nice paper". It contains many excerpts by

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-02 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/2/2016 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: His favorite Gospel was that of John, but did he ever quote its first chapter? "In the beginning was the Word [logos] ... Since his father taught him Greek at a very early age, I'm sure that New Testament Greek was one of the first texts he

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe. Yes. But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Jay Zeman

2016-10-13 Thread John F Sowa
I forgot to include the URL of his web site: http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jzeman/ - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

2016-10-13 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/13/2016 5:24 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: [Peirce's pragmatic axiom] once accepted, – intelligently accepted, in the light of the evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of one’s house. Each abstraction is either pronounced to be gibberish or is provided with a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman

2016-10-17 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/17/2016 3:15 AM, Dau, Frithjof wrote: I own www.existential-graph.org (for about two decades now...) and I would be more than pleased to offer somespace on my site. That's an excellent idea. It would be important to combine Jay's EG material and related work on EGs on a site that has a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

2016-10-15 Thread John F Sowa
On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now. I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist: Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-07 Thread John F Sowa
Clark and Jerry, Every branch of science has four kinds of developers: (1) naturalists, (2) experimenters, (3) theoreticians, and (4) engineers. They often disagree, but they need each other. Many of them play two or more roles at different times. Peirce played all four roles in his various

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

2016-12-07 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/7/2016 1:52 PM, Clark Goble wrote: I do think there is a different type of bias and type of thinking for those doing more theoretical work. No two people have identical interests, preferences, and ways of thinking. The word 'bias' has a negative connotation that is only appropriate when

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

2016-12-11 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/11/2016 7:44 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: if electrical field theory contradicts quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle, then it is valid (at most) only in a classical limit. Quantum Electrodynamics (QED) is the well developed theory that unifies quantum mechanics and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

2016-12-12 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/12/2016 1:24 PM, Clark Goble wrote: I don’t like the term “legitimate” precisely because it’s ambiguous. However I think good theories are theories that allow us to inquire about their truthfulness by making somewhat testable predictions. I agree with both points. I think that some of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

2016-12-13 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/13/2016 11:15 AM, John Collier wrote: For some theories, like number theory and set theory, there are statements that are true but not deducible. I would think they are entailed by the theory even if not provable, so I would call them part of the theory. I agree. I just blame my fingers

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

2016-12-14 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/13/2016 2:43 PM, Thomas903 wrote: I wanted to comment on statements made last night about the meaning of law-theory-hypothesis. I wasn't attempting to state a definitive analysis of scientific terminology. I was making the point that logicians use the word 'theory' in a formal sense

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:9216] biological theory ... towards semiotics

2016-12-17 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/16/2016 4:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: I'd like to suggest the recent lecture by Denis Noble in the British Physiological Society: http://www.voicesfromoxford.org/video/dance-to-the-tune-of-life-lecture/699 Thanks for the reference. That led me to some of his earlier articles. The one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

2016-12-12 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/12/2016 10:57 AM, Clark Goble wrote: I think the bigger problem is that most of the big theories (loop quantum gravity, string theory) don’t really have even “in theory” tests that are limited by technology. String theory in particular has the problem that it explains too much. I would

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

2016-12-05 Thread John F Sowa
On 11/29/2016 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote: Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent of what any particular person thinks about it is key. That is not a new point. Scientists have always assumed that the laws of nature are "really real". Ernst Mach is the positivist who

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theism and Peircean Cosmology

2016-12-31 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/31/2016 10:43 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Is this list about the philosophy of Peirce any more? - Or does CSP only serve as a starting point to presenting any kinds of ideas loosely connected with CSP? Those are good questions. I believe that it's important to relate CSP's

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theism and Peircean Cosmology

2016-12-29 Thread John F Sowa
On 12/29/2016 2:52 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I wonder why [Luther's] still well regarded. For the same reason as Russell vs. Peirce: better hype and PR. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread John F Sowa
Clark and Claudio, Clark I think my point about modal realism is more that connection between universals and particulars. Does he make that connection with mathematics early on? Again I don’t know. It’s one thing to speak about the nature of mathematics as possibilities and quite an other to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread John F Sowa
Clark, Jon A.S., and Claudio, I'm trying to relate Peirce's logic, mathematics, semiotic, theory of truth, and logic of pragmatism to his insights into perception, cognition, and purposeful action. CSP's essential insights: triadic semiotic; icons as the starting point; symbols growing from

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-16 Thread John F Sowa
On 3/16/2017 11:20 AM, Clark Goble wrote: The way I usually think about it is that there are many continuous equations such that the limit as x → ∞ y → 0. But if we use some language with a finite alphabet and limit the theories to a finite specification, there are at most a countable number

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-16 Thread John F Sowa
On 3/16/2017 8:44 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: This is the question of “convergence”, a question that mathematicians, physicists, systems theorists, etc. have investigated in great detail. As a rule we find that some methods of procedure, of stepping through a sequence of states, will eventually

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

2017-04-10 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of other sentences in other symbol systems. I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-02 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made for a more accurate representation of what we really mean. I certainly agree. But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-02 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/2/2017 11:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: I like your terms and yes, Peirce has indeed used all of them. My question is: What would your definition be of a 'sign'? You use it often in the chart but it has no definition. I'm glad that you approve of the choice of terms. Re definition of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-06 Thread John F Sowa
Jon and Edwina, Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-07 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread John F Sowa
Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined. There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. I agree. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess. For a law of science, the proposition that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread John F Sowa
Jon and Edwina, Jon I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/ regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat reality as consisting entirely of Signs. Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks could be interpreted and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

2017-04-13 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian Bed essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in CSP’s theory of logical graphs of relations? Or, is a semantic explanation possible? Peirce published his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-20 Thread John F Sowa
Jon, That is an extensional definition of a relation: Following the pattern of the functional case, let the notation “L ⊆ X × Y” bring to mind a mathematical object specified by three pieces of data, the set X, the set Y, and a particular subset of their cartesian product X × Y}. As before we

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-14 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-23 Thread John F Sowa
Helmut, Jeffrey, Jon A, Clark, list, HR Not every triadic relation is categorically thirdness. But which are? That's a good question. Some basic principles: 1. For each of Peirce's categories, there is a characteristic question: Firstness: What is it? What kind of mark?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

2017-03-08 Thread John F Sowa
On 3/8/2017 12:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: I'm trying to interpret Peirce's remarks about the importance of stating the mathematical hypotheses of a system precisely for the purpose of drawing conclusions with exactitude. I certainly agree. And the point I was trying to make is that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

2017-03-09 Thread John F Sowa
Jerry, Clark, list, In my response to Jeff B.D., I was defending the claim that board games are versions of mathematics. But I definitely do *not* restrict math to board games or to set-theoretic models. Jerry Many mathematicians reject set theory as a foundation for mathematics Yes. Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

2017-03-10 Thread John F Sowa
On 3/10/2017 8:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence, coherence, consensus, and instrumental reliability are all essential and constitutive elements of truth--none is any more fundamental than the others. Moreover, each of these elements of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Cosmos

2017-03-06 Thread John F Sowa
On 3/4/2017 4:26 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: I saw Beauty, Goodness, and Truth as the intersecting circles of a Venn diagram, with the summum bonum the central cell. Note that Beauty comes first in most versions -- including Peirce's. All sciences, including the normative sciences, are based on

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

2017-03-07 Thread John F Sowa
Jerry, We already have a universal foundation for logic. It's called "Peirce's semiotic". JLRC the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the discrete become the mathematics of the continuous. They are all subsets of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

2017-03-07 Thread John F Sowa
On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded on such hypotheses. More precisely, pure mathematics starts with axioms and definitions. A hypothesis is a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-02 Thread John F Sowa
Edwina, Gary, and Jon, ET So, rather than saying that a single bacterium 'has' a quasi-mind, I'd consider that bacterium to be a semiosic materialization of Mind. The brain is not the same as Mind. Peirce would certainly agree that the brain is not the same as mind, and so would I. But when

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-04-01 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A.S., Clark, list, I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked with other commitments. My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer article: http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

2017-04-01 Thread John F Sowa
Edwina, Stephen, list, I don't disagree with the points you're addressing, but I'm concerned about the proliferation of terminology. Formal logic and linguistics (Chomsky, Montague, Kamp, Partee and their PhD students) have had little success for AI and natural language understanding. The next

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-07 Thread John F Sowa
Edwina, Gary, Clark, list, ET I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a secondary step. I agree with both sentences. And I

Re: Aw: Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

2017-08-16 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/12/2017 4:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I have problems with the term "final" or "end" anyway. I guess that the pragmatic maxim is only a proposal how to make our ideas clearer, in order to be able to talk more reasonably, but not absolutely end-clear. That 1878 article about the gates of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread John F Sowa
Gene, Gary F, and Clark, Gene let's remember the influential book by Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (1923), which brought discussion of Peirce to a wider audience over many following decades. It was Lady Welby's influence on Ogden that brought Peirce into the discussion, using

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

2017-08-10 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/10/2017 3:23 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Is Tarski’s approach to the formal logics of metalanguages essential to give coherence to communication with the broad array of modern synthetic symbol systems? By itself, Tarski's version of model theory and metalanguage is not sufficient. But

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

2017-08-12 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/11/2017 5:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: A system, I think, is defined by the part of its structure, that does not change. The system exists as long as this part of structure (set of relations) exists. Which part of the structure is used to define the system, can be arbitrary choice, but

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

2017-08-12 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/12/2017 10:43 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Isn't the point of considering anything the end? And isn't the end a practical actionable something (expression, act) that contains the initial sign and the index. Peirce said that the interpretant of any sign is always another sign. He also said

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's definitions in the Century Dictionary

2017-07-13 Thread John F Sowa
On 7/12/2017 5:19 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: I assume that each JPG you would want to download is an image of a single page of the CD. Yes. I'm primarily interested in Peirce's definitions, and I've given up hope for that "forthcoming" volume. I've found that going to the word list to

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's definitions in the Century Dictionary

2017-07-12 Thread John F Sowa
I have downloaded some of Peirce's definitions, and I wondered whether there is any site that contains more or all of them. Following are the few that I downloaded as .jpg files: http://www.jfsowa.com/peirce/defs For the short ones, I've extracted part of the .jpg page. But the longer ones

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Is relativity theory holding back progress in science?

2017-07-20 Thread John F Sowa
I have been following new developments in physics for many years, and I am also interested in Peirce's views on the subject. But I agree with the summary below by Kashyap V Vasavada. I would prefer not to have these emails stuff my folder for Peirce-L. Unless other Peirce-L subscribers want to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt Revisited • Propositions and Information

2017-06-29 Thread John F Sowa
On 6/29/2017 2:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Jon--The Peirce list is a forum, not a kind of personal 'storage' site. Gary R I second that motion. My email handler (Thunderbird) has a place to store "drafts". Other email handlers I've used or seen also have such storage sites. I suggest them as

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's own definition of 'information'

2017-06-29 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A, Charles Pyle, and John C., The main point I was trying to make is that the term 'proposition' is basic, and that information is knowledge (propositional content) that is being communicated or derived in some way. Jon there is simply no reason why we should not take seriously the

[PEIRCE-L] Re: { Information = Comprehension × Extension }

2017-06-28 Thread John F Sowa
On 6/28/2017 1:44 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: The short shrift for now is that neither Peirce nor I is talking about propositions in the sense of dicisigns or dicent symbols at this juncture but rather the simpler sorts of propositions that fall under the heading of the Propositional Calculus in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: C.S. Peirce • Logic As Semiotic

2017-06-27 Thread John F Sowa
On 6/25/2017 5:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: interesting outline - and I'd need to spend a lot more time on it. I realize that 112 slides are a bit much to digest. So I deleted 93 slides to create a short version (title page + 18 slides): http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/vrshort.pdf In the short

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

2017-06-29 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F, JA Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion? I was about to send the following when your note appeared in my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information', but we can discuss other issues later. JD I take the following passage to indicate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: { Information = Comprehension × Extension }

2017-06-27 Thread John F Sowa
Jon, The subject line raises some complex issues: Information = Comprehension × Extension A more fundamental term is 'proposition', which is informally defined as the "meaning" of a sentence. That meaning is usually analyzed as comprehension (AKA intension) and extension. Given that

[PEIRCE-L] Re: { Information = Comprehension × Extension }

2017-06-28 Thread John F Sowa
Jon, That's an important topic to explore: JA we can take up the issue of propositions in more detail as it arises in the relevant context. For a good analysis of the issues, I recommend the following book: Stjernfelt, Frederik (2014) Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce’s Doctrine

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Determination and Creation in Sign-Action

2017-04-28 Thread John F Sowa
On 4/28/2017 10:24 AM, Jerry Rhee wrote: Great quote! Thanks Jon, Tom, list! I agree: Proust 1.48 I put down the cup and turn to my mind. It is up to my mind to find the truth. But how? What grave uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is also the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-28 Thread John F Sowa
On 7/28/2017 12:39 PM, Clark Goble wrote: I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little resemblance to Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it is both on the nature of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger breaks from Husserl. Heidegger too turned

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

2017-08-08 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/7/2017 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: How does the modern notion of a system compare with CSP’s late 19th / early 20 th Century rhetoric? Very directly. Peirce had provided the logical foundation for describing all of them. He didn't have the modern experience with the latest

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-08 Thread John F Sowa
Kirsti, Gary F., and Clark, Kirsti Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that? Yes. Peirce said many times in many ways that any meaningful concept must show its passport at the gates of perception and action. That is a major part of its context. Kirsti Letters to lady Welby need to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-07-29 Thread John F Sowa
On 7/28/2017 5:07 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: when [Peirce] uses “intentional” in an ordinary context, it means pretty much the same as it typically does in ordinary usage today. For instance, CP 1.334 (c. 1905)... Yes. And note the definition of 'intentional' that he wrote for the _Century

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-09 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/9/2017 9:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Peirce certainly devoted a lot of study to the meanings of English words, especially in the period /before/ he developed his detailed classification of signs, but of course his work was not /limited/ to those studies. Yes. I would never "block

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

2017-08-05 Thread John F Sowa
On 8/4/2017 5:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition. That is, because additional information is needed Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology

2017-06-20 Thread John F Sowa
Dear Kirsti, End of this dicussion in my part. Nothing bothers me. But I do have one very general comment: In any discussion of any subject of any kind, avoid using the word 'you'. It always diverts attention away from the subject and toward the person being addressed. John

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

2017-06-20 Thread John F Sowa
On 6/20/2017 11:58 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Are you taking the side: "machines are innocent, blame individual persons' ??? No, that's not what I said or implied. You said that you agreed with Gene, and I was also agreeing with Gene: On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: What

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: C.S. Peirce • Logic As Semiotic

2017-06-24 Thread John F Sowa
Jon A, I was trying to emphasize the distinction between syntax and semantics. Literally, 'formal' means "according to form"; 'syntactic' means "according to the arrangement (taxis)". For diagrams (in one or more dimensions) the form is the arrangement. Therefore, the word 'formal', when

[PEIRCE-L] Re: C.S. Peirce • Logic As Semiotic

2017-06-25 Thread John F Sowa
On 6/25/2017 6:24 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: I am also concerned with maintaining avenues of communication and cross-fertilization among various communities of inquiry. We have to observe the specialized ways that terms are used in particular communities but we cannot capitulate to uses so

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

2017-06-19 Thread John F Sowa
On 6/19/2017 12:38 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: I’ve just read your article on “Peirce's contributions to the 21st century” (http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf)... I couldn’t explain what’s wrong with it as clearly as you have. (especially in your section on “logical negativism.” I got

[PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman's existentialgraphs.com

2017-05-22 Thread John F Sowa
Jay Zeman's web site at the University of Florida is still available at http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jzeman/ But the link to existentialgraphs.org is broken. His wife forgot to renew the registration. Fortunately, I downloaded that web site. I have now posted a copy at

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman's existentialgraphs.com

2017-05-27 Thread John F Sowa
On 5/26/2017 8:49 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: my own site, http://www.gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm, which I think improves on Zeman’s version in some respects, even correcting a few errors. Yes, that looks good. your contribution to the “Five Questions” collection,

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