Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Helmut Raulien]

John, list,

linguistics can only be better developed than biosemiotics, if it is not a branch of it´s, i.e. if there are inanimate things that speak. Logic is only a ready, unchanged by new experience science, if it is not based on words, like the greek root meaning both suggests. Mathematics is only the basis of it all, if it is more than mere tautology, but then it would be dependent on new experience too, and not be basical anymore. I doubt, that classification of sciences makes sense at all.

Best,

Helmut

 

14. September 2018 um 22:32 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
 

Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC,

Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because
it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the
sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits
nearly all the details.

ET
> I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I
> consider them debates and not discussions] about classification
> and terminology

I definitely do not want to debate. I consider this thread as a
*collaborative inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said
and fill in the gaps. My only goal is to get a clear understanding
of that outline and its relationship to all of Peirce's writings.

That classification has some very important implications for biology,
but I'll have to address that separately because it requires more space.

JR
> From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory
> at all. Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand
> itself.

I agree. But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that
mathematics includes all possible theories about anything. Every
theory, formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical
science is an application of some theory of mathematics.

JR
> my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is
> different from semiotic because of its special focus on living
> systems (biology, hence biosemiotic).

Semiotic also has a focus on living systems: human beings. Peirce
himself talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals.

JR
> I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind.

The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria,
considered bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms:
> The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-
> forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness,
> our sensitivities and stimulations.

Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree. My only
correction would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with
'homomorphic' (similar form). This quotation comes from
https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html

At the end of that article are various comments by prominent
researchers in biology and related fields. They're helpful
for understanding Lynn M's contributions.

JAS
> The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves,
> and cannot be reduced to Signs

I agree. I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce
that clarified that issue.

JAS
> Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as
> Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology.

No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics.
As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception.
But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments.
Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and
narrow" point of view. See CP 1.573.

Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways:
Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without
exception. In *every* science, logic is used in the broad sense.
But normative science is an exception: it's used in a narrow sense.

JLRC
> Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.
> Mathematics alone is not even logic.

I don't know how you define those terms. What I've been trying to do
is to summarize Peirce's classification of the sciences as accurately
as possible. If you can find any quotations by Peirce that support
those two points, please let us know.

JLRC
> CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that
> illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an
> extraordinary wide sense.

I agree. He said that linguistics was the best developed of all
the psychic sciences. That would probably imply that all the
other psychic sciences depend on linguistics. But that does not
negate his point that all sciences, including linguistics, depend
on math and logic.

John

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, list,

I apologize, I was just provocating by reversing the classification of logic as cenoscopis, and biology as idioscopic. I agree that both are or can be both (if that is what you meant) Sorry!

 

 14. September 2018 um 18:35 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list

Could you explain to me the functional difference, to a research program, whether you define it as cenoscopic [study of the data already acquired] vs idioscopic [discovers new phenomena]. And what is 'language-based idioscopic' in biology?

If you are a scientist, working within the scientific method then this includes both hypothesis construction [idioscopy would fit in here] and empirical observation [cenoscopic] - So why would you define your research into one OR the other - when both areas ought to be part of the research.

Edwina

 

On Fri 14/09/18 12:23 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Jerry LR Chandler, list,

 

Yes! I both humbly (just pretending?) and provocatingly ask: Is biosemiotics cenoscopic, and language-based logic idioscopic?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 14. September 2018 um 18:07 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" wrote:
 


List:
 

The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina deserve deep perusal.

 

In spirit , these posts parallel my own feelings.

 

Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused.

 

Mathematics alone is not even logic.

 

In my view, CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an extraordinary wide sense.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry
 
Sent from my iPad


On Sep 14, 2018, at 10:18 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
 




Dear John, list,

 

My question was a follow-up to your own question on where to place semiotic in CSPsemiotic.jpg.

 

Question:  Where is semeiotic?

To which, you said,

As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic
under mathematics.  But semeiotic is also an applied science when
it is used in perception, action, communication...

 

From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory at all.  

Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand itself (cf., Kull, Velmezova).  

Even when compared to semiotic, which is this blob that hovers over The Sciences, Philosophical, Mathematical and Empirical, my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is different from semiotic because of its special focus on living systems (biology, hence biosemiotic). 

 

I would say I have done biosemiotic, and yet, I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind. 

I see it as a thing that my mind treats.  I recognize bacteria, how it is used in sciences and respond to it.  Bacteria are grown as cultures or individually.  We study it, we model its behaviors, we use it to study other things (eg., for cloning in medicine)..

 

Therefore, your response is strange to me. 

Specifically this:

 

Very simply.  Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.

 

Your discussion of the unconscious..

the even mention of it to my question..

that this is somehow consistent with modern views..

this is all very bizarre. 

 

And I am still left with not having an idea on how to use CSPsemiotic.jpg to classify biosemiotic.  I am sure the image you created, and devoted much effort to, charts well what may be in the record of Peirce’s writings, but I still don’t see how it is to be used to classify anything novel at all.  That is, it does not appear to be adaptable.  Perhaps I do not have the proper perspective.  Should I turn it, be over it, twist it, wrap it, fold it?

 

I have a similar gripe as Edwina, above. 

We should listen to what she’s saying.

 

Hth,

Jerry R


 
On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


John, list

Agreed - and Pierce was quite specific that you don't need a conscious and separate Mind to be involved in semiosis.

My point, again, is that I don't see the function of this list's focus on classification and terminology. How does that, for example, help us in examining the semiosic processes in a bacterium or in a meadow, filled with diverse species, or in a hurricane, or in a societal ideological movement or in artificial intelligence?

And even more deeply - do we want to move out of the seminar room and into examining the semiosic processes of the outside world?

Edwina

 

On Fri 14/09/18 8:38 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:



On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme? 

Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has
a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs
it recognizes and responds to.

When Peirce said "present to the mind in any way", he did not rule
out the unconscious. In fact, there are 51 instances of the word
'unconscious' in CP. Following is one of them:

> I am prepared to maintain, operations 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I fully agree with your admiration for Peircean classification. I'm
not against it. I'm not saying that his classifications don't cover
everything!

My point - which you don't seem to get, is that I wonder if this
list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I consider them
debates and not discussions] about classification and terminology,
into the 'mud and dirt' to see exactly HOW these terms and
classifications function to enlighten us as to what is going on in
the real phenomenological world.

And yes - I agree with you, that anything that is 'mental', is a
semiosic Sign..and that includes any Mind. 

Edwina
 On Thu 13/09/18 11:05 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Edwina and Jon AS, 
 ET 
 > My concern is that this list seems to focus almost exclusively 
 > on debates about terminology and classification of research areas,
 
 > and doesn't venture outside the seminar room into the mud and dirt

 > of the real matter-as-mind world. 
 Peirce had a long career in science and engineering.  He certainly 
 knew how to apply mathematics and science to build things and make 
 them work.  And his engineering work influenced what he wrote about 
 the practical sciences in his classifications. 
 One reason why I like Peirce's classification is that it shows 
 how all the sciences are related to each other, to mathematics, 
 to philosophy, to the methodeutic that "digs in the dirt" to 
 discover facts, and to the practical sciences that build things. 
 If you can find anything "in the mud and dirt" that it doesn't 
 cover, I'd like to see that. 
 > JFS:  The subject matter of phenomenology is the totality of signs

 > that appear to the mind, and CP 1.300 calls the semiotic
categories 
 > "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought". 
 >  
 > JAS:  This does not seem right to me; it presupposes that anything

 > that appears to the mind must be a Sign.  
 Two points:  (1) if the phaneron contains anything that is not 
 a sign, semiotic could be defined as the study of the signs in 
 phenomenology.  (2) In any case, it's hard to imagine anything 
 that appears to the mind that is not a sign. If Peirce ever said 
 that there are things in the mind, in thought, or in the phaneron 
 that are not signs, I'd like to see the quotation. 
 John 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Exactly - 'all possible theories about anything [ET: and I'd add
everything] are related". And yes "all possible modes of inquiry are
interrelated".

And this means, I suggest,  that we can't 'block the way of inquiry'
by insisting on 'correct terms' and 'zones of research'. 

And yes, "nothing that exists rests on terms and classes". And yes '
everything that is imaginable can be described by some theory of pure
mathematics"

But this still doesn't deal with my concern, which is, how does one
move from this focus on abstract  terminology and classification of
areas of study, into actually examining what is going on in the real
matter-as-mind world? 

Your answer was 'hard work and study'. No- hard work and study is
found in BOTH that focus on abstract terminology and classification
AND in research about the semiosic process in the real matter-as-mind
world. 

My concern is that this list seems to focus almost exclusively on
debates about terminology and classification of research areas, and
doesn't venture outside the seminar room into the mud and dirt of the
real matter-as-mind world. That's where, in my view, the power of
Peircean semiosis actually sits and rests - in the real world of
matter-as-mind. That's his legacy - that it can explain the pragmatic
world.

 My question is, how does one move out of the seminar room, and into
examining and explaining, by using Peircean semiosis, what is going on
in this matter-as-mind world.

Edwina
 On Thu 13/09/18 11:33 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 9/13/2018 11:10 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > What's the point of these seminar-room analyses of terminology, of
 
 > classification of areas of study? Surely it can't mean that one is
 
 > barred from studying X within the area of Y because X  is strictly
 
 > classified in another area of re 
 It shows how all possible theories about anything are related. 
 Peirce would never "block the way of inquiry", but he shows 
 how all possible modes of inquiry are interrelated. 
 > In my view, Peircean semiosis doesn't rest on terms and classes 
 > but on the examination of the dynamics - both material and 
 > cognitive - that are actually taking place in the real world.  
 Yes.  Nothing that exists rests of terms and classes.  But 
 everything that is imaginable can be described by some theory 
 of pure mathematics.  That includes anything static or dynamic 
 in any number of dimensions. 
 The normal way of discovering any theory is by observation 
 and abduction.  Mathematics is useful to generalize and 
 analyze the theory.  Then the more refined theory can be 
 applied to any subject matter that may be appropriate. 
 > how does one bridge this gap between the yes, comforts of the 
 > seminar room intellectual debates - and they are debates with 
 > an insistence on 'who is right'  
 By hard work and study.  And Peirce is a good guide.  Note my 
 summary (copy below).  I didn't invent it.  Peirce did.  I'd 
 be delighted if anyone can show how to extend or correct it. 
 John 
 

 Summary of what Peirce wrote or implied in his 1903 classification 
 as supplemented by the references cited above: 
   1. There are two sciences that do not depend on any other science 
  for their subject matter:  mathematics and phenomenology. 
   2. Mathematics, formal and informal, contains all possible
theories 
  that can be stated with a finite alphabet in any language, 
  natural or artificial.  But before those theories are applied 
  to anything actual, the subject matter is hypothetical. 
Theorems 
  are necessary conclusions about the assumed possibilities. 
   3. Phenomenology is the subject that studies anything "present to 
  the mind" in any way from any source (internal to the body or 
  external through the senses).  Its subject matter is any and 
  every sign that may appear in the phaneron. 
   4. Peirce said that every science depends on mathematics.  Pure 
  mathematics contains all possible hypotheses -- formal or
informal 
  -- before they have been applied to anything.  Every theory of
any 
  subject whatever is an application of mathematics. 
   5. When a pure theory is applied to something actual, indexes in 
  the theory (e.g., variables) are linked to actual entities. 
Its 
  theorems are claims that certain statements about those
entities 
  are necessarily true.  The reliability of those claims depends 
  on testing by methodeutic. 
   6. Every theory of logic or semiotic, before it is applied, is 
  a version of pure mathematics.  The theories of phenomenology 
  are applied semiotic.  Logic as a normative science is, as 
  Peirce said, "a partial and narrow" view. 

-
PEIRCE-L 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list
Thanks for your, as usual, clear and reasoned outline. But I have a
question.

What's the point of these seminar-room analyses of terminology, of
classification of areas of study? Surely it can't mean that one is
barred from studying X within the area of Y because X  is strictly
classified in another area of research? Surely it can't mean that one
can't truthfully examine what is going on in the real world unless one
uses the exact set of terms? And even - does one need to know these
terms to understand Peircean semiosis?

In my view, Peircean semiosis doesn't rest on terms and classes but
on the examination of the dynamics - both material and cognitive -
that are actually taking place in the real world. Since 'matter is
effete mind' - then, to examine only the intellectual constructs that
set up, i.e., the terms and mental classes of 'how we talk about
semiotics' - actually misses the point of Peircean semiosis, which is
that it is a powerful means of examining and finding out the reality
of the material and mental processes in the real world.

It can, I suggest, explain what is going on the physico-chemical
realm, in the biological realm and, not merely in the rhetorical
world of words, but in the operational processes of the most complex
organization of matter and mind, i.e., in societal organization, in
economic processes, in population dynamics..

Therefore - my question is - how does one bridge this gap between
the yes, comforts of the seminar room intellectual debates - and they
are debates with an insistence on 'who is right' - but how does
one bridge this gap and actually examine how Peircean semiosis
actually functions, outside of the rhetoric about it, outside of the
'correct terms' - but how it actually creates, adapts and evolves, 
matter-as-mind, in the real world?

Edwina
 On Thu 13/09/18 10:03 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Jon AS, Auke, and Jeff BD, 
 Both subject lines are closely related.  For modes of being, 
 I'll quote Bertrand Russell, whom I rarely cite: 
 > Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know 
 > what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.

 That is a dramatic way of making a point that Peirce repeated many 
 times in many ways:  Every theorem in pure mathematics is
hypothetical. 
 It has the form "If hypothesis (and/or axioms), then conclusion." 
 That means the subject matter of pure mathematics is pure
possibility, 
 and the theorems are necessary statements about those possibilities.

 If a mathematical theorem is applied to something actual in some 
 branch of science or in common sense, then its conclusion is a 
 prediction about those actual entities that must be tested by 
 methodeutic.  For quotations by Peirce, search for the phrase 
 "pure mathematics" in CP.  There are 49 instances. 
 As for semiotic, there is a reason why CP 1.190 is just one line: 
 > Phenomenology is, at present, a single study. 
 Please look at CP 1.300 to 1.353, which he wrote in 1894.  That is 
 his study of the "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of 
 thought."  Since he had previously written that long analysis, 
 there was no reason for him to say more about phenomenology in 1903.

 In 1905, he used the term 'phaneroscopy': 
 > Phaneroscopy is the description of the _phaneron_; and by the 
 > _phaneron_ I mean the total of all that is in any way or in 
 > any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it 
 > corresponds to any real thing or not.  (CP 1.284) 
 Whether or not phaneroscopy/phenomenology are identical or closely 
 related, Peirce's writings from CP 1.284 to 1.353 include his 
 phenomenological categories -- a major part of semiotic.  Then 
 CP 1.190 says that phenomenology is "at present a single study". 
 That study would be his 1894 version of semiotic (or some update). 
 But he left open the option that he might include more later. 
 But CP 1.191 about normative science is longer because it's his
first 
 statement about the normative sciences.  In 1906, he wrote much
more: 
 > Normative Science forms the mid-portion of coenoscopy and its 
 > most characteristic part Logic, regarded from one instructive,

 > though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of 
 > deliberate thinking. To say that any thinking is deliberate is 
 > to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform 
 > to a purpose or ideal.  (CP 1.573) 
 Note that he says logic applied to the normative sciences is 
 a "partial and narrow" point of view as "the theory of deliberate 
 thinking."  Since phenomenology/phaneroscopy includes anything 
 "present to the mind" in any way, the theory of deliberate thinking 
 would be a special case. 
 JAS 
 >> JFS:  Semiotic, the general theory of signs, would also be pure 
 >> mathematics, either formal or informal. 
 >  
 > Not