subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\]"

[PEIRCE-L] CfP 8th World Congress on the Square of Opposition

2024-04-18 Thread jean-yves beziau

The 8th edition of the World Congress on the Square of Opposition
will take place in Costa Rica, September 9-13, 2024.
Deadline to submit an abstract is  May 8
https://sites.google.com/view/square8-2024/
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[PEIRCE-L] Logic and Religion Webinar: The Love Commandments - Robert Audi, April 18

2024-04-17 Thread FRANCISCO MARIANO

Dear Colleague,

You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and
Religion Webinar Series which will be held on *April 18 (THIS THURSDAY),
2024*, at *4 pm CET* with the topic:



THE LOVE COMMANDMENTS: SOME LOGICAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS


Speaker: Robert Audi
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fphilosophy.nd.edu%2Fpeople%2Ffaculty%2Frobert-audi%2F=05%7C02%7Cassismariano%40missouri.edu%7C071855f1cb9542b3ba5008dc5e28de4e%7Ce3fefdbef7e9401ba51a355e01b05a89%7C0%7C0%7C638488776863080658%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C=pacOIJ%2BHkzvCt5AjxuGSaQUGTrHsZGy4dnRIlUjA4oU%3D=0>
(University
of Notre Dame, USA)

Chair: Ricardo Sousa Silvestre
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.logicandreligion.com%2Fsilvestre=05%7C02%7Cassismariano%40missouri.edu%7C071855f1cb9542b3ba5008dc5e28de4e%7Ce3fefdbef7e9401ba51a355e01b05a89%7C0%7C0%7C638488776863090180%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C=ComE9gIGpMip4BZl3vqGfL1vr0E5mLgVeNsQGyrLi3U%3D=0>
(Federal
University of Campina Grande, Brazil)



Time zones: 10:00 am in New York; 12:00 pm in Brazil; 4:00 pm in Paris;
5:00 pm in Jerusalem; and 8:30 pm in New Delhi.



Zoom link to access the talk:



https://umsystem.zoom.us/j/96654646326?pwd=UnNwM0VMSlZlVU44KzZ6d0ZwVzRFdz09


Meeting ID: 966 5464 6326
Passcode: 810492



For more information about the webinar schedule and speakers please check
the link:
https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars
<https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.logicandreligion.com%2Fwebinars=05%7C02%7Cassismariano%40missouri.edu%7C071855f1cb9542b3ba5008dc5e28de4e%7Ce3fefdbef7e9401ba51a355e01b05a89%7C0%7C0%7C638488776863098097%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C=FMpwcwqSnbkzRwyjrqnjBGO5lF8Wt0gDbnfTm7cGc6c%3D=0>


Abstract: This presentation explores the meaning and scope of the love
commandments, especially the second, telling us to love our neighbors as
ourselves.  What kind of relation to God is appropriate to the command to
love God with all our heart, soul, and mind?  If, as is plausible, what is
commanded can be intended, what is intended is action, and love is not an
action or under direct positive voluntary control, how can love be
commanded?  If love really is impossible to achieve at will and cannot be
directly commanded, what kinds of acts are appropriate to carrying out the
two commandments?  This question is important not only theologically (and
not only for Christianity), but also for understanding moral obligation in
general.  With that in mind, Kant’s categorical imperative, in its Formula
of Humanity version—requiring us to treat persons as ends in themselves and
never merely as means—will be briefly examined.







Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session!

With best wishes,



-- 

Francisco de Assis Mariano,
The University of Missouri-Columbia (USA)
LARA Secretary
l...@logicandreligion.com
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Gary Richmond

John, Jon, Helmut, List,

JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.

Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
the following two sentences:

1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.

Compare this to:

GR:
1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

"Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
the following two sentences:"

1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon:  ". . . a mark is an actual
material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself  *"an
actual material sign."

To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my words"
"he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to 'x' ")
physical material is brought to mind."

That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.

JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( 
token type)."

There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
discussed.

Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion
needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean
terminological matters  -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic
value whatsoever."   And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on
Peirce-L. "Get rid of it."

Best,

Gary

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 1:04 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted
> Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be'
> should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual
> thing.   See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of
> Peirce's statement.
>
> But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's
> unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.
>
> In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term
> 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the
> same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic
> sheet.  Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just
> like a 'word', any word, say camel".
>
> I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the
> profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may
> be used for the first term in the trichotomy (  token type).   Consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had
> read Peirce's writings.  For those of us who believe that it's important to
> bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we
> cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce
> scholars).
>
> In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else
> uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use.  It
> is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer
> programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type)  frequently, and
> some of them even mention Peirce.  But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use
> 'tone' as the first term.  And even Peirce scholars never use it for a
> broad audience.
>
> Fundamental principle:  We live in the 21st C.  Our readers live in the
> 21st C.  The word 'tone' was confu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

LD* have exactly the same
> spelling as the word that names the actual thing that we observe by any
> external of internal senses.  Furthermore, his explanation takes just three
> sentences.
>
> Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph *REALLY *is an
> abstract might-be.  However, we are permitted to call the perceptible
> replica on a phemic sheet an existential graph *PROVIDED **THAT *we
> acknowledge the distinction between the might-be and the replica.
>
> To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below.  My words are
> enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of
> the MS):   "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed
> anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark].  If it actually be so
> [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is
> [observed].  For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself
> [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might
> be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they
> are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel".
>
> As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and
> the actual is justified by Peirce:  The word that is used for the might-be
> should be applicable to all the actual occurrences.  Peirce's definition of
> 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or
> all external and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the
> phaneron)..  But the word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of
> auditory sensations, is far less general than the word 'mark'.
>
> The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this
> subject.  Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be
> generalized to any type of might-be and actual.  If the principle is
> sufficiently general that it can be applied to camels, it should be
> applicable to marks.
>
> This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody
> has written in all the notes on this subject.
>
> John
> ___
>
> Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an
> assertion is called a graph.  If it actually be so scribed, it would be
> incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet.  For that
> would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December
> 1911).
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread John F Sowa

 scribed, it would be 
incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet.  For that would 
be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a 
"general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something which might be if 
conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like 
a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December 1911).
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Helmut Raulien

ith its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901)."

 

I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.


 

Best regards, Helmut







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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)

2024-04-16 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Jon:  

On review, this comment is of possible interest to a purist! 

> On Feb 27, 2024, at 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> JAS: Every explicitly scribed EG is a replica (instance), a sinsign (token) 
> of a peculiar kind that embodies a legisign (type).
> 
> JLRC: Frankly, I fail to find a connection between this stance regarding the 
> existential graphs and the prior development of the metaphysics of substance 
> of 1868. This reading of token and type is novel. 
> 
> Peirce does not introduce the terminology of qualisign/sinsign/legisign and 
> tone/token/type until 1903 and 1906, respectively, so I am puzzled by your 
> reference to something from nearly four decades earlier. In any case, there 
> is nothing novel about this reading, it is a well-known aspect of his 
> speculative grammar within the normative science of logic as semeiotic. 

The 1868 notions from metaphysics remain foundational today.  History has not 
not changed these foundational arguments and the organization of these semes 
and semantics.

Cheers
Jerry 

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[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-16 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three
relations.

According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more
generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical)
object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is *irreducibly *triadic,
such that it is not *composed *of its constituent dyadic relations,
although it *involves *the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and
its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant,
and its final interpretant.

HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone"
is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of
three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes.

According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's *relation *with
itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself *as
a correlate*, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's
genuine dyadic *relations *with its (dynamical) object and (final)
interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign
classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later
tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns
(types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes
of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns
(phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908
taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the
sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the
genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies *would *result
in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of
determination, but Peirce himself never did this.

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon,
index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or
symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols *involve *indices
and icons, and all indices *involve *icons. Moreover, a sign can be
*predominately
*iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or
*predominately* indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other
hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as
"definitely significant Forms" are *embodied *in tokens, such that every
type *involves* tokens (its instances) and every token *involves *tones.
Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908
taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically *involves
*the existent and the possible, and the existent *involves *the possible.
For example, every sign must be *either *a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but
all delomes *involve *phemes and semes, and all phemes *involve *semes.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Jon, List,
>
> you wrote:
>
> "Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
> trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
> is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
> distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
> any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
> any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and
> an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a 
> *degenerate
> *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
> 1901)."
>
> I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three
> relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure"
> one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it
> is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be
> said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign
> and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a
> composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel
> classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a
> sharp distinction.
>
> Best regards, Helmut
>
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-16 Thread Helmut Raulien

ords 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

 

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

 

Best regards

Helmut






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[PEIRCE-L] Tone, Token, Type, was, Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Helmut, List,

This is a bald an expression of why "the word "mark" is a terrible
choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic
will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual
material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with
"token."

In my opinion (and after reviewing your extended exchange with John Sowa on
the topic), it seems to me clear that you have well argued (with
*considerable *textual support) as to why 'tone' is *far preferable* to
'mark' for the "possible sign" under consideration. However, if one is
'married' to a term (because, say, he's published work using that term, or
plans to use it in future papers and presentations, etc.) then he will find
reasons to reject any other term. Yet I am *completely* willing to admit
that if he has weighed the arguments and still feels that
his argumentation is superior, well, that is that.

So, as I began the paragraph above, *all *of this is merely 'my opinion'.

Again, I expect Peirce-L members will make up their own minds on the
matter. In my thinking, it's really quite simple: either "mark" suggests "a
material sign" rather than a possible one, or it does not. But, on the
other hand, if one concludes that, in addition to those problematic
material associations with the term 'mark', that one finds nothing
connoting that which is 'material' about the term, 'tone', and for that
reason, along with other reasons which have been argued for it, that it is
the nature, and so, superior, term for the 'possible sign' being
considered, well that is in my view but an expression of critical
commonsense.

Best,

Gary

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 11:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
> the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
> details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
> misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
> treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of
> "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Helmut, Jon, List,
>>
>> That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't
>> be wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.
>>
>> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
>> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>>
>> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use
>> a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:
>> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical
>> sense and everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.
>>
>> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be
>> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also
>> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the
>> sound  of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that
>> subset of marks that could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those
>> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings.
>>
>> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was
>> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since
>> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little
>> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose
>> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly.
>>
>> John
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of
"tone/tuone/tinge/potisign."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Helmut, Jon, List,
>
> That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't
> be wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.
>
> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>
> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a
> word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:
> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical
> sense and everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.
>
> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be
> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also
> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the
> sound  of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that
> subset of marks that could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those
> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings.
>
> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was
> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since
> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little
> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose
> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread John F Sowa

Helmut, Jon, List,

That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't be 
wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a word 
with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:   academics 
who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical sense and 
everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.

In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be correct 
for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also considered 
'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the sound  of tones 
or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that subset of marks that 
could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those sounds as well as 
arbitrary sights and feelings.

That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was close 
to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since the 
overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little about the 
fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose terms that they 
are capable of remembering and using  correctly.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about 
using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by 
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in 
order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with 
the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy 
for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is 
icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp 
distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any 
object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any 
interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an 
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate 
sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not 
rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, 
then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the 
three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or 
possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a 
possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, 
dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always 
a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the 
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic 
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it 
can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic 
relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 
6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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[PEIRCE-L] Tone Token Type, was Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Gary Richmond

, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>>
>> List,
>>
>> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
>> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>>
>> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no
>> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world
>> itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be
>> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and
>> shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words
>> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are
>> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be
>> obsolete today."
>>
>> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there
>> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and
>> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or,
>> as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
>>
>> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of
>> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes,
>> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think
>> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then"
>> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation
>> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and
>> classification (3ns).
>>
>> Best regards
>> Helmut
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token
in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree
with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".

Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and an
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a
*degenerate
*sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".

Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then, but
not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a
necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be
in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be
either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible,
the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a
symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign
or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification
(3ns).

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks
it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is itself
a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the
composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> List,
>
> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt,
> that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too
> much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material
> sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>
> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no
> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world
> itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be
> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and
> shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words
> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are
> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be
> obsolete today."
>
> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there
> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and
> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or,
> as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
>
> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of
> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes,
> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think
> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then"
> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation
> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and
> classification (3ns).
>
> Best regards
> Helmut
>
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Helmut Raulien

supplement: thinking about it, I am not clear anymore, if composition "is"or"". Also classification is not simply "either-or", this either-or only applies to parallel classes, but between a class and a subclass it seems more complicated. How exactly, that is how to translate composition, determination, and classification into logic (e.g. Boole, EG, EntG, Venn) I haven´t worked out yet. I even don´t know, whether it is translatable at all, as propositional logic to me seems to suit classification, but not composition. Maybe an Euler-diagram is good for composition? But how to translate one into EG?

List,

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Best regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa"
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

Edwina, Jon, List,

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.

ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-14 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

Best regards

Helmut

Edwina, Jon, List,

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.

ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them. Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer.

I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to expl

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-14 Thread Edwina Taborsky

ense against the inventor of the 
>> symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat 
>> the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)
>> 
>> That is why the portion of "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic" where 
>> this passage appears bears the title, "The Ethics of Terminology"--it 
>> advocates voluntary cooperation by the practitioners of any particular 
>> branch of science to use scrupulously consistent terminology. In fact, 
>> Peirce acknowledges up-front that it would violate his own principles "to 
>> make the smallest pretension to dictate the conduct of others in this 
>> matter" (CP 2.219, EP 2:263; emphasis mine). Our disagreement over "tone" 
>> vs. "mark" is a good example--we have each attempted to persuade the other 
>> (and those reading along) to adopt one of these and abandon the other, but 
>> since Peirce himself considered both without definitively choosing one, 
>> neither of us can rightly impose his preference on the other (or anyone 
>> else). 
>> 
>> JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' 
>> with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was 
>> justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough 
>> overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.
>> 
>> Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was 
>> perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for 
>> philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for 
>> which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages 
>> of philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with 
>> a distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis mine). He 
>> coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any mind in any 
>> way because this is a slightly different conception from "the phenomenon" as 
>> introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he renamed the 
>> corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about direct 
>> observation than systematic study.
>> 
>> JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for 
>> choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice.
>> 
>> In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing 
>> terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself. 
>> Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and 
>> applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern 
>> research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different 
>> terms really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can 
>> be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as 
>> Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual 
>> differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it 
>> seems congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what 
>> it means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so 
>> far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 
>> 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - 
>> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread John F Sowa

ly Peirce himself. 
Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding his ideas and 
applying his framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern research 
fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different terms 
really have the same meanings as Peirce's terms. Consequently, it can be 
inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as 
Peircean--the terminological differences reflect underlying conceptual 
differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it seems 
congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what it 
means, but in fact they do not have in mind "Objects which are Signs so far as 
they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 
2:488, 1908 Dec 25).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt -
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's ethics

2024-04-13 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

n the peculiar force a
general word may have in a proposition or argument. (CP 2.265, EP 2:297,
1903)


On the other hand, since Peirce never spells out the proper logical order
of the ten trichotomies in his 1906-1908 taxonomies, he also provides no
corresponding text with examples of the 66 classes. I am inclined to think
that this would be too granular for practical purposes anyway, but it can
nevertheless be useful to look at different subsets. I have done so in a
recent post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00015.html)
for the three interpretant trichotomies because I find the ten classes that
result from arranging them as final/dynamical/immediate to be more
plausible than the ten classes that result from arranging them as
immediate/dynamical/final. I also suggested the following a couple of
months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00082.html
).

   - A question is a suggestive phemic actuous symbol, a proposition
   presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to
   produce action (elicit an answer).
   - A command is an imperative phemic actuous symbol, a proposition urged
   by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce
   action.
   - A hypothesis is a suggestive phemic temperative, a proposition
   presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to
   produce self-control.
   - An assertion is an imperative phemic temperative, a proposition urged
   by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce
   self-control.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 1:06 PM Claudio Guerri 
wrote:

> Dear Etwina, Gary, List
> It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List, however, I still
> receive the corresponding information and from time to time I find precise
> indications on the possibility of deepening in some Peircean concept in my
> extensive library on Peirce.
>
> Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am
> interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better understand
> the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to take practical
> design decisions... and the same with respect to qualitative market
> research... another discipline with a necessary practical scope.
>
> However, in both cases it is a matter of developing to the maximum the
> aspects of the *enabling Firstness*: the *design* and the understanding
> of the problem... a difficult subject if there are any... or… our world
> would be a little better than what we have.
>
> I consider Peirce's *ethics* (2ness) to be directly related to his
> training in chemistry where every element in Mendeleev's table must
> necessarily be precisely nominated: H=1 cannot be confused with Pb=207.
> This is not the case with other matters such as color where there may be a
> subtle variation, unnameable with precision, in a [blue] or a [red].
>
> However, this *ethical concern* (Peirce?) entails a serious contradiction
> with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal where the main task
> should not be the positive essence but the inter-relational construction of
> a semiotic concept or process (Lizska wrote something about this).
>
> I believe that the exegesis of Peirce's work is still necessary given the
> vastness and the difficult access to his writings. However, semiotics, as a
> discipline with pretensions of *scientific methodology* (Magariños de
> Morentin) does not deal with any exegesis, but with cognitive-semiotic
> processes that are important in order to understand something about any
> subject and to be able to make decisions of different kinds, for example:
>
> 1. *to make possible* the formal description of the logic of a
> theoretical concept in order to improve it, change it or discard it
> (1ness);
>
> 2. to analyze a concrete product or behavior to *determine* its relative
> economic validity (2ness); and
>
> 3. to allow the analysis of any socio-cultural-political value in order to
> make a *decision* (Althusser) coherent with the *needs* (Peirce) of a
> given time and context (3ness).
>
> On the other hand, while the proposal to take the classification to 128 or
> hundreds of thousands of different sign-subsigns is absolutely logical, I
> wonder if there is a single person in the world who has developed that
> immense semiotic process applied to any object, problem or concrete case.
> Probably AI programs will be able to do it... but will anyone really be
> able to understand and review it for practical purposes?
>
> This is why I have developed the *Semiotic Nonagon* as a practical tool
> for qualitative analysis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

gt; vacillation nullifies any obligation to continue his practice.
>>> 
>>> Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for 
>>> 'logic as semeiotic'.  Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the 
>>> symbolic logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one).  Instead, 
>>> he chose the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's.   I believe 
>>> that Peirce made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) 
>>> deliberately chose the term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as 
>>> semeiotic'.  In my recent article on phaneroscopy, I adopted  Fisch's 
>>> recommendation.
>>> 
>>> And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority.  It is 
>>> the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing 
>>> terminology for that field.  I recommend that practice.
>>> 
>>> John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

ave similar or even different
> analyses of these realities…even though they use different terms for the
> same phenomena.
>
> I think it is vital to move the Peircean framework into modern research
> fields; It is a powerful analytic framework and has a great deal to teach
> us - and to do so, I feel, requires that we use terminology that these
> other fields feel comfortable with. …
>
> Edwina
>
> On Apr 13, 2024, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
>
> I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of
> terminology.  But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or
> indifferent.  The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for
> naming biological species.  But very few things in the world are so rigidly
> classifiable.  And those that are have been classified by international
> conventions:  the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical
> compounds.
>
> And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with
> 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later.  I believe that he was
> justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough
> overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.   As for the
> choice of 'mark' vs 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and
> his vacillation in 1908 indicates that he had some misgivings.  That
> vacillation nullifies any obligation to continue his practice.
>
> Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for
> 'logic as semeiotic'.  Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the
> symbolic logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one).  Instead,
> he chose the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's.   I believe
> that Peirce made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book)
> deliberately chose the term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as
> semeiotic'.  In my recent article on phaneroscopy, I adopted  Fisch's
> recommendation.
>
> And by the way, my citation of Fisch is *NOT *an appeal to authority.  It
> is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing
> terminology for that field.  I recommend that practice.
>
> John
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Mary Libertin

I accidentally hit the send button and I apologize for the incompleteness of my 
previous post.  

In response to the question about the definition of nominalism, I must admit 
that I have always been fascinated by Peirce’s discussion of the difference 
between nominalism and realism. 

Max H. Fisch writes the following about nominalism and realism in Published 
Works I: Electric Edition: Part Three. 1901-1908. The following is from pages 
xxviii-xxvix of the introduction. I use the blue coloring to focus Fisch's 
text, as opposed to his footnotes.
Now for the hairsplitting. The Berkeley review is much more emphatic than the 
cognition series on the distinction between the
[7 
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;chunk.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;toc.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;brand=default;query=nominalism#writings.charles.v2.11tm>
 For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's Progress from
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#15>
  Nominalism
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#17>
   toward Realism," Monist 51(1967):159–78, at 160–65.]
[8 
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;chunk.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;toc.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;brand=default;query=nominalism#writings.charles.v2.12tm>
 For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's General Theory of Signs," in Sight, 
Sound, and Sense, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1978), pp. 31–70 at 33–38 and, for Berkeley, pp. 57,63,65. For Peirce's 
early
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#16>
  nominalism
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#18>
   and its probable derivation from Whately, see also pp. 60–63. (It is worth 
adding here that Boole in An Investigation of the Laws of Thought after an 
introductory first chapter begins the investigation with Chapter II "Of Signs 
in General, and of the Signs appropriate to the science of Logic in particular; 
also of the Laws to which that class of signs are Subject"; and that Chapter 
III is headed "Derivation of the Laws of the Symbols of Logic from the Laws of 
the Operations of the Human Mind.”)]
― xxviii ―

forward and the backward reference of the term "reality" and the identification 
of
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#17>
  nominalism
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;query=nominalism;brand=default;hit.rank=14#19>
   with the backward and of realism with the forward reference. Which amounts 
to a semeiotic resolution of the controversy. Of the three central categories, 
quality is monadic, relation dyadic, and representation irreducibly triadic. 
The sign represents an object to or for an interpretant. But we may focus on 
the sign-object or on the sign-interpretant. If the question is whether there 
are real universals, the nominalists turn backward to the sign-object and do 
not find them; the realists turn forward to the sign-interpretant and find them 
(pp. 467 ff. below). That is primarily because the backward reference to the 
object is more individualistic, and the forward reference to the interpretant 
is more social. So realism goes with what has been called the social theory of 
logic, or "logical socialism."9 
<https://pm.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=peirce_w/peirce_w.02.xml;chunk.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;toc.id=writings.charles.v2.d010;brand=default;query=nominalism#writings.charles.v2.13fm>
 If we were selecting key sentences from the Peirce texts in the present 
volume, they might well include these two: (1) "Thus, the very origin of the 
conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the 
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite 
increase of knowledge" (p. 239). (2) "Whether men really have anything in 
common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if 
so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental 
practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution of 
which we have it in our power to influence" (p. 487).

The question about whether there are real universals can be answered via 
nominalism or realism, as explained above. Peirce grappled with the terms. He 
moved from being a nominalist to a realist during his life. See his review of 
Berkeley’s Collected Works where he explains his move from nominalism to 
realism.

Another place where Peirce discusses the term is in “A Description of a 
Notation for the Logic of Relatives.” I find that fascinating and can quot

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Mary Libertin

nd John (and I and many others) claim that it 
> is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no 
> already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of 
> introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it 
> behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is 
> feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio 
> Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and 
> design. 
> 
> It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, 
> there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several 
> forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. 
> Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and 
> yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that 
> intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe 
> you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I 
> will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me 
> (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since 
> I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult 
> period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then 
> that was offensive.]
> 
> If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does 
> indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's 
> terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my 
> referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant 
> primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar 
> room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's 
> ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those 
> accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in 
> structural engineering on the List.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Gary R, List
>> 
>> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am 
>> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am 
>> also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to 
>> the same  situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate 
>> scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms 
>> that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these 
>> different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should 
>> be open to using  these different terms for the SAME situation.
>> 
>> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
>> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
>> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
>> meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
>> nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
>> universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different 
>> terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
>> conceptualism. 
>> 
>> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s 
>> not my point, is it?
>> 
>> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
>> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 
>> 
>> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
>> work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
>> scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
>> perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
>> terms used by other scholars.
>> 
>> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an 
>> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given 
>> conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be 
>> made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of 
>> the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made 
>> reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of 
>> other people on the list. 
>> 
>> Edwina 
>> 
>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond &

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Gary, List

 1] With regard to terminology - the question becomes - whose terms are to be 
used?  My point is that there are other researchers who are focused on similar 
issues, each unknown to the others, [such as complex adaptive systems, the 
development of information,  anticipation processes, the development of norms 
of behaviour; genetic developments etc and etc  - the list is enormous]…I don’t 
think that anyone can be certain of ‘who thought it first’ -and therefore we 
must use The First Person's terminology’.  Most certainly, as has been pointed 
out, when we are referring to objective sciences such as  chemistry and 
referring to empirically observable chemicals and molecules and interactions 
etc… the Community of Scholars develops the terminology, over time, together.

But- cognitive and semiosic processes are different - and as I’ve said, there 
are multiple scholars working in these fields - each unknown to the other,  and 
there is no reason why, in my view, that we cannot use their terms when we 
refer to the Peircean framework…I think we should acknowledge the analytic work 
that is being done in other fields that, unknown to the researcher, fits in 
perfectly within the Peircean framework. …And I don’t see why we should insist 
that they use Peircan terminology!

2] I think that ‘purist’ could describe Jon’s approach to Peirce, but I wasn’t 
referencing him in particular - I was referencing my view that it is a fact 
that other research is being done in the same areas that Peirce focused on - 
albeit with different terminology - and I consider it important that Peircean 
research acknowledge this work and see where these analysis, using different 
terms,  align within the Peircean framework. And of course, I always emphasize 
pragmatic applications of theory.

Edwina

> On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I 
> will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last 
> word.
> 
> We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same 
> situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion, 
> that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a 
> desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter 
> if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a 
> desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any 
> scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where 
> and when it is possible. 
> 
> My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as 
> important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that it 
> is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no 
> already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of 
> introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that it 
> behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is 
> feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio 
> Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and 
> design. 
> 
> It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L, 
> there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several 
> forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others. 
> Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and 
> yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that 
> intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to describe 
> you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my apology. [I 
> will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were directed at me 
> (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List exchanges since 
> I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting that difficult 
> period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything I said then 
> that was offensive.]
> 
> If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does 
> indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's 
> terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my 
> referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant 
> primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the seminar 
> room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put Peirce's 
> ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with those 
> accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in 
> structural engineering on th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, List,

I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I
will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last
word.

We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same
situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion,
that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a*
desideratum* which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject
matter *if and when such a shared terminology is adopted*. Of course
such a *desideratum
*is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any scientific
community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where and when it
is possible.

My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as
important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that
it is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and *if* there is
no already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of
introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that
it behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is
feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what
Claudio Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art,
architecture and design.

It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L,
there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving
several forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several
others. Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by
others (and yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that
during that intense exchange I did indeed use such words as
"pseudo-Peircean" to describe you, but that I promptly apologized, and that
you accepted my apology. [I will not comment here on the unpleasant
expressions which were directed at me (and others) by you (and others) in
that fusilade of off List exchanges since I would hope that the List is
well on its way to putting that difficult period behind us. In any event, I
am truly sorry for anything I said then that was offensive.]

If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does
indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's
terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my
referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant
primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the
seminar room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put
Peirce's ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with
those accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in
structural engineering on the List.

Best,

Gary

On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Gary R, List
>
> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am
> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am
> also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to
> the same  situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot
> isolate scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only
> the terms that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that
> these different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and
> should be open to using  these different terms for the SAME situation.
>
> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the
> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some
> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to
> the meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction
> into nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality -
> aka universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different
> terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as
> conceptualism.
>
> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s
> not my point, is it?
>
> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic,
> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’.
>
> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that
> the work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of
> another scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all
> - it is perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce
> using the terms used by other scholars.
>
> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an
> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given
> conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's ethics

2024-04-13 Thread Claudio Guerri


Dear Etwina, Gary, List
It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List, however, I still 
receive the corresponding information and from time to time I find 
precise indications on the possibility of deepening in some Peircean 
concept in my extensive library on Peirce.


Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am 
interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better 
understand the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to 
take practical design decisions... and the same with respect to 
qualitative market research... another discipline with a necessary 
practical scope.


However, in both cases it is a matter of developing to the maximum the 
aspects of the /enabling Firstness/: the /design/ and the understanding 
of the problem... a difficult subject if there are any... or… our world 
would be a little better than what we have.


I consider Peirce's /ethics/ (2ness) to be directly related to his 
training in chemistry where every element in Mendeleev's table must 
necessarily be precisely nominated: H=1 cannot be confused with Pb=207. 
This is not the case with other matters such as color where there may be 
a subtle variation, unnameable with precision, in a [blue] or a [red].


However, this /ethical concern/ (Peirce?) entails a serious 
contradiction with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal 
where the main task should not be the positive essence but the 
inter-relational construction of a semiotic concept or process (Lizska 
wrote something about this).


I believe that the exegesis of Peirce's work is still necessary given 
the vastness and the difficult access to his writings. However, 
semiotics, as a discipline with pretensions of /scientific methodology/ 
(Magariños de Morentin) does not deal with any exegesis, but with 
cognitive-semiotic processes that are important in order to understand 
something about any subject and to be able to make decisions of 
different kinds, for example:


1. /to make possible/ the formal description of the logic of a 
theoretical concept in order to improve it, change it or discard it 
(1ness);


2. to analyze a concrete product or behavior to /determine/ its relative 
economic validity (2ness); and


3. to allow the analysis of any socio-cultural-political value in order 
to make a /decision/ (Althusser) coherent with the /needs/ (Peirce) of a 
given time and context (3ness).


On the other hand, while the proposal to take the classification to 128 
or hundreds of thousands of different sign-subsigns is absolutely 
logical, I wonder if there is a single person in the world who has 
developed that immense semiotic process applied to any object, problem 
or concrete case. Probably AI programs will be able to do it... but will 
anyone really be able to understand and review it for practical purposes?


This is why I have developed the /Semiotic Nonagon/ as a practical tool 
for qualitative analysis in sufficient and recursive logical 
sub-aspects: 3, 9, 27 or 81. Although, as Liszka says the SN “is not 
strictly Peircean”, 40 years of its use in academia with doctoral theses 
and professional practice as a qualitative market researcher have long 
demonstrated its efficacy. Thanks to Gary Richmond I found out yesterday 
that there is a long list of articles on this topic both in English and 
Spanish: https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri 
<https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri>This allows me not to go into further 
details about this ‘strictly’ semiotic tool. Because, it seems to me (as 
far as I know) worth noting that Peirce NEVER performed any semiotic 
analysis using his own proposed classification of signs, except for his 
unhappy decision to repeatedly name only the weather vane as an index. 
And since, as Saussure explains, verbal language develops in a 
sequential line (which prevents us from saying more than one stupid 
thing at a time), every object, behavior, or concept is always a 
complete triadic and always a complex SIGN... of which we may name one 
aspect anyway, as basic rhetoric teaches us.


All the best
CL

*Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri*
Consultant Professor
Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina
Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-7976
Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123
E-mail: claudiogue...@gmail.com
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

ral engineer’ - and has given 
> conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be 
> made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of 
> the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made 
> reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of 
> other people on the list. 
> 
> Edwina 
> 
>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina, List,
>> 
>> This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your 
>> addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
>> 
>> You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of 
>> terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that 
>> terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can 
>> constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you 
>> appear to), why?  
>> 
>> And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally 
>> focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, 
>> and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a 
>> rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with 
>> nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your 
>> definition of nominalism.
>> 
>> And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with 
>> having different concepts?
>> 
>> Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the 
>> List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed 
>> constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you 
>> suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression 
>> been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild 
>> kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea 
>> what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain 
>> what you mean by this.
>> 
>> It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean 
>> semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and 
>> pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a 
>> scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and 
>> although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory 
>> and practice).
>> 
>> So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. 
>> 
>> And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, 
>> not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean 
>> theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own 
>> priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully 
>> building on Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his words," 
>> is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to 
>> speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise.
>> 
>> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along 
>> with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought 
>> is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics. 
>>  https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en
>> 
>> Best,
>> 
>> Gary
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> List
>> 
>> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the 
>> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the 
>> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what 
>> is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky >> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ 
>>> of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
>>> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
>>> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of 
>>> the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on 
>>> ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
>>> 
>>>  Therefore , as you point out, we g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread John F Sowa

ith having 
different concepts?

Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List 
referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed 
constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you 
suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been 
directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild kind of 
'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what you mean 
by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you mean by 
this.

It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, 
of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and 
that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be 
interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, he 
himself accomplished much in both theory and practice).

So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today.

And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, not 
infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical 
'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is accurately 
understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on Peirce's views 
by carefully studying and adhering to his words," is an accomplished and 
distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at conventions and 
other gatherings because of his expertise.

And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along 
with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought is 
applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics.
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en

Best,

Gary

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky  
wrote:
List

As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct 
one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the 
individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the 
meaning and function].

Edwina

On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate 
not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic 
requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad 
which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ 
- and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .

Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ 
with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are often drawn 
between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling 
which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce -  
these are ‘false distinctions’….

Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce 
used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis,  it 
better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  taking place - 
without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???

I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and 
the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce 
never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such 
modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence 
by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite 
terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean 
semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - is where I believe the focus 
should be.

Edwina

On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:

List,I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types 
of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  a 
écrit :
John, List:

JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
'tone' as a term for a possible mark.

Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in Baldwin's 
dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," "tinge," and 
"potisign"--in various other places.

JFS: But some words

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Gary R, List

1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology.  I am also 
aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing.  I am also aware 
of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the same  
situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate scholars and 
research from each other by insisting that use only the terms that specific 
scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these different scholars were 
trying to examine the same situations - and should be open to using  these 
different terms for the SAME situation.

2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the 
insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some 
reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the 
meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into 
nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka 
universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, 
there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as 
conceptualism. 

Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not 
my point, is it?

3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, 
idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 

4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the 
work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another 
scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is 
perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the 
terms used by other scholars.

5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an 
‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given 
conference papers and  published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be 
made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of 
the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made reference, 
- such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of other people on 
the list. 

Edwina 

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List,
> 
> This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your 
> addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
> 
> You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of 
> terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that 
> terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can 
> constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you 
> appear to), why?  
> 
> And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally 
> focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, 
> and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a 
> rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with 
> nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your 
> definition of nominalism.
> 
> And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with 
> having different concepts?
> 
> Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the List 
> referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed 
> constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you 
> suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression 
> been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild 
> kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea what 
> you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain what you 
> mean by this.
> 
> It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean semeiotic, 
> of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and pragmatism -- and 
> that they are not mutually exclusive, that a scholar/scientist can be 
> interested both in theory and practice (and although Peirce once denied it, 
> he himself accomplished much in both theory and practice).
> 
> So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today. 
> 
> And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt, 
> not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean theoretical 
> 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own priority is 
> accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on 
> Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his words," is an 
> accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often invited to speak at 
> conventions and other gatherings because of his expertise.
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-13 Thread robert marty

John, List,
In the same vein, I also published another article in Academia.edu, which
consists of a commented reading of CP 265, the item that follows his
diagram of affinities between classes of signs of 2.264 (a sort of
intuition that Peirce had of the structure of order that is a lattice,
which I have shown many times). Probably I wasn't convincing enough.
Perhaps this comment will be more convincing. There is no mention of
Tone/Mark, Token, or Type, but of course, they are present in other names.

 https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs
<https://www.academia.edu/44462107/Other_subdivisions_of_signs>

As for hypoicons, which I, too, have noted appear only once in MS 478, I am
in the process of finalizing a solid argument, at my peril, of course, to
the effect that this notion should be abandoned because it is invalidated
by the contents of MS 540.  My conclusion is that these hypoicons, wrongly
considered as a sort of subdivisions of icons (which I myself erroneously
theorized) are a kind of shadow image of the trichotomy of the object of
the sign, forgotten by Peirce in MS 478. But that's another story.
Regards,
Robert

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 21:19, John F Sowa  a écrit :

> Robert, Jon, List,
>
> Thanks for the note.  There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree
> with Jon's comments.
>
> But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes
> enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others.  For
> example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that
> Peirce discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he
> introduced semes as a generalization of rhemes.
>
> This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the
> decade of 1903 to 1913.  To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I
> won't say anything more.
>
> John
>
>
>
> ------
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *Sent*: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
> *To*: Peirce-L 
> *Cc*: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, Anthony Jappy ,
> "Houser, Nathan R." 
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
>
> Robert, List:
>
> Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the
> List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's
> 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his
> 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only
> quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is
> why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly
> replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537,
> 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three
> additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost
> oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
> sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.
>
> RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should
> make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a
> tone/mark of a particular kind.
>
>
> Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.
>
> CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act
> as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with
> its character as a sign.
> A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It
> can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or
> rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and
> only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291,
> 1903)
>
> CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as
> some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon,
> and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only
> be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign.
> (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)
>
>
> Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be
> carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant
> Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied
> in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every
> sinsign/token *involves *qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every
> iconic sinsign/token *embodies *a qualisign.
>
> Regards,
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, List,

This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your
addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:

You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of
terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence
that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it
can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree
(which you appear to), why?

And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally
focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt,
and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a
rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has *anything* to do
with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your
definition of nominalism.

And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with
having different concepts?

Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the
List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed
constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today
*you* suggested
that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been
directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild
*kind* of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no idea
what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please explain
what you mean by this.

It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean
semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and
pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a
scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and
although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory
and practice).

So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today.

And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan Schmidt,
not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean
theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own
priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully
building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *
words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often
invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his
expertise.

And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find, along
with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean thought
is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and ethics.
 https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en

Best,

Gary

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> List
>
> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the
> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the
> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to
> ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’
> of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s
> a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a
> more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function
> of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on
> ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
>
>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce
> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are
> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression -
> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally
> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
>
> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which
> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your
> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is
> semiotically  taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour
> of rejection???
>
> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the
> terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic
> object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic
> mediation….[*Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean;
> you are…*” . But without such modernization and explanation of the
> function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only
> Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be
> able to move the real analytic power of Peircean

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread John F Sowa

Jon,

To begin, I'll quote a highly respected authority about arguments from 
authority.  The following passage about authority comes from Wikiquote, a 
source that is widely considered an authoritative source of information:

"Appeal to an authority which depends on human reason is the weakest kind of 
proof.

- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica

...when we engage in argument we must look to the weight of reason rather than 
authority. Indeed, students who are keen to learn often find the authority of 
those who claim to be teachers to be an obstacle, for they cease to apply their 
own judgement and regard as definitive the solution offered by the mentor of 
whom they approve. I myself tend to disapprove of the alleged practice of the 
Pythagoreans: the story goes that if they were maintaining some position in 
argument, and were asked why, they would reply: "The master said so", the 
master being Pythagoras. Prior judgement exercised such sway that authority 
prevailed even when unsupported by reason."

My argument for the word 'mark' as a better choice than 'tone' is based on my 
own reasoning long before I noticed that Tony Jappy had made the same choice.  
And in the discussions, I supported every point with my own reasons.  However, 
I realized that some readers, such as you, might disagree.  So I said that if 
you don't believe me, go to another Peirce scholar who has spent years of 
research on these issues.

That is the kind of citation that is REQUIRED in peer-reviewed publications in 
every field.  The author is expected to cite related research.  Instead of 
criticizing me, you should thank me for providing that additional information.

JAS:  That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is 
required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, 
it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the 
author's.

I suggest that you read (or reread) some of the articles in the Summa 
Theologiae by Aquinas.  In every article, he cites what other scholars have 
written pro and con each of the statements he is trying to prove.  He then 
explains the arguments he agrees with and refutes the ones he disagrees with.

The methods of citation by Aquinas established the polices for scholarly 
writing for universities for the next 800 years.  At the top, I quoted Aquinas. 
 I suggest that you read (or reread) a few of his articles.  My citations of 
Jappy's writings are the same kind of references that Aquinas used to cite 
authors who supported the points he was trying to prove.

And by the way, Peirce had also read quite a bit of the writings by Aquinas (in 
Latin, of course).  In fact, the commentary about Aristotle by Aquinas is still 
regarded as a good introduction today.  In fact, Hilary Putnam recommended it.

Those recommendations are very respectable.  They're the kind of references I 
made to Jappy.  Anybody who criticizes that as a fallacy deserves a huge amount 
of criticism.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/11/24 10:28 PM

John, List:

JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical 
fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or 
an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.

Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an influential 
figure is used as evidence to support an argument" 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a dictionary 
or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is not a fallacious 
appeal to authority because such references contain facts on which there is 
broad consensus, not opinions whose persuasiveness depends primarily on the 
eminence and purported expertise of a particular person who holds them.

JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that 
authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for 
their own claims.

That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required 
by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is 
primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's.

JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as 
an authority.

Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about his own views is also not a 
fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said before, his is 
the only authority that matters in such a context. As someone once said, 
"Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody 
can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended" 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html).

JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in 
exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term.

Obvio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panel on Semiotic Exploration of Ecology at the 2024 Warsaw IASS-AIS World Congress

2024-04-12 Thread Gary Richmond

Dear Claudio,

This is exciting news indeed, and in an area of semiotics which I know
holds considerable interest to at least several members of the Peirce-L
forum including me.

Thank you for all the excellent work you have done and continue to do in
the Peircean semiotics -- including his three categories -- of design and
ecology, including the semiotics of art, architecture, etc. I'm delighted
that many of your works are available in English; were my Spanish better,
I'd delve into some of your work written in that beautiful language.
https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri

 I have plans to be in Europe from September 9 through the 24th (Brussels,
Amsterdam/Tilburg, and Berlin) and will see if it is still possible to
adjust my schedule to include your Warsaw panel.

Warm regards,

Gary

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 2:27 PM Claudio Guerri 
wrote:

> Dear Friends and colleagues, we have some excellent news to share with you!
>
> The network "SPACE SEMIOTICS [Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping]"
> https://significant.design/subscribe is organizing a *panel *titled: *Semiotic
> Explorations of Ecology (in Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping)* 
> (Isabel
> Marcos & Claudio Guerri) this year within the framework of the *16th
> IASS-AIS World Congress devoted to Signs and Realities, 2-6 September 2024
> in Warsaw, Poland.*
>
> *The call is open until the 15th April 2024, you can submit your paper
> here:* *https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty*
> <https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty>
>
> * How the registration process works:*
>
> *1. You pre-register without paying.*
>
> *2. You get your registration ID (RegID).*
>
> *3. With your RegID you can submit your paper abstracts until 15 April
> 2024.*
>
> At the end of the panel, we will include a round-table to discuss the
> unresolved problems of *Signs and Realities*, *Ecology in Design* and
> *Design* and *Morphology* in general. With this call we are asking all
> interested scholars to participate in this round-table and to propose their
> own point of view on applied semiotics.
>
> We will finally meet in person!
>
> Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri
>
> *Description of the panel proposal:*
>
> Ecology, when examined from a semiotic perspective, reveals itself as a
> complex reality, intertwining tangible environmental phenomena with
> theoretical, physical and symbolic representations. This manifestation
> possibilities invites us to explore the interconnections between semiotics,
> design, architecture, urbanism and landscaping. Thus, ecology, connecting
> the tangible aspects of the environment to the different semiotic
> constructions shape our understanding and interaction with this reality.
>
> *1. Semiotics in Environmental Communication:* Explore how semiotic
> systems contribute to the communication of environmental issues.
>
> *2. Semiotic Analysis of the Ecological Crisis:* Investigation of
> semiotic representations of the ecological crisis in different discourses.
>
> *3. Ecological Language and Technological Innovation:* Study of the
> creation of a specific semiotic language to discuss ecological issues, with
> an analysis of the impact of technological innovations.
>
> *4. Semiotic Ethics in Design:* Explore the ethical implications of
> semiotics related to growth in the fields of design. How do signs
> contribute to the formulation of new ecological ethics in design?
>
> *5. Semiotics in Bioclimatic Architecture:* Examine the role of
> bioclimatic architecture and how the signifying elements of this approach
> are used to create the maximum ecological impact of natural resources.
>
> *6. Urban Semiotics and Environmental Policy: *Examining how new
> ecological practices in the urban context impact environmental policies.
> What is the ecological significance of these urban practices and how do
> they shape environmental policies?
>
> *7. Landscape Semiotics and Ecological Impact:* Study of sign usage in
> vegetal, urban, and architectural landscapes, taking into account their
> ecological impact. How does landscape semiotics influence environmental
> awareness and sustainable practices?
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> message and nothing in the body.  More at
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread John F Sowa

Robert, Jon, List,

Thanks for the note.  There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree with 
Jon's comments.

But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes 
enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others.  For 
example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that Peirce 
discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he introduced 
semes as a generalization of rhemes.

This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the decade 
of 1903 to 1913.  To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I won't say 
anything more.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci 
, Anthony Jappy , 
"Houser, Nathan R." 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

Robert, List:

Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the List 
back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's 1903 
taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his 1906-1908 
taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only quibble with 
it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is why it 
identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly replaces 
"sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, 1906). 
Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three additional 
classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost oval in each Venn 
diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical sinsigns/tokens, and dicent 
sinsigns/tokens.

RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it 
possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark 
of a particular kind.

Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.

CSP: A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.
A Sinsign ... is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only 
be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, 
several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a 
sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, 1903)

CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as some 
quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, and thus 
a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only be 
interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. (CP 
2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)

Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be 
carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant Forms" 
(CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied in 
sinsigns/tokens in order to act as signs. In fact, every sinsign/token involves 
qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token embodies a 
qualisign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty  wrote:
List,I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types 
of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Robert, List:

Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the
List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's
1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his
1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only
quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is
why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly
replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537,
1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three
additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost
oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical
sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens.

RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should
make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a
tone/mark of a particular kind.

Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this.

CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as
a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its
character as a sign.
A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It
can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or
rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and
only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291,
1903)

CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as
some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon,
and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only
be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign.
(CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903)

Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be
carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant
Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied
in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every
sinsign/token *involves
*qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token *embodies
*a qualisign.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> List,
> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a
> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but
> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the
> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky

List

As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct 
one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the 
individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the 
meaning and function].

Edwina

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
> the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a 
> debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more 
> basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the 
> triad which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term 
> to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .
> 
>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce 
> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are 
> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - 
> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally 
> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
> 
> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which 
> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your 
> analysis,  it better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  
> taking place - without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???
> 
> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
> ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object 
> and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic 
> mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you 
> are…” . But without such modernization and explanation of the function of 
> semiosis, and the insistence by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - 
> and above all, his ‘favourite terms’ - , we will never be able to move the 
> real analytic power of Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - 
> is where I believe the focus should be. 
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
>> 
>> List,
>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a 
>> few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but 
>> the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the 
>> six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>> Regards,
>> Robert Marty
>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
>> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>> John, List:
>>> 
>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>> 
>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>> 
>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>> 
>>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so 
>>> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, 
>>> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>>> 
>>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>> 
>>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, wi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of 
the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate 
not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic 
requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative function of the triad 
which is using those terms; it is instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ 
- and the focus is on ‘purity vs functionality’. .

 Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce prefer’ 
with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are often drawn 
between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression - the wrangling 
which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce -  
these are ‘false distinctions’….

Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which Peirce 
used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your analysis,  it 
better explains the operative function of what is semiotically  taking place - 
without the heavens opening up with a downpour of rejection???

I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the terms 
‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the Dynamic object and 
the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the semiosic mediation….[Peirce 
never used those words!! You’re a pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such 
modernization and explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence 
by ’The Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite 
terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of Peircean 
semiosis into the modern world. And that -  - is where I believe the focus 
should be. 

Edwina


> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> List,
> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few 
> years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the 
> same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six 
> types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
> Regards,
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
> 
> 
> 
> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>> John, List:
>> 
>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 
>> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>> 
>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in 
>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone," 
>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>> 
>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be 
>> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>> 
>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that 
>> it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then 
>> "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and 
>> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting 
>> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>> 
>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
>> in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>> 
>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is 
>> the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times 
>> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and 
>> necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was published during his 
>> lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and 
>> the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found 
>> solely in the latter, although she subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone 
>> once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he 
>> tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to 
>> understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing 
>> explanations for his abstract ideas" 
>> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>> 
>> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
>> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-12 Thread robert marty

List,
I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but
the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the
six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
Regards,
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*



Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> John, List:
>
> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and
> 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>
>
> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in
> Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>
> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be
> considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>
>
> Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so
> that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion,
> then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and
> "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting
> with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."
>
> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often,
> mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>
>
> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is
> the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times
> between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
> necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during
> his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries
> and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign"
> found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone."
> As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining
> principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and
> difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more
> convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>
> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single
> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody
> else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or
> the other, please let us know.
>
>
> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his
> personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately
> understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's
> *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Gary, Jon, List,
>>
>> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous
>> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.).
>>
>> My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the
>> words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word
>> pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But
>> some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered
>> ugly.   They are certainly not memorable.
>>
>> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible
>> mark'.  That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word
>> for the future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more
>> often, mainly in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>
>> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the
>> triad (mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the
>> issues.  As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are
>> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the
>> street).
>>
>> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in
>> logic, including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and
'tone' as a term for a possible mark.

Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in
Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
"tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.

JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be
considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.

Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so
that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion,
then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and
"type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting
with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device."

JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly
in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.

It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is
the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times
between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during his
lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and
the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found
solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone." As
someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles
that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to
understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing
explanations for his abstract ideas" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).

JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single
non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody
else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or
the other, please let us know.

Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his
personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately
understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on
*Peirce's *views
by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary, Jon, List,
>
> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous
> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.).
>
> My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the words
> 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word pulled
> out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But some
> words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly.
>   They are certainly not memorable.
>
> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible
> mark'.  That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word
> for the future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more
> often, mainly in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.
>
> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the
> triad (mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the
> issues.  As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are
> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the
> street).
>
> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in
> logic, including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for
> publications.   There are even more lecture slides.  (Copies upon request.)
>
> But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the
> future.  The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists,
> and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term,
> find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone.  I discovered that
> point while talking to them.  That is not a scientific survey, but I could
> not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word
> 'tone'.
>
> If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference)
> one way or the other, please let us know.
>
> John
>
> --
> *From*: "Gary Richmond" 
> List,
>
> While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as
> it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of hi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical
*fallacy*". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a
dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.

Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an
influential figure is used as evidence to support an argument" (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a
dictionary or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is *not *a
fallacious appeal to authority because such references contain *facts *on
which there is broad consensus, not *opinions *whose persuasiveness depends
primarily on the eminence and purported expertise of a particular person
who holds them.

JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows
that authors are *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend
on for their own claims.

That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is
required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time.
Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are
not the author's.

JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him
as an authority.

Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about *his own views* is also
not a fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said
before, his is the *only *authority that matters in such a context. As
someone once said, "Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion
of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce
intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html).

JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in
exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*.

Obviously, all these English words *are *terms--no one is disputing that.
The issue here is whether they *signify *a certain kind of term. As defined
by Peirce in Baldwin's dictionary, that is *precisely *what "mark"
signifies; but as defined by Peirce in the various passages that I have
repeatedly cited and quoted, that is *not at all* what "tone," "tuone,"
"tinge," and "potisign" signify.

JFS: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just
pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a
mistake.

I have not accused anyone of anything, nor have I claimed that anyone is
making a mistake. I have simply spelled out *Peirce's *relevant views, as
amply supported by exact quotations. Besides, as someone once said, "we
should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition.
If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the
correction" 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html)--not
treat it as an accusation.

JFS: If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I
have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so.

I have not criticized anyone for believing that "mark" is a better choice
than "tone" for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and
necessitant "type," even though I strongly disagree. On the contrary, I
have explicitly stated more than once that anyone is welcome to hold that
opinion and make a case for it. Nevertheless, as I have also stated more
than once, no one can accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and
definitive choice.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, Gary, List,
>
> First, let me dismiss a false claim:  "appeal to authority is a logical
> *fallacy".*
>
> Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an
> encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.   The requirement to
> cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are
> *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their
> own claims.  In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are
> appealing to him as an authority.  Of course, everybody is fallible, even
> authorities.  But rejection of an authority requires some evidence.
>
> Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted
> below):  "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever
> it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to
> say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one
> term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or
> things can be predicated".
>
> The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in
> exa

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-11 Thread John F Sowa

Gary, Jon, List,

My note crossed in the mail with Gary's.  I responded to the previous notes by 
Jon and Gary (q.v.).

My conclusion:  As words, there is no logical difference between the words 
'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.   In fact, any word pulled out 
of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark.  But some words, 
such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly.   They are 
certainly not memorable.

Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible mark'.  
That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word for the 
future.  Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly 
in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.

But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the triad 
(mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the issues.  As I 
pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are more likely to be 
authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the street).

And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in logic, 
including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for publications.   
There are even more lecture slides.  (Copies upon request.)

But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the future.  The 
overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, and philosophers 
who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, find mark far more 
congenial and memorable than tone.  I discovered that point while talking to 
them.  That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single 
non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'.

If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one 
way or the other, please let us know.

John


From: "Gary Richmond" 
List,

While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has 
continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that  
the principal issue being considered has not been resolved unless you want to 
accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines 
of his analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled 
because John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion.

I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is 
bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has 
repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - 
that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition 
is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 
'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of term and, so, 
decidedly not a possible sign. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 
'mark' is always an existential one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty 
mark.

Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a 
possible sign include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of 
feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to 
be positively possible."

John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague 
Quality" that his listeners, typically not schooled in Peircean thought, "find 
it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can 
only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, 
earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana 
Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's 
Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, 
type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's 
semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the 
three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic 
device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun 
intended).

Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the 
term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical 
fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with 
Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 
'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words!

Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements 
with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed 
appreciation for the engagement with several Peirce-L members with whom he has 
'contended' on the List, including John.

And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent 
one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-11 Thread John F Sowa

Jon, Gary, List,

First, let me dismiss a false claim:  "appeal to authority is a logical 
fallacy".

Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an 
encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.   The requirement to cite 
references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show 
the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims.  In fact , 
when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority.  
Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities.  But rejection of an 
authority requires some evidence.

Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below):  
"To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be 
predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two 
terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) 
can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be 
predicated".

The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly 
the same way that the word 'mark' is a term.  Whatever those terms may be 
predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated.  Therefore, the word 
'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer 
to a possible mark.

In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark.  In 
fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose.  In 1908, Peirce 
recognized that point.  Whether or not he vacillated on that point is 
irrelevant.  He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most 
speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable.   That is 
sufficient justification for preferring it.

JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this 
issue.

JAS: Then why keep posting about it?

Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to 
Peirce list.   I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending 
them to the list.

Remark to Gary:  Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake.  I 
am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a 
mistake.  If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do 
so.  If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have 
a right to do so without being criticized for doing so.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:

JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with 
Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its 
favor.

As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any 
use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's 
dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is inconsistent with 
his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and 
"potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or 
things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be 
predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be 
predicated"--which entails that it is a necessitant type embodied in existent 
tokens, not a possible sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as 
"what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a 
quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character 
in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite 
significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 
Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but 
felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25).

JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why 
I adopted it in my writings on this topic.

The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with 
Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly misunderstands the word "mark" 
when it is used for a possible sign, the counterpart of an existent "token" and 
a necessitant "type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," 
"tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely not "that part of an image that 
determines it as a token of some type" 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among 
other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its Instances or 
embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 
339:277r, 1906 Apr 2).

JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of 
Peirce's writings during

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-11 Thread Gary Richmond

List,

While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it
has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded
me that  the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved
unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way,
completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v.
'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so,
there's no need for further discussion.

I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's
argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example,
contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than
sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with
Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion
of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by
Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*.
Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an
*existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark.

Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions
of a *possible
sign* include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of
feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt
to be positively possible."

John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague
Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in Peircean thought,
"find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written
work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years.
For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the
George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of
Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing
tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were
familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and,
indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't'
perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may,
that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended).

Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used
the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the
logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of
discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have
faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words!

Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his
disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his
papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with* several*
Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John.

And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most
recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact
did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages where
Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as 'tuone' and
'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating his opinions with
little textual support.

So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic to
honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and determine for
themself who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'.
Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest (at least for a time).

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent
> with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point
> in its favor.
>
>
> As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support,
> any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's
> dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is
> *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone,"
> "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of
> term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to
> say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these
> terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a
> *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign.
> On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being
> whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling
> which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature
> incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with
Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in
its favor.

As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support,
any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's
dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is
*inconsistent *with
his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and
"potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms
or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can
be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be
predicated"--which
entails that it is a *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not
a *possible *sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what
has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a
quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a
character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an
indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R
339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are
merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488,
1908 Dec 25).

JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is
why I adopted it in my writings on this topic.

The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with
Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly *misunderstands *the word
"mark" when it is used for a *possible *sign, the counterpart of an *existent
*"token" and a *necessitant *"type." For example, as a candidate to replace
"tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely *not *"that part
of an image that determines it as a token of some type" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again,
among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its *Instances
*or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only
similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2).

JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution
of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his
analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to
note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather
than 'tone'.

Tony Jappy *uses *"mark" rather than "tone," but does he ever give a
*reason *for doing so? Maybe it is just for convenience when quoting the *only
*sentence where Peirce himself employs it without qualification--"Consequently
an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which
shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489,
1908 Dec 25). Either way, as Gary already observed, appeal to authority is
a logical *fallacy*, and we also need to be mindful of the danger of
confirmation bias. Over the years, I have benefited greatly from my
*disagreements
*with others on the List because they have prompted me to go back to *Peirce's
*relevant writings and then either bolster my arguments (as in this case)
or revise my position accordingly, although I never find bald assertions to
be persuasive.

JFS: I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing
new.

On the contrary, in my last post (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00049.html), I listed
for the first time *all *the different passages where Peirce uses "tone" as
well as "tuone," "tinge," "potisign," and even "idea"; and I provided a
long excerpt from his Logic Notebook that has not previously appeared in
this or any other recent List thread, where he describes what he has in
mind (using "tuone") and carefully distinguishes it from a type. By
contrast, much of the post below is repetition of previously expressed
opinions, with no exact quotations from Peirce to support them.

JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this
issue.

Then why keep posting about it?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 9:02 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary, Jon, List
>
> To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions
> have to be made.  I have stated the reasons why I believe that the
> trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and
> most detailed reasoning.  I also agree with him that (mark token type) are
> simpler English words that would

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-10 Thread John F Sowa

Gary, Jon, List

To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions have to 
be made.  I have stated the reasons why I believe that the trichotomy 
(potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and most detailed 
reasoning.  I also agree with him that (mark token type) are simpler English 
words that would be better for widespread use.

The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's 
definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor.  
The words 'tone', 'tinge', or 'tuone' are too narrow.  They might be useful for 
sounds, but they are not as general as 'mark' for images in other sensory 
modalities.

I have also lectured and written articles for a larger audience of 
professionals who are familiar with the terms 'token' and 'type', but have 
never used, read, or heard the word 'tone' for the first member.  The most 
likely reason is that nobody except Peirce scholars would ever use the word 
'tone'.  But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial.  That is 
why I adopted it in my writings on this topic.

Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of 
Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life.  I find his analyses 
quite compatible with my own studies.  Therefore, I am pleased to note that he 
has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'.

I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject.  There is nothing new.  I 
am not asking him to do anything he doesn't want to do.  All I'm saying is that 
there is no reason to continue discussing this issue.

John


From: "Gary Richmond" 

John, Jon, List,

JFS: I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of 
hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to 
mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
GR: It appears to me that if Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to argue his 
position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping.

But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's "rather 
poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been argued rather 
convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for preferring 'tone' to 
'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own work, I can see why you 
might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and as I've followed this 
discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's argument for 'tone' is stronger 
than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not alone in that opinion.

This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from  
authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own:

JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my own 
studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade."
GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to 
solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for 
scientists and other scholars to try to refute his work where possible in the 
interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a 
corollary of the method of science as  opposed to the other methods of inquiry. 
With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable hypotheses, 
inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the methods of 
tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori method (pretty 
much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some matter is 'right' 
), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in scientific inquiry. Of 
course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that the appeal to authority is a 
well-known logical fallacy.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.
GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to 
determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for that 
matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L.  Still, I must agree with you that the 
arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and List 
members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been strongest, most 
convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or Jon's, or my word 
for it.

JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings.  i strongly urge you to 
study them.
GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which he 
clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority is 
unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing belief.

It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of inquiry, 
and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe meant to 
apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that reflecting on those 
ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they consider what conduct is and 
is not appropriate here. As did

[PEIRCE-L] The central executive

2024-04-10 Thread John F Sowa

Dima,

Yes, they were in the same field as George Miller (psychology).  But they also 
hung out with enough neuroscientists that some of the blood and guts rubbed off 
on them.   Right now, the major research on the topic depends on neuroscience.

That is one among many reasons why I prefer to use the term 'Cognitive 
Science'.  The subject is so complex that collaboration among the different  
fields is essential.

John


From: "Dima, Alden A. (Fed)' via ontolog-forum" 

Hi John,
A certain large language model tells me that Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch 
were psychologists and not neuroscientists.
Alden
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[PEIRCE-L] The central executive

2024-04-10 Thread John F Sowa

;Artificial General Intelligence" (AGI). That's
> why I have very little faith in anything called AGI.
>
> John
>
> 
> From: "doug foxvog" 
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The central executive
>
> On Wed, April 10, 2024 14:07, John F Sowa wrote:
>> In today's ZOOM meeting, I objected to the term 'neuro-symbolic hybrid'
>> of
>> artificial neural networks (ANNs) with symbols. Hybrids simply relate
>> two
>> (sometimes more) distinctly different things. But all the processes in
>> the mind and brain are integrated, and they all operate continuously in
>> different parts of the brain, which are all monitored and controlled by
>> a
>> central executive. ...
>
> This seems to me to be modeling the body as a machine and not an accurate
> description.
>
> There are a wide variety of processes in the mind and brain -- many
> processes in the brain occur independently without being integrated either
> with each other or with the mind. I am excluding standard cellular level
> processes that go on in every cell and the processes of the circulatory
> system in the brain. Every neuron regularly chemically interacts with
> adjacent neurons & passes electrical signals along its surface.
>
> As far as i understand, much that goes on in the brain we are unaware of,
> neurohormone production, for example. Sensory input processing does not
> seem to be integrated with a number of other processes. I have seen no
> evidence of a central executive in the brain that monitors and controls
> all the other processes. I'm not sure how such a central executive could
> have evolved.
>
> --
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[PEIRCE-L] The central executive

2024-04-10 Thread John F Sowa

Doug,

The central executive was proposed by the neuroscientists Baddeley & Hitch, not 
by AI researchers.  There is nothing "machine-like" in the idea, by itself.   
Without something like it, there is no way to explain how a huge tangle of 
neurons could act together and coordinate their efforts to support a common 
effort.

It reminds me of a neighboring town (to my residence in Croton on Hudson, NY), 
which was doing some major developments without hiring a general contractor.  
They thought that their local town employees could schedule all the processes.  
It turned out to be a total disaster.  All the subcontractors did their tasks 
in a random order, each one interfering with some of the others, and causing a 
major mess.  There were lawsuits back and forth, and the town management was 
found  guilty and had losses that were many times greater than the cost of 
hiring a general contractor.

It is certainly true that there is a huge amount of computation going on in the 
brain that is below conscious awareness.  Most of that is done by the 
cerebellum (little brain), which is physically much smaller than the cerebral 
cortex.  But it contains over four times the number of neurons.  In effect, the 
cerebellum behaves like a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit) which is a superfast, 
highly specialized processor for all the perception and action that takes place 
without conscious awareness.

For example, when you're walking down the street talking on your cell phone, 
the cerebellum is monitoring your vision, muscles, and strides -- until you 
step off the curb and get run over by a bus. That's why you need a central 
controller to monitor and coordinate all the processes.

Sharks and dolphins are about the same size and they eat the same kind of prey. 
 Sharks have a huge cerebellum and a small lump for a cerebellum.   Dolphins 
have a huge cerebral cortex and a huge cerebellum.  They are as agile as 
sharks, but they can plan, communicate, and coordinate their activities.  When 
the food is plentiful, they can both eat their fill.  But when it's scarce, the 
dolphins are much more successful.

Please look at the citations in my previous note and the attached Section7.pdf. 
  The cycle of abduction, induction, testing, and induction depends on a 
central executive that is responsible for planning, coordinating, and 
integrating those steps of conscious feeling, thinking, reasoning, and acting.  
 With a central executive, an AI system would be more intelligent.  But much, 
much more R & D would be required before anything could be called "Artificial 
General Intelligence"  (AGI).  That's why I have very little faith in anything 
called AGI.

John

From: "doug foxvog" 
Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The central executive

On Wed, April 10, 2024 14:07, John F Sowa wrote:
> In today's ZOOM meeting, I objected to the term 'neuro-symbolic hybrid' of
> artificial neural networks (ANNs) with symbols. Hybrids simply relate two
> (sometimes more) distinctly different things. But all the processes in
> the mind and brain are integrated, and they all operate continuously in
> different parts of the brain, which are all monitored and controlled by a
> central executive. ...

This seems to me to be modeling the body as a machine and not an accurate
description.

There are a wide variety of processes in the mind and brain -- many
processes in the brain occur independently without being integrated either
with each other or with the mind. I am excluding standard cellular level
processes that go on in every cell and the processes of the circulatory
system in the brain. Every neuron regularly chemically interacts with
adjacent neurons & passes electrical signals along its surface.

As far as i understand, much that goes on in the brain we are unaware of,
neurohormone production, for example. Sensory input processing does not
seem to be integrated with a number of other processes. I have seen no
evidence of a central executive in the brain that monitors and controls
all the other processes. I'm not sure how such a central executive could
have evolved.
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[PEIRCE-L] Panel on Semiotic Exploration of Ecology at the 2024 Warsaw IASS-AIS World Congress

2024-04-10 Thread Claudio Guerri


Dear Friends and colleagues, we have some excellent news to share with you!

The network "SPACE SEMIOTICS [Design, Architecture, Urbanism, 
Landscaping]"https://significant.design/subscribe 
<https://significant.design/subscribe>is organizing a *panel 
*titled:*Semiotic Explorations of Ecology (in Design, Architecture, 
Urbanism, Landscaping)*(Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri) this year within 
the framework of the *16th IASS-AIS World Congress devoted to/Signs and 
Realities/, 2-6 September 2024 in Warsaw, Poland.*


**The call is open until the 15th April 2024*, you can submit your paper 
here:**https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty* 
<https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty>*

*

*How the registration process works:*

*1. You pre-register without paying.*

*2. You get your registration ID (RegID).*

*3. With your RegID you can submit your paper abstracts until 15 April 
2024.*


At the end of the panel, we will include a round-table to discuss the 
unresolved problems of*/Signs and Realities/*,*/Ecology in 
Design/*and*/Design/*and*/Morphology/*in general. With this call we are 
asking all interested scholars to participate in this round-table and to 
propose their own point of view on applied semiotics.


We will finally meet in person!

Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri

*Description of the panel proposal:*

Ecology, when examined from a semiotic perspective, reveals itself as a 
complex reality, intertwining tangible environmental phenomena with 
theoretical, physical and symbolic representations. This manifestation 
possibilities invites us to explore the interconnections between 
semiotics, design, architecture, urbanism and landscaping. Thus, 
ecology, connecting the tangible aspects of the environment to the 
different semiotic constructions shape our understanding and interaction 
with this reality.


*1. Semiotics in Environmental Communication:*Explore how semiotic 
systems contribute to the communication of environmental issues.


*2. Semiotic Analysis of the Ecological Crisis:*Investigation of 
semiotic representations of the ecological crisis in different discourses.


*3. Ecological Language and Technological Innovation:*Study of the 
creation of a specific semiotic language to discuss ecological issues, 
with an analysis of the impact of technological innovations.


*4. Semiotic Ethics in Design:*Explore the ethical implications of 
semiotics related to growth in the fields of design. How do signs 
contribute to the formulation of new ecological ethics in design?


*5. Semiotics in Bioclimatic Architecture:*Examine the role of 
bioclimatic architecture and how the signifying elements of this 
approach are used to create the maximum ecological impact of natural 
resources.


*6. Urban Semiotics and Environmental Policy:*Examining how new 
ecological practices in the urban context impact environmental policies. 
What is the ecological significance of these urban practices and how do 
they shape environmental policies?


*7. Landscape Semiotics and Ecological Impact:*Study of sign usage in 
vegetal, urban, and architectural landscapes, taking into account their 
ecological impact. How does landscape semiotics influence environmental 
awareness and sustainable practices?


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-09 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: I don't understand why you're jumping through hoops to defend a rather
poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once.
(Except for once more in the LNB.)


I am not the one who is jumping through hoops--the textual evidence plainly
*supports* my position. For example, it is blatantly false that Peirce
mentions "tone" just once or twice; on the contrary, he uses it as the
counterpart of "token" and "type" more often than any other candidate after
abandoning qualisign/sinsign/legisign (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31; CP 4.537,
1906; SS 83, EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23; CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25; R
339:340, 1908 Dec 27). In one of the few exceptions, he instead uses
"tuone," which "is a blend of Tone and Tune" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2); more
on that below. By contrast, the December 1908 letter to Lady Welby is the
*sole* place where "mark" and "potisign" appear as alternatives, and the
only other variants are "tinge" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31) and "idea" (R
795, c. 1908).

JFS: The word 'mark' is much more natural, more general, more consistent
with his definition in Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to
explain to intelligent listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars.


Please review my last post, especially the exact quotations that I provided
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00043.html). In
Baldwin's dictionary, Peirce explicitly defines a "mark" as a certain kind
of *term*, which is a symbol and thus a *necessitant* sign (type) that is
embodied in *existent* signs (tokens)--utterly inconsistent with his
various definitions of a *possible* sign, including the following lengthy
discussion of a tuone and how it differs from a type.

CSP: It means a quality of feeling which is significant, whether it be
simple, like a Tone or complex, like a Tune. But the latter is not *pure*
feeling. By a Token, I mean an existing thing or an historical event which
serves as a Sign. By a Type, I mean a general form which can be repeated
indefinitely, and is in all its repetitions one and the same Sign. Thus the
word *the* is a Type. It is likely to occur over a score of times on a page
of an English book; but it is only one word twenty times repeated. The
distinction between a Type and a Token is obvious. There may be some
confusion between the Tuone and the Type. They may, however, be
distinguished in various ways. In the first place, a Type is absolutely
identical in all its *Instances* or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have
any identity, it has only similarity. Thus the sound of any word will be
slightly different every two times it is pronounced and in so far as it is
so, it is two Tuones. But any two vowels in so far as they are alike are
the same Tuone, in the only sense in which there can be any sameness to a
Tuone. Any thing then that could conceivably be made absolutely definite,
bearing in mind that no two things can be exactly alike in any quality
whatever, cannot be a Tuone. Another test is that Tuone though it may be
composed of many ingredients is, like a chemical compound of many elements,
perfectly homogeneous and structureless in effect; while a Type, though it
may be indecomposable, must be more or less complex in its relations. Tests
might be multiplied; yet after all, it will often require subtlety to
decide whether a given Sign is a Tuone or a Type. Take for example a given
melody, say "The Last Rose of Summer." Considered as to its structure it is
a Type; but considered as a whole in its esthetic effect which is not
composed of one part due to one note and another to another, it is a Tuone.
As ordinarily conceived it is a Tuone, slightly different however every
time it is sung, but from the point of view of counterpoint, it is
absolutely the same every time it is rendered with substantial correctness
(though it be a table out of tune and time) and so it is a Type. But any
one singing of it is neither Tuone nor Type but a Token. Notwithstanding
these difficulties in many cases there is no room for an instant’s
hesitation, and the distinction is not only useful but practically
indispensible. (R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2)


A type is a "definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537) such that it is
*identical*--one and the same sign--in all its embodied instances (tokens),
while a tuone is "an indefinite significant character" (ibid) such that it
can only exhibit *similarity* to other tuones. The *sound* of a word is a
tuone, but the spoken word *itself* is a token of a type.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.


In that case, please do not feel obligated to reply to this post.

JFS: You said that you had read Tony's writings. I strongly urge you to
study them.


I said that I have likewise read *and *carefully studied about a dozen
articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-09 Thread Gary Richmond

John, Jon, List,

JFS: I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all
kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce
happened to mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
GR: It appears to me that *if* Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to
argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping.

But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's
"rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been
argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for
preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own
work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and
as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's
argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not
alone in that opinion.

This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from
authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own:

JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my
own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade."
GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to
solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for
scientists and other scholars to try to *refute* his work where possible in
the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a
corollary of the method of science as  opposed to the other methods of
inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable
hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the
methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori
method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some
matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in
scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that
the *appeal* to authority is a well-known logical fallacy.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.
GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to
determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for
that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L.  Still, I must agree with you that
the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and
List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been
strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or
Jon's, or my word for it.

JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings.  i strongly urge you
to study them.
GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which
he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority
is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing
belief.

It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of
inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe
meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that
reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they
consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have
always wanted Peirce-L to be essentially self-moderated. But in the past
few years I have seen that there are participants who rather flaunt their
independence from such ethical and collegial practices as Ransdell
outlined. It will no longer be tolerated, and those who have previously
been warned their anti-collegial conduct on the List jeopardizes their
continuation on Peirce-L. In short, they will be removed without further on
or off List discussion.

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)

On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 12:15 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of
> hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to
> mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
>
> First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words
> that Peirce frequently coined.  The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of
> thought, which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906.
> It's also very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many
> issues he had been discussing for years.  Except for the fact that those
> words are rather ugly, they are the result of deep thinking.
>
> By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on
> one rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice).  The word 'mark' is much
> more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in
> Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent
> listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars.  (And I believe that
> those people are the most important audience for Peirce scholars to
> address.)
>
> F

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9385] ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON SEMIOTIC AGENCY IN CELEBRATION OF ALEXEI SHAROV´S 70TH ANNIVERSARY

2024-04-09 Thread Gary Richmond

FYI: GR

Dear all,

on Wednesday April 10th (tomorrow) at 10.00-14.10 CET the one-day
international conference “The active forces of development and semiotic
agency (Developmental and semiotic agency)" will be held at the Institute
of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (INION RAN) in Moscow, Russia, and online. The conference, which
is held in Russian (mainly) and English, is organized in celebration of the
70th anniversary of Alexei Sharov and hosted by Mikhail Ilyin.

The conference starts with a presentation of the book *Semiotic agency:
Science beyond mechanism
<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-89484-9> *(Sharov &
Tønnessen 2021), and features talks by Alexei Sharov, Morten Tønnessen,
S.T. Zolyan, S.V. Chebanov, V.I. Arshinov and M.V. Ilyin. The event can be
attended digitally by following this Zoom link:
https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88090035919?pwd=UUqbzYrUYJ64gAGrgVLhqUyLCR0mkK.1
(identificator:
880 9003 5919; password: 222986)

My best,

-- 
*Morten Tønnessen*
Professor of philosophy at University of Stavanger´s Department of social
studies <https://www.uis.no/en/department-social-studies> — Secretary of Nordic
Association for Semiotic Studies <http://nordicsemiotics.org/> — Member of
Norway´s Council for Animal Ethics <http://www.radetfordyreetikk.no>
---
ADDRESS Nådlandsbråtet 25, 4034 Stavanger, Norway — PHONE NO. (+47) 9423
7093
---
Academic blog: Utopian Realism <http://UtopianRealism.blogspot.com>
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[PEIRCE-L] Catalogues of Conceptual Structures?

2024-04-09 Thread Andrius Kulikauskas

Greetings from the Lithuanian countryside!

Please, does anybody know of any websites that list or catalogue examples
of conceptual structures, cognitive frameworks, polychotomies and so on?  I
am interested not only in Peirce but in all manner of thinkers, disciplines
and worldviews.  I am also interested in books, papers and databases.

I have found some pages at Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trichotomy_(philosophy)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Dichotomies
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Dilemmas
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Philosophical_problems
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism
And, of course,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Peirce)

I have also found this list of metatheories
https://www.arc.voyage/um-library

I am curious what has already done because I intend to create my own online
database.  It would be nice for that to be a collaborative project.
Currently, I have in mind a simple work flow where relevant links can be
dumped
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/FrameworkDump
perhaps curated further, then placed into tables
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/FrameworkTables
and then each scholar could organize them further according to their own
system. For example, I have a theory of three minds (Unconscious,
Conscious, Consciousness) and here are about 15 examples:
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/FrameworkCatalogue

This is relevant for me because, since childhood, in my quest to know
everything and apply that knowledge usefully, I have developed a private
language of concepts, which I call Wondrous Wisdom
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/Vocabulary
Here is an overview of the basic structures
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Research/20170929TimeSpaceDecisionMaking
I speak of it as a private language but, from my own point of view, I am
inquiring into absolute truth.

Similarly, I think of Peirce, Jesus, Plato, Kant, Hume, Christopher
Alexander, Buckminster Fuller, Karl Friston, and so on, as having developed
their own private languages which their enthusiasts became fluent in.  In
my case, I have started Math 4 Wisdom, http://www.math4wisdom.com as a
language club for learning Wondrous Wisdom, but in particular, showing
where the conceptual structures arise in advanced mathematics.

For example, here is a presentation "The Yoneda Embedding Expresses
Whether, What, How, Why"
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Research/YonedaEmbeddingFoursome
Another presentation is "Bott Periodicity Models Consciousness? Preliminary
Exploration"
https://www.math4wisdom.com/wiki/Exposition/20231126BottPeriodicity

My goal is that my own private language could be understood by others as
scientifically useful and meaningful.  Ultimately, I want to work toward a
shared language that would be relevant for the many private languages.

Thus I want to start by learning what catalogues already exist, if any.

Peirce's ideas - iicon, index, symbol - abduction, deduction, induction -
firstness, secondness, thirdness - are important in my own philosophy and
have also come up in our study groups on Sociology
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUsVCfB5P-A=PL4jG0jj6NdI1DMOhSMYjQVSg_9-E72x7H
and also Ecotechnology, through the work of Jere Northrop and John Roy
Hammann and the AutoGnomics project.

Thank you for helping me!

Andrius

Andrius Kulikauskas
math4wis...@gmail.com
http://www.math4wisdom.com
Eiciunai, Lithuania
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[PEIRCE-L] Modern vs. classical structures of opposition: A discussion - LUW April 10, 4pm CET

2024-04-09 Thread jean-yves beziau

Logica Universalis Webinar
April 10, 2024 at 4pm CET

Speakers:  Didier Dubois, Henri Prade & Agnès Rico
Title: "Modern vs. classical structures of opposition: A discussion"
Abstract: "The aim of this work is to revisit the proposal made by Dag
Westerst°
ahl a decade ago when he provided a modern reading of the traditional square
of opposition and of related structures. We propose a formalization of this
modern
view and contrast it with the classical one.We discuss what may be a modern
hexagon of opposition and a modern cube, and show their interest in
particular
for relating quantitative expressions."
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11787-024-00347-1

Associate organization: ADRIA-IRIT, CNRS
https://www.irit.fr/en/departement/dep-artificial-intelligence/adria-team/
Presented by Didier Dubois and Henri Prade

Chair : Sayantan Roy, Assistant Editor LU

Everybody is welcome to join, register here:
https://cassyni.com/events/LMSPiEvqN9JUsvzryqD1f3
Jean-Yves Beziau
Editor of Logica Universalis and Organizer of LUW
https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-08 Thread John F Sowa

elf, his 
definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he 
wrote about Potisign.

I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made far 
deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and writings by 
Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908.   As you know, his existential graphs 
also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach their fully complete 
specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta.  For Gamma, the 1903 
version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell lectures.  Peirce used 
metalanguage for specifying modality and a version of higher-order logic in 
1903.

But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911.

There is much more to say.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-08 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

chmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in
> the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was
> based on one example, "a tone of voice".  After two more years of intensive
> study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of
> the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby
> (EP2, p.
>
> "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as
> such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible
> Presentation, are divisible (o) into:
>
> "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely
> possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray
> that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's
> hexagram.8
>
> "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such
> as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single
> paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be
> repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place.
> But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an
> edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy."
> Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token
> Type).   We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it.  But
> later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and
> Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006.
> He also discussed universes in considerable detail.  That is a topic he
> began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token
> Type).  But he is now introducing this new triad without making any
> reference to it.  But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of
> detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly.
>
> Then on p. 488, he writes:  "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in
> 1906,1 devoted much study
> to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as
> I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former
> names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge
> or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type  I think Potisign
> Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)...
>
> Then he continues:  "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can
> afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I
> must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years
> and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different
> classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think...
>
> In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of
> trichotomies "the wildest guesses".  That should not encourage anyone to
> consider them as having any reliable status.  The best definition of (Mark
> Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign
> Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488.  For the
> definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary
> should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign.
>
> I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made
> far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and
> writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908.   As you know, his
> existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach
> their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta.
> For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell
> lectures.  Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version
> of higher-order logic in 1903.
>
> But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911.
>
> There is much more to say.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-08 Thread John F Sowa

Jeff,

There seem to be quite a few people who are interested in discussing 
applications of Peirce's logic and philosophy to current issues.  That was 
certainly a hot topic in the various Peirce -ennials.

I believe that it would be a topic of general interest.

John


From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" 
Sent: 4/8/24 12:35 AM
To: "Michael J.J. Tiffany" , 
"s...@bestweb.net" 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)

Hello Michael and John,

Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael.
I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out 
some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a 
wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and 
political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information 
across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling 
and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in 
relations of reciprocity and interdependence.
I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, 
chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. 
Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list 
or as part of a small research and discussion group.
Yours,
Jeff Downard
Flagstaff, AZ
Philosophy, NAU
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany 
Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)



John, List:

I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.

I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that 
time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company 
(HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two 
personal observations:

1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce 
railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In 
evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in 
Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > 
individual selection.

However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about 
socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth 
transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many 
examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with 
naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even 
"greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary 
wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most 
successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. 
Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful 
model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent 
phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once 
put it).

2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates 
understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained 
transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, 
vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write 
qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can 
understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the 
reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction 
as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at.

Warm regards,

Michael J.J. Tiffany

Portsmouth, New Hampshire

On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's 
writings for our time (the 21st C).

Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
present.

John



Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
To: John Sowa 
Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)

John,
I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in 
philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
existential crisis we’re facing today at the event

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9384] Unresolved problems in biosemiotics

2024-04-08 Thread Gary Richmond

FYI: GR

Dear friends and colleagues,



We invite you to join the panel on biosemiotics which will take place at
the world congress of semiotics „Signs and Realities“ in Warsaw, Poland, 2–6
September this year. <https://www.semcon2024.com/>  The biosemiotics panel
– “Unresolved problems in biosemiotics” – was proposed by Don Favareau and
me (description below).

Deadline for abstracts is 15 April. Please submit
<https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty> your abstract.



With all best wishes

Kalevi & Don



Fundamentals of semiotics are not yet concisely formulated, theory of
meaning making requires still much work in clarification. Biosemiotics has
the major responsibility in this work inasmuch biosemiotics concerns the
general semiotics.

Among the unresolved problems we can recognize, for instance, the following:

(a) the minimal conditions for a metabolic system to carry semiosis;

(b) the relationship between interpretation, free choice, subjective
present, umwelt, agency, logical paradox, and semiosis;

(c) the operational typology of prelinguistic signs;

(d) the nature of (sign) modality as such;

(e) existence (and description) of forms of semiosis that never appear in
human communication or in human bodies;

etc.

We should also pay attention to the perspective methods to be used for
providing the solutions. In particular, this concerns the role of
mathematical and empirical study methods. This includes several problems,
for instance:

(x) whether the fundamental semiotic theory can be formulated in
mathematical terms;

(y) which are the general methods to be used for testing semiotic models.

The panel will include a roundtable to discuss the unresolved problems in
biosemiotics. We ask all interested scholars to participate in this
roundtable and to propose the ideas for solutions.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-07 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Hello Michael and John,

Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael.

I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out 
some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a 
wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and 
political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information 
across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling 
and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in 
relations of reciprocity and interdependence.

I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, 
chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. 
Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list 
or as part of a small research and discussion group.

Yours,

Jeff Downard
Flagstaff, AZ
Philosophy, NAU

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany 
Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)
John, List:

I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.

I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that 
time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company 
(HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two 
personal observations:

1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce 
railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In 
evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in 
Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > 
individual selection.

However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about 
socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth 
transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many 
examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with 
naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even 
"greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary 
wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most 
successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. 
Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful 
model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent 
phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once 
put it).

2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates 
understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained 
transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, 
vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write 
qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can 
understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the 
reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction 
as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at.


Warm regards,

Michael J.J. Tiffany
Portsmouth, New Hampshire


On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's 
writings for our time (the 21st C).

Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
present.

John


____
Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>
Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)

John,

I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in 
philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. 
Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition 
to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, 
the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a 
radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the 
‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century 
later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution.

In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford E

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-07 Thread John F Sowa

Jon, List,

We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in the 
Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was based on one 
example, "a tone of voice".  After two more years of intensive study, analysis, 
and writings, he presented a more precise specification of the trichotomy 
(Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby (EP2, p.

"Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, 
General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible 
Presentation, are divisible (o) into:

"A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, 
but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray that passes 
through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's hexagram.8

"B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such as 
any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of 
a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be repetition of the whole 
paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is 
not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS 
word is only in my copy."

Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token 
Type).   We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it.  But later 
(EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and Famisigns 
without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006.  He also 
discussed universes in considerable detail.  That is a topic he began to 
discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token Type).  But he is 
now introducing this new triad without making any reference to it.  But he is 
discussing this new version in quite a bit of detail, and he is referring to 
universes repeatedly.

Then on p. 488, he writes:  "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 
devoted much study
to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as I 
know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names 
are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or 
Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type  I think Potisign Actisign 
Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)...

Then he continues:  "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can 
afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I must 
do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years and more 
ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were 
the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think...

In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of trichotomies 
"the wildest guesses".  That should not encourage anyone to consider them as 
having any reliable status.  The best definition of (Mark Token Type) should be 
considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign Famisign) with the definitions 
stated in EP pp. 485-488.  For the definition of Mark, by itself, his 
definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he 
wrote about Potisign.

I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made far 
deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and writings by 
Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908.   As you know, his existential graphs 
also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach their fully complete 
specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta.  For Gamma, the 1903 
version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell lectures.  Peirce used 
metalanguage for specifying modality and a version of higher-order logic in 
1903.

But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911.

There is much more to say.

John

----
From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/7/24 6:27 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

John, List:

JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image 
that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token 
are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things.

Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not 
what Peirce ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign 
classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself" (CP 
8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are "token" and 
"type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 
1906)--it is not itself a physical thing, but it can be possessed by a token, 
which is a physical thing (or event) that exists (or occurs) at a single place 
and time (ibid). A type is "a definitely s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-07 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jerry
This section is, I believe,from 1868 - and there are more descriptions of the 
categories elsewhere., eg. 8/328 1904.

The three terms you reference - quality, relation, representation] can be 
understood to refer to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.The categories, are 
‘modes of being’, or the form of the substance in which information is 
functioning,  and are basic to the Peircean framework.  And he explains them in 
the preceding and following paragrdaphs. But you can also see his outline in 
5.41 and on-150. And 1.23; And 1.300 and on [1894] 1:277 and on….

I am not sure of your agenda re: icon, index, symbol…which are Relations 
between the Represetnamen and Object in the mode of Firstness, Secondness and 
thirdness [ but I assume you know that already]…

I think my analogy of the three categorical modes of chance/freedom; current 
state interaction; and new habits of organization [aka Firstness, Secondness 
and Thirdness] ae pretty obvious within an economic process.  After all- an 
economy operates within entrepreneurship [ Firstness] where novel ideas are 
generated and developed. It operates within a steady state daily life process 
of local interactions [Secondness] - which process takes up most of the 
‘energy’ of an economic mode. And - it operates within the development of new 
economic modes and goods and services - which require the development of 
new‘habits of organization’ to produce and deliver the products. 

Even such a system as the use of symbolic units [ money[ went through these 
three categories, with the introduction of the symbol [Firstness]; and then, 
the common use in local interactions [ Secondness] and the legislated 
overseeing of the common value of these ‘bits of metal and paper’ [Thirdness]. 
And now -we are developing new symbols and new habits of the use of ‘money’..as 
a symbol of value. ..

I analyze economic modes with a triad of Investment/Production/Consumption [and 
these can even. E understood within 3ns, 2ns, 1ns!!!

Edwina

> On Apr 7, 2024, at 8:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> Dear Edwinia, List 
> 
>> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
>> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
>> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
>> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 
>> 
> 
> Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish  reach. 
> 
> I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of 
> categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic 
> closures. 
> 
> In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and 
> then asserts:
> 
> "BEING
>   Quality (Reference to a Ground)
>   Relation(Reference to a Correlate)
>   Representation  (Reference to an Interpretant)
> SUBSTANCE
> 
> The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.”
> 
> (The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6)
> 
> I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and 
> symbols”.
> 
> Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? 
> Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of 
> “SUBSTANCE”  to the conclusions in economics?
> 
> Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I 
> have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months…
> 
> Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-07 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Dear Edwinia, List 

> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 
> 

Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish  reach. 

I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of 
categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic 
closures. 

In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and 
then asserts:

"BEING
Quality (Reference to a Ground)
Relation(Reference to a Correlate)
Representation  (Reference to an Interpretant)
SUBSTANCE

The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.”

(The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6)

I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and 
symbols”.

Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? 
Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of 
“SUBSTANCE”  to the conclusions in economics?

Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I 
have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months…

Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed.

Cheers

Jerry 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-07 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

corations or images of some significant things.  But
> linguists discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan
> words.  By assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern
> spoken Mayan, linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a notation
> for the words of the Mayan language.  The same images from one point of
> view are marks of tokens of decorations.  From another point of view, they
> are marks of tokens of morphemes of the Mayan language.
>
> In textual criticism, Peirce's exact words in any MS must be recorded
> exactly.  But in publications about  Peirce's intentions, the terminology
> must be adapted to the way modern readers would interpret the words.  Max
> Fisch, for example, realized that Peirce's decision to use the word 'logic'
> as an abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'.  In his 1986 book, Fisch
> stated that he was using the word 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for
> 'logic as semeiotic".
>
> Fisch is certainly a respectable authority on the subject, and I believe
> that we should follow his example in choosing which of Peirce's options to
> consider as a standard for the 21st C..
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-07 Thread John F Sowa

 unlike icon/index/symbol, this trichotomy is 
not a matter of degree. Consider its terminological predecessor--a qualisign 
cannot also be a replica (sinsign) of some legisign. Instead, a qualisign must 
be embodied in a sinsign, and likewise, a mark/tone must be embodied in a token.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 4:55 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is 
overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the 
copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in 
the trichotomy:  "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice 
can neither be called a Type nor a Token."

The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the 
sound of a voice that is speaking something.  I have a high regard for Peirce's 
choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks.  Just look at 
Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary.  Every tone is a mark, 
which may also be a token of some type.  But only a tiny subset of marks are 
tones.  I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has 
doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement.  There is no 
ethical reason for keeping it.

Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363):  "From the summer of 1905 to the 
same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is 
time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But 
I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly 
called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;...

CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, 
which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives...

Note Peirce's choice of Mark.  That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' 
in Baldwin's dictionary.  That was written before 1903, when the only 
trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol".  Every tone of voice is a mark, but most 
marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else.  Note that Peirce had 
also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'.  Every tinge is also a mark.

JAS:  his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days 
later.   But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is 
a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's 
dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general 
technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he 
selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) 
the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'.

But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, 
philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark 
token type), but not (tone token type).  Since Peirce was always writing for 
the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future.   A tone is a limited 
and confusing special case of mark.

On this point, Tony made the correct choice.  The word 'tone' should be used 
ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS.   In all discussions of Peirce's 
system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice.

John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-07 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Michale

Thank you for this excellent post. You are exactly right 

Peirce's agapastic  semiosis is a dynamic and generative process- and it 
explains not merely the increasing complexity of the physicochemical and 
biological realms [which are, indeed, complex adaptive systems,]  but also, 
explains the socioeconomic world of our species. 

As you say - wealth creation, which is all about a growth economy- - is quite 
different from the no-growth zero sum wealth transfer which is found in all no 
growth steady state populations [ before the industrial age]. 

And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 

Again - thank you for an excellent post, and moving Peirce out of the seminar 
room into the real world.

Edwina 

> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:57 PM, Michael J.J. Tiffany 
>  wrote:
> 
> John, List:
> 
> I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.
> 
> I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that 
> time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company 
> (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). 
> Two personal observations:
> 
> 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce 
> railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. 
> In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in 
> Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > 
> individual selection. 
> 
> However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about 
> socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth 
> transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many 
> examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted 
> with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or 
> even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the 
> extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of 
> the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they 
> shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a 
> literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, 
> especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as 
> the Santa Fe Institute once put it).
> 
> 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates 
> understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained 
> transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's 
> another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to 
> write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you 
> can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the 
> reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of 
> abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. 
> 
> 
> Warm regards,
> 
> Michael J.J. Tiffany
> Portsmouth, New Hampshire
> 
> 
> On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa  <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>> Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
>> about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of 
>> Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C).
>> 
>> Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
>> contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
>> present.   
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
>> To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>
>> Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of 
>> science (U Pitt)
>> John,  
>> 
>> I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
>> ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
>> positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead 
>> in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
>> existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass 
>> extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in 
>> his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in 
>> his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-07 Thread Michael J.J. Tiffany

John, List:

I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.

I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In
that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity
company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies
2023). Two personal observations:

1. Agapism has *greater predictive power* than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce
railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open
Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now
than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group
selection > individual selection.

However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking
about socio-economic evolution. Wealth *creation* -- distinct from zero sum
wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are
many examples of successful wealth *aggregators* whose success could be
predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the
fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account
for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the
motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of
cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more
inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and
predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds
hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it).

2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically
accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of
large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy
that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence
having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't
see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're
calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an
understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better
or worse at.

Warm regards,

Michael J.J. Tiffany
Portsmouth, New Hampshire

On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note
> about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of
> Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C).
>
> Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value
> his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which
> is our present.
>
> John
>
>
> --
> *Sent*: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
> *To*: John Sowa 
> *Subject*: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of
> science (U Pitt)
>
> John,
>
> I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s
> ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical
> positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the
> beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to
> the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of
> mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more
> widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna
> Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s
> philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic
> foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently
> remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re
> long overdue for a revolution.
>
> In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the *Stanford
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/>*,
> Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s
> perspective …
>
> An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is
> that in Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.”
> Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most
> fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife,
> greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is
> prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of
> its neighbor. This doctrine had a social significance for Peirce, who
> apparently had the intention of arguing against the morally repugnant but
> extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century.
> The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce
> associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical
> ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirc

[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-07 Thread John F Sowa

Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's 
writings for our time (the 21st C).

Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
present.

John


Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
To: John Sowa 
Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)

John,
I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in 
philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. 
Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition 
to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, 
the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a 
radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the 
‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century 
later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution.
In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s 
perspective …

An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is that in 
Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.” Peirce speaks of 
evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most fundamental engine of the 
evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, greed, or competition. Rather it 
is nurturing love, in which an entity is prepared to sacrifice its own 
perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of its neighbor. This doctrine had a 
social significance for Peirce, who apparently had the intention of arguing 
against the morally repugnant but extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of 
the late nineteenth century. The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic 
significance, which Peirce associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John 
and with the mystical ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the 
third of Peirce’s six papers in Popular Science Monthly, entitled “The Doctrine 
of Chances,” Peirce even argued that simply being logical presupposes the 
ethics of self-sacrifice: “He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the 
whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, 
collectively.” To social Darwinism, and to the related sort of thinking that 
constituted for Herbert Spencer and others a supposed justification for the 
more rapacious practices of unbridled capitalism, Peirce referred in disgust as 
“The Gospel of Greed.”
All merely hypothetical or purely conjectural, of course. But your admonition 
to relate Peirce to our 21st century world nudged me into sharing the idea.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F Sowa
Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2024 5:53 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List 

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)
Jerry,
Thanks for that note.   The following sentence shows why we need to relate 
Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today:

>From the abstract:  "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a 
>canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science."

I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session 
and attended other talks in more general sessions.  And I have not heard 
anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk).

The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody 
else had ever used his notation for logic.  But they don't mention Peirce, 
despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor 
notational changes by Peano).

In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. 
 Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were 
rarely available in those days.  But any typesetter could easily turn letters 
upside down and backwards.  So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit 
to Peano for the algebraic notation.

It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, 
modern world.  Susan Haack does that very well.  Some others do that.   And 
it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's 
work to the hot topics of the 21st century.  Peirce himself expected his 
writings to be hot issues for 400 years.  We're almost halfway there, and we 
need to heat up the discussions.

John

--

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-06 Thread John F Sowa

Jerry,

Thanks for that note.   The following sentence shows why we need to relate 
Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today:

>From the abstract:  "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a 
>canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science."

I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session 
and attended other talks in more general sessions.  And I have not heard 
anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk).

The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody 
else had ever used his notation for logic.  But they don't mention Peirce, 
despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor 
notational changes by Peano).

In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. 
 Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were 
rarely available in those days.  But any typesetter could easily turn letters 
upside down and backwards.  So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit 
to Peano for the algebraic notation.

It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, 
modern world.  Susan Haack does that very well.  Some others do that.   And 
it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's 
work to the hot topics of the 21st century.  Peirce himself expected his 
writings to be hot issues for 400 years.  We're almost halfway there, and we 
need to heat up the discussions.

John


From: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U 
Pitt)

FYI
JLRC

Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT

This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at 
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686

Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism

Abstract:  Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot 
about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, 
however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of 
philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist 
movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent 
representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including 
Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. 
This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the 
mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a 
formidable movement.
In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s 
philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), 
Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability 
theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in 
which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the 
engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and 
get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual 
marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

2024-04-05 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

FYI 
JLRC 

Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT

This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at 
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686

Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism

Abstract:  Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot 
about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, 
however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of 
philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist 
movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent 
representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including 
Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. 
This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the 
mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a 
formidable movement.
In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s 
philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), 
Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability 
theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in 
which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the 
engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and 
get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual 
marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science.
 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

out
> the purely physical world”. 4.551.  That is, cognition does not require a
> separate brain. Therefore, even a semiosic triad operating in total
> Secondness, is a ‘cognitive act, based on the nature of the materials of
> the interaction [eg, a Dicent Sinsign, a weathervane’.
>
> 7] ET: I fully agree - nothing is independent of semiosis and I don’t
> think I have ever argued for such a view.
>
> 8] ET: Again - I have often quoted this section and fully agree. Please
> note - ’signs’ is plural.
>
> 9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the
> Final Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my
> post of today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI -
> and note that it is not always part of the semiosic action.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-05 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

uture.   A
> tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark.
>
> On this point, Tony made the correct choice.  The word 'tone' should be
> used *ONLY *in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS.   In all discussions of
> Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice.
>
>
> John
>
> --
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>
> John, List:
>
> JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two
> tokens of the same type.
>
>
> This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an
> indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can
> have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things
> can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types.
>
> JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice.
>
>
> Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908,
> https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> Jon,
>
> I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of
> 'mark':
>
> Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
> Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)
>
> Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same
> mark are two tokens of the same type.
>
> It confirms Peirce's final choice.
>
> John
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread John F Sowa

ng] and therefore - 
can’t provide enough information to the next experience [ the Dynamic 
Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the clarity of Secondness.

So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.

Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 categorical 
> sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign).

9] ET: My discussion has primarily been around your positioning of the Final 
Interpretant before the Dynamic and Immediate Interpretants - In my post of 
today, I outlined what I consider to be the function of the FI - and note that 
it is not always part of the semiosic action. 

Edwina
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky  <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> I will try to answer in pints:
>> 
>> 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of 
>> signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of 
>> semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes 
>> to the interpretants? 
>> 
>> 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ 
>> phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. 
>> 
>> 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object 
>> itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic 
>> process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, 
>> of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. 
>> 
>> 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen 
>> and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical 
>> modes. 
>> 
>> 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference 
>> suggests your conclusion. 
>> 
>> 6]  My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of 
>> understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the 
>> semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of 
>> the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being 
>> of the DI..and the DI contains  the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t 
>> see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual 
>> example.
>> 
>> I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II 
>> ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a 
>> ‘purpose to the FI.  Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th 
>> DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the 
>> mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily 
>> feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next 
>> experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the 
>> clarity of Secondness. 
>> 
>> So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.
>> 
>> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-05 Thread John F Sowa

On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is 
overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the 
copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in 
the trichotomy:  "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice 
can neither be called a Type nor a Token."

The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the 
sound of a voice that is speaking something.  I have a high regard for Peirce's 
choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks.  Just look at 
Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary.  Every tone is a mark, 
which may also be a token of some type.  But only a tiny subset of marks are 
tones.  I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has 
doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement.  There is no 
ethical reason for keeping it.

Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363):  "From the summer of 1905 to the 
same time in 1906, I devoted much
study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as 
I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names 
are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, 
an
Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;...

CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, 
which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives...

Note Peirce's choice of Mark.  That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' 
in Baldwin's dictionary.  That was written before 1903, when the only 
trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol".  Every tone of voice is a mark, but most 
marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else.  Note that Peirce had 
also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'.  Every tinge is also a mark.

JAS:  his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days 
later.   But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is 
a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's 
dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general 
technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he 
selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) 
the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'.

But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, 
philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark 
token type), but not (tone token type).  Since Peirce was always writing for 
the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future.   A tone is a limited 
and confusing special case of mark.

On this point, Tony made the correct choice.  The word 'tone' should be used 
ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS.   In all discussions of Peirce's 
system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

John, List:

JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two 
tokens of the same type.

This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an 
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can have 
different tones, yet be tokens of the same type; and two things can have (some 
of) the same tones, yet be tokens of different types.

JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice.

Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
Jon,

I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark':

Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)

Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are 
two tokens of the same type.

It confirms Peirce's final choice.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

have under ideal circumstances.

Finally, just to be clear, although the terminology is similar, this is
*not* the same division as possible/existent/necessitant for each
individual trichotomy in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign
classification. Again, the *purpose* of the final interpretant (ideal
effect) is either to produce feeling (for a gratific sign), to produce
action (for an actuous sign), or to produce self-control (for a temperative
sign); the *mode of being* of the dynamical interpretant (actual effect) is
either that of a feeling (for a sympathetic sign), that of an exertion (for
a percussive sign), or that of another sign (for a usual sign); and the *mode
of presentation* of the immediate interpretant (range of possible effects)
is either as abstract qualities (for a hypothetic sign), as concrete
inherences (for a categorical sign), or as real relations (for a relative
sign).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> I will try to answer in pints:
>
> 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of
> signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of
> semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical
> modes to the interpretants?
>
> 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why
> the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’.
>
> 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object
> itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the
> semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the
> ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the
> representamen/sign.
>
> 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between
> theSign/representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the
> three categorical modes.
>
> 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338
> reference suggests your conclusion.
>
> 6]  My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of
> understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the
> semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of
> the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of
> being of the DI..and the DI contains  the mode of presentation of the II. I
> don’t see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual
> example.
>
> I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II
> ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a
> ‘purpose to the FI.  Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then,
> th DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that
> the mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily
> feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next
> experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the
> clarity of Secondness.
>
> So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread Edwina Taborsky

se conclusions as to 
> whether the terms are logical or temporal. 
> 
> 4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I 
> reject  JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit 
> that “reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general,  but 
> only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… 
> I refer to this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects 
> ‘out there’ is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his 
> explanations of the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic 
> Object- which is “the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the 
> Sign of its Representation” 4.536.1906.   And “the dynamical object does not 
> mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in 
> perception” SS197..1906. 
> 
> That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it 
> becomes part of the semiotic process. 
> 
> And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, 
> degenerate etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of 
> terms I think refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and 
> these nodal sites in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. .
> 
> 5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic 
> process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to 
> linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word 
> ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s 
> extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is 
> confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would 
> require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. 
> 
> But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not 
> ready to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than 
> that I prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the 
> value of the Peircean framework.
> 
> Edwina

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. 

 

Edwina




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread John F Sowa

the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not 
the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also 
continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161.

I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the 
conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’.

And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to 
whether the terms are logical or temporal.

4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I 
reject  JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that 
“reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general,  but only of 
what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to 
this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ 
is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of 
the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the 
Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its 
Representation” 4.536.1906.   And “the dynamical object does not mean something 
out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” 
SS197..1906.

That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it 
becomes part of the semiotic process.

And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate 
etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think 
refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites 
in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. .

5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic 
process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to 
linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word 
’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s 
extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is 
confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require 
merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work.

But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready 
to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I 
prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the 
Peircean framework.

Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread Edwina Taborsky

e [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean 
>> that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if 
>> the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two 
>> interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant 
>> is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either 
>> in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. 
>> 
>> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

I have likewise already read (and carefully studied) about a dozen articles
by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Sign
Classes and the Philosophy of Representation*. Why assume otherwise?

I still disagree with him on destinate=final and explicit=immediate (as I
maintain) vs. destinate=immediate and explicit=final (as he maintains).
However, having made our cases, I agree with him that we must ultimately
"leave the list members to make up their own minds."

The only authority that really matters here is that of Peirce himself. I
strongly urge everyone to study *his *writings in light of our different
arguments, and then draw their own conclusions about *his *views based on
those texts.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy
> that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality.  I strongly
> urge you to study his writings.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

 immediate interpretant constrains the mode of being of
the dynamical interpretant, which constrains the purpose of the final
interpretant. I find the former much more plausible than the latter.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
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On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 12:53 PM Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> List
>
> I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’
> or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that
> ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent
> to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?.
>
> And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes
> an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he
> says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But
> this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes.
>
> And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the
> Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a
> necessitant] but, if we consider  the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY
> ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are
> in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I
> think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final
> Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in
> a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint.
>
>  And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes -
> we see, of course, the same format
>
> Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative
> representamen/sign, not within the Interpretants. It is this site that
> plays the key role in forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad.
>
> And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from
> possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not
> then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is
> that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other
> two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate
> interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants
> can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s
> outlines.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread John F Sowa

Jon,

I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy that 
explain these issues in far greater depth and generality.  I strongly urge you 
to study his writings.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/4/24 12:39 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 
to the end

List:

While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing 
that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification 
is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that 
result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the 
other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of 
misinterpretations.

Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor 
"precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can 
determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by 
nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant 
divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 
Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final 
interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," 
respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following 
restrictions.

- A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a 
sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; 
i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only 
feelings.
- Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, 
can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is 
necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or 
possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce 
self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead 
produce exertions or feelings.
- A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, 
must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation 
is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present 
those effects as abstract qualities.
- Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is 
necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of 
presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a 
categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that 
actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, 
although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract 
qualities.

Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic 
percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic 
percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, 
categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is 
misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a 
different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction 
of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which 
makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns.

By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require 
the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to 
necessitant--which does not make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, 
and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's 
purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce 
exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign 
whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always 
actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants.

Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according 
to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is 
hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of 
propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that 
they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic 
sheet is a strictly logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined to a 
further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three 
kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the 
immediate interpretant must come after the one for the dynamical 
interpretant--if it were the other way around, then only relative propositions 
with at least two lines of ide

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every 
>>> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... 
>>> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, 
>>> 1909)
>>>  
>>> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, 
>>> which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally 
>>> be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter 
>>> were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909)
>>> 
>>> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s 
>>> ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that 
>>> toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual 
>>> interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not after the final 
>>> interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant 
>>> determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the 
>>> exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the 
>>> degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the 
>>> utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These 
>>> definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the 
>>> actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that the 
>>> only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual 
>>> semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended 
>>> interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is 
>>> ‘the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the 
>>> utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind 
>>> of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii follows 
>>> the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the 
>>> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation.
>>> 
>>> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of 
>>> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the 
>>> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when 
>>> accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations.’ (JS)
>>> 
>>> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 
>>> 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of 
>>> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - all 
>>> the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants.
>>> 
>>> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), The Logic of 
>>> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie 
>>> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906)
>>> 
>>> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own 
>>> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. 
>>> 
>>> TJ
>>> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must
>> have its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My
>> Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of
>> Interpretation and is different in each from that of any other; and the
>> Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every
>> Interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered. The
>> Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The
>> Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is
>> that toward which the actual tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909)
>>
>>
>>
>> ...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it
>> *immediately* expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added)
>>
>> And of the *final interpretant* (If) he says this:
>>
>> That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached),
>> interpretant (final I mean, in the logical sense of attaining the purpose,
>> is also final in the sense of bringing the series of translations [to a
>> stop] for the obvious reason that it is not itself a sign) is to be
>> regarded as the ultimate signification of the [sign]. (LI: 356-357; 1906)
>>
>>
>>
>> The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every
>> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered...
>> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111,
>> 1909)
>>
>>
>>
>> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant,
>> which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally
>> be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter
>> were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909)
>>
>> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s
>> ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that
>> toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual
>> interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final
>> interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant
>> determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the
>> exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the
>> degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the
>> utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These
>> definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the
>> actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that
>> the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual
>> semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended
>> interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is ‘the
>> *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the
>> utterer; the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a determination of the
>> mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii
>> follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the
>> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation.
>>
>> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of
>> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the
>> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when
>> accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.’ (JS)
>>
>> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1)
>> displaying 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904
>> and 1908, of which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given
>> by JS - *all* the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named
>> final interpretants.
>>
>> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), *The Logic of
>> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series*, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie
>> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906)
>>
>> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own
>> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions.
>>
>> TJ
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-04 Thread Edwina Taborsky

t;> The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every 
>> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... 
>> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, 1909)
>>  
>> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which 
>> I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be 
>> decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were 
>> carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909)
>> 
>> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s ordering: 
>> if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which the 
>> actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) might 
>> take place, surely not after the final interpretant. There is no suggestion 
>> here that the final interpretant determines the sign’s meaning (of which the 
>> immediate interpretant is the exponent). And surely misinterpretation and 
>> misconception depend upon the degree of congruence between the intended 
>> meaning emanating from the utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the 
>> interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent 
>> interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) 
>> surely suggest that the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from 
>> when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the 
>> intended interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that 
>> there is ‘the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind 
>> of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the 
>> mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii 
>> follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the 
>> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation.
>> 
>> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of 
>> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the 
>> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when 
>> accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations.’ (JS)
>> 
>> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 
>> 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of 
>> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - all 
>> the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants.
>> 
>> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), The Logic of 
>> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie 
>> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906)
>> 
>> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own 
>> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. 
>> 
>> TJ
>> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two
tokens of the same type.


This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can
have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things
can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types.

JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice.


Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of
> 'mark':
>
> Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
> Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)
>
> Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same
> mark are two tokens of the same type.
>
> It confirms Peirce's final choice.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark'
instead of 'tone'.

Again, going by the manuscript dates, Peirce's *final *choice was "tone" (R
339, 27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i), not "mark"
(CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)--especially since the latter passage
includes the word "might" and a parenthetical question mark, clearly
indicating that "mark" was tentative rather than definitive.

JFS: The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she
admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason
for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system

As quoted, Lady Welby does not say that she does not *understand *Peirce's
"exposition of the 'possible' Sign"--on the contrary, she calls it
"profoundly interesting"--only that she is "not equal to the effort of
discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone *to *mark*"; and
again, her stated rationale for this preference is strikingly similar to
Peirce's stated rationale for coining "tone" in the first place (CP 4.537,
1906). Besides ...

JFS: That is the primary reason why he [Peirce] found Lady Welby's
correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining
principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and
difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more
convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html)

Why think that "tone" vs. "mark" was an exception to this, such that her
"homely" opinion about it did not sway him--especially since he was still
vacillating between these two options, and specifically *asked *her to help
him choose one?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 1:08 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Tony, Jon, List,
>
> I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line:  Evolution.  I
> believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in
> from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which
> he highlighted the features he considered important.  I'd also emphasize
> Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues,
> terminology, and notations of 1903.   That was an important beginning, but
> the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes.
>
> One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology.   He
> coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the
> end.  But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new
> words.  The points where he changed terms also involve critical
> innovations.  If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important
> indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm).  For example,
> the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911.
>
> There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and
> every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system.  The shift
> from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that
> it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete
> examples that Lady Welby used.   Another shift from the word-based
> terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images,
> such as semes and phemes, is significant.  Since  semes include hypericons,
> he never again needed that word.   He also used the term "phemic sheet" as
> replacement for 'sheet of assertion'.
>
> I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead
> of 'tone'.  The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she
> admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason
> for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system:  "Your
> exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not
> equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer
> *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say
> 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).
>
> There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I
> have the time.
>
> John
>
> PS:   The initials JS are ambiguous.   It's better to write JAS or JFS.
>
> --
> *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation
> from 1903 to the end
>
> This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-03 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

gt; The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111,
> 1909)
>
>
>
> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant,
> which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally
> be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter
> were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909)
>
> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s
> ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that
> toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual
> interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final
> interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant
> determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the
> exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the
> degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the
> utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These
> definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the
> actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that
> the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual
> semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended
> interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is ‘the
> *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the
> utterer; the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a determination of the
> mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii
> follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the
> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation.
>
> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of
> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the
> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when
> accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.’ (JS)
>
> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 14
> six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of
> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS -
> *all* the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final
> interpretants.
>
> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), *The Logic of
> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series*, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie
> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906)
>
> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own
> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions.
>
> TJ
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-03 Thread John F Sowa

Jon,

I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark':

Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)

Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are 
two tokens of the same type.

It confirms Peirce's final choice.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-03 Thread John F Sowa

Edwina, Tony, Jon, List,

I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line:  Evolution.  I 
believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in from 
1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which he 
highlighted the features he considered important.  I'd also emphasize Tony's 
point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, terminology, and 
notations of 1903.   That was an important beginning, but the evolution in the 
following decade made fundamental changes.

One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology.   He coined 
and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the end.  But 
there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new words.  The points 
where he changed terms also involve critical innovations.  If he never again 
uses the old terms, that is an important indication that he began a new way of 
thinking (paradigm).  For example, the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished 
in June 1911.

There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and every 
one of them shows a significant innovation in his system.  The shift from 
phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that it 
indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete examples 
that Lady Welby used.   Another shift from the word-based terminology, such as 
dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, such as semes and phemes, 
is significant.  Since  semes include hypericons, he never again needed that 
word.   He also used the term "phemic sheet" as replacement for 'sheet of 
assertion'.

I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 
'tone'.  The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she 
admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for 
preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system:  "Your exposition of 
the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort 
of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer tone to mark for the homely 
reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to 
his tone'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).

There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I have 
the time.

John

PS:   The initials JS are ambiguous.   It's better to write JAS or JFS.


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 
to the end

This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy 
[TJ]. .

I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of 
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of 
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.

This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this 
generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate 
Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most 
immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic 
Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not 
always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result.

And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes.

The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an 
priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the 
Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the 
opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis.

And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant 
follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of 
the authoritarian FI.

Edwina

On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy  wrote:

List,
I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three 
interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in 
Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by John 
Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer not to 
get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an alternative 
interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in Chapter Four of my 
recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one 
proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. 
These replies are sufficient to support my position. First this statement:
‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical 
determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination 
within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines 
the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate 
(Ii)’. (JS)
Here are two

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] determination

2024-04-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

 


Robert, List,

 

Thank you! And is that definition different from my Boolean assumption? Boole is about true/false, but "renders definitely to such as it will be", and "particular manner" sound like something between true or false, but is that so? "Not particular" and "not definitely" might be translated with "false", i think.

 

Best regards, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. April 2024 um 18:06 Uhr
Von: "robert marty" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination


Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it will be"

"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.(CP 8.361)342-379 M-20b (1908))

Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of determination is transitive.

Best regards, Robert

 




Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

 







 

	
		
			
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Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> a écrit :




Dear list members,

 

some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.

 

Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity.

 

Best regards, Helmut


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination

2024-04-03 Thread robert marty

Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it
will be"

*"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.*(CP 8.361)342-379
M-20b *(1908))*

Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of
determination is transitive.

Best regards, Robert


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
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Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Dear list members,
>
> some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds
> of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also
> determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and
> classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it
> more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the
> second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that
> determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or
> "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or,
> if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.
>
> Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society
> determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there
> is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined
> by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the
> government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines
> the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself
> as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion
> (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and
> classification form a complexity.
>
> Best regards, Helmut
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-03 Thread Edwina Taborsky

tail that modern formal systems of modal logic will never turn 
>> out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point, such 
>> an assessment is utterly irrelevant for ascertaining what Peirce had in mind 
>> when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to add a 
>> Delta part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals." A 
>> straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new 
>> notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and nonsensical 
>> tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about propositions 
>> involving possibility and necessity.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>> On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa > <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>>> To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's 
>>> theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy 
>>> discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions 
>>> about Delta graphs.
>>> 
>>> The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in 
>>> much more detail in a  book he wrote in 2017.  I inserted commentary at 
>>> various points marked by "JFS:".  But I did not add, delete, or change any 
>>> of Jappy's text.  My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs, 
>>> but they provide some background information that may be helpful for 
>>> interpreting L376.
>>> 
>>> John
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> 
> 
> --
> Tony Jappy
> 
> CRESEM : Centre de recherches sur les Sociétés et Environnements en  
> Méditerranée
> University of Perpignan-Via Domitia,
> 66860 Perpignan Cedex,
> France
> 
> e-mail: anthony.ja...@gmail.com <http://mail.com/>, t...@univ-perp.fr 
> <mailto:t...@univ-perp.fr>
> 
> 
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[PEIRCE-L] determination

2024-04-03 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear list members,

 

some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.

 

Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity.

 

Best regards, Helmut
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-03 Thread Anthony Jappy

>(CP 8.338, SS 34-35, 1904 Oct 12), so it makes sense for the If trichotomy
>likewise to come *before *the Id trichotomy.
>
> I can elaborate on any or all of these if anyone is interested. As for the
> inserted comments ...
>
> JFS: Note that “Mark Token Type” is Peirce's final choice of labels for
> that trichotomy.
>
>
> In that draft letter to Lady Welby, Peirce states, "But I dare say some of
> my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a *Potisign
> *a *Tinge *or *Tone*, an *Actisign *a *Token*, a *Famisign *a *Type *...
> I think *Potisign Actisign Famisign* might be called *Mark Token Type (?)*
> ..." (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). The word "might" and the
> parenthetical question mark indicate that his choice of "mark" is *not *final.
> In fact, he reverts to "Tone" in a Logic Notebook entry dated two days
> later (27 Dec 1908,
> https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).
>
> Moreover, two days earlier, Peirce writes, "For a 'possible' Sign I have
> no better designation than a *Tone*, though I am considering replacing
> this by 'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (SS 83, 1908 Dec 23).
> Lady Welby replies a few weeks later, "Your exposition of the 'possible'
> Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of
> discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone* to *mark* for the
> homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his
> words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).
>
> I agree with her, especially since Peirce himself gives essentially the
> same rationale for "tone" when he introduces it--"An indefinite significant
> character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token.
> I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*" (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides, "mark"
> already had a well-established and quite different definition in logic,
> which Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
> Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark);
> and as discussed on the List recently, "markedness" is now an unrelated
> technical term in linguistics.
>
> JFS: In computer science and applications, the Lewis-style of modal logic
> has been useless in practical computations.
>
>
> Again, "useless" strikes me as an overstatement, and even if accurate, it
> does not entail that modern formal systems of modal logic will *never *turn
> out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point,
> such an assessment is *utterly irrelevant* for ascertaining what *Peirce *had
> in mind when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to
> add a *Delta *part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals."
> A straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new
> notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and
> nonsensical tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about
> propositions involving possibility and necessity.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's
>> theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy
>> discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions
>> about Delta graphs.
>>
>> The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in
>> much more detail in a  book he wrote in 2017.  I inserted commentary at
>> various points marked by "JFS:".  But I did not add, delete, or change any
>> of Jappy's text.  My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs,
>> but they provide some background information that may be helpful for
>> interpreting L376.
>>
>> John
>>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661

2024-04-02 Thread gnox

“From manuscripts R 703–4 it is clear that Peirce worked extensively on the 
third Illustrations article, “The Doctrine of Chances,” that same month.” That 
month was August 1910, according to Cornelis de Waal’s edition of Illustrations 
of the Logic of Science, from which the above quote is taken. (Open Court. 
Kindle Edition).

 

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of James Rizzo
Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2024 6:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661

 

Dear All,

 

Would anyone know how to find out when specifically in 1910 (i.e., month) 
Peirce wrote his additional notes on "The Doctrine of Chances"? The editorial 
note at CP 2.661, where these additional notes appear, just gives the year 
1910, as does Justus Buchler.  

 

Thanks in advance for your help,

 

James Rizzo

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[PEIRCE-L] Date of CP 2.661

2024-04-02 Thread James Rizzo

Dear All,

Would anyone know how to find out when specifically in 1910 (i.e., month)
Peirce wrote his additional notes on "The Doctrine of Chances"? The
editorial note at CP 2.661, where these additional notes appear, just gives
the year 1910, as does Justus Buchler.

Thanks in advance for your help,

James Rizzo
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter 8:1 - March/April 2024

2024-04-02 Thread Gary Richmond

List,

FYI: This latest edition of the Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter is
packed with information of interest to the Peirce community including an
introduction to Hans Joas, the new president of the Society, a section
*In Memoriam*: John Lachs, Nicholas Rescher, Don Roberts, and Beverly
Kent, news
of Society sessions and speakers at the 2024 World Congress of Philosophy
being held in Rome this August, and much else.

Gary Richmond, Moderator of Peirce-L

The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter 8:1

[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]

Dear Gary Richmond

Internationally, the thought of Charles S. Peirce continues to stimulate
significant work and discussion. Dedicated to promoting Peirce’s work and
thought, the Charles S. Peirce Society is pleased to update you on its
efforts, on new publications relating to Peirce and to pragmatism, and on
other news relating to Peirce. We are grateful for your support and for
being a part of such a wonderful and expansive community of inquirers.

Yours truly,

The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee

*Spotlight on the Peirce Society President*

We are pleased to announce that Professor *Hans Joas*, Ernst Troeltsch
Professor for the Sociology of Religion at the Humboldt University of
Berlin, is the President of the Charles S. Peirce Society this year,
succeeding Professor Yi Jiang, who is now serving as past president and who
will be, along with other past presidents, a Society Fellow for life.

For more than twenty years, Professor Joas was also a visiting professor in
the Department of Sociology and in the Committee on Social Thought at the
University of Chicago. He holds honorary doctorates from the University of
Tübingen, Uppsala University and the Pazmanyi Peter University in Budapest.
>From 2011 until 2014 he was a Fellow at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced
Studies (FRIAS), and before that, from 2002 until 2011, he was the Director
of the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies at the
University of Erfurt.

Professor Joas’s contributions to pragmatist thought begin with his famous
study on George H. Mead, *G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His
Thought* (MIT Press, 1985, 1997). Since then, he has authored more than a
dozen other books, including *Pragmatism and Social Theory*, *The
Creativity of Action* and *The Genesis of Values* (all of them University
of Chicago Press, 1993, 1996 and 2000, respectively). They are all
contributions to a new social theory based on American pragmatism. A more
recent book is *The Power of the Sacred. An Alternative to the Narrative of
Disenchantment* (OUP 2021), in which he argues that Peirce’s semiotics can
be synthesized with William James’s psychology of religion, and that such a
synthesis is crucial to a contemporary theory of religion. His most recent
book is *Under the Spell of Freedom: Theory of Religion after Hegel and
Nietzsche* (OUP, 2024).

It is truly an honor that Professor Joas will help lead our Society this
year and into the future.

*The 2024-2025 Peirce Essay Prize*

Once again, our Society is holding an essay contest directed to promoting
work by junior scholars. The 2024-2025 Peirce Essay Prize offers a $1,000
cash prize plus up to $750 for travel to the Society’s annual meeting to
present the winning essay, as well as its publication (subjective to
editorial revision) in the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*.

The essay can be on any topic related to Peirce’s work, and we consider
submissions from graduate students and those who are no more than seven
years out from the year they earned their last graduate degree,
or ten years for those who have given birth or have had childcare
responsibilities (past winners of the contest are ineligible). The list of
previous winners can be found here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=4aa7dbbfd5=860edf35dc>
.

The submission deadline is *August 15, 2024*. Because the winning essay may
be published in the Transactions, the length of contest submissions should
be about the length of an average journal article. The maximum acceptable
length is 10,000 words, including notes. The presentation of the winning
submission at the annual meeting cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time. Go
here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=7e9cc86b35=860edf35dc>
for
more information.

*In Memoriam**: John Lachs, Nicholas Rescher, Don Roberts, and Beverly Kent*

We are saddened by the passing of four distinguished scholars over the past
six months, whose contributions to pragmatism and to Peirce studies are
well known. It is our duty and privilege to remember and honor each one of
them.

*John Lachs* served as the Peirce Society president in 1987. He was
professor emeritus at Vanderbilt University, where he had served since
1967. He is the author of more 10 books and 150 articles, with one of his
la

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

2024-04-01 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

F Sowa  wrote:

> To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's
> theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy
> discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions
> about Delta graphs.
>
> The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in
> much more detail in a  book he wrote in 2017.  I inserted commentary at
> various points marked by "JFS:".  But I did not add, delete, or change any
> of Jappy's text.  My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs,
> but they provide some background information that may be helpful for
> interpreting L376.
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Mistake about sodium sulfate (was Meta-languages...

2024-03-26 Thread John F Sowa

ould be a chemical representation for the word 'that'.

John__

On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:20 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
 wrote:
John, Jon:

In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s “metalanguage" 
are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is simpler to just pose an 
example of the meanings of metalanguages in the relevant logic used by CSP.

The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book, page 22:

What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences relative to 
concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the consequences?

How would the blanks be relative to the copula?  Copula’s of “metalanguages?

What would be the number of metalanguages necessary for a conclusion from  a 
posited pragmatic sentence with n blanks?

Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the 
example cited by Roberts?

Have fun!

Cheers
Jerry
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