Aw: Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Jon and Edwina. I don´t understand it, except I have a hunch that he is saying: A thing´s form is unique, and its matter is not, because other things are also made of the same material. I guess I rather want to keep my concept of form and matter, which I think is more naiive: In a piece of clay the clay is the matter, and its shape is the form. If the clay is red, this redness is a function of its matter, not of the form. Aristotle´s and Peirce´s views are too complicated for me in the moment. I am reluctant to adopt complicated concepts and give up clear enough (I think) concepts.

Best,

Helmut

 

 12. Februar 2018 um 23:29 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Edwina, Helmut, List:

 

The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP 6.360-361 (from Baldwin's Dictionary, 1902) highlight the importance of being clear about what we mean by "Form" when we talk about it; likewise "Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the following.

 


... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the element of existence. The suchness of red is such as it is in its own suchness, and in nothing else.

 

Matter, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever red is, it is of its very essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite. But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form, as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in reference to something else than itself ... (293-294)


 

The next paragraph includes what I quoted previously (294-295), and then comes the following.

 



This Entelechy, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. The philosopher who recognizes only Form, will do best to insist that Form fulfills this uniting function by virtue of its generality. But it is not so; since Form remains entirely within its own self. (295-296)



 

Hence in this particular manuscript, it is clear that Form is 1ns, Matter is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  Similarly, in EP 2:304 (1904), Peirce stated the following.

 



But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ... What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.



 

Here it is equally clear that Aristotelian Form corresponds to the characters (1ns) that a Sign signifies, Aristotelian Matter corresponds to the object (2ns) that a Sign denotes, and Aristotelian Entelechy corresponds to the unity of these (3ns) that a Sign expresses.

 

Of course, whether or how these two texts have bearing on our interpretation of Peirce's other writings is another question.

 

Regards,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear All,

I wonder why Peirce associated the categories like that. To me it rather seems like matter would be 1ns, form 2ns, and entelechy 3ns. That is because I cannot see more than one mode in matter, but 2 in form: Reason for it, and aim (telos) of it. Aristotle said, that form consists of energy and entelechy, so two parts (modes?). 2.1. might be said like: material reason of the form, or the form´s sustenance by matter, potential energies keeping the form together, and 2.2. the form of the form, or the form´s formal reason, which is it´s aim.

Also, I see "quality" rather associated with matter than with form. As the form of a thing is more likely to change due to circumstances than its matter is, I see "actuality" rather suiting with "form" than with "matter".

Does "entelechy" contain "telos"? Does it mean quite the similar?


Best,

Helmut


12. Februar 2018 um 18:42 Uhr
 "Ben Novak" 
wrote:


Dear All:
 

A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were rather eloquently addressed in an article in First Things, "Discovering the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:

 

https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle


 









 
Ben Novak

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"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone." Oswald Spengler

 

 

 

 

 

 

 












 

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:


Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 



On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:





List:

 

As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.

 

I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.

 


CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism, endeavors to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c. 1903?, emphasis added)


 

This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote: