Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
left this road.
By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research
relying on Peircean Categories.
It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
issues involved.
To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.
Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
work in the context of his work as a whole.
Best, Kirsti
Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
List,
Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
that so? It is my impression.
And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
Best,
Helmut
01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:
Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
question
of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
2000's.
As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
refer
to the list archives.
It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
that
his starting points were different from those most often refered and
discussed here in the list.
Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
developed
his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.
In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost
only
analytical philosophy.
Best,
Kirsti
CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
>> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond
<gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
>> of this classification recently discussed here was an important
part
>> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
>> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
>> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
>> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
>
> Well I think we're saying the same thing the question is more the
> more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity
of
> structure in general. That's a more subtle point I don't have
> strong positions on although I'm sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
> to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime
driver.
> But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
>
> I'd love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
> driver.
>
> My own beliefs here (which I'm more than happy to change with
> further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
> earlier "Pragmatism" from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
> variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong
focus
> on meaning.
>
>> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
>> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
>> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
>> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
>> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
>> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is
quite
>> another affair.
> (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
>
> He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
> discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
> _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by
asking
> how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for
that
> to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
> conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
> pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always
keeps
> that topic of meaning in sight. It's true that by the middle of the
> paper he's shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
> signification. But that's merely because it's a more precise way
> of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
> discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign
can't
> be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the
meaning
> of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
> "would be" as a way of ultimately grounding meaning.
>
> He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism
> contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of
meaning
> using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the whole
> point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the differences
> between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and
others.
>
> Again, I'm fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far
> better versed in the nuances of Peirce's development than I. But it
> really seemed to me to be that distancing himself from others over
> meaning that led to his getting into deeper nuance in the structure
of
> the object and interpretant than he had in previous decades.
>
>>
>
>>> SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision
about
>>> what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to
>>> use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to now?
>>> Maybe it is both. . .
>>
>> This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by
>> Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at times
>> emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought,
while
>> others at times emphasize using his ideas to further contemporary
>> thought. But this appears to be mainly a matter of _emphasis_, and
>> it seems to me that some of the strongest contributors to this
forum
>> see it as a both (that is certainly my position).
>
> If the list is only for understanding the history or exegesis of
> Peirce's own writings then it's far too limited to be of that much
> interest I must confess. It's in application that Peirce's thought
> has most value. Whether that be in philosophy (my own interest) or
> chemistry or related fields as others have focused on. But if it's
> merely dry history of philosophy with no interest in relevancy then
> the list will surely die quickly.
>
>> I do not at all think that "it is safe to say" that Peirce's work
on
>> meaning has been more influential than his work in semiotics,
>> especially in recent decades. While it is true that James and
Dewey
>> didn't fully (really, not all that mujch) embrace Peirce's work on
>> signs. But this field of modern semeiotics which Peirce had pretty
>> much invented (although drawing from Classical, Medieval, and
other
>> sources) was, naturally, both entirely new to them and quite
>> difficult to fully grasp (as it is even in our day, although I see
>> some considerable progress in this regard). As I see it, neither
>> James nor Dewey had studied enough of the developments in the
logic
>> of Peirce's time to fully (much) understand his semiotic (this was
>> especially so for James, while Peirce did not think very much of
>> Dewey's work in logic).
>
> Sorry, I should have clarified that I meant within philosophy
proper.
> In terms of semiotics you are of course correct. Within philosophy
> though the import of Peirce's logic and semiotics have not yet been
> appreciated I fear. My personal opinion is that had people like
Dewey
> (or later Rorty and Putnam) applied the logic more a lot of
> philosophical dead ends would have been avoided. (Indeed I think
most
> of Quine's major works largely end up positions Peirce already held
> due to his logic)
>
>> Again, while I agree with the important of, not only the pragmatic
>> maxim, but all of his work in pragmaticism, your notion that "the
>> place of meaningfulness . . . in some ways exceeds his work on
>> signs" is your opinion, while many would disagree. I haven't time
to
>> discuss this at the moment except to say that I am of that camp
>> which would _strongly_ disagree.
>
> Well again I'm limiting myself to philosophy and again noting that
> in saying how importance meaning is that doesn't mean his logic is
> unimportant. Just not as important.
>
> I still have to address your earlier points which are well made and
> need engaged with. Hopefully later this week. I hope that I
clarified
> that I'm speaking more of philosophy rather than applied semiotics.
>
>>
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