From: John Collier
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 10:16 AM
To: 'peirce-l'
Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}From: John Collier Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 10:05 AM To: 'Jerry Rhee' <jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim} I see no problem here. It is your linear rendition that gives the illusion it is a special problem. It isn’t a problem, so your rendition is off, being to narrow and isolated. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 9:26 AM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim} Wait, are you saying that the standards you use to determine good/bad is not a part of your consideration for determining the pragmatic maxim? Then what is? On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 2:24 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: I don’t. I only talk about g=better or worse. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 9:23 AM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim} and you get no recommendations for how to do any of that with the original maxim. So, why do you say that it ought to be the pragmatic maxim? On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 2:20 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Good ones support by explaining well established inductions, mostly. But more importantly they stand the test of time, as we get our ideas more clear and strengthen the inductions new discover by explaining them. That will do, but there is mot to it than that, like fitting into our other reasoning, and setting up novel inductive tests. Among other things like reasoning about immediate and final interpretants in the light of certain abductuions sand then, of course, testing the bringing us to a new spot in inquiry into the nature of things). John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 9:05 AM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim} John, Let me ask you. How do you distinguish a good pragmatic maxim from a bad one? Thanks, J On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:43 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Jerry, you are just not putting things together. I see liittle function in further discussion on this. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 6:45 AM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim} oh, and btw, you said: "Peirce himself tied the pragmatic maxim more closely to induction “Abduction … furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction verifies” CP 2.776. In this case it is induction that connects us most closely to the world, providing the expectations of the pragmatic maxim." Abduction provides the problematic theory: 1) pragmaticism (C) is represented by CP 5.189 (A). Then the inquirer is asked to render judgment for whether this is a good theory or not in induction, which calls for reasoning, pairing/parting/comparing C with A with standards for what is expected of C and what is explicitly stated of A. This is induction. Compare that against: 2) pragmaticism (C) is represented by CP 5.402 (A). To render a judgment for whether 1) is better than 2) is to ask what you think pragmaticism is. There are lots of things in pragmaticism but the very least is knowing about the three categories and why C has to be First, A has to be Second and B has to be Third. These are questions you can't even ask of CP 5.402. So, if that is the criterion, then 1) beats 2) because criterion. The issue is whether we are brave enough to state what such standards are before we examine the theory, which can't even be expressed with help of 5.402 but can be expressed through 5.189. This is so obvious and matter of fact to me, I feel sometimes like I'm the boy who is pointing out the emperor wearing no clothes. It is that crazy to me. But I understand it. There is a lot of history for why 5.402 is treated as the pragmatic maxim. It was the first and Peirce said it was. The rest of it is people explaining something as if what Peirce said is divine. People think it's the right thing to do, they think they are acting morally. Best, Jerry On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 11:16 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>> wrote: Hi John, Thank you for your comments. What did you find displeasing about the way the syllogism thing was handled? That is, what do you think syllogism is? Is it as simple as identifying extremes to find the middle? Also, you said: "C plays the role of connecting to the world there is no restrictions on A’s that do the job, leaving us with a bit too many." Consider the following: C = pragmaticism A = Consider what effects...(CP 5.402) vs. CP 5.189. There are not that many. Right now, there is two. Now consider if the question of pragmaticism is simply the question of the logic of abduction and CP 5.189 is the normative form, then it's simple enough to have C (pragmaticism) and A (CP 5.189) converging is easy to envision, no? But you're right. When you say it hugely oversimplifies, that is not all of it but there's nothing wrong with saying that it is. For example, Strauss says that if you can understand sophistry and statesmanship, you'll understand philosophers, which is to say that you can know about philosophy if you understand the sophist and the statesman. That is hugely simplifying things but if you understand what that means, you will agree that it is a good coarse-graining for metaphysics. By that, I mean that C = substance and A = Being and B = copula. This is substantially the question of Aristotle's Metaphysics. One can also work out the divine thought through consideration of the syllogism Father, Son, Spirit. Once you recognize the meaning of one two three, the vitality of CP 5.189 is quite remarkable. Best, Jerry Best, Jerry On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: Jerry, There was a lot of discussion some time ago on this list as to whether CP 5.189 was a syllogism. I was never very pleased with the discussion, let alone the results, since I thought it was the wrong way to tackle the issue. Not surprisingly, then, I have the same problem with your account of the logic of abduction. Peirce himself tied the pragmatic maxim more closely to induction “Abduction … furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction verifies” CP 2.776. In this case it is induction that connects us most closely to the world, providing the expectations of the pragmatic maxim. Nonetheless, there are those who want to tie the pragmatic maxim in a straight-forward way with theory selection, though I would think the process of theory selection in science typically involves much more complexity and especially feedback, including feedback with the world rather than just inference to the best (or an adequate, since there may be no “best”) explanation. Even by your own account, in which C plays the role of connecting to the world there is no restrictions on A’s that do the job, leaving us with a bit too many. The “best” (whatever that means – simplest, fitting best with other beliefs, elegant, etc.) might give enough restriction, but I doubt it does objectively. This is one of the central issues that Kuhn dealt with, and I think it is still not fully resolved, though more naturalistic causal accounts are currently considered to be better. So for this group, including yourself, A is given, little selection of C is provided beyond “it works”, and A is just a given. Sorry, but I think that hugely oversimplifies a complex process in which all three elements come into play, working together and against each other. Furthermore, we can break into it in almost any place, but induction, not the surprising fact is, I think the starting point in must normal science. I have little doubt that there are historical cases that fit your model, but I doubt they are the norm in science. I particular, I think that your approach fails to connect method with metaphysics, thiough I stand t be corrected. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 10:45 PM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim} Hi John, Thank you for that. Especially this: I assume there is a common idea that Peirce neve r got to utter or to write. So we have to find it. I would only add that CP 5.189 takes care to address everything you said above and that it what is in front of you but have not yet found/tied down/habit taking. For instance, where antecedent = A in The surprising fact, C, is observed. But if A were true... Best, Jerry On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 1:35 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: I agree on the aim of the maxim, though I think it came to play a larger role in both Peirce’s metaphysics (the self-reflective aspect) and his scientific project. I am pretty sure that my interpretation of {Peirce is pretty close at the very least, to what he intended). I give some quotes from his later work. Here is on version of pragmatacisms: 1905 | Issues of Pragmaticism | CP 5.438 Pragmaticism was originally enounced in the form of a maxim, as follows: Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. I will restate this in other words, since ofttimes one can thus eliminate some unsuspected source of perplexity to the reader. This time it shall be in the indicative mood, as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. Except for my focus on menai9ng differences (because I don’t think we can get absolute meaning any more than we can get things in themselves). It is pretty close to what I said. 1905 | Issues of Pragmaticism | CP 5.453 Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate nature of meaning, must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing whatever there be which is such as the proposition expresses, independently of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to be so in any other symbol of any man or men. But that amounts to saying that possibility is sometimes of a real kind. The setting of the maxim as an interpretant of the conditions for finding meaning (specifically the third grade of meaning) , where meaning is an object external to ourselves (not something we make up – that would be a form of nominalism). 1905 [c.] | Letter draft to Mario Calderoni | CP 8.205-6 In the April number of the Monist [‘What Pragmatism Is’, 1905] I proposed that the word ‘pragmatism’ should hereafter be used somewhat loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller, James, Dewey, Royce, and the rest of us, while the particular doctrine which I invented the word to denote, which is your first kind of pragmatism, should be called ‘pragmaticism.’ The extra syllable will indicate the narrower meaning. Pragmaticism is not a system of philosophy. It is only a method of thinking… As I said. 1910-07-19 | Letters to Paul Carus | MS [L] 77 Pragmatism (pragmaticism) might be defined as that mode of thinking that never results in a concept that is equivalent to a noun substantive, since all that it thinks is an assertion, or a qualified assertion such as “suppose that (so and so),” or else it is equivalent to an expression of the speaker’s will not asserting it so much as exhibitingit. Addressing the issue of the object of “pragmatic maxim” that I distinguished in my second part. Wikipedia gives seven different ways of understanding the maxim. Either Peirce was seven way ambiguous, or else there is a common idea behind his versions. I assume there is a common idea that Peirce neve r got to utter or to write. So we have to find it. And, of course we know that many of Peirce’s contemporaries, even friends, took home out of context in ways he sometimes derided. If these interpreters are part of what determines the interpretation, then we would have to says that either Peirce was very naïve about meaning, or else he didn’t understand the significance of pragmatism, or both. Either or both could be true, but I think that if a particular interpretation of the pragmatic maxim gives great unifying power to Peirce’s metaphysics and his methodology, that is good evidence that it is the correct interpretation. Now I gave a reason, the self-reflective one, for arguing that the pragmatic maxim is consistent with Peirce’s metaphysics, which brings it together with his methodology. For me, this is a very strong argument that my interpretation is a very good one if not the best one. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 7:51 PM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology and Pragmatic Maxim Context is important. But there is more in context than what some realize. It depends on one's experience, both, the writers' and the readers'. When you say, "The version of the maxim I gave is not literally from Peirce, but a rendition of several things he says." That is not taking Peirce for what he said, then because maxims are definite things, not clouded over throughout his other works...and then we are back to the Edwina/Jon conflict. This is the ridiculousness. And the pragmatic maxim, if it is to do anything at all, is to render ideas clear. To ask for a maxim that helps to make ideas clear, therefore, is not ridiculous. It is to ask a critical question about what Peirce meant when he said that maxims can do this. If we can't find it, then there is something wrong. This is what I am trying to show. Best, Jerry On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:44 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: I disagree with your theory of interpretation of what people say. Context is all important. The version of the maxim I gave is not literally from Peirce, but a rendition of several things he says. Meaning isn’t found in words alone, but in how they are used and to what effect. You are asking for the ridiculous. . John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>] Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 7:27 PM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology and Pragmatic Maxim John Collier, list: You said: …all three elements are involved in the pragmatic maxim. …there are various differently stated versions of the pragmatic maxim, and it is also implicit in other work by Peirce. My question is, the pragmatic maxim is not the same as “other work by Peirce” because maxims are carefully constructed, short expressions of principles. They have different functions than essays or books. You can put them in your pocket and keep them handy, share it with friends who don’t know Peirce, etc… It is true that there are several pragmatic maxims. So, to which pragmatic maxim were you referring when you asserted that “all three elements are involved in the pragmatic maxim”? Thanks, Jerry Rhee
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