subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] Perfect Sign Revisited"

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-14 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jerry, List,

About consciousness: I guess that ethics requires self-consciousness, which only humans have, and animals that would pass the mirror-test, like some apes, some birds, and so on. Logic seems quite ubiquituous to me, and feeling too, but only if you identify it with sensation. In this case it is hard to tell a blind reaction from a decision based on sensation. I think, this leads into confusion, and it is better to say: Esthetics is not just feeling, but the conscious awareness of it too, logic is not just something happening according to universal laws, but conscious logical reasoning too. So I guess you are right. The whole matter of esthetics, logic, and ethics is based on consciousness.

Best, Helmut

13. März 2018 um 21:20 Uhr
"Jerry Rhee"

Helmut, list,

There’s a clear response to your explicit assertion for your consideration of what effects you conceive the object of your conception to have. For whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists.

But perhaps given past experience, it’s better to leave the truth of that matter to such things as are independent of the vagaries of me and you.

Still, I applaud you for keeping to earnest inquiry, in spite of the warranted reputation Peirce carries on this list.

Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:31 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Jerry, List,

From the quotes you wrote, I get it that for Peirce ethics was 2ns, and logic 3ns. I think it is the other way around: Logic to me seems like a brute reaction to a thesis, telling whether it is consistent or not. And ethics seems like mediation to me: It mediates between logic´s reaction and the feeling, the valuing qualia "beautiful" or "ugly" that arise in one´s mind due to the thesis. For example the categorical imperative by Kant: It contains logic in the form of a syllogism, like you cannot act in a way opposing your concept of univerality, if you don´t want to contradict youself by performance. And it contains esthetics, as the motive of this logical reasoning: You want to feel well, have a good feeling with what you do.

Best, Helmut

13. März 2018 um 00:48 Uhr
"Jerry Rhee"
wrote:

Dear Helmut, list,

I’m glad you think so. Please consult the list of criteria to ensure that your conception passes the test of universality. If not, please modify accordingly.

Best,

Jerry R

As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all” (CP 5.133, 1903).

What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an ethical test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903).

It is clear at this point, that the test for a summum bonum is not the domain of esthetics alone, but it must be evaluated by all three normative sciences. The test must pass the test of feeling (of admiration); it must pass the ethical test of universality, and it must pass the logical-scientific test, based on the effects of its implementation.

This perhaps explains Peirce’s various pronouncements as to whether the determination of ends is the subject matter of esthetics or ethics Esthetics governs the first test of its admirableness, ethics its second test of universality, and logic, in the form of a methodology for inquiry, governs the third test, a study of the effects of its implementation.

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Jerry, List,

I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is also esthetics again. Best, Helmut

12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr
"Jerry Rhee"
wrote:

Dear list,

This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.

The books do seem so feeble…

Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes.

It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.

The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled with doubts and queries mainly..

With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But truth is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a certain true thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet specified. In the future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up. I can see truth only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as open-end-evolution, but as approximation towards an asymptote,

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-13 Thread Jerry Rhee

Helmut, list,



There’s a clear response to your explicit assertion for your consideration
of what effects you conceive the object of your conception to have.  For
whenever there is any kind of feeling, there consciousness exists.



But perhaps given past experience, it’s better to leave the truth of that
matter to such things as are independent of the vagaries of me and you.



Still, I applaud you for keeping to earnest inquiry, in spite of the
warranted reputation Peirce carries on this list.



Best,
Jerry R


On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:31 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear Jerry, List,
> From the quotes you wrote, I get it that for Peirce ethics was 2ns, and
> logic 3ns. I think it is the other way around: Logic to me seems like a
> brute reaction to a thesis, telling whether it is consistent or not. And
> ethics seems like mediation to me: It mediates between logic´s reaction and
> the feeling, the valuing qualia "beautiful" or "ugly" that arise in one´s
> mind due to the thesis. For example the categorical imperative by Kant: It
> contains logic in the form of a syllogism, like you cannot act in a way
> opposing your concept of univerality, if you don´t want to contradict
> youself by performance. And it contains esthetics, as the motive of this
> logical reasoning: You want to feel well, have a good feeling with what you
> do.
> Best, Helmut
>
> 13. März 2018 um 00:48 Uhr
>  "Jerry Rhee" 
> wrote:
>
> Dear Helmut, list,
>
>
>
> I’m glad you think so.  Please consult the list of criteria to ensure
> that your conception passes the test of universality.  If not, please
> modify accordingly.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
> As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently
> pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all”
> (CP 5.133, 1903).
>
>
>
> What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an
> ethical test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903).
>
>
>
> It is clear at this point, that the test for a summum bonum is not the
> domain of esthetics alone, but it must be evaluated by all three normative
> sciences. The test must pass the test of feeling (of admiration); *it
> must pass the ethical test of universality*, and it must pass the
> logical-scientific test, based on the effects of its implementation.
>
>
>
> This perhaps explains Peirce’s various pronouncements as to whether the
> determination of ends is the subject matter of esthetics or ethics
> Esthetics governs the first test of its admirableness, ethics its second
> test of universality, and logic, in the form of a methodology for inquiry,
> governs the third test, a study of the effects of its implementation.
>
> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Dear Jerry, List,
>> I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling
>> // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of
>> 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an
>> interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is also esthetics
>> again. Best, Helmut
>>
>> 12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr
>>  "Jerry Rhee" 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Dear list,
>>
>>
>>
>> This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.
>>
>>
>> The books do seem so feeble…
>>
>> Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different
>> universes.
>>
>> It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming
>> is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.
>>
>> The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should
>> fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled
>> with doubts and queries mainly..
>>
>>
>>
>> With best wishes,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But
>>> truth is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a
>>> certain true thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet
>>> specified. In the future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up.
>>> I can see truth only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as
>>> open-end-evolution, but as approximation towards an asymptote, wouldn´t
>>> that be boring hell? And real blasphemy, I would say: God as a clockmaker.
>>> Jon, List,
>>> I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic
>>> idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in
>>> metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple
>>> rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it
>>> a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is
>>> logical?
>>> Best, Helmut
>>>
>>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>>>
>>> Helmut, List:
>>>
>>> Again, in this

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-13 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Jerry, List,

Best, Helmut

13. März 2018 um 00:48 Uhr
"Jerry Rhee"
wrote:

Dear Helmut, list,

I’m glad you think so. Please consult the list of criteria to ensure that your conception passes the test of universality. If not, please modify accordingly.

Best,

Jerry R

As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all” (CP 5.133, 1903).

What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an ethical test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903).

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Jerry, List,

12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr
"Jerry Rhee"
wrote:

Dear list,

This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.

The books do seem so feeble…

Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes.

It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.

The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled with doubts and queries mainly..

With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is logical?

Best, Helmut

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals or regulative hopes. A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there are such truthful Signs. A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a way that does not constitute Entelechy, the genuine unity of Matter and Form. Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we like it or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises when our beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false.

CSP: ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not sincere, the irresistible effect of

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-12 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear Helmut, list,



I’m glad you think so.  Please consult the list of criteria to ensure that
your conception passes the test of universality.  If not, please modify
accordingly.



Best,

Jerry R



As Peirce concludes, “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently
pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all”
(CP 5.133, 1903).



What is important to note here, is that Peirce claims this to be an ethical
test, not an esthetic one (CP 5.133, 1903).



It is clear at this point, that the test for a summum bonum is not the
domain of esthetics alone, but it must be evaluated by all three normative
sciences. The test must pass the test of feeling (of admiration); *it must
pass the ethical test of universality*, and it must pass the
logical-scientific test, based on the effects of its implementation.



This perhaps explains Peirce’s various pronouncements as to whether the
determination of ends is the subject matter of esthetics or ethics
Esthetics governs the first test of its admirableness, ethics its second
test of universality, and logic, in the form of a methodology for inquiry,
governs the third test, a study of the effects of its implementation.


On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 6:35 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear Jerry, List,
> I think, esthetics is 1ns, logic 2ns, and ethics 3ns (Quality or feeling
> // reaction // mediation). This way, logic would imply esthetics, as 1ns of
> 2ns (2.1.): Does the logic feel beautiful or ugly. Ethics would be an
> interpretant too, becoming a sign (1ns) again, so ethics is also esthetics
> again. Best, Helmut
>
> 12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr
>  "Jerry Rhee" 
> wrote:
>
> Dear list,
>
>
>
> This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.
>
>
> The books do seem so feeble…
>
> Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different
> universes.
>
> It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is
> illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.
>
> The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should
> fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled
> with doubts and queries mainly..
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But truth
>> is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a certain true
>> thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet specified. In the
>> future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up. I can see truth
>> only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as open-end-evolution,
>> but as approximation towards an asymptote, wouldn´t that be boring hell?
>> And real blasphemy, I would say: God as a clockmaker.
>> Jon, List,
>> I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic
>> idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in
>> metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple
>> rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it
>> a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is
>> logical?
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>>
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals
>> or regulative hopes.  A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it
>> conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there
>> are such truthful Signs.  A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral
>> Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a
>> way that *does not* constitute Entelechy, the *genuine *unity of Matter
>> and Form.  Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we
>> like it or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises
>> when our beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false.
>>
>>
>> CSP:  ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in
>> the end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not
>> sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experience will
>> be to make him so ... I hold that truth's independence of individual
>> opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the
>> predestined result to which sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead.
>> (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)
>>
>>
>> Only at the ultimate limit--in the *infinite *future, which will never
>> arrive--would the final opinion *perfectly *coincide with the Absolute
>> Truth.
>>
>>
>> CSP:  The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it
>> might be truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought
>> carried to its last perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and
>> further toward the positive side traversed

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-12 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Jerry, List,

12. März 2018 um 01:41 Uhr
"Jerry Rhee"
wrote:

Dear list,

This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.

The books do seem so feeble…

Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes.

It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.

The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled with doubts and queries mainly..

With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

Best, Helmut

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

CSP: ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experience will be to make him so ... I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the predestined result to which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)

Only at the ultimate limit--in the infinite future, which will never arrive--would the final opinion perfectly coincide with the Absolute Truth.

CSP: The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it might be truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought carried to its last perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and further toward the positive side traversed infinity and appears coming nearer and nearer from the negative side, so thought passing always from object to interpretation at its extremest point reaches the absolute reality of objectivity. The real and true thing is the thing as it might be known to be. (NEM 4:300; 1904)

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your post seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung der Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human discourse towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point and the way you put it, each and every sign is connected to truth somehow, and there cannot be a distinction between perfect and imperfect signs. If truth is being looked for by every sign, but achieved by none, who could justifiedly assign a perfection value to a sign, or define a perfection scale for signs?

One more complication: If the sign is a lie, then the final interpretant is a lie too, not the truth. Except one might say: It is the truth that this lie is put up, or: It is the truth that people believe in this sign or are influenced by it. But you hardly can say, that the sign is perfect or true. Maybe in his time, Karl Otto Apel could not foresee how bold and unscrupulous people today design alternative facts and forge signs of them. But

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-11 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Jon S, List,


You're trying to develop an interpretation of the meaning of "perfect sign" as 
it is used in EP 2:545n25. The footnote refers to a passage in "The Basis of 
Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences", where he talks about an ordinary 
conversation as "a wonderfully perfect kind of sign functioning." (EP, 2: 391).


For starters, I looked at Peirce's definitions  of "perfect" in the Century 
Dictionary in cases where it is used as an adjective. Here are four definitions 
that seem relevant:


1. brought to consummation, fully finished, completed in every part.

2. full; whole; entire; complete.

4. without blemish or defect; lacking in nothing; the best, highest, or most 
complete type; exact or unquestionable in every particular, e.g., perfect 
likeness, a perfect specimen

7. completely effective; satisfactory in every respect


With those definitions in hand, let's consider the following passage from the 
PARTIAL SYNOPSIS OF A PROPOSED WORK IN LOGIC where he describes a relatively 
perfect process of signification:


Transuasion in its obsistent aspect, or Mediation, will be shown to be subject 
to two degrees of degeneracy. Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A 
Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to 
a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into 
relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into 
relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum. If the series is broken 
off, the Sign, in so far, falls short of the perfect significant character. It 
is not necessary that the Interpretant should actually exist. A being in futuro 
will suffice. (CP 2.92) [my emphasis for the underlined phrase]


For the purpose of getting clearer about how Peirce is using "perfect" as an 
adjective to modify "sign" and "sign functioning" in the "The Basis of 
Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences", I recommend trying to interpret those 
uses in light of the way he is characterizing "perfect significant character" 
here. Note how central the idea is to the account of the genuine mediation of a 
sign as a process that is capable of being interpreted further--potentially 
without end. As we know, the validity of scientific reasoning hinges on such an 
assumption.


Hope that helps.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, March 10, 2018 8:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

List:

Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can now 
make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in EP 
2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.

  *   It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its 
occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other Sign 
except those that are its ingredients.
  *   It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that acts; 
and whatever acts, changes.
  *   Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the 
Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its outlines 
are becoming more indefinite.
  *   It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it the 
accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the energy that 
it already had, but which had lain dormant.
  *   It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by its 
will, but are phenomena of growth.
  *   It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs.
The Perfect Sign involves the present existence (2ns) of only those Signs that 
comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues receiving 
accretions of new Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing spontaneous 
changes (1ns).  After further contemplation, I now believe that Peirce was 
describing the same thing here as in the passage about "the ideal sign" that I 
have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple of years earlier.

CSP:  What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, 
but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every 
sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as 
nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect 
Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) 
would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or 
entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to 
mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and 
so identical,--in su

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-11 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list,



This conversation is so esthetically pleasing.


The books do seem so feeble…

Esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes.

It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that that seeming is
illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics.

The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should
fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled
with doubts and queries mainly..



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 6:49 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Sorry, I think it was wrong supposing platonic idealism to you. But truth
> is a complicated subject. I donot think, that a sign denotes a certain true
> thing. Signs can be unclear, denoting something not yet specified. In the
> future there may be bifurcations: Concepts can split up. I can see truth
> only in the path, not in the goal. Seeing life not as open-end-evolution,
> but as approximation towards an asymptote, wouldn´t that be boring hell?
> And real blasphemy, I would say: God as a clockmaker.
> Jon, List,
> I guess, our truth concepts differ slightly. Maybe it is about platonic
> idealism versus transcendental pragmatism. Does the "meta"- thing in
> metaphysics consist of many discrete blueprints, or is it just one simple
> rule? Is entelechy a complicated, obscure force we cannot analyse, or is it
> a reasonable principle of nature we might understand? Because "Logos" is
> logical?
> Best, Helmut
>
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals or
> regulative hopes.  A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it
> conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there
> are such truthful Signs.  A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral
> Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a
> way that *does not* constitute Entelechy, the *genuine *unity of Matter
> and Form.  Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we
> like it or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises
> when our beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false.
>
>
> CSP:  ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in
> the end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not
> sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experience will
> be to make him so ... I hold that truth's independence of individual
> opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the
> predestined result to which sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead.
> (CP 5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)
>
>
> Only at the ultimate limit--in the *infinite *future, which will never
> arrive--would the final opinion *perfectly *coincide with the Absolute
> Truth.
>
>
> CSP:  The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it
> might be truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought
> carried to its last perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and
> further toward the positive side traversed infinity and appears coming
> nearer and nearer from the negative side, so thought passing always from
> object to interpretation at its extremest point reaches the absolute
> reality of objectivity. The real and true thing is the thing as it might be
> known to be. (NEM 4:300; 1904)
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, List,
>> I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your post
>> seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung der
>> Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human discourse
>> towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point and the way
>> you put it, each and every sign is connected to truth somehow, and there
>> cannot be a distinction between perfect and imperfect signs. If truth is
>> being looked for by every sign, but achieved by none, who could justifiedly
>> assign a perfection value to a sign, or define a perfection scale for signs?
>>
>> One more complication: If the sign is a lie, then the final interpretant
>> is a lie too, not the truth. Except one might say: It is the truth that
>> this lie is put up, or: It is the truth that people believe in this sign or
>> are influenced by it. But you hardly can say, that the sign is perfect or
>> true. Maybe in his time, Karl Otto Apel could not foresee how bold and
>> unscrupulous people today design alternative facts and forge signs of them.
>> But these signs are rid of (regulative) hope, thank you for this term, and
>> I think it is justified to hope, that in a false sign the absence of
>> regulative hope is easily detectable.
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>>  10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>>
>> Helmut,

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Best, Helmut

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Only at the ultimate limit--in the infinite future, which will never arrive--would the final opinion perfectly coincide with the Absolute Truth.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

Best, Helmut

10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, Edwina, List:

HR: I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.

And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements of the 'Truth.' Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign" (EP 2:304). It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and Sign-theory as having everything to do with truth.

ET: I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc,

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Best, Helmut

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Only at the ultimate limit--in the infinite future, which will never arrive--would the final opinion perfectly coincide with the Absolute Truth.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

Best, Helmut

10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, Edwina, List:

HR: I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.

ET: I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.

And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy] to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304); and he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a perfect sign" (EP 2:545n25). It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of perfection (i.e., Entelechy;

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

Again, in this context, the concepts of truth and perfection are ideals or
regulative hopes.  A Sign is truthful or perfect to the extent that it
conforms to its Object, and we can recognize lying Signs only because there
are such truthful Signs.  A lying Sign takes advantage of our Collateral
Experience with actual Things and real Qualities, but connects them in a
way that *does not* constitute Entelechy, the *genuine *unity of Matter and
Form.  Fortunately, inquiry tends to be self-correcting, whether we like it
or not; the "outward clash" confronts us with unpleasant surprises when our
beliefs--manifested as our Habits of Interpretation--are false.

CSP:  ... the objectivity of truth really consists in the fact that, in the
end, every sincere inquirer will be led to embrace it--and if he be not
sincere, the irresistible effect of inquiry in the light of experience will
be to make him so ... I hold that truth's independence of individual
opinions is due (so far as there is any "truth") to its being the
predestined result to which sufficient inquiry *would *ultimately lead. (CP
5.494, EP 2:419; 1907)

Only at the ultimate limit--in the *infinite *future, which will never
arrive--would the final opinion *perfectly *coincide with the Absolute
Truth.

CSP:  The true and perfect reality, the very thing, is the thing as it
might be truly represented, as it would be truly represented were thought
carried to its last perfection. As a perissid curve passing further and
further toward the positive side traversed infinity and appears coming
nearer and nearer from the negative side, so thought passing always from
object to interpretation at its extremest point reaches the absolute
reality of objectivity. The real and true thing is the thing as it might be
known to be. (NEM 4:300; 1904)

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> I agree and try to correct myself. A sign has to do with truth. Your post
> seems to me as a generalization of Karl Otto Apel´s "Letztbegründung der
> Diskursethik" (Final foundation of discourse ethics?) from human discourse
> towards communications, signs, in general. But with this point and the way
> you put it, each and every sign is connected to truth somehow, and there
> cannot be a distinction between perfect and imperfect signs. If truth is
> being looked for by every sign, but achieved by none, who could justifiedly
> assign a perfection value to a sign, or define a perfection scale for signs?
>
> One more complication: If the sign is a lie, then the final interpretant
> is a lie too, not the truth. Except one might say: It is the truth that
> this lie is put up, or: It is the truth that people believe in this sign or
> are influenced by it. But you hardly can say, that the sign is perfect or
> true. Maybe in his time, Karl Otto Apel could not foresee how bold and
> unscrupulous people today design alternative facts and forge signs of them.
> But these signs are rid of (regulative) hope, thank you for this term, and
> I think it is justified to hope, that in a false sign the absence of
> regulative hope is easily detectable.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  10. März 2018 um 22:50 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>
> Helmut, Edwina, List:
>
>
> HR:  I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a
> concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.
>
>
> And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently
> complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the
> same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements
> of the 'Truth.'  Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact
> that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
> sign" (EP 2:304).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and
> Sign-theory as having *everything *to do with truth.
>
>
> ET:  I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign',
> etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>
>
> And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy] to
> mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect,
> and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very
> matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304); and
> he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a *perfect *sign" (EP
> 2:545n25).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of
> perfection (i.e., Entelechy; cf. NEM 4:292-300) to be an *essential
> aspect* of Peircean semiosis.
>
>
> ET:  That is - there is no Final State of Perfection ... There can be no
> necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.
>
>
> Who has stated or implied otherwise?  As Gary R. just pointed out, the
> text that I quoted clearly treats perfection as an ideal, a *regulative
> hope*.  It is much like Peirce's notion of "the final opinion," which
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, list,

Edwina wrote:

ET: I stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means
that no final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the
perfect' or even 'truth'.

I would tend to strongly agree "that no final state can be reached.",
Neither JAS nor I have suggested that a final state can be reached, in
fact, quite the contrary. As Jon wrote:

JAS:  As Gary R. . . pointed out, the text that I quoted clearly treats
perfection as an ideal, a *regulative hope*.  It is much like Peirce's
notion of "the final opinion," which will never *actually *be achieved,
either.

I must admit that I don't see what you're disagreeing with.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 6:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> Peirce doesn't employ the notion of perfection in any concrete sense. I
> stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means that no
> final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the perfect' or
> even 'truth'.
>
> The basic composition of the universe, i.e., the Three Categories and the
> Triadic Semiosic Process means that deviation from a 'path' is basic to
> life. Indeed, your quotes below confirm my point - that no final state [and
> that includes perfection] is possible. Not merely not possible but it would
> be non-semiosic - for that triad and those three categories prevent
> finality.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 10/03/18 4:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the
> notion of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the
> perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."
>
> Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
> does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up"
> by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings.
>
> ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system
> that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and
> Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and
> developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there
> is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity
> prevent such a linear and closed path.
>
> See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of
> 'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by
> him not to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is
> a tendency exactly towards evolutionary growth, but that it is asymptotic
> and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die
> out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is
> neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how
> Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic
> inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.
>
> 1909 | Letters to William James  | EP 2:496-7
>
> …there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
> Interpretant, because  it is that which would finally be decided to be
> the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far
> that an ultimate opinion were reached.
>
> Notice the would in would finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could argue
> in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate opinion"
> in the snippet quoted above. These are general tendencies considered in
> futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909 letter Peirce
> writes:
>
> ". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts
> about according to which a general description of result is made to come
> about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or
> that particular way" (CSP).
>
>
> ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
> frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
> but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
> but its very individuality precludes perfection.
>
> This might be the case were the world to go on forever, grow and evolve as
> if stars and planets didn't also grow old and die. (There is a theological
> notion which I assume I'm not the only one to hold

[PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list:

Peirce doesn't employ the notion of perfection in any concrete
sense. I stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean
semiosis means that no final state can be reached - whether that
final state be 'the perfect' or even 'truth'.

The basic composition of the universe, i.e., the Three Categories
and the Triadic Semiosic Process means that deviation from a 'path'
is basic to life. Indeed, your quotes below confirm my point - that
no final state [and that includes perfection] is possible. Not merely
not possible but it would be non-semiosic - for that triad and those
three categories prevent finality.

Edwina
 On Sat 10/03/18  4:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, list,
 Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the
notion of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection',
'the perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."

 Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean
semiosis" does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not
being "made up" by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not
vernacular) meanings.
ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a
system that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity,
diversity - and Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the
phenomenon of growth and developing complexity, which appears to be
universal" 6.64. That is - there is no Final State of Perfection, for
the reality of growth and complexity prevent such a linear and closed
path. 

See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's
use of 'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality')
which are used by him not to deny growth and evolution, but rather to
suggest that there is a tendency exactly towards evolutionary growth,
but that it is asymptotic and will--can--never be reached (for one
thing, the sun will eventually die out and all Earthly activity,
including evolution, will cease--but that is neither her nor there).
In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how Peirce is using the
terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic inquiries. Take for
example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.  
 1909 | Letters to William James  | EP 2:496-7

…there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the
Final Interpretant, because  it is that which would finally be decided
to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were
carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached.Notice the would
in would finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could argue in a similar
manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate opinion" in the
snippet quoted above. These are  general tendencies considered in
futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909 letter
Peirce writes:
 ". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing
facts about according to which a general description of result is
made to come about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to
come about in this or that particular way" (CSP). 
 ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of
novelty, spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a
deviation from any stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions
both to constantly reduce diversity, mould commonality and generality
- and this too would again, provide a method of deviation from any
stable format [of perfection]. The mode of Secondness, with its focus
on the particular and the linear, is frankly the only mode that would
be available for a path-to-perfection, but not only does it not exist
alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes - but its very individuality
precludes perfection. 

This might be the case were the world to go on forever, grow and
evolve as if stars and planets didn't also grow old and die. (There
is a theological notion which I assume I'm not the only one to hold
it--although I can't recall where I got it--that none of this world's
growth and evolution is lost in the Mind of God, or just Mind if you
prefer; however, this is surely not the thread to get into  that
idea.)ET: And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative
node that transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a
constantly interactive and individual semiosis which is
transformative and complex rather than linear. There can be no
necessitarian perfection or 'final state' 
 There is no "necessitarianism" in Peirce's notion of the 'perfect
Sign', etc. Take, for example, Peirce's understanding of "Final
Causation":
  1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Prelogical Notions. Section I.
Classification of the Sciences (Logic II) | EP 2:120; CP 1.211 

Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to
be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain
general character.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, list,

Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion
of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."

Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up"
by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings.

ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that
is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce
himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing
complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no
Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent
such a linear and closed path.

See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of
'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by
him *not* to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is
a tendency *exactly towards evolutionary growth,* but that it is asymptotic
and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die
out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is
neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how
Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic
inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.

1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:496-7

…there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
Interpretant, because it is that which *would *finally be decided to be the
true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that
an ultimate opinion were reached.

Notice the *would* in *would* finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could
argue in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate
opinion" in the snippet quoted above. These are *general tendencies*
considered in futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909
letter Peirce writes:

". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts
about according to which a general description of result is made to come
about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or
that particular way" (CSP).

ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
but its very individuality precludes perfection.

This might be the case were the world to go on forever, grow and evolve as
if stars and planets didn't also grow old and die. (There is a theological
notion which I assume I'm not the only one to hold it--although I can't
recall where I got it--that none of *this *world's growth and evolution is
lost in the Mind of God, or just Mind if you prefer; however, this is
surely not the thread to get into *that* idea.)

ET: And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
'final state'

There is no "necessitarianism" in *Peirce's notion* of the 'perfect Sign',
etc. Take, for example, Peirce's understanding of "Final Causation":

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Prelogical Notions. Section I.
Classification of the Sciences (Logic II) | EP 2:120; CP 1.211

Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be
brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain *general
characte**r**. *(emphasis added by me)

In my view, the 'general character' of the evolution of the Cosmos through,
shall we say, infinite semiosis, is what Peirce means when he uses such
terminology as that involving 'final' and 'perfect' and 'Truth'.

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List -
>
>  I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
> 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
> sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>
> The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that is
> innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

 Helmut, Edwina, List:

HR:  I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth ... Truth is a
concept of transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think.

And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "Every sign that is sufficiently
complete refers to sundry real objects ... [that] are parts of one and the
same Universe of being, the 'Truth' ... All these characters are elements
of the 'Truth.'  Every sign signifies the 'Truth' ... The 'Truth,' the fact
that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
sign" (EP 2:304).  It seems to me that Peirce himself considered Signs and
Sign-theory as having *everything *to do with truth.

ET:  I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect sign', etc,
is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.

And yet Peirce stated quite plainly, "We may adopt the word [entelechy] to
mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect,
and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very
matter denoted united with the very form signified by it" (EP 2:304); and
he later drafted a lengthy definition of "a *perfect *sign" (EP 2:545n25).
It seems to me that Peirce himself considered the very idea of perfection
(i.e., Entelechy; cf. NEM 4:292-300) to be an *essential aspect* of
Peircean semiosis.

ET:  That is - there is no Final State of Perfection ... There can be no
necessitarian perfection or 'final state'.

Who has stated or implied otherwise?  As Gary R. just pointed out, the text
that I quoted clearly treats perfection as an ideal, a *regulative hope*.
It is much like Peirce's notion of "the final opinion," which will
never *actually
*be achieved, either.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List -
>
>  I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
> 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
> sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>
> The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that is
> innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce
> himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing
> complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no
> Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent
> such a linear and closed path.
>
> That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
> frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
> but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
> but its very individuality precludes perfection.
>
> And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
> transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
> interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
> complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
> 'final state'.
>
> Edwina
>
On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 1:08 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
> I do not think, that a sign has to do with truth (aka perfection,
> nonquasiness, geninunity...). It has to do with force, need, or volition,
> depending on the utterer-interpreter-weldedness, whether it/she/he/they
> is/are nonorganic, organic, or nervous. Truth is a concept of
> transcendental philosophy, but not of sign theory, I think. Best, Helmut
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, list,

You concluded: "Any comments?  I am guessing that these topics must simply
not be of much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I
find it hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been
posting. :-)"

I would imagine that there are several on this list (I could probably name
them) who find the topics you're discussing of considerable interest, and I
am one of them. I doubt that everyone--even and especially every one of
those interested individuals--agrees with everything you've been posting,
but I personally agree with much of it, having some reservations about some
of it which I'll have to discuss in a future post.

However, more to the middle reason you offered in the snippet I quoted
above as to why you haven't received much feedback recently. I myself have
been exceedingly busy of late and haven't had much time to fully digest
your very rich messages let alone respond to them. From off list messages,
I know two other list members who are quite interested in this line of
inquiry but who are now themselves very busy. This situation reminds me of
Joe Ransdell's comment on the Peirce-l page at the Arisbe web site.


 If nobody responds to your posts you should NOT assume that it is because
of lack of interest, or that your post is perceived as something
negligible. You really have no basis for doing that, given the
understandings and practices of lists like this. Frequently, the interested
people just don't have time to respond, and few of us have time to respond
to more than a small percentage of the things that interest us, in any
case. Since you usually have no way of knowing why you didn't get the
response you hoped for, it is best to be Stoic about it. . .  Pose your
questions and comments well by your own standards and remind yourself that
even if there is no overt response, what you have said or asked will be
read by hundreds of people in any case, and with what results or "fruits"
you cannot know.


While I'm still busy, for now I'd like to respond to a couple of more
substantive points made in your most recent post:

JAS:  After further contemplation, I now believe that Peirce was
describing *the
same thing* here as in the passage about "the ideal sign" that I have
mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple of years earlier.


You then quoted the passage from EP 2:304 which included these sentences:


CSP:  . . . Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*,
which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the
very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
denoted united with the very form signified by it.

This snippet from the longer quotation, especially the phrase "the ideal
sign which should be quite perfect," would seem to nearly confirm your
sense that what Peirce terms the "ideal sign" and, years later, the
"perfect sign" are, indeed, synonymous.

And I'm also "with you" in your revising your previous hypothesis.


JAS: 
Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous with
"Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the
Universe.

While I've held from the get-go that 'perfect Sign' and 'Quasi-mind' are
*not* the same thing, I'm beginning to return to my original thought that
the 'perfect Sign' expresses some kind of an ideal, some asymptotic
approach to "the Truth that corresponds to the Universe," a Universe
which, however, is ever-evolving.

So, it seems to me that 'perfection' (also, 'ideal') in Peirce's semieotic
sense is *not* being employed by him in some informal, every day,
colloquial way. I think that if respondents to your posts were to read more
of what Peirce means by these terms ('perfect' or 'ideal' + sign, 'the
Truth', etc.) rather than what they 'think' these may mean based on a less
scientific and more colloquial usage, that this inquiry could perhaps move
forward more speedily. Or not.

Best,

Gary R

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Stephen C. Rose

Disregarding the pejorative tone of your note the creators of CP certainly
did not see their work as exhaustive though they hoped for a complete
display of Peirce online. Blocking the road of inquiry is to Peirce one of
the major evils and if I have committed it I apologize. The substance of
your note I leave to wiser heads to determine the weight of.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Stephen, Jon S, list,
>
> Stephen wrote:
>
> SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of
> matters Peirce himself did not see as important.
>
>
> I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive
> complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In
> fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic
> which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it
> is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason
> whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this
> as an important inquiry and quite the contrary.
>
> SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used
> in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000
> references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect.
>
>
> Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your
> stats hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of
> certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for
> example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and
> never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one
> might come up with a *very* different frequency rate.
>
> Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about
> it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a
> great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a
> fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of
> terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances
> of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a
> number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years,
> say. . .
>
> SR:  I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not
> fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended
> treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
>
>
> What *I* think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road
> of inquiry" because one  doesn't find it of personal interest or personal
> value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by
> Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further
> research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of
> the topics under consideration.
>
> SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
> lexicon
>
>
> First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's
> own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to
> give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may
> warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute
> to it.
>
> Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond
> the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently
> noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and
> this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially
> his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to
> dictionaries, etc.
>
> Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order
> to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with
> what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself
> deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:
>
> Do not block the way of inquiry.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
>> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
>> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
>> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
>> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
>> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
>> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
>> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
>> lexicon.
>>
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Gary Richmond

Stephen, Jon S, list,

Stephen wrote:

SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important.

I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive
complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In
fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic
which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it
is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason
whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this
as an important inquiry and quite the contrary.

SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used
in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000
references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect.

Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your stats
hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of
certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for
example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and
never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one
might come up with a *very* different frequency rate.

Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about
it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a
great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a
fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of
terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances
of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a
number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years,
say. . .

SR:  I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not fundamental
to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended treatment as
something that will somehow advance u thinking.

What *I* think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road of
inquiry" because one  doesn't find it of personal interest or personal
value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by
Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further
research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of
the topics under consideration.

SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
lexicon

First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's
own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to
give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may
warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute
to it.

Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond
the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently
noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and
this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially
his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to
dictionaries, etc.

Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order
to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with
what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself
deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

Do not block the way of inquiry.

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
> lexicon.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>>
>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
>> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
>> EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>>
>>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>>occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other
>>Sign except those that are its ingredients.
>>- It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
>>acts;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Stephen C. Rose

The main problem with this is that one can be a realist without assuming we
have reached a point at which reality as a state of actual existence is
realized. It is a paradox admittedly, but I believe fundamental to Peirce
to assume things as real that are not fully realized and to see continuity
as the slow and fallible process of moving toward realization. We are part
of moving reality.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 12:20 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> ‘man is a sign.’
>
>
>
> *The purpose of every sign is* to express "fact," and by being joined
> with other signs, *to approach as nearly as possible* to determining an
> interpretant which would be *the perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
>
>
>
> *Absolute truth* “is the *agreement* of the content of cognition with the
> actuality.” Uberweg.
>
>
>
> *Absolute horizon*.  “The *congruence* of the limits of human cognition
> with the limits of collective human perfection in general.”  Kant, Logik,
> Einleitung VI, p. 207.
>
>
>
> Indeed all propositions refer to one and the same determinately singular
> subject, well understood *between all utterers and interpreters*, namely,
> to the Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is assumed on all
> hands to be real.
>
>
>
> .. we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us.
>
>
> For our aim is not to know what truth is but to *be* truthful..
>
>
>
> There is but one individual, or completely determinate, state of things,
> namely, the all of reality.
>
>
>
> “Eschenmayer asserts that God is infinitely higher than the absolute,
> which is only the last object of knowledge, while God is only an object of
> faith, which is infinitely higher than knowledge.”
>
>
>
> Absolute philosophy.  A philosophy which is absolute knowledge, if true.
> (Selections mostly from Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological
> Edition, Volume 2)
>
>
>
> My final words are about my title. Why *contrite* fallibilism? As far as
> I know *Peirce used that expression, *“contrite fallibilism”,* only once*,
> in the quotation I gave earlier where he said that it was “out of a
> contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality
> of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, that all of his
> philosophy had grown (CP 1.13-14). ~Nathan Houser
> Hth and Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
>> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
>> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
>> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
>> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
>> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
>> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
>> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
>> lexicon.
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>>
>>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we
>>> can now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign"
>>> in EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>>>
>>>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>>>occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no 
>>> other
>>>Sign except those that are its ingredients.
>>>- It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
>>>acts; and whatever acts, changes.
>>>- Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the
>>>Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its
>>>outlines are becoming more indefinite.
>>>- It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from
>>>it the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the
>>>energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.
>>>- It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by
>>>its will, but are phenomena of growth.
>>>- It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential
>>>Graphs.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The Perfect Sign involves the *present *existence (2ns) of *only* those
>>> Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues
>>> receiving accretions of *new *Signs (3ns) from its Object and
>>> undergoing *spontaneous *changes (1ns).  After further contemplation, I
>>> now believe that Peirce was describing *the same thing* here as in the
>>> passage about "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he
>>> wrote a couple of years

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list,

‘man is a sign.’

*The purpose of every sign is* to express "fact," and by being joined with
other signs, *to approach as nearly as possible* to determining an
interpretant which would be *the perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as
such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.

*Absolute truth* “is the *agreement* of the content of cognition with the
actuality.” Uberweg.

*Absolute horizon*.  “The *congruence* of the limits of human cognition
with the limits of collective human perfection in general.”  Kant, Logik,
Einleitung VI, p. 207.

Indeed all propositions refer to one and the same determinately singular
subject, well understood *between all utterers and interpreters*, namely,
to the Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is assumed on all
hands to be real.

.. we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us.

For our aim is not to know what truth is but to *be* truthful..

There is but one individual, or completely determinate, state of things,
namely, the all of reality.

“Eschenmayer asserts that God is infinitely higher than the absolute, which
is only the last object of knowledge, while God is only an object of faith,
which is infinitely higher than knowledge.”

Absolute philosophy.  A philosophy which is absolute knowledge, if true.
(Selections mostly from Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological
Edition, Volume 2)

My final words are about my title. Why *contrite* fallibilism? As far as I
know *Peirce used that expression, *“contrite fallibilism”,* only once*, in
the quotation I gave earlier where he said that it was “out of a contrite
fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and an
intense desire to find things out”, that all of his philosophy had grown
(CP 1.13-14). ~Nathan Houser
Hth and Best,
Jerry R

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
> lexicon.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>>
>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
>> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
>> EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>>
>>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>>occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other
>>Sign except those that are its ingredients.
>>- It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
>>acts; and whatever acts, changes.
>>- Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the
>>Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its
>>outlines are becoming more indefinite.
>>- It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it
>>the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the
>>energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.
>>- It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by
>>its will, but are phenomena of growth.
>>- It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Perfect Sign involves the *present *existence (2ns) of *only* those
>> Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues
>> receiving accretions of *new *Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing
>> *spontaneous *changes (1ns).  After further contemplation, I now believe
>> that Peirce was describing *the same thing* here as in the passage about
>> "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple
>> of years earlier.
>>
>>
>> CSP:  What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
>> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself.
>> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with
>> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
>> interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
>> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
>> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which
>> he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the
>> very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Stephen C. Rose

I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
lexicon.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
>
> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
> EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>
>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other
>Sign except those that are its ingredients.
>- It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
>acts; and whatever acts, changes.
>- Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the
>Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its
>outlines are becoming more indefinite.
>- It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it
>the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the
>energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.
>- It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by
>its will, but are phenomena of growth.
>- It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs.
>
>
>
> The Perfect Sign involves the *present *existence (2ns) of *only* those
> Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues
> receiving accretions of *new *Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing
> *spontaneous *changes (1ns).  After further contemplation, I now believe
> that Peirce was describing *the same thing* here as in the passage about
> "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple
> of years earlier.
>
>
> CSP:  What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself.
> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with
> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
> interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he
> never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very
> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
> denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the
> Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe
> in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that
> is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.
> (EP 2:304; 1904)
>
>
>
> Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous
> with "Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the
> Universe.  As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above, since the
> Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a Quasi-mind, but also "a
> Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality" (CP
> 4.553; 1906).  Of course, this does not at all entail that a Quasi-mind
> and the Universe are the same thing.
>
>
>
> CSP:  … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two
> different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which it
> testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as testifying to
> in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential Graph of a
> Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical Universe, as
> it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that* account,
> be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is like a
> telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the
> instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the
> objective lens. (NEM 4:324; 1906)
>
> Any comments?  I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of much
> interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find it hard to
> believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been posting. :-)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>

[PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

2018-03-10 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

List:


Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.

   - It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
   occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other
   Sign except those that are its ingredients.
   - It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
   acts; and whatever acts, changes.
   - Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the
   Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its
   outlines are becoming more indefinite.
   - It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it
   the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the
   energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.
   - It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by its
   will, but are phenomena of growth.
   - It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs.



The Perfect Sign involves the *present *existence (2ns) of *only* those
Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues
receiving accretions of *new *Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing
*spontaneous *changes (1ns).  After further contemplation, I now believe
that Peirce was describing *the same thing* here as in the passage about
"the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple
of years earlier.


CSP:  What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The
purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant
which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at
least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle
gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never
succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that
is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in
such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with
the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being,
then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a
sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted
but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904)



Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous with
"Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the
Universe.  As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above, since the
Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a Quasi-mind, but also "a
Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality" (CP 4.553;
1906).  Of course, this does not at all entail that a Quasi-mind and the
Universe are the same thing.



CSP:  … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two
different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which it
testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as testifying to
in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential Graph of a
Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical Universe, as
it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that* account,
be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is like a
telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the
instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the
objective lens. (NEM 4:324; 1906)

Any comments?  I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of much
interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find it hard to
believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been posting. :-)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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