RE: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Hello Mara! I want to say that only a pluralist would say it is possible to model monism with pluralism – and as a monist I want to say that one can’t do that. J Cathy *From:* Mara Woods [mailto:[email protected]] *Sent:* Saturday, 17 May 2014 1:50 a.m. *To:* Catherine Legg *Cc:* peirce List *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality Cathy, List, Thank you for your thoughtful reply. You said, "This is very good but I want to call it 'modeling monism'". Perhaps we mean the same thing: modeling monism with pluralism? Mara Woods On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: Mara - it is interesting to think about whether the nature of the final opinion would be so very much more highly developed than our current beliefs as to be unrecognisable by us as the truth even were we 'hit over the head with it', so to speak. I wonder whether the pragmatic maxim might have a role to play, though, in anchoring both sets of beliefs in specific expectations about how the world will behave based on those beliefs, which will serve to make their meaning, well, clear. So for instance a frog understands flies in a very basic rudimentary way, and an entomologist in a highly sophisticated way. But both expect the fly to pass them by in a particular kind of trajectory. In a later message, you wrote: "Might the solution be metaphorically related to the community of inquirers? Just as the variability in the individual subjectivity of the inquirers is weeded out through by identifying these as outliers when comparing their views intersubjectively with others, so can the representative power of a singular proposition, which leaves out something about the dynamic object and adds something unwanted to the immediate object, be strengthened by the overlap in a network of representations. In other words: modeling pluralism." This is very good but I want to call it "modeling monism" :-) Cathy On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 5:32 AM, Mara Woods wrote: Gary, List, I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take my attention this week. Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. Mara Woods On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Mara, list, Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed further reflection. You wrote: MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent a dynamic or continuous process. If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of them. As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final belief" Pe
Re: SV: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Soeren wrote: "We can get all kinds of knowledge. They just have a prize." Yes. I agree that knowledge can lead to a 'prize' occasionally but entails paying 'a price' everytime. With all the best. Sung > Dear Gary and Phyllis > > I have become fond of the term Hypercomplexity as a solution to the > problem of change and realism as it signifies that there is order in > process but it is not reducible to one model as there are multiple aspects > and dynamics working at the same time. It is a bit what Prigogine and > others points out that you create more entropy than you reduce when you > try to get writ of it in searching for true and simple knowledge of a > complex system, because no system can be completely isolated from outside > interference and in doing science you always use energy and produce > entropy. We can get all kinds of knowledge. They just have a prize. Which > we by the way all know from our own lives. > >Best > Søren > > Fra: Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] > Sendt: 13. maj 2014 03:00 > Til: Phyllis Chiasson > Cc: Mara Woods; peirce List > Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality > > Phyllis, List, > > Gee, why wouldn't I get that you'd be thinking in terms of the NA at the > moment?! Anyhow, I'm going to skip ahead to Chapter 13 of your Peirce's > Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking to try to get a heads up on your > thinking in this matter. You wrote: > > PC: But my point was that if the possibility of Chance is real in the > sense of actions in mind or matter (degraded mind), then everything > evolves somewhat unpredictably (or devolves if chance destroys its form > into chaos). In any case, whatever something was was before it manifested > would be real, according to Peirce, but may not enter into general > experience until it is apprehended in actuality, then classified & > named--or until it is described in such a way as it can be mentally > apprehended. > > Hm. I have a few reservations here. First, I don't think that matter is > "degraded mind," only "mind hidebound with habits." > > (W)hat we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound > with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in that > diversification there is life (CP 6.158). > > Yes, there is that moment--that moment of bifucation in Prigogine's > version of chaos theory--where something either evolves or devolves. But > there is more than mere chance in it--Peirce resisted his own philosophy > being thought of solelhy in terms of his Tychism. > > There is no reality without the possibility of manifestation. This is the > problem Peirce has with Hegel, that Hegel doesn't see the essential > necessity of 2ns, of brute existence in reality. Well, that could have > been stated better. So, an example: > > If, say, I am walking down the street and a brick dislodges itself from a > building I'm passing and hits me on the shoulder, it may be that it will > afterward be "classified & named," but its reality for me is very much an > existential occurrence in its happening. And if I were, say, a dog, I > wouldn't 'know' anything more than that shock and pain, etc. Reality > implies all 3 categories being operative. > > Perhaps I am missing your point in one matter since, for me, a "would-be" > is nothing that merely happens "unpredictably," but rather it is that > which would come into existence if the conditions were set (or came about) > for its happening. For example, in my ordinary day to day life I have > rather considerable control over what "would be" the activities of my next > day were I to plan it: say, lunch with a friend, and theater in the > evening with my spouse. We make our lunch plans and I buy the theater > tickets. That doesn't mean that it necessarily will happen--chance > certainly enters into it if I suddenly have a dental emergency, say. > > But "would-bes" are category 3ns, the category of necessity--all things > being equal. And, all things being equal, I will have lunch with my friend > tomorrow, and I will go to the theater with my spouse--unless something > unexpected, something untoward, happens--because I created the conditions > for those events to occur (nature does something equivalent to this). Most > often--but certainly not always--events in my life do frequently happen as > planned. You concluded: > > PC: I can see how easy it is to seem nominalistic when describing stuff > without the categories, because it is in naming or understanding signs > that they become r
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Cathy, List, Thank you for your thoughtful reply. You said, "This is very good but I want to call it 'modeling monism'". Perhaps we mean the same thing: modeling monism with pluralism? Mara Woods On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: > Mara - it is interesting to think about whether the nature of the final > opinion would be so very much more highly developed than our current > beliefs as to be unrecognisable by us as the truth even were we 'hit over > the head with it', so to speak. > > I wonder whether the pragmatic maxim might have a role to play, though, in > anchoring both sets of beliefs in specific expectations about how the world > will behave based on those beliefs, which will serve to make their meaning, > well, clear. So for instance a frog understands flies in a very basic > rudimentary way, and an entomologist in a highly sophisticated way. But > both expect the fly to pass them by in a particular kind of trajectory. > > > In a later message, you wrote: > "Might the solution be metaphorically related to the community of > inquirers? Just as the variability in the individual subjectivity of the > inquirers is weeded out through by identifying these as outliers when > comparing their views intersubjectively with others, so can the > representative power of a singular proposition, which leaves out something > about the dynamic object and adds something unwanted to the immediate > object, be strengthened by the overlap in a network of representations. In > other words: modeling pluralism." > > This is very good but I want to call it "modeling monism" > :-) Cathy > > > On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 5:32 AM, Mara Woods wrote: > >> Gary, List, >> >> I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take >> my attention this week. >> >> Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my >> own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs >> will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a >> future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample >> propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much >> use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because >> we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to >> rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose >> of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant >> by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular >> propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs >> required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. >> >> Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is >> something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand >> it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? >> Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my >> thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. >> >> Mara Woods >> >> >> On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond >> wrote: >> >>> Mara, list, >>> >>> Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post >>> for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still >>> with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed >>> further reflection. You wrote: >>> >>> MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and >>> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >>> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >>> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >>> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >>> a dynamic or continuous process. >>> >>> If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an >>> alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording >>> induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of >>> regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the >>> sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the >>> truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. >>> On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative >>> position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of >>> them. >>> >>> As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static >>> representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final >>> belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope >>> that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality >>> of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. >>> You concluded: >>> >>> MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara - it is interesting to think about whether the nature of the final opinion would be so very much more highly developed than our current beliefs as to be unrecognisable by us as the truth even were we 'hit over the head with it', so to speak. I wonder whether the pragmatic maxim might have a role to play, though, in anchoring both sets of beliefs in specific expectations about how the world will behave based on those beliefs, which will serve to make their meaning, well, clear. So for instance a frog understands flies in a very basic rudimentary way, and an entomologist in a highly sophisticated way. But both expect the fly to pass them by in a particular kind of trajectory. In a later message, you wrote: "Might the solution be metaphorically related to the community of inquirers? Just as the variability in the individual subjectivity of the inquirers is weeded out through by identifying these as outliers when comparing their views intersubjectively with others, so can the representative power of a singular proposition, which leaves out something about the dynamic object and adds something unwanted to the immediate object, be strengthened by the overlap in a network of representations. In other words: modeling pluralism." This is very good but I want to call it "modeling monism" :-) Cathy On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 5:32 AM, Mara Woods wrote: > Gary, List, > > I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take > my attention this week. > > Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my > own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs > will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a > future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample > propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much > use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because > we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to > rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose > of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant > by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular > propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs > required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. > > Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is > something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand > it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? > Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my > thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. > > Mara Woods > > > On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> Mara, list, >> >> Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post >> for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still >> with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed >> further reflection. You wrote: >> >> MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and >> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >> a dynamic or continuous process. >> >> If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an >> alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording >> induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of >> regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the >> sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the >> truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. >> On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative >> position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of >> them. >> >> As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static >> representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final >> belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope >> that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality >> of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. >> You concluded: >> >> MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the >> community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the >> object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct >> simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does >> it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the >> concept is related to other concepts? >> >> Good question. Ag
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara, List, I agree with Søren that metaphor is not especially helpful here, since we still need to cash it out in terms of meaning, which on Peirce's view brings us back to his theory of signs. The idea of a model, which can be used very generally from precise mathematical models through analogies to metaphors allows vague and more clear ideas, and progressive clarity of ideas. We have reason to clarify our ideas when we run into problems with respect to our expectations about the world. These very problems can guide us towards what we need to make more clear (the argument in my doctoral thesis on the incommensurability problem). It is very late here (I have insomnia tonight) or I would go into more detail. What Søren calls hypercomplex Cliff Hooker and I called complexly organised, though we are not wedded to the term. Complexly Organised Dynamical Systems with C.A. Hooker (1999). Robert Rosen calls such systems closed to efficient causation, which is too strong a condition. He argues, correctly, that such systems have no largest model, meaning they may have accurate mathematical descriptions, but that these are incomplete. He thinks that such systems and living systems are congruent, but I am sure this is false. Must try to sleep, John At 07:48 PM 2014-05-14, Mara Woods wrote: Søren, List, It is interesting that you bring up modeling plurality to help deal with the problems of modeling dynamic systems. Even representation of relatively static systems seems to require plurality of models. I've been chewing on this issue for the past week, not sure whether to bring it up because it did not feature in this chapter of Kees' book. Discussing assertions of the truth of a proposition brings up the problem of the accuracy and precision of the representation of reality. As Vinicius Romanini discussed in a side thread, representation is always a metaphor for its object, and as such, is always to some degree a misrepresentation. As far as I understand it, such misrepresentation has two parts: some aspect of the representation introduces some idea in the immediate object that is not in the dynamic object and some aspect of the dynamic object is left out of the immediate object. The intrinsic fallibility of representation is mentioned at the end of section 8.2. The settled belief is no longer possible to correct, as Kees puts it. Might this mean that no representation can be a better one because any other representation offers new misrepresentations (noise, even) to bring the interpretants further away from the dynamic object? Logically speaking, if our representations of reality (and here I assume we can include thought-signs) can do no more than speak metaphorically and approximately about the object, and since nothing is real except that which is the object of final belief, then there is an inherent indeterminacy about the object. However, it is unclear how we can say that our representations -- including thoughts -- about reality are merely metaphorical since anything outside of the metaphor, so to speak, is meaningless. Might the solution be metaphorically related to the community of inquirers? Just as the variability in the individual subjectivity of the inquirers is weeded out through by identifying these as outliers when comparing their views intersubjectively with others, so can the representative power of a singular proposition, which leaves out something about the dynamic object and adds something unwanted to the immediate object, be strengthened by the overlap in a network of representations. In other words: modeling pluralism. Mara Woods On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 2:07 PM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote: Dear Gary and Phyllis I have become fond of the term Hypercomplexity as a solution to the problem of change and realism as it signifies that there is order in process but it is not reducible to one model as there are multiple aspects and dynamics working at the same time. It is a bit what Prigogine and others points out that you create more entropy than you reduce when you try to get writ of it in searching for true and simple knowledge of a complex system, because no system can be completely isolated from outside interference and in doing science you always use energy and produce entropy. We can get all kinds of knowledge. They just have a prize. Which we by the way all know from our own lives. Best Søren Fra: Gary Richmond [ mailto:[email protected]] Sendt: 13. maj 2014 03:00 Til: Phyllis Chiasson Cc: Mara Woods; peirce List Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality Phyllis, List, Gee, why wouldn't I get that you'd be thinking in terms of the NA at the moment?! Anyhow, I'm going to skip ahead to Chapter 13 of your Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking to try to get a heads up on your thinking in this matter. You wrote: PC: But my point
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara, list, So I ask someone, "As a cenoscopic scientist, what is your belief about x?" and she offers me, say, a proposition as a statement of her belief. Now that proposition is in extreme scholastic reality either true or it is false or it is nonsense. It would seem that this is where pragmatism leads us, at least in terms of the results of any given inquiry. One certainly can't at the moment of a question such as I hypothetically asked offer the entire theory underlying the proposition offered, nor would anyone demand that of someone. But one can answer a specific question relating to some specific aspect of that theory. Yet, however this may be in our ordinary day to day belief systems, this would be misleading in science as such because, while some retroductive inferences have very "high degrees of certainty" as to their probability, yet these inferences "do not belong to science" but are, rather "established truths", that is,"they are propositions into which the economy of endeavor prescribes that, for the time being, further inquiry shall cease." [S]cience . . . has nothing at stake on any temporal venture but is in pursuit of eternal verities (not semblances to truth) and looks upon this pursuit, not as the work of one man's life, but as that of generation after generation, indefinitely. Thus those retroductive inferences which at length acquire such high degrees of certainty, so far as they are so probable, are not pure retroductions and do not belong to science, as such; while, so far as they are scientific and are pure retroductions, have no true probability and are not matters for belief. We call them in science established truths, that is, they are propositions into which the economy of endeavor prescribes that, for the time being, further inquiry shall cease. (CP 5.589) And so these "established truths" may be taken up again later as certain doubts surface, for example, those which led us from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian world view. We could, however, probably all of us offer a rather long list of "established truths" which we believe, and this seems necessarily in order to stabilize our belief systems at all. So, from Peirce's standpoint, retroductions in "so far as they are scientific and are pure retroductions, have no true probability and are not matters for belief." This is in line with his notion of science being "a living historic entity" which can never be fully completed at any given moment of that history. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 1:32 PM, Mara Woods wrote: > Gary, List, > > I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take > my attention this week. > > Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my > own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs > will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a > future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample > propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much > use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because > we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to > rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose > of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant > by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular > propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs > required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. > > Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is > something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand > it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? > Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my > thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. > > Mara Woods > > > On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> Mara, list, >> >> Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post >> for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still >> with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed >> further reflection. You wrote: >> >> MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and >> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >> a dynamic or continuous process. >> >> If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an >> alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording >> i
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Gary, List, I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take my attention this week. Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. Mara Woods On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Mara, list, > > Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post > for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still > with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed > further reflection. You wrote: > > MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and > therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another > interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the > dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of > a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent > a dynamic or continuous process. > > If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an > alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording > induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of > regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the > sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the > truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. > On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative > position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of > them. > > As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static > representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final > belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope > that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality > of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. > You concluded: > > MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the > community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the > object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct > simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does > it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the > concept is related to other concepts? > > Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that any > final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods wrote: > >> List, >> >> Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter >> 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis >> de Waal. >> >> >> Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: >> >> Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on >> the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, >> and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies >> principles outside of logic itself. >> >> As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing >> implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the >> course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, >> after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that >> this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may >> think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and >> mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those >> subjects and is not in some ordering involving them.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Phyllis, Mara, List, The position I assume you're alluding to, Phyllis, is Peirce's *Extreme Scholastic Realism*, the reality of possibles and would-bes. Indeed, *agapasm*, as outlined, for example, in "Evolutionary Love," is a strictly evolutionary theory. Speaking here of Lamarckian evolution (also beginning to come back into fashion, although, of course, necessarily revised in the of decades of research since Peirce reflected on it), Peirce comments on the "double part" which habit plays in evolution,and how Lamarckian evolution in Peirce's understanding "coincides with the general description of the action of love": *. . . Habit is mere inertia, a resting on one's oars, not a propulsion. Now it is energetic projaculation . . .by which in the typical instances of Lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created. Habit, however, forces them to take practical shapes, compatible with the structures they affect, and, in the form of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them. Thus, habit plays a double part; it serves to establish the new features, and also to bring them into harmony with the general morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they belong. But if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble of turning back a page or two, he will see that this account of Lamarckian evolution coincides with the general description of the action of love. . . (CP 6.300, EP1:360).* In Peirce's view the cosmos itself is evolving as you noted, Phyllis, apropos of the evolution of natural laws, while the 'last frontier' of evolution is the evolution of consciousness, of mind itself (recalling that in Peirce's synechastic philosophy matter is really mind). I'm quoting the following passage at some length (but with a few ellipses and broken up into shorter paragraphs for readability) because it seems to me a kind of précis of Peirce's views on evolution as it relates to the growth of learning (and, indirectly, to the evolution of consciousness). Philosophers, especially, should take note of the final segment below. Remembering that all matter is really mind, remembering, too, the continuity of mind, let us ask what aspect Lamarckian evolution takes on within the domain of consciousness. Direct endeavor can achieve almost nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one's stature as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the Muses by merely straining for it before it is ready to come. . . . Besides this inward process, there is the operation of the environment, which goes to break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the mind lively. Everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic, while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the ideas. Where there is a motion, where history is a-making, there is the focus of mental activity . . . Few psychologists have perceived how fundamental a fact this is. A portion of mind, abundantly commissured to other portions, works almost mechanically. It sinks to a condition of a railway junction. But a portion of mind almost isolated, a spiritual peninsula, or cul-de-sac, is like a railway terminus. Now mental commissures are habits. Where they abound, originality is not needed and is not found; but where they are in defect spontaneity is set free. Thus, the first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting of sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play. As to growth by exercise, I have already shown, in discussing "Man's Glassy Essence," . . . . what its modus operandi must be conceived to be . . .. Namely, it consists of the flying asunder of molecules, and the reparation of the parts by new matter. It is, thus, a sort of reproduction. It takes place only during exercise, because the activity of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is its necessary condition. Growth by exercise takes place also in the mind. Indeed, that is what it is to learn. But the most perfect illustration is the development of a philosophical idea by being put into practice. The conception which appeared, at first, as unitary splits up into special cases; and into each of these new thought must enter to make a practicable idea. This new thought, however, follows pretty closely the model of the parent conception; and thus a homogeneous development takes place. The parallel between this and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent. Patient attention will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction called learning (CP 6.301, EP1:361). Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 4:12 PM, Phyllis Chiasson wrote: > Mara, Gary, List, > > Or could it be both? Peirce identifed pure chance as a real and operable > element of reality. If chance is real, as however
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara, Gary, List, Or could it be both? Peirce identifed pure chance as a real and operable element of reality. If chance is real, as however small an element of reality, then the idea that laws (and even the universe itself) evolve would be real as well. There must be a Peircean (non-nominalistic) way of stating that, especially now that new cosmological discoveries are suggesting he is correct about laws of nature evolving. Of course it is not our naming them that makes them real, but pure chance does imply something ocurring/coming to exist that never was before. For example, maybe it was pure abductive-like chance that a 3M chemist thought to use a failed & worthless non- super glue on scraps of paper, to mark pages in his choir book? The potential usefulness of the USELESS glue evolved right out of the "discovery" that the hoped for super glue didn't work. I don't know how I'd ever keep things straight in my mind these days without Post It Notes. Were they only real after they were invented and named? Or was the potential for their reality inherent all along--even BEFORE that glue failure? Regards, Phyllis Gary Richmond wrote: >Mara, list, > >Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post >for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still >with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed >further reflection. You wrote: > >MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and >therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >a dynamic or continuous process. > >If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an >alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording >induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of >regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the >sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the >truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. >On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative >position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of >them. > >As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static >representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final >belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope >that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality >of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. >You concluded: > >MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the >community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the >object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct >simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does >it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the >concept is related to other concepts? > >Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that any >final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. > >Best, > >Gary R. > > >*Gary Richmond* >*Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >*Communication Studies* >*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > >On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods wrote: > >> List, >> >> Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter >> 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis >> de Waal. >> >> >> Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: >> >> Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the >> scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, and >> its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies >> principles outside of logic itself. >> >> As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing >> implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the >> course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, >> after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that >> this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may >> think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and >> mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those >> subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an >> eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted >> but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of >> nominalism versus realism. >> >> >> >>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara, list, Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed further reflection. You wrote: MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent a dynamic or continuous process. If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of them. As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. You concluded: MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the concept is related to other concepts? Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that any final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods wrote: > List, > > Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter > 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis > de Waal. > > > Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: > > Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the > scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, and > its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies > principles outside of logic itself. > > As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing > implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the > course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, > after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that > this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may > think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and > mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those > subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an > eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted > but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of > nominalism versus realism. > > > > --- > > Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the > first sections of the chapter. > > Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that > generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human > intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' > practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general > sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into > the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves > inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in > particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the > universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be > explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford > explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination > of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create > explanatory patterns out of randomness? > > These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general > explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara, list, I'm sorry that I've gone a little quiet - I've been more than usually inundated with practical matters. I expect to take this thread up again tomorrow. Best, Ben On 5/5/2014, Mara Woods wrote: List, Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies principles outside of logic itself. As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of nominalism versus realism. Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the first sections of the chapter. Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness? These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic components of the universe. Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, is to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a shared opinion about it. If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community of inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe are to be considered real and statements that express those regularities would be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the nature of the sign and its final interpretant in a later post). Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarit
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Gary, all, Yes, that's an especially lucid quote. I'll just add that it comes from "Lessons from the History of Science" - the CP editors' title, as far as I can tell. It's from MS 1288 "The Principal Lessons of the History of Science (LHS)", "published in part as 1.43-125" according to the Robin Catalog. The CP editors say it's a manuscript of notes for a projected, but never completed, _History of Science_ circa 1896. - Best, Ben On 5/6/2014 2:15 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Matt, Ulysses, Mara, Ben, List, Peirce comments in several places on Mill's understanding of the phrase "the uniformity of nature" as the basis for induction. Here's one lucid passage, broken up into shorter paragraphs for readability and to allow for some brief comments on the material I've placed in italics (Mill's position) and boldface (Peirce's counter to it). However, I'm pressed for time the next few days, so I'm sending it out sans comments because I think the passage itself gets at the heart of question and, in truth, doesn't really need much comment as I see it. CP 1.92 §16. REASONING FROM SAMPLES Many persons seem to suppose that the state of things asserted in the premisses of an induction renders the state of things asserted in the conclusion probable. . . Even John Stuart Mill holds that the uniformity of nature makes the one state of things follow from the other. *He overlooks the circumstance that if so it ought to follow necessarily, while in truth no definite probability can be assigned to it without absurd consequences. He also overlooks the fact that inductive reasoning does not invariably infer a uniformity; it may infer a diversity* . . . Mill never made up his mind in what sense he took the phrase "uniformity of nature" when he spoke of it as the basis of induction. /In some passages he clearly means any special uniformity by which a given character is likely to belong to the whole of a species, a genus, a family, or a class if it belongs to any members of that group. / *In this sense, as well as in others, overlooked by Mill, there is no doubt the knowledge of a uniformity strengthens an inductive conclusion; but it is equally free from doubt that such knowledge is not essential to induction. * /But in other passages Mill holds that it is not the knowledge of the uniformity, but the uniformity itself that supports induction, and furthermore that it is no special uniformity but a general uniformity in nature. / Mill's mind was certainly acute and vigorous, but it was not mathematically accurate; and it is by that trait that I am forced to explain his not seeing that* this general uniformity could not be so defined as not on the one hand to appear manifestly false or on the other hand to render no support to induction, or both. * He says it means that under similar circumstances similar events will occur. But this is vague. /Does he mean that objects alike in all respects but one are alike in that one?/ *But plainly no two different real objects are alike in all respects but one.* /Does he mean that objects sufficiently alike in other respects are alike in any given respect?/ *But that would be but another way of saying that no two different objects are alike in all respects but one. It is obviously true; but it has no bearing on induction, where we deal with objects which we well know are, like all existing things, alike in numberless respects and unlike in numberless other respects.* 1.93. *The truth is that induction is reasoning from a sample taken at random to the whole lot sampled. A sample is a random one, provided it is drawn by such machinery, artificial or physiological, that in the long run any one individual of the whole lot would get taken as often as any other. Therefore, judging of the statistical composition of a whole lot from a sample is judging by a method which will be right on the average in the long run, and, by the reasoning of the doctrine of chances, will be nearly right oftener than it will be far from right.* 1. 94. That this does justify induction is a mathematical proposition beyond dispute. It has been objected that the sampling cannot be random in this sense. But this is an idea which flies far away from the plain facts. Thirty throws of a die constitute an approximately random sample of all the throws of that die; and *that the randomness should be approximate is all that is required.* Ben and I recently wrote a paper touching on aspects of this issue from Peirce's perspective for Torkild Thellefsen's book, so I know he'll have a great deal of interest to say about it. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Gary R., all, I saw your post only after I sent my previous post. Yes, I had plenty to say, way too much, including draft material that didn't make it into the article that Gary mentions, where I attempted to summarize Peirce's arguments in "Ground of Validity of the Laws of Logic." Many of these arguments aim to show that the supposed uniformity or orderliness of the universe is not a helpful supposition, and he holds that the universe is extremely various and diverse in its phenomena. Best, Ben On 5/6/2014 2:15 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Matt, Ulysses, Mara, Ben, List, Peirce comments in several places on Mill's understanding of the phrase "the uniformity of nature" as the basis for induction. Here's one lucid passage, broken up into shorter paragraphs for readability and to allow for some brief comments on the material I've placed in italics (Mill's position) and boldface (Peirce's counter to it). However, I'm pressed for time the next few days, so I'm sending it out sans comments because I think the passage itself gets at the heart of question and, in truth, doesn't really need much comment as I see it. CP 1.92 §16. REASONING FROM SAMPLES - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Ulysses, Matt, Mara, list, I think that Peirce would agree with Matt's posted criticism by Swigart of Mill https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2014-05/msg00066.html so far as it goes. Mill is trying to re-cast induction as deduction from some postulated or inductively inferred uniformity of nature. In "Grounds of the Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of the Four Incapacities" (1868), http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html and, taking into account the idea of infinite universe, in "The Probability of Induction," https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_12/April_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_IV, Peirce argues, in more detail than I can recapitulate here, that induction’s validity depends not on some determinate state, especially an orderliness, of the universe, but on its method - in particular, fair sampling - and on the reality ( = the cognizability) of generalities and of being as general (such that objects can share characters). (Peirce would, I think, argue that, as far as the logical critique of induction is concerned, induction does not take its principles from any particular metaphysical doctrine about real generalities. ) Since inductions can't be claimed generally conclude in truths, but only to approximate to truth, inductions (and hypothetical inferences) depend for their validity on their eventual correctability (I'd say that that's true even for deduction since deduction is not always simple) and on the real's being only that which would be found sooner or later but still inevitably by sufficient investigation. Note that in "Grounds" he refers to induction and hypothetical inference as "probable inference" and such should not be confused with that which he later calls "probable deduction." In "The Probability of Induction," Peirce focuses on an illusion-riddled infinite universe (CP 2.684) in which an observed orderliness of nature would be a transitory illusion; his argument there becomes that we find that case to be contrary to our most settled _/belief/_, and that we would only stultify ourselves by accepting it; this echoes back to Peirce's argument in "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" against merely verbal doubts. In "The Probability of Induction," Peirce goes on to remark that preconceptions about universal distributions, random or otherwise, would make some sense only if we could freely sample universes, and even those would belong to a higher universe, one to which the conception of probability would not apply. (Shades of the multiverse and its reported 'measure problem'!) Peirce wrote in 1900 that "[Induction] supposes that there is a certain course of experience, and that the sample has been so drawn as to be governed by that same course of experience." (A Letter to Langley, _Historical Perspectives_ 2:878). In his 1913 letter to F.A. Woods (CP 8.385-387) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/induction.html, saying that "_/Induction/_ [...] depends upon our confidence that a run of one kind of experience will not be changed or cease without some indication before it ceases [...]" Then there is Peirce's contribution http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Uniformity to the article "Uniformity" in Baldwin's _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_ Volume 2 (1902). Also see the Drafts D and A of Memoir 23 "On the Validity of Induction" http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-07.htm#m23 in the Carnegie application (1902). Best, Ben On 5/5/2014 9:37 PM, U Pascal wrote: Mara, Ben, List I'm excited for the discussion that you have set up with your introductory remarks. Keeping it brief, (I'm sneaking this email in while at work) I wanted to focus one of your first questions:; Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness? Peirce's argument against Mill's notion that we can form knowledge about the universe because it is regular has always puzzled me. It strikes me that this argument is of fundamental importance (especially when dealing with themes the of truth & reality), however I've always felt something lacking in my understanding of Peirce's take down. If somebody is willing to rehearse Mill's position and Peirce's response, I think we could get closer to answering Mara & Ben's question. Best, Ulysses On 5/5/2014, Mara Woods wrote: List, Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a scien
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Matt, Ulysses, Mara, Ben, List, Peirce comments in several places on Mill's understanding of the phrase "the uniformity of nature" as the basis for induction. Here's one lucid passage, broken up into shorter paragraphs for readability and to allow for some brief comments on the material I've placed in italics (Mill's position) and boldface (Peirce's counter to it). However, I'm pressed for time the next few days, so I'm sending it out sans comments because I think the passage itself gets at the heart of question and, in truth, doesn't really need much comment as I see it. CP 1.92 §16. REASONING FROM SAMPLES Many persons seem to suppose that the state of things asserted in the premisses of an induction renders the state of things asserted in the conclusion probable. . . Even John Stuart Mill holds that the uniformity of nature makes the one state of things follow from the other. *He overlooks the circumstance that if so it ought to follow necessarily, while in truth no definite probability can be assigned to it without absurd consequences. He also overlooks the fact that inductive reasoning does not invariably infer a uniformity; it may infer a diversity*. . . Mill never made up his mind in what sense he took the phrase "uniformity of nature" when he spoke of it as the basis of induction. *In some passages he clearly means any special uniformity by which a given character is likely to belong to the whole of a species, a genus, a family, or a class if it belongs to any members of that group. *I*n this sense, as well as in others, overlooked by Mill, there is no doubt the knowledge of a uniformity strengthens an inductive conclusion; but it is equally free from doubt that such knowledge is not essential to induction. * *But in other passages Mill holds that it is not the knowledge of the uniformity, but the uniformity itself that supports induction, and furthermore that it is no special uniformity but a general uniformity in nature. *Mill's mind was certainly acute and vigorous, but it was not mathematically accurate; and it is by that trait that I am forced to explain his not seeing that* this general uniformity could not be so defined as not on the one hand to appear manifestly false or on the other hand to render no support to induction, or both. * He says it means that under similar circumstances similar events will occur. But this is vague. *Does he mean that objects alike in all respects but one are alike in that one?* *But plainly no two different real objects are alike in all respects but one.* *Does he mean that objects sufficiently alike in other respects are alike in any given respect?* *But that would be but another way of saying that no two different objects are alike in all respects but one. It is obviously true; but it has no bearing on induction, where we deal with objects which we well know are, like all existing things, alike in numberless respects and unlike in numberless other respects.* 1.93. *The truth is that induction is reasoning from a sample taken at random to the whole lot sampled. A sample is a random one, provided it is drawn by such machinery, artificial or physiological, that in the long run any one individual of the whole lot would get taken as often as any other. Therefore, judging of the statistical composition of a whole lot from a sample is judging by a method which will be right on the average in the long run, and, by the reasoning of the doctrine of chances, will be nearly right oftener than it will be far from right.* 1.94. That this does justify induction is a mathematical proposition beyond dispute. It has been objected that the sampling cannot be random in this sense. But this is an idea which flies far away from the plain facts. Thirty throws of a die constitute an approximately random sample of all the throws of that die; and *that the randomness should be approximate is all that is required.* Ben and I recently wrote a paper touching on aspects of this issue from Peirce's perspective for Torkild Thellefsen's book, so I know he'll have a great deal of interest to say about it. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, May 6, 2014 at 12:30 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > Here's Mill's position as given by Sigwart. > > Logic, Vol. II pg. 299 -301, 303: > > In one respect J. S. Mill holds the same views as Hume. For him nothing is > given but particular sensations, and these sensations are originally > subjective states of feeling. But there must be some way of proceeding from > these to science in the full sense, and this way is to be shown by > inductive logic ; this will be, moreover, the only way in which we can pass > beyond immediate experience to the knowledge of something which we do not > experience immediately. > > Induction, as he defines it, is that operation of the mind by which we > infer that what we know to be true in a part
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Here's Mill's position as given by Sigwart. Logic, Vol. II pg. 299 –301, 303: In one respect J. S. Mill holds the same views as Hume. For him nothing is given but particular sensations, and these sensations are originally subjective states of feeling. But there must be some way of proceeding from these to science in the full sense, and this way is to be shown by inductive logic ; this will be, moreover, the only way in which we can pass beyond immediate experience to the knowledge of something which we do not experience immediately. Induction, as he defines it, is that operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects—the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times. But he goes on to add that this process of inference presupposes a principle, a general assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe, namely, that what happens once will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen again, and not only again, but as often as the same circumstances recur. This proposition, that the course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle, or general axiom of induction. Every particular so-called induction is therefore a syllogism, of which the major premise is this general principle, and which can be expressed as follows:— Under similar circumstances, the same event will always happen. Under circumstances a, b, c, D has been found ; Therefore under circumstances a, b, c, D will always be found ; It is clear, although Mill has not sufficiently noted it, that, regarded only in this aspect, the particular case proves just as much as a whole series of cases, and that I can draw exactly the same conclusion from a single observation as from many similar observations. But now the question arises as to the origin of the universal major premise and the consequent significance of this syllogism; and here comes in again Mill's doctrine as to the nature of the syllogism of which we have already spoken (I. § 55, 3, p. 359). The universal major premise cannot explain the inductive process, for it is itself obtained by induction; it is indeed one of the latest and highest inductions grounded upon preceding partial inductions. The more obvious laws of nature must have been already recognised by induction as general truths before we could think of this highest generalization. Hence we can only regard this highest major premise as a guarantee for all our inductions in the sense in which all major premises contribute something to the validity of their syllogisms; the major premise contributes nothing to prove the truth of the conclusion, but is a necessary condition of its being proved, since no conclusion can be proved for which there cannot be found from the same grounds a valid universal major premise. In other words, we really infer only from observed cases of uniformity to other cases ; because we have found a uniform relation between a certain number of phenomena, we infer that it will be so also with every other class of phenomena; but, according to Mill, this latter conclusion—a real Aristotelian inference from example—is only certain if we can infer from the observed uniformities to general uniformity. Upon what ground can we infer from a number of instances of observed uniformity to universal uniformity? […] […] pg. 303: Taking away with one hand what he gives with the other. Mill shows in the uncertainty of his views the helplessness of pure empiricism, the impossibility of erecting an edifice of universal propositions on the sand-heap of shifting and isolated facts, or, more accurately, sensations; the endeavour to extract any necessity from a mere sum of facts must be fruitless. The only true point in the whole treatment is one in which Mill as a logician gets the better of Mill as an empiricist; namely, that every inductive inference contains a universal principle; that if it is to be an inference and not merely an association of only subjective validity, the transition from the empirically universal judgment all known A's are B to the unconditionally universal all that is A is B can only be made by means of a universal major premise, and that only upon condition of this being true are we justified in inferring from the particular known A’s to the still unknown A’s. But then the universal major premise cannot be obtained simply by means of a summation of facts, for this by itself can yield no more than it says, that in a certain number of cases A
Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
Mara, Ben, List I'm excited for the discussion that you have set up with your introductory remarks. Keeping it brief, (I'm sneaking this email in while at work) I wanted to focus one of your first questions: Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness? Peirce's argument against Mill's notion that we can form knowledge about the universe because it is regular has always puzzled me. It strikes me that this argument is of fundamental importance (especially when dealing with themes the of truth & reality), however I've always felt something lacking in my understanding of Peirce's take down. If somebody is willing to rehearse Mill's position and Peirce's response, I think we could get closer to answering Mara & Ben's question. Best, Ulysses - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality
List, Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies principles outside of logic itself. As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of nominalism versus realism. --- Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the first sections of the chapter. Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness? These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic components of the universe. Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, is to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a shared opinion about it. If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community of inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe are to be considered real and statements that express those regularities would be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the nature of the sign and its final interpretant in a later post). Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129). Since Peirce limited the pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts only (115) and "the only intellectual effect such objects can have upon us, Peirce claims, is to produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the (immediate) objects of
