Gary was not on your recipient list but you obviously intended for him to
receive it. Peirce-l doesn't receive your messages, at least for the time
being. - Ben
On 4/22/2024 3:53 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
Gary and Ben,
Why do you insist on punishing me instead of Jon? Or both?
You asked me
gary f., List,
Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus in
on just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two
A scientific man is likely in the course of a long life to pick up a pretty
extensive acquaintance with the results of science; but in many branches,
this is so little necessary that one will meet with men of the most
deserved renown in science who will tell you that, beyond their own little
Ben, Gary, List,
As I said in my last note, this thread has wasted everybody's time for no
useful purpose.
The real expert on this topic is Tony Jappy, who has devoted years of research
and publications to this topic. As I said in the first notes, Tony is the
expert on this topic.. But he
Well said. Joe Ransdell would be proud. - Best, Ben
On 4/20/2024 6:26 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
List,
As Edwina accurately commented a few days ago, this exchange between John
and Jon has become less a discussion and more a debate, so much so that I
have commented -- now for the third time --
Jon, List,
On that point, we are in complete agreement:
JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any
noun in the English language.
JAS: In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it
is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and
John, List:
JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost
any noun in the English language.
In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it
is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction
between a "graph" as a type
Jon,
The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any noun in
the English language. As I'm now looking out the window, I see three tree
instances nearby and many more instance of trees farther down the hill. But
the word 'instance' may be dropped when there is no need
List, Jon:
> On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon,
> index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.
>
> According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or
John, List:
JFS: He uses exactly the same word with no change whatsoever for the
abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, lines, and ovals) and
the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet.
It is remarkable that someone can read a short paragraph and then seriously
claim that
Jon, Gary, List,
Please reread the paragraph below by Peirce from L376 (December 1911). The
example he uses is 'existential graph'. He uses exactly the same word with no
change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots,
lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it
Jon, List,
That 'something' which is, as Peirce writes, ". . . a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are," I have for many
years referred to as "a would-be' *if.* . .". That "if" emphasizes the
Gary, List:
Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
CSP: Any visible
John, Jon, Helmut, List,
JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
the following two sentences:
1. A hump is a tone
John, List:
JFS: 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Thanks for demonstrating once again that the common meaning and usage of
"mark" today render it a terrible alternative for "tone" as the possible
counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." Any
Jon:
On review, this comment is of possible interest to a purist!
> On Feb 27, 2024, at 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> JAS: Every explicitly scribed EG is a replica (instance), a sinsign (token)
> of a peculiar kind that embodies a legisign (type).
>
> JLRC: Frankly, I fail to
John, List:
On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
Helmut, Jon, List,
That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't be
wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic.
HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt,
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a
Helmut, List:
HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
John, List
I think this concept of the ‘right’ to use different terminologies when
discussing reality aligns with Peirce’s concept of the advancement of
knowledge, where he specifically rejects the Cartesian ‘epistemic
individualism’, ie, making the individual the ‘locus of knowledge’ [ with
Edwina, Jon, List,
Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.
ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one
is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in
particular, in the scientific disciplines.
JFS: The
Claudio, List:
CG: It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List
I am delighted that you did so today, and I hope that it will not be as
long before you do so again!
CG: Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am
interested in being able to use the Peircean
List, JAS
I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.
No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in
particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term created
by an individual for a specific specimen or action
John, Edwina, List:
Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this
well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave
it at that.
JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming
biological species.
Peirce did not so
I accidentally hit the send button and I apologize for the incompleteness of my
previous post.
In response to the question about the definition of nominalism, I must admit
that I have always been fascinated by Peirce’s discussion of the difference
between nominalism and realism.
Max H.
List,
I agree with Edwina’s points. I hope Peirce’s comments will focus us on the
matter at hand.
87 (20 August 1908) 164-165: Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and
Meaning of Thought, or Genetic Logic. Vol. II.
On 20 August 1908, Peirce published a review of James Baldwin’s
Gary, List
1] With regard to terminology - the question becomes - whose terms are to be
used? My point is that there are other researchers who are focused on similar
issues, each unknown to the others, [such as complex adaptive systems, the
development of information, anticipation
Edwina, List,
I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I
will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last
word.
We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same
situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so
John, List
I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his claim
that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In other
words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see absolutely
nothing wrong with this!!
My point is different -
Edwina, Gary, Robert, List,
I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of
terminology. But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or
indifferent. The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for
naming biological species. But very few
Gary R, List
1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology. I am also
aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing. I am also aware
of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the same
situations as Peirce describes. My point is that
; John
>
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
> *Sent*: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
> *To*: Peirce-L
> *Cc*: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci <
> bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>, Anthony Jappy ,
> "Houser, Nathan R."
>
Edwina, List,
This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your
addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of
terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence
Jon,
To begin, I'll quote a highly respected authority about arguments from
authority. The following passage about authority comes from Wikiquote, a
source that is widely considered an authoritative source of information:
"Appeal to an authority which depends on human reason is the weakest
Dear Claudio,
This is exciting news indeed, and in an area of semiotics which I know
holds considerable interest to at least several members of the Peirce-L
forum including me.
Thank you for all the excellent work you have done and continue to do in
the Peircean semiotics -- including his three
of agreement, I won't say
anything more.
John
From: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Sent: 4/12/24 1:18 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci
, Anthony Jappy ,
"Houser, Nathan R."
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
R
Robert, List:
Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the
List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's
1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his
1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes;
List
As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the correct
one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the particular, the
individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to ‘what is real’. [ ie the
meaning and function].
Edwina
> On Apr 12, 2024, at
Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of embodiment’ of
the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate - and it’s a debate
not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]- rejects a more basic
requirement of analysis; namely - what is the operative
List,
I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a
few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but
the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the
six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
John, List:
JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and
'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in
Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
"tinge," and
John, List:
JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical
*fallacy*". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a
dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority.
Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an
Gary, Jon, List,
My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous notes by
Jon and Gary (q.v.).
My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words
'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled out
of thin air could be
Jon, Gary, List,
First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical
fallacy".
Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an
encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to cite
references in an academic publication
List,
While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it
has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded
me that the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved
unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the
John, List:
JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with
Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in
its favor.
As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support,
any use of "mark" that is consistent with
Gary, Jon, List
To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions have to
be made. I have stated the reasons why I believe that the trichotomy
(potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and most detailed
reasoning. I also agree with him that (mark token
John, List:
JFS: I don't understand why you're jumping through hoops to defend a rather
poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once.
(Except for once more in the LNB.)
I am not the one who is jumping through hoops--the textual evidence plainly
*supports* my position.
John, Jon, List,
JFS: I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all
kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce
happened to mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.)
GR: It appears to me that *if* Jon has been 'jumping through hoops'
Jon, List,
I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of
hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to
mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.)
First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words that
John, List:
JFS: Peirce defined this trichotomy [potisign/actisign/famisign] without
making any reference to (Tone Token Type).
This is highly misleading--Peirce wrote EP 2:478-490 over three consecutive
days (1908 Dec 23-25), and he *did* make reference to tone/token/type both
before and after
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
Sent: 4/8/24 12:35 AM
To: "Michael J.J. Tiffany" ,
"s...@bestweb.net"
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science
(U Pitt)
Hello Michael and John,
Nice to hear fr
Flagstaff, AZ
Philosophy, NAU
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on
behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany
Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM
To: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science
(U Pitt)
John, List:
I agree
to say.
John
From: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Sent: 4/7/24 6:27 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List:
JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that p
Jerry
This section is, I believe,from 1868 - and there are more descriptions of the
categories elsewhere., eg. 8/328 1904.
The three terms you reference - quality, relation, representation] can be
understood to refer to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.The categories, are
‘modes of being’,
Dear Edwinia, List
> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the
> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state
> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of
John, List:
JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an
image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and
the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable
things.
Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it
Jon, List,
See the recent notes about the ZOOM talk on Friday. It is essential for Peirce
scholars to bring his philosophy and its applications to the attention of
philosopher, scientists, and engineers in the 21st century -- Peirce worked in
all three professions.
The word 'tone' is a
ctively.” To social Darwinism, and to
>> the related sort of thinking that constituted for Herbert Spencer and others
>> a supposed justification for the more rapacious practices of unbridled
>> capitalism, Peirce referred in disgust as “The Gospel of Greed.”
>>
>&g
ituted for Herbert Spencer and others a supposed justification
> for the more rapacious practices of unbridled capitalism, Peirce referred
> in disgust as “The Gospel of Greed.”
>
> All merely hypothetical or purely conjectural, of course. But your
> admonition to relate Peirce to our 21st
Jerry,
Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate
Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today:
>From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a
>canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science."
I
Edwina, List:
ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and the
interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section.
This is not at all controversial among Peirce scholars. He does not refer
to the *dynamical *object and *final *interpretant in 1903 because he
John, List:
Anyone is welcome to make a case for the opinion that "mark" is a
*better *choice
than "tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification
whose other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately
claim that "mark" was *Peirce's *final and definitive
Jon, Edwina, List,
Please note the subject line. The 1903 Harvard and Lowell lectures were an
important starting point for the major developments in Peirce's final decade.
And note Tony's word 'evolving' for the developments during that decade. In
any decision about Peirce's directions and
> On Apr 5, 2024, at 5:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the
> ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’.
>
> I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have
On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is
overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the
copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in
the trichotomy: "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of
Edwina, List:
ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the
’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’.
I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave
it at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign
A few more comments.
1] With regard to your post, John - I support the shift from a language based
analysis to an image based one - but - question whether the phaneron is “in
direct contact with the ding an sich’. My understanding is that such a
relationship never takes place.
2]with regard
Edwina, Jon, List,
The following observation is a good starting point for analyzing the
development iof Peirce's thought and writing from 1903 to 1908 and later:
ET: I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic
process as within the linguistic realm. If this
I will try to answer in pints:
> On Apr 4, 2024, at 8:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements
> about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct
> engagement these days, but I
John, List:
I have likewise already read (and carefully studied) about a dozen articles
by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Sign
Classes and the Philosophy of Representation*. Why assume otherwise?
I still disagree with him on destinate=final and explicit=immediate
Edwina, List:
In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements
about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from
direct engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in
this case. Hopefully, I will not regret it.
ET: I am aware that
: Peirce-L
Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903
to the end
List:
While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing
that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign clas
List
I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or
‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically
constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces-
otherwise - how would it function as that
List:
While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for
believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign
classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten
sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much
List
I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS
has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] -
have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his.
But just a few points:
1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion
John, List:
JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two
tokens of the same type.
This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can
have *different *tones, yet be
o his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).
>
> There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I
> have the time.
>
> John
>
> PS: The initials JS are ambiguous. It's better to write JAS or JFS.
>
> --
> *Fro
List:
It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most
important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final
interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant
(SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly
guous. It's better to write JAS or JFS.
From: "Edwina Taborsky"
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903
to the end
This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy
[TJ]. .
I a
Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it
will be"
*"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.*(CP 8.361)342-379
M-20b *(1908))*
Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce
This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy
[TJ]. .
I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.
This
List,
I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the
three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper
published in *Semiotica *(which is indeed the published version of the text
mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his
“From manuscripts R 703–4 it is clear that Peirce worked extensively on the
third Illustrations article, “The Doctrine of Chances,” that same month.” That
month was August 1910, according to Cornelis de Waal’s edition of Illustrations
of the Logic of Science, from which the above quote is
John, List:
FYI, I removed Dr. Jappy from the cc: line because he has told me in the
past that he greatly values his privacy and thus prefers not to be included
in any List discussions.
JFS: This is an unpublished article by Tony Jappy.
The title is different, but the abstract exactly matches
Jerry,
As you know very well, there is a huge difference in the various kinds of
chemical bonds.In a combination of a noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase
(VP). The NP is analogous to a sodium ion Na with a negative charge, and the
VP is analogous to a sulfate ion (SO4) with a positive
Jerry, List:
Roberts is not discussing metalanguage at all in that excerpt from p. 22 of
his 1973 book, he is talking about rhemata/rhemes (Peirce uses both terms).
These are incomplete propositions, with blanks where subjects need to be
added in order to turn them into complete propositions.
John, Jon:
In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s “metalanguage"
are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is simpler to just pose an
example of the meanings of metalanguages in the relevant logic used by CSP.
The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book,
Jon, List,
All the commentary, quotations, and citations below by both of us are
irrelevant to mathematical practice from ancient times to the present.
Following is a definitive statement of mathematical practice from Euclid to the
present:
In mathematics, the distinction between axioms,
John, List:
JFS: I am happy to say that I completely agree with Jon's note below.
However, the following passage from another note is misleading about
Peirce, Euclid, and mathematical practice from ancient times to the present.
The quoted passage is from my same note below.
JFS: In
Jerry, Jon, List,
JLRC: If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs
of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division?
I agree with Jon's explanation below that Peirce did not use the word
"division" to mean the numerical operation of
Jerry, List:
In this context, "division" simply refers to Peirce's 1903 *organization *of
Existential Graphs (EGs) into distinct Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts. Alpha
implements propositional logic, Beta implements a version of first-order
predicate logic by adding the line of identity, and Gamma
Jerry, List:
No one is claiming that Peirce ever used the *term *"metalanguage," only
the *concept*. Specifically, he provided a Gamma EG notation for asserting
a proposition about a proposition--the lightly drawn (1898) or dotted
(1903) oval for treating a complete proposition as a *subject
List, John:
> On Mar 20, 2024, at 3:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> That quotation shows that Gamma graphs add one and only one NECESSARY feature
> to Alpha + Beta graphs: the same or equivalent metalanguage feature used in
> 1898 (RLT). When Peirce referred to the DIVISION of Gamma graphs,
John, List:
JFS: It's not clear which "55 pages" Peirce was counting.
On the contrary, here is the relevant text in R L376.
CSP: An account of slightly further development of it was given in the
*Monist *of Oct. 1906. In this I made an attempt to make the syntax cover
Modals; but it has not
Jon, List,
It's not clear which "55 pages" Peirce was counting. It may have been his own
MS. As for L477, he was probably recalling words that he remembered from the
letter to Risteen. In L477, he only mentioned one sentence on that topic:
"It cost me the trouble of my nonsensical
John, List:
In the first passage that you quoted from R L376, I agree that Peirce is
primarily condemning cuts, not tinctures. However, he is also condemning
his *entire *55-page description of EGs in "Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism"--that is the total length of the article as
Jon and Mike,
The unfinished letter L376 has rarely been mentioned by Peirce scholars, and
nobody has undertaken a serious study of it. If anybody can find anything more
than a brief citation about it, please send a copy to P-List so that we can all
see it and analyze it.
Please note the
Mike, List:
I agree that the interchange was (generally) enjoyable and enlightening,
and I am sorry that it ultimately became contentious and tiresome--I am not
interested in "slugging it out" further. I also agree that John Sowa has
much of value to say about EGs and logic, especially as applied
Very sad news. Nathan notified the Peirce Society EC as well. We'll honor
them both in our upcoming newsletter.
-Aaron
Aaron B. Wilson, PhD
Executive Director of the Charles S. Peirce Society
On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 10:01 PM Gary Richmond
wrote:
> List,
>
> Nathan Houser wrote to me this
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