subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation \(was Immediate Objects and Phenomena\)"

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - my own quite logical example. I know that he did refer to the
syllogism somewhere but I'm not going to look it up..but, it's
obviously quite a logical assumption.

Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 3:26 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its
Interpretant--e.g., "An Argument is a sign which distinctly
represents the Interpretant, called its Conclusion, which it is
intended to determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any
text where he similarly associated the Representamen with the major
premiss and/or the Object with the minor premiss? Or is that just
your own illustrative example?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound
is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'.

IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an
external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound

II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and
knowledge based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external
'thing'

DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II:
'I should flee this external thing'.

The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The
Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological
nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. This
stored information mediates the soundand 'thinks' about it..and
comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run
away from'.

Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism.

The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the
individual situation.

The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be
understood as the Representamen

the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s].

Edwina

On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [4]
sent:
Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all
of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s
perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the
bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural
structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means
something, it would not perceive it. Best, Helmut

Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its
Interpretant--e.g., "An *Argument *is a sign which distinctly represents
the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to
determine" (CP 2.95; 1902).  Just curious--is there any text where he
similarly associated the Representamen with the major premiss and/or the
Object with the minor premiss?  Or is that just your own illustrative
example?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound is
> NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'.
>
> IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an external
> existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound
>
> II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and knowledge
> based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external 'thing'
>
> DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II: 'I
> should flee this external thing'.
>
> The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The
> Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological
> nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience.
> This stored information mediates the soundand 'thinks' about it..and
> comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run away
> from'.
>
> Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism.
>
> The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the individual
> situation.
>
> The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be understood
> as the Representamen
>
> the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
> I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself
> is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This
> has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to
> instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud
> sound means something, it would not perceive it.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound
is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'.

IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an
external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound

II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and
knowledge based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external
'thing'

DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II:
'I should flee this external thing'.

The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The
Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological
nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. This
stored information mediates the soundand 'thinks' about it..and
comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run
away from'.

Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism. 

The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the
individual situation.

The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be
understood as the Representamen

the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s].

Edwina
 On Mon 05/02/18  2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all
of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s
perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the
bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural
structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means
something, it would not perceive it. Best, Helmut 05. Februar
2018 um 19:43 Uhr
 Von: "Gary Richmond" 
 Jon, Edwina, list,   I think I'm going to drop out of the
discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye
operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this
year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism
piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can
get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary,
late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is
so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential
relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of
"Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new
understanding and fresh insights.   I'm beginning to think--and
especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues
discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really are
as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent
discussion stimulating also because it reminds me that there is much
in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or
even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at
all.   I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some
validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of
you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth
between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this
difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and,
again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and
valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way
that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on
some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or
two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of
"breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then
I feel lost again myself. . .   I disagree with Jerry C that your
analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's.
So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such
analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of
language--at times appear linear, while I think that both you and
Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways,
that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the essentially triadic
nature of semiosis (and  that is surely not linear).   So, again--and
this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion
for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in
preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make
more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and
Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing.   Best,   Gary R  
Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:  Edwina:
  I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because
otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious.  You keep
pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of
interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am
trying to

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

2018-02-05 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,

I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means something, it would not perceive it.

Best,

Helmut

05. Februar 2018 um 19:43 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond"

Jon, Edwina, list,

I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights.

I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really are as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent discussion stimulating also because it reminds me that there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at all.

I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . .

I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of language--at times appear linear, while I think that both you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the essentially triadic nature of semiosis (and that is surely not linear).

So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing.

Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Edwina:

I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly that--I do not have a firm opinion yet. Nevertheless, I continue to find your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen.

On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and Representamen that is general--i.e., Symbols can only be Collective Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909).

Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful discussion. Enjoy the sponge cake! :-)

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?

And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of the external stimuli.

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

2018-02-05 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Edwina, list,

I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally,
because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in
different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading
Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as
well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that
extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2).
There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential
relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it
might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights.

I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that
some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the
terminological) really *are* as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have
found the recent discussion stimulating also* because* it reminds me that
there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear
enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be
at all.

I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity,
while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain
key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very
different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in
interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the
effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways.
What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and
Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in
that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on
what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that
self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . .

I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon;
or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is,
I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of
the nature of language--at times *appear* linear, while I think that both
you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different
ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the *essentially *triadic
nature of semiosis (and *that* is surely *not* linear).

So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular
discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in
preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more
sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's
analyses, also very intriguing.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina:
>
> I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise
> I fear that it is going to get contentious.  You keep pressing me on where
> to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the
> whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly
> that--I do not have a firm opinion yet.  Nevertheless, I continue to find
> your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my
> understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen.
>
> On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns
> need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and
> Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective
> Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make
> abundantly clear.  Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form
> (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and
> entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?),  EP
> 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909).
>
> Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful
> discussion.  Enjoy the sponge cake! :-)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process.
>> How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
>>
>> And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of
>> the external stimuli.  I consider that this action of representation
>> belongs to the Interpretant.
>>
>> You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the
>> 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact is the
>> function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this contact,  with the
>> incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets it into the Interpretant.
>>
>> I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

2018-02-05 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Jon, List:

> On Feb 2, 2018, at 4:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be Existents 
> (2ns). 

In your opinion do you also believe that none of this example of semiosis that 
are 2ns?

> As such, it should not be surprising that our analysis of it resembles "a 
> simplistic causal sequence”;

As I read your highly imaginative narrative, the words you select attempt to 
use a simple linear ordering to “explain” the fundamental scientific philosophy 
of the categorizations of pragmatic logic.   
> hence Edwina's worry about making it out to be "too mechanical.” 

The simple linear ordering of the five symbols is a mechanical logic, in my 
opinion.

> Furthermore, since Peirce's synechism entails that semiosis is continuous, 
> rather than discrete, the assignment of terms is indeed arbitrary to a 
> degree.  In fact, that was a source of initial confusion on my part—

My only comment would be that it continues to be deep sources of confusion 
about CSP's notion of symbolization and categorization.

Cheers

Jerry.

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina:

I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise
I fear that it is going to get contentious.  You keep pressing me on where
to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the
whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly
that--I do not have a firm opinion yet.  Nevertheless, I continue to find
your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my
understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen.

On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns
need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and
Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective
Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make
abundantly clear.  Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form
(qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and
entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?),  EP
2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909).

Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful
discussion.  Enjoy the sponge cake! :-)

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process.
> How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
>
> And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of the
> external stimuli.  I consider that this action of representation belongs to
> the Interpretant.
>
> You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the
> 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact is the
> function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this contact,  with the
> incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets it into the Interpretant.
>
> I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since that
> is a Symbol'.  I disagree that all cognition takes place as 'symbolic'.
> After all, as Peirce said - Mind does not involve consciousness and takes
> place within crystals. Do you consider that the habits of
> chemcial formation which develop a crystal from various
> chemcial...understanding the crystals' development as the
> Dynamic Interpretant of the chemicals...do you consider that this action is
> SYMBOLIC?
>
> I also disagree that a symbolic interpretation requires a general DO. If I
> hear that loud sound..and finally think/say: That loud sound was the oak
> tree falling...that DI [which itself is a full triad] is a SYMBOLIC
> articulation of the physical event. Nothing general about that Dynamic
> Object; it was the single tree falling in a local, particular place.
>
> Again - Form is not in a mode of Firstness, since Form is MIND - and Mind
> is an action of Thirdness.
>
> And now - must go and bake a sponge cakeI'll check in later.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 05/02/18 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the
> Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., represents) the
> loud sound in the human's mind.  The Representamen does not itself include
> the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable
> him/her to recognize the sensate data as the result of a tree falling
> (IO), and then infer that it corresponds in this case to a  particular tree
> falling (DI).  Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is
> the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since
> that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so this is
> another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play somehow.
>
> In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single
> semiosic event that includes the loud sound (Dynamic Object) and the
> bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant).  Again, I agree that the
> bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere between those two
> stages.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Gary R, list:
>>
>> OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:
>>
>> DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't
>> know that.
>>
>> IO:  my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
>> differently than my cat or dog or children or...
>>
>> R:  the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive
>> MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This
>> Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its
>> full knowledge baseinterprets that data.
>>
>> II:  this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and
>> organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become
>> conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - I don't separate Mind and Matter. Mind exists AS matter.
Matter couldn't exist without habits-of-formation. And Mind couldn't
exist without being those habits within Matter...Pure Aristotle.

Edwina
 On Mon 05/02/18 10:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Analyzing the various "Signs within Signs" might be unavoidable
eventually, especially if we end up going down the road of defining
Dicisigns (i.e., natural propositions) as "complete Signs" and all
other classes (except Arguments) as "incomplete Signs."  However,
right now it just muddies the waters further from my standpoint.
 Your last statement, "Mind exists within matter," is problematic for
me, because it maintains a distinction where Peirce insisted on
continuity--"matter  is effete mind."  That is yet another can of
worms that we probably should not reopen right now.
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the
same time' so to speak.

If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree
falling...whether the Receiver is a bird or human - there are
multiple semiosic actions involved.

1] For both, there can be the 'rhematic iconic qualisign' [a feeling
of sound]. This would involve DO and IO and R. The neurological R. 

2] For both, there can be a Rhematic indexical sinsign'..[a local,
non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimuli...This would
involve DO, IO, R and II. Again, neurological. Here we just have the
neurological reaction..but note..even this neurological reaction
could not appear without there being  neurological habits within the
bird/human's systems

3] So, bringing in Thirdness, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign...which
involves that DO, IO, R and II. Here, the system acknowledges the
habits of formation of the human/bird. 

4] With the human, I'd add: possibly, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign to
acknowledge that the human has symbolically named the DO.

BUT - semiosic action 1 and 2 rest within 3. That is -  my view is
that there is no such thing as a 'feeling' of redness or a feeling of
sound - existing outside of a morphological or material 'home'/form.
Mind exists within matter. 

Edwina 

On Mon 05/02/18  9:20 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with
something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second
(e.g., the bird's neural pattern) is accurate.  It seems to me that
any adequate model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of
Signs into account.  What I continue to find tricky in this
particular discussion is where to "locate" the collateral experience
and habits of interpretation that come into play when an external
Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign.  I have some hints in
mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements," but nothing
that I can explicate or defend just yet. 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to
turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a
sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."  
 I meant to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the
external sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that
'responds' to that external sign as immediate object.
 Sorry about that!
  Best,
 Gary R
  Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [3]
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, list,
 Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a
sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other
more general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in
consideration of the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being 
existent is but half the story. You seem to me to look at the sign
from 'without', while I tend to look at it from 'within'.
 But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me,
human semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the
non-human, non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external,
existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one
(as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems
to me to be the former, mine the latter.
 Best,
 Gary R
 Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [4]
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary R., List:
 Of course the Sign can be within the bird; what I said was that I
think it does not necessarily

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic
process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?

And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation'
of the external stimuli.  I consider that this action of
representation belongs to the Interpretant. 

You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with
the 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact
is the function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this
contact,  with the incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets
it into the Interpretant.

I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since
that is a Symbol'.  I disagree that all cognition takes place as
'symbolic'. After all, as Peirce said - Mind does not involve
consciousness and takes place within crystals. Do you consider that
the habits of chemcial formation which develop a crystal from various
chemcial...understanding the crystals' development as the Dynamic
Interpretant of the chemicals...do you consider that this action is
SYMBOLIC?

I also disagree that a symbolic interpretation requires a general
DO. If I hear that loud sound..and finally think/say: That loud sound
was the oak tree falling...that DI [which itself is a full triad] is a
SYMBOLIC articulation of the physical event. Nothing general about
that Dynamic Object; it was the single tree falling in a local,
particular place.

Again - Form is not in a mode of Firstness, since Form is MIND - and
Mind is an action of Thirdness.

And now - must go and bake a sponge cakeI'll check in later. 

Edwina
 On Mon 05/02/18  9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I
understand the Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for
(i.e., represents) the loud sound in the human's mind.  The
Representamen does not itself include the person's memories and
habits; instead, the latter are what enable him/her to recognize the
sensate data as the result of a tree falling (IO), and then infer
that it corresponds in this case to a  particular tree falling (DI). 
Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is the DO
(Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since
that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so
this is another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play
somehow.
 In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the
single semiosic event that includes the loud sound (Dynamic Object)
and the bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant).  Again, I
agree that the bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere
between those two stages. 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, Gary R, list:

OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:

DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I
don't know that. 

IO:  my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
differently than my cat or dog or children or...

R:  the Representamen consists of both my physiological and
cognitive MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are
learned]. This Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO
and, according to its full knowledge baseinterprets that data. 

II:  this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained
and organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I
become conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware
that it is not a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of
me and that..it might be familiar...

DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside
of me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the
sound of a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the
Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'. 

Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the
Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets
up a cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to
flee. The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant...

Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including
the action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and
I don't understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an
almost purely mechanical one, that doesn't include this force.  

Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness
[habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even
they, are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function
within habits

That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic
indexical sinsign only refers to the single event

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

Analyzing the various "Signs within Signs" might be unavoidable eventually,
especially if we end up going down the road of defining Dicisigns (i.e.,
natural propositions) as "complete Signs" and all other classes (except
Arguments) as "incomplete Signs."  However, right now it just muddies the
waters further from my standpoint.

Your last statement, "Mind exists *within *matter," is problematic for me,
because it maintains a distinction where Peirce insisted on
continuity--"matter *is *effete mind."  That is yet another can of worms
that we probably should not reopen right now.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the same
> time' so to speak.
>
> If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree falling...whether
> the Receiver is a bird or human - there are multiple semiosic actions
> involved.
>
> 1] For both, there can be the 'rhematic iconic qualisign' [a feeling of
> sound]. This would involve DO and IO and R. The neurological R.
>
> 2] For both, there can be a Rhematic indexical sinsign'..[a local,
> non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimuli...This would involve
> DO, IO, R and II. Again, neurological. Here we just have the neurological
> reaction..but note..even this neurological reaction could not appear
> without there being neurological habits within the bird/human's systems
>
> 3] So, bringing in Thirdness, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign...which
> involves that DO, IO, R and II. Here, the system acknowledges the habits of
> formation of the human/bird.
>
> 4] With the human, I'd add: possibly, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign to
> acknowledge that the human has symbolically named the DO.
>
> BUT - semiosic action 1 and 2 rest within 3. That is -  my view is that
> there is no such thing as a 'feeling' of redness or a feeling of sound -
> existing outside of a morphological or material 'home'/form. Mind exists
> within matter.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 05/02/18 9:20 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with
> something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g.,
> the bird's neural pattern) is accurate.  It seems to me that any adequate
> model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into account.
> What I continue to find tricky in this particular discussion is where to
> "locate" the collateral experience and habits of interpretation that come
> into play when an external Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign.  I
> have some hints in mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements,"
> but nothing that I can explicate or defend just yet.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
>> emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn
>> to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your
>> emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."
>>
>> I meant to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external
>> sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that
>> external sign as immediate object.
>>
>> Sorry about that!
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Blocked image]
>>
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon S, list,
>>>
>>> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a
>>> sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more
>>> general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of
>>> the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being existent is but half the
>>> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to
>>> look at it from 'within'.
>>>
>>> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human
>>> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human,
>>> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign,
>>> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least
>>> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the
>>> former, mine the latter.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Blocked image]
>>>
>>> Gary Richmond
>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>>> Communication Studies
>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 Gary R., List:

 Of course the Sign can be within the bird; what I said was that I
 think it

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the
Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., *represents*) the
loud sound in the human's mind.  The Representamen does not *itself *include
the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable
him/her to *recognize *the sensate data as the result of a tree falling
(IO), and then infer that it corresponds in this case to a *particular *tree
falling (DI).  Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is
the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since
that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so this is
another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play somehow.

In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single
semiosic event that *includes *the loud sound (Dynamic Object) *and *the
bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant).  Again, I agree that the
bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere between those two
stages.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R, list:
>
> OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:
>
> DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't know
> that.
>
> IO:  my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
> differently than my cat or dog or children or...
>
> R:  the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive
> MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This
> Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its
> full knowledge baseinterprets that data.
>
> II:  this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and
> organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become
> conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is not
> a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of me and that..it
> might be familiar...
>
> DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside of me,
> is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the sound of a
> tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the Representamen...I
> decide.."It's that old oak tree'.
>
> Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the
> Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets up a
> cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to flee.
> The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant...
>
> Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including the
> action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and I don't
> understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an almost purely
> mechanical one, that doesn't include this force.
>
> Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness
> [habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even they,
> are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function within
> habits
>
> That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic indexical
> sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound. This is, as Gary
> R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL.  But - when we add in the RESULT,
> the bird's flight - we must include the neurological habits of the bird,
> which are: 'run from danger' - and so, the Interpretant is: flight.
>
> Edwina
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 05/02/18 8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
>
> Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out the
> necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What carries
> out this function of habit? The Representamen.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
> soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
> frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
> non-cognitive example.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>>
>> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation
>> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in
>> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer
>> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis
>> added by me in all cases).
>>
>> 1910  | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated  | MS [R] 678:23
>>
>> …we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our
>> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
>> calls up some feeling, effort, or

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list

1. See my most recent post - which has the Representamen as the
mediation between the O and the I. As to whether this semiosic triad
can function 'outside or inside' - to me, that doesn't make any
sense, since I consider semiosic as an interaction between two
entities. ..Yes, this can be a purely conceptual interaction taking
place within one human..but..semiosis remains an interaction.

2. I disagree that Peirce considered the form as operative in
Firstness. Firstness is a quality, a sensation - and Form, as such,
functions within constraints, borders, rules .Form is a property of
Thirdness.  I also disagree that matter is 'Secondness'. Secondness
is a brute interaction and not necessarily material. And- even matter
doesn't exist without Form. That's why I use the term 'morpohological
unit' - to outline the nature of matter-as-a-form.

3. I think that your interpretation of Peirce's outline misses the
point that the function of the Representamen is to mediate, and
transform the sensate data received from the DO - into some
understanding of what that data is. How can the Representamen mediate
- unless it 'is in touch' with, so to speak, the normative patterns,
the habits, of that entity?

Edwina
 On Mon 05/02/18  9:39 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1.  Per my last response to Gary R., it depends on which Sign we are
discussing.  The loud sound is obviously outside the bird, while the
neural pattern is obviously inside the bird.  In my current thinking,
both can be analyzed as Representamens; in yours, if I understand you
correctly, only the latter is a Representamen.
 2.  I start having trouble following you when you introduce new
terms like "morphological units" and "material forms"; the latter
term, in particular, almost seems like an oxymoron, since
philosophers (including Peirce) traditionally maintain a  distinction
between form (1ns) and matter (2ns).  In any case, you only mention
birds, trees, and insects as "locations" of semiosis; does this mean
that you reject physical semiosis in non-living material things, or
perhaps view it as consisting entirely of brute dyadic reactions?
 3.  Again, where memory (collateral experience) and habits (of
interpretation) fit into the process of semiosis is precisely what I
am now trying to figure out.  Because I define the Representamen as
that which stands for an Object to an Intepretant--which is how I
read Peirce defining it, as well--I do not see how these elements can
be "located" within the Representamen.  Instead, my sense--still quite
vague and tentative at this point--is that collateral experience has
something to do with recognizing the Immediate Object as a
determination of its Dynamic Object, while habits of interpretation
have something to do with the tendency to produce a particular
Dynamic Interpretant from the range of possibilities that constitutes
the Immediate Interpretant. 
 4.  It sounds like we agree on interpreting Peirce as holding that
substances (like an individual bird) are bundles of habits.
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list

1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the
bird? Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud? 

2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in
this case, within the bird. Semiosis is also going on in other
material forms outside of this bird, within the tree, the other
birds, the insects.. Semiosis is ongoing within these material forms
and between these material forms. 

3] Where, in your view, does memory or continuity or habits exist? I
consider that habits/memory exist within the material form. Consider
an atom; its habits of formation DO exist; without such habits - it
would not exist as that atom. Same with the bird; its habits of
formation exist [DNA etc] within it. 

4] The individual sound acts on the habits of form within the Bird;
these habits set up the neurological reaction of 'fear and flight'.
Without such habits- the bird would not exist but would collapse
into...multiple diverse molecules???

Edwina 
 On Sun 04/02/18 10:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not
necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that
disagreement aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does
semiosis only take place within the bird?  Is there no other semiosis
going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
 How can the Representamen be classified as general (Legisign or
Type) in a scenario where an  individual sound leads an individual
bird to the individual action of flight?  I thought you were saying
in your previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which
makes much more sense

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

1.  Per my last response to Gary R., it depends on which Sign we are
discussing.  The loud sound is obviously outside the bird, while the neural
pattern is obviously inside the bird.  In my current thinking, both can be
analyzed as Representamens; in yours, if I understand you correctly, only
the latter is a Representamen.

2.  I start having trouble following you when you introduce new terms like
"morphological units" and "material forms"; the latter term, in particular,
almost seems like an oxymoron, since philosophers (including Peirce)
traditionally maintain a *distinction *between form (1ns) and matter
(2ns).  In any case, you only mention birds, trees, and insects as
"locations" of semiosis; does this mean that you reject *physical *semiosis
in *non-living* material things, or perhaps view it as consisting entirely
of brute dyadic reactions?

3.  Again, where memory (collateral experience) and habits (of
interpretation) fit into the process of semiosis is precisely what I am now
trying to figure out.  Because I define the Representamen as that which
stands for an Object to an Intepretant--which is how I read Peirce defining
it, as well--I do not see how these elements can be "located" within the
Representamen.  Instead, my sense--still quite vague and tentative at this
point--is that collateral experience has something to do with recognizing
the Immediate Object as a determination of its Dynamic Object, while habits
of interpretation have something to do with the tendency to produce a
particular Dynamic Interpretant from the range of possibilities that
constitutes the Immediate Interpretant.

4.  It sounds like we agree on interpreting Peirce as holding that
substances (like an individual bird) are bundles of habits.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> 1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the bird?
> Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud?
>
> 2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in this
> case, within the bird. Semiosis is also going on in other material forms
> outside of this bird, within the tree, the other birds, the insects..
> Semiosis is ongoing within these material forms and between these material
> forms.
>
> 3] Where, in your view, does memory or continuity or habits exist? I
> consider that habits/memory exist within the material form. Consider
> an atom; its habits of formation DO exist; without such habits - it would
> not exist as that atom. Same with the bird; its habits of formation exist
> [DNA etc] within it.
>
> 4] The individual sound acts on the habits of form within the Bird; these
> habits set up the neurological reaction of 'fear and flight'. Without such
> habits- the bird would not exist but would collapse into...multiple diverse
> molecules???
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 10:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not necessarily
> within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
> now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis only take place
> within the bird?  Is there no other semiosis going on, in which the loud
> sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>
> How can the Representamen be classified as general (Legisign or Type) in
> a scenario where an individual sound leads an individual bird to the 
> individual
> action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your previous post that it
> is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense to me.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
>> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>>
>> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>>
>> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to
>> react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological
>> system is the IO.
>>
>> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis:
>> which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>>
>> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>>
>> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
>> stand alone.
>>
>> 
>>
>> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
>> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>>
>> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
>> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
>> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>>
>> ---
>> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in
>> a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base,
>> both biological and learned, of that bird.
>>
>>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the
same time' so to speak.

If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree
falling...whether the Receiver is a bird or human - there are
multiple semiosic actions involved.

1] For both, there can be the 'rhematic iconic qualisign' [a feeling
of sound]. This would involve DO and IO and R. The neurological R. 

2] For both, there can be a Rhematic indexical sinsign'..[a local,
non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimuli...This would
involve DO, IO, R and II. Again, neurological. Here we just have the
neurological reaction..but note..even this neurological reaction
could not appear without there being neurological habits within the
bird/human's systems

3] So, bringing in Thirdness, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign...which
involves that DO, IO, R and II. Here, the system acknowledges the
habits of formation of the human/bird. 

4] With the human, I'd add: possibly, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign to
acknowledge that the human has symbolically named the DO.

BUT - semiosic action 1 and 2 rest within 3. That is -  my view is
that there is no such thing as a 'feeling' of redness or a feeling of
sound - existing outside of a morphological or material 'home'/form.
Mind exists within matter.

Edwina
 On Mon 05/02/18  9:20 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with
something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second
(e.g., the bird's neural pattern) is accurate.  It seems to me that
any adequate model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of
Signs into account.  What I continue to find tricky in this
particular discussion is where to "locate" the collateral experience
and habits of interpretation that come into play when an external
Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign.  I have some hints in
mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements," but nothing
that I can explicate or defend just yet. 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to
turn to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a
sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."  
 I meant to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the
external sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that
'responds' to that external sign as immediate object.
 Sorry about that!
  Best,
 Gary R
  Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [2]
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, list,
 Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a
sign' than you think is justified (one more individual, the other
more general as I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in
consideration of the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being 
existent is but half the story. You seem to me to look at the sign
from 'without', while I tend to look at it from 'within'.
 But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me,
human semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the
non-human, non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external,
existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one
(as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems
to me to be the former, mine the latter.
 Best,
 Gary R
 Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [4]
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary R., List:
 Of course the Sign can be within the bird; what I said was that I
think it does not necessarily  have to be be within the bird.
 I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go
in that direction.
 In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
(individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand
what point you are making about this.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [6] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [7]  
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon, Edwina, list,
 Jon wrote:
  I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not
necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that
disagreement aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does
semiosis only take place within the bird?  Is there no other semiosis
going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
 me.
 Cannot the Sign be

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Gary R., List:

Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with
something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g.,
the bird's neural pattern) is accurate.  It seems to me that any adequate
model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into account.
What I continue to find tricky in this particular discussion is where to
"locate" the collateral experience and habits of interpretation that come
into play when an external Sign is "translated" into an internal Sign.  I
have some hints in mind now that I have started rereading "New Elements,"
but nothing that I can explicate or defend just yet.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:06 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
> emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn
> to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your
> emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."
>
> I *meant *to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external
> sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that
> external sign as immediate object.
>
> Sorry about that!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, list,
>>
>> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign'
>> than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as
>> I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the
>> Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the
>> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to
>> look at it from 'within'.
>>
>> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human
>> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human,
>> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign,
>> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least
>> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the
>> former, mine the latter.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R., List:
>>>
>>> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I
>>> think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.
>>>
>>> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
>>> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
>>> that direction.
>>>
>>> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
>>> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what
>>> point you are making about this.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Jon, Edwina, list,

 Jon wrote:

 I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
 necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
 aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
 place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in
 which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
  me.

 Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
 perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
 the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
 with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
 importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place
 within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the
 sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another
 analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this
 analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and
 clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird
 although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).

 Jon wrote:

 How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or
 Type) in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird
 to the *individual *action of

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

Jon, Gary R, list:

OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:

DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I
don't know that. 

IO:  my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
differently than my cat or dog or children or...

R:  the Representamen consists of both my physiological and
cognitive MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are
learned]. This Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO
and, according to its full knowledge baseinterprets that data.

II:  this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained
and organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I
become conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware
that it is not a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of
me and that..it might be familiar...

DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside
of me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the
sound of a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the
Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'.
Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the
Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets
up a cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to
flee. The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant...

Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including
the action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and
I don't understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an
almost purely mechanical one, that doesn't include this force. 

Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness
[habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even
they, are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function
within habits

That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic
indexical sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound.
This is, as Gary R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL.  But - when
we add in the RESULT, the bird's flight - we must include the
neurological habits of the bird, which are: 'run from danger' - and
so, the Interpretant is: flight.

Edwina

Edwina
 On Mon 05/02/18  8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out
the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What
carries out this function of habit? The Representamen.

Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you
will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted
quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on
our current non-human, non-cognitive example.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Edwina, Jon S, list,
 At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's
interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem,
feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why*
I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think
might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all cases). 
 1910  | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated  | MS [R] 678:23

…we apply this word “sign” to  everything recognizable whether
to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination,
provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought…
 1902 [c.]  | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38

 A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes
its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign.
[—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing
else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back
toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this
case collapse into an immediate present. The type of a sign is memory,
which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion
of it to future memory. 
 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R]  | CP 2.228

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that
is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps
a more developed sign.  That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in
reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground
of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out
the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What
carries out this function of habit? The Representamen.

Edwina
On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Gary R., List:
Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you
will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted
quotes, because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on
our current non-human, non-cognitive example.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Edwina, Jon S, list,
At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's
interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem,
feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why*
I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a direction I think
might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all cases).
1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23

…we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether
to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination,
provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought…
1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38

A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes
its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign.
[—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing
else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back
toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this
case collapse into an immediate present. The type of a sign is memory,
which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion
of it to future memory.
1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that
is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps
a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in
reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground
of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of
Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense
in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which
we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some
previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far
as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that
is to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
instant of the interval a new idea.
1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6

… a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or
sign. So that it appears that every species of actual cognition is of
the nature of a sign. [—]
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 [4]

Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(718)%20482-5690

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list

1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the
bird? Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud? 

2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in
this case, within the bird. Semiosis is also going on in other
material forms outside of this bird, within the tree, the other
birds, the insects.. Semiosis is ongoing within these material forms
and between these material forms. 

3] Where, in your view, does memory or continuity or habits exist? I
consider that habits/memory exist within the material form. Consider
an atom; its habits of formation DO exist; without such habits - it
would not exist as that atom. Same with the bird; its habits of
formation exist [DNA etc] within it.

4] The individual sound acts on the habits of form within the Bird;
these habits set up the neurological reaction of 'fear and flight'.
Without such habits- the bird would not exist but would collapse
into...multiple diverse molecules???

Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18 10:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the Sign, not
necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that
disagreement aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does
semiosis only take place within the bird?  Is there no other semiosis
going on, in which the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
 How can the Representamen be classified as general (Legisign or
Type) in a scenario where an  individual sound leads an individual
bird to the individual action of flight?  I thought you were saying
in your previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which
makes much more sense to me.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within
the birdthe IO-Representamen-II.

A Representamen is always internal to the triad. 

The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to
react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological
system is the IO.

What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis:
which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.

The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.  

The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it
doesn't stand alone. 



A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to
that deaf bird- the bird's flight.

Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of
that other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.

---
 No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases'
is in a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the
knowledge base, both biological and learned, of that bird.

--
  Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18  8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to
highlight more differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
 The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete
mind, and mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so
I am still not seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the
scenario is analyzed in a certain way.  Are you positing some kind of
discontinuity in the semiosis during the chain of events from the
falling of the tree, to the loud sound that it causes, to the
impinging of the propagating sound waves on the bird, to its
resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems to me
that  each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one)
that it should flee, as well.
 As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to
be one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per
the 1903 Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I
am inclined to agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent.  The
bird's reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the  individual action
of flight; the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever
happened.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it
transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an
Interpretation...

So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it.

I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn
to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your
emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."

I *meant *to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external
sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that
external sign as immediate object.

Sorry about that!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon S, list,
>
> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign'
> than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as
> I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the
> Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the
> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to
> look at it from 'within'.
>
> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human
> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human,
> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign,
> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least
> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the
> former, mine the latter.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I
>> think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.
>>
>> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
>> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
>> that direction.
>>
>> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
>> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what
>> point you are making about this.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, Edwina, list,
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
>>> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
>>> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
>>> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
>>> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>>>  me.
>>>
>>>
>>> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
>>> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
>>> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
>>> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
>>> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place
>>> within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the
>>> sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another
>>> analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this
>>> analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and
>>> clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird
>>> although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
>>> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
>>> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
>>> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
>>> more sense to me.
>>>
>>>
>>> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
>>> indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs
>>> attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP
>>>
>>> Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds?
>>>
>>> OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of
>>> potential value imo, at least for me.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>>

>

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Gary R., List:

Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I think
it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.

I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
that direction.

In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
(individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what
point you are making about this.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>  me.
>
>
> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within
> the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of
> which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis).
> (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to
> consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the
> analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can
> take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
> more sense to me.
>
>
> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
> indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs
> attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP
>
> Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds?
>
> OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of
> potential value imo, at least for me.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
>>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Edwina, list,

I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back!

Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be
helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read
my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful. I
think it might be easier to get a 'handle' on this question focusing on
human semiosis (anyhow, I'm finding the 'bird' example 'tricky').

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
> soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
> frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
> non-cognitive example.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>>
>> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation
>> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in
>> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer
>> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis
>> added by me in all cases).
>>
>> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
>>
>> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
>> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
>> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*
>>
>>
>> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
>>
>> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
>> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A]
>> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that
>> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the
>> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an
>> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the
>> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*
>>
>>
>> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
>>
>> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
>> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
>> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
>> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of
>> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands
>> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
>> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is
>> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in
>> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches
>> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was
>> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which
>> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so
>> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
>> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
>> instant of the interval a new idea.
>>
>>
>> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
>>
>> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
>> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature
>> of a sign.* [—]
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote:

I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily
within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place
within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud
sound plays the role of the Representamen?
 me.

Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within
the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of which
it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). (Btw, I
think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to
consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the
analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can
take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).

Jon wrote:

How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in
a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to the
*individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your previous
post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense
to me.

But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs
attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP

Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds?

OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of
potential value imo, at least for me.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>
> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
> more sense to me.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
>> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>>
>> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>>
>> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to
>> react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological
>> system is the IO.
>>
>> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis:
>> which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>>
>> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>>
>> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
>> stand alone.
>>
>> 
>>
>> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
>> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>>
>> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
>> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
>> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>>
>> ---
>> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in
>> a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base,
>> both biological and learned, of that bird.
>>
>> --
>>  Edwina
>>
>> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight
>> more differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>>
>> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
>> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
>> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
>> certain way.  Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the
>> semiosis during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the
>> loud sound that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves
>> on the bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it
>> seems

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Gary R., List:

Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
non-cognitive example.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>
> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
> with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
> matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
> quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added
> by me in all cases).
>
> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
>
> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*
>
>
> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
>
> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A]
> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that
> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the
> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an
> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the
> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*
>
>
> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
>
> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of
> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands
> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is
> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in
> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches
> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was
> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which
> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so
> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant
> of the interval a new idea.
>
>
> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
>
> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature
> of a sign.* [—]
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>

-
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily
within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place
within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud
sound plays the role of the Representamen?

How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in
a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
the *individual
*action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your previous post that it
is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense to me.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>
> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>
> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react
> and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is
> the IO.
>
> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which
> is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>
> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>
> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
> stand alone.
>
> 
>
> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>
> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>
> ---
> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a
> mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both
> biological and learned, of that bird.
>
> --
>  Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
> differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>
> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
> certain way.  Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis
> during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound
> that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the
> bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems
> to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
> bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it
> should flee, as well.
>
> As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be
> one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903
> Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to
> agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent.  The bird's
> reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the individual action of flight;
> the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever happened.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms
>> the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation...
>>
>> So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
>> as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it.
>>
>> I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of
>> Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as
>>
>> O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of
>> local stimuli as referenced to a general rule.
>>
>> So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of
>> flight.
>>
>> But- the Representamen can be in other modes.
>>
>> 
>> -
>>
>> 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness.
>>
>> this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where
>> all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example
>> was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A
>> local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state.
>>
>> 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are
>> three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness:
>>
>> O-R-I   or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an
>> iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation
>>
>> O-R-I or 2-2-1  A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign .  A

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, Jon S, list,

At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added
by me in all cases).

1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23

…we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*

1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38

A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign
which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing
itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other
forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate
present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of
past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*

1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228

A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands for
that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which
I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to
be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in everyday talk;
I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s
idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at
some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the
thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a
*like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the
interval a new idea.

1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6

…a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature of
a sign.* [—]

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>
> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>
> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react
> and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is
> the IO.
>
> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which
> is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>
> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>
> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
> stand alone.
>
> 
>
> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>
> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>
> ---
> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a
> mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both
> biological and learned, of that bird.
>
> --
>  Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
> differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>
> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
> certain way.  Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis
> during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound
> that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the
> bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems
> to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
> bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it
> should flee, as well.
>
> As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within
the birdthe IO-Representamen-II.

A Representamen is always internal to the triad. 

The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to
react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological
system is the IO.

What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis:
which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.

The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object. 

The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it
doesn't stand alone. 



A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to
that deaf bird- the bird's flight.

Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of
that other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.

---
 No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases'
is in a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the
knowledge base, both biological and learned, of that bird.

--
  Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18  8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to
highlight more differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
 The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete
mind, and mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so
I am still not seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the
scenario is analyzed in a certain way.  Are you positing some kind of
discontinuity in the semiosis during the chain of events from the
falling of the tree, to the loud sound that it causes, to the
impinging of the propagating sound waves on the bird, to its
resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems to me
that  each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one)
that it should flee, as well.
 As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to
be one in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per
the 1903 Sign classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I
am inclined to agree that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent.  The
bird's reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the  individual action
of flight; the habit was already in place before the loud sound ever
happened.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it
transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an
Interpretation...

So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it.

I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of
Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as

O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation
of local stimuli as referenced to a general rule. 

So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of
flight.

But- the Representamen can be in other modes.

-

2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness.

this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign-
where all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness.
Peirce's example was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be
a feeling of sound. A local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe
individual state. 

3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are
three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness:

O-R-I   or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram;
an iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation

O-R-I or 2-2-1  A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign .  A spontaneous cry. a
local non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical
stimuli.

O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction. 



So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a
mode of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.

---

But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the
Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation.

Edwina 

On Sun 04/02/18  7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt 
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Yes, again, we have very different definitions of

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
differences in our views that are becoming apparent.

The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
certain way.  Are you positing some kind of *discontinuity *in the semiosis
during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound
that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the
bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems
to me that *each *of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
bird's flight, which might signal to another bird (say, a deaf one) that it
should flee, as well.

As I have stated a couple of times before, I consider our example to be one
in which all of the correlates are Existents (2ns); i.e., per the 1903 Sign
classification, it is an Indexical Sinsign, although I am inclined to agree
that it is Rhematic, rather than Dicent.  The bird's
reaction/interpretation of the Sign is the *individual *action of flight;
the *habit *was already in place before the loud sound ever happened.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 6:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> 1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it transforms
> the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an Interpretation...
>
> So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
> as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it.
>
> I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of
> Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as
>
> O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation of
> local stimuli as referenced to a general rule.
>
> So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of
> flight.
>
> But- the Representamen can be in other modes.
>
> 
> -
>
> 2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness.
>
> this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign- where
> all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness. Peirce's example
> was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be a feeling of sound. A
> local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe individual state.
>
> 3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are three
> classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness:
>
> O-R-I   or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram; an
> iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation
>
> O-R-I or 2-2-1  A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign .  A spontaneous cry. a local
> non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical stimuli.
>
> O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction.
>
> 
>
> So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a mode
> of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.
>
> ---
>
> But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the
> Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen."  Just
> to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound cannot be
> treated as the Representamen in any semiotic analysis of this scenario?
> If so, why not?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with
>> the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree
>> might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI].
>>
>> But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud
>> sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate
>> Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound.
>> The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an
>> interpretation [II and DI].
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as
>> I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs
>> significantly from Edwina's.  This leads to a different analysis in which
>> the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound,
>> with the other terms reassigned accordingly.  Sign-action is mediation,
>> even though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine
>> triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the
>> Interpretant as its Third

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it
transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an
Interpretation...

So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
as MIND, transforming this sound into some interpretation of it.

I am, in the above, assuming that the Representamen is in a mode of
Thirdness [Mind]. For example, as

O-R-I or a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, an individual interpretation
of local stimuli as referenced to a general rule.

So- the bird's reaction/interpretation of the sound..is the habit of
flight.
 But- the Representamen can be in other modes.


-

2] Now..let's see..what if it's instead in a mode of Firstness.

this would have the triad [O-R-I] as a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign-
where all three parts of the Sign are in a mode of Firstness.
Peirce's example was that 'feeling of redness'; this example would be
a feeling of sound. A local and internal non-interpreted, non-describe
individual state.

3] What if the Representamen were in a mode of Secondness. There are
three classes where the R is in a mode of Secondness:

O-R-I   or 1-2-1 A Rhematic Iconic Sinsign. An individual diagram;
an iconic non-analyzed description of a sensation

O-R-I or 2-2-1  A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign .  A spontaneous cry. a
local non-intentional reaction to a local and direct indexical
stimuli.

O-R-I or 2-2-2- a Dicent Indexical Sinsign; a mechanical reaction.



So - in the above - I could see that the Representamen could be in a
mode of Secondness..as a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign.

---

But- in none of the above - do I define the loud sound as the
Representamen, since I maintain that its role is mediation.

Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18  7:13 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen." 
Just to clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound
cannot be treated as the Representamen in any semiotic analysis of
this scenario?  If so, why not?
 Thanks,
 Jon S.  
 On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign
[O-R-I]with the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The
wind-taking-down-the-tree might by a Dynamic Object to the
tree...which then reacts by falling [DI]. 

But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that
loud sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation.
The Immediate Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird
from that sound.  The Representamen is a process of mediating this
sensate data into an interpretation [II and DI].  

Edwina 
 On Sun 04/02/18  4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Helmut, List:
 In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the
Representamen, as I initially suggested--noting again that my
definition differs significantly from Edwina's.  This leads to a
different analysis in which the Dynamic Object is the falling of the
tree that causes the sound, with the other terms reassigned
accordingly.  Sign-action is mediation, even though the Sign itself
is indeed the  First Correlate of the genuine triadic relation that
has the Object as its Second Correlate and the Interpretant as its
Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903). 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

Edwina, List:

Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen."  Just to
clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound *cannot *be
treated as the Representamen in *any *semiotic analysis of this scenario?
If so, why not?

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign [O-R-I]with
> the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The wind-taking-down-the-tree
> might by a Dynamic Object to the tree...which then reacts by falling [DI].
>
> But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that loud
> sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation. The Immediate
> Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird from that sound.
> The Representamen is a process of mediating this sensate data into an
> interpretation [II and DI].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as
> I initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs
> significantly from Edwina's.  This leads to a different analysis in which
> the Dynamic Object is the falling of the tree that causes the sound, with
> the other terms reassigned accordingly.  Sign-action is mediation, even
> though the Sign itself is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine
> triadic relation that has the Object as its Second Correlate and the
> Interpretant as its Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign
[O-R-I]with the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The
wind-taking-down-the-tree might by a Dynamic Object to the
tree...which then reacts by falling [DI].

But within the bird, what affects the senses of the bird - is that
loud sound. That is the external Dynamic Object to that situation.
The Immediate Object is whatever sensual data is felt within the bird
from that sound. The Representamen is a process of mediating this
sensate data into an interpretation [II and DI].

Edwina
On Sun 04/02/18 4:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Helmut, List:
In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the
Representamen, as I initially suggested--noting again that my
definition differs significantly from Edwina's. This leads to a
different analysis in which the Dynamic Object is the falling of the
tree that causes the sound, with the other terms reassigned
accordingly. Sign-action is mediation, even though the Sign itself
is indeed the First Correlate of the genuine triadic relation that
has the Object as its Second Correlate and the Interpretant as its
Third Correlate (cf. EP 2:290; 1903).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 1:51 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Edwina, isn´t mediation (thirdness) a matter of the interpretant
(thirdness), not the representamen? Well, I see representamen,
object, interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, which perhaps you don´t. Ok,
representamen is also the sign, which is thirdness, because it
includes all. This is difficult. Maybe the solution lies in the
semiosis, when the interpretant (3ns) becomes a representamen (1ns)
again? I don´t know. Have to ponder, get back later. Or do you have
an idea what I am missing? Best, Helmut 04. Februar 2018 um 20:19 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut - I'll disagree. You are missing the triadic semiosic process
of O-R-I. You are missing the process of mediation between the Object
and the Interpretant - which is the action carried out by the
Representamen.

Therefore - the Representamen is not 'the loud sound' -

Edwina
On Sun 04/02/18 2:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [5]
sent:Jon, Edwina, List, I think: - The representamen is the loud
sound, and everything connected with it in the situation (as the
representamen is also the sign, so including all following points
too) - The dynamical object is that, what the bird initially feels to
be the source of the loud sound, as this (imaginary) source really
(not imaginary) is, and as it is in the concepts of all other birds
and all other creatures, - The immediate object is what is initially
arisen (imagined) in the bird´s mind by the loud sound for being its
source, - The immediate interpretant is the reason the bird assumes
having to fly away, - The dynamical interpretant is really avoiding
the (still imaginary) danger by flying away, - The final interpretant
is the real benefit achieved by the bird, defined by what would really
have happened if the bird had not flown away. This was a quick shot.
Now I guess, maybe there is a pattern of combinations of "imaginary"
and "real"... Best, Helmut

Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
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[5]
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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

 

Helmut - no the relation between the Representamen and the Object
can be in ANY of the three modes [1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness]. Same
with the Representamen-in-itself. And the relation between the
Representamen and the Interpretant can also be in any of the 2 modes.
Check the ten sign classes . 2.256. See also 8.335.

The full triad is the Sign [capital S] - and this full triad must be
O-R-I. 

Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18  2:51 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, isn´t mediation (thirdness) a matter of the interpretant
(thirdness), not the representamen? Well,  I see representamen,
object, interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, which perhaps you don´t. Ok,
representamen is also the sign, which is thirdness, because it
includes all. This is difficult. Maybe the solution lies in the
semiosis, when the interpretant (3ns) becomes a representamen (1ns)
again? I don´t know. Have to ponder, get back later. Or do you have
an idea what I am missing? Best, Helmut04. Februar 2018 um 20:19
Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Helmut - I'll disagree. You are missing the triadic semiosic process
of O-R-I. You are missing the process of mediation between the Object
and the Interpretant - which is the action carried out by the
Representamen. 

Therefore - the Representamen is not 'the loud sound' -  

Edwina
 On Sun 04/02/18 2:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Jon, Edwina, List, I think: - The representamen is the loud sound, and
everything connected with it in the situation (as the representamen is
also the sign, so including all following points too) - The dynamical
object is that, what the bird initially feels to be the source of the
loud sound, as this (imaginary) source really (not imaginary) is, and
as it is in the concepts of all other birds and all other creatures,
- The immediate object is what is initially arisen (imagined) in the
bird´s mind by the loud sound for being its source, - The immediate
interpretant is the reason the bird assumes having to fly away, - The
dynamical interpretant is really avoiding the (still imaginary) danger
by flying away, - The final interpretant is the real benefit achieved
by the bird, defined by what would really have happened if the bird
had not flown away. This was a quick shot. Now I guess, maybe there
is a pattern of combinations of "imaginary" and "real"... Best,
Helmut 02. Februar 2018 um 17:25 Uhr
 Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
  Edwina, List:   I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual)
surprise to discover that, at least in the specific example of a bird
fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our analyses of the semiosis
involved are substantially in agreement after all.  
*The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself. 
*The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud
sound. 
*The Representamen (R) is, or at least includes, the bird's
neural pattern that stands for the loud sound. 
*The Immediate Interpretant (II) is the range of possible effects
of this neural pattern on the bird. 
*The Dynamic Interpretant (DI) is the actual effect of this
neural pattern on the bird, which is its flight. 

  What remains unresolved is the "location" of the bird's collateral
experience and habits of interpretation; hence the new subject line. 
This is an aspect of Peirce's overall semeiotic that I have been
wondering about for quite some time.  You place them within (or as)
the R, but I am still having a hard time seeing it that way in light
of Peirce's definition (in multiple places) of the R as that which
stands for the Object  to the Interpretant.  My sense is that these
elements are instead somehow bound up in what it means for the Object
to  determine the Sign to determine the Interpretant; i.e., collateral
experience is what enables the bird to "recognize" its sensation as
corresponding to the loud sound, while a habit of
interpretation--whether instinctive, learned, or both--is what
prompts the bird's response to be flight, rather than any of the
other possible effects.   One alternative is to designate the habit
of interpretation as the one correlate that is missing above--the
Final Interpretant (FI).  Up until now, my working hypothesis has
been that the FI is defined as the habit of
feeling/action/thought--i.e., the habit of interpretation--that the
Sign would produce.  However, I had in mind the habit that the
Receiver (in this case, the bird) would develop after sufficient
repetition of the same Representamen (in this case, the neural
pattern that stands for the loud sound).  I am starting to wonder if
instead we should define the FI as the   general tendency that
governs (but does not mechanically dictate) which actual DI is
produced by a particular Sign from among the various possibilities
that correspond to its II.  The FI would then be the cumulative
effect of all previous instances of semiosis that are somehow
relevant to this particular encounter with  this

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)