Gary R.:
I am fine with taking a break for a while from analyzing examples of
semiosis, especially if the alternative is an in-depth discussion of
"Pragmatism." As I said once before, I encourage you not to limit that
study to EP 2:398-433, but also include CP 5.467-481. That was a different
Jon, list,
You wrote:
JAS: Hence we seem to be converging at last on classifying the girl's
scream as a genuine Sign, both for her and for the mother, at least from a
certain point of view. However, I am still not sure whether to treat it as
a Replica of one Sign or of two different Signs.
Gary R., List:
I was about to send an addendum to my previous post when I received your
reply--for which I am grateful, because it prompted me to hold off a bit
and reconsider a couple of things. I agree that we make a good team in
this discussion, given our opposing proclivities for abstract
Jon S, list,
You wrote:
JAS: In your original presentation of this thought experiment, the child
was a toddler and did not scream "Maman" or any other recognizable word,
but simply "Aie!" As such, I took it to be an involuntary reflex, such as
any of us likely would exclaim when surprised by
Gary R., List:
In your original presentation of this thought experiment, the child was a
toddler and did not scream "Maman" or any other recognizable word, but
simply "Aie!" As such, I took it to be an involuntary reflex, such as any
of us likely would exclaim when surprised by pain, although as
Jon, list,
You wrote:
I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
questions about the girl's scream.
For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic Interpretant
produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by a series of
dyadic causes?
. . .
Gary R., List:
I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
questions about the girl's scream.
1. For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic
Interpretant produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by
a series of dyadic causes?
2.
Jon, list
You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:
JAS: Does any of this make sense? To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
to
Gary R., List:
Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
response. Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign. Upon
reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper
Jon, Edwina, list,
Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I still
can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the mother.
You wrote:
JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
child's semiosis" and "the mother's
Edwina, List:
What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where Peirce
contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to Interpretants as
Form to *perceiving *Entelechy) with practice (from a Sign of a character
as Form to Interpretants as Matter to *producing* Entelechy).
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}Jon - in reply
1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:
'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive
Interesting Edwina -- I would see the formation of a habit as what we are
looking at. And indeed a continual adjustment even when habits exist in
relatively stable form. A while back I took entropy to mean the dispersion
of everything with no reference to Peirce or habits or the eventual
List:
In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
to try combining multiple replies into one post.
Gary R.:
1. I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
capacity for Habit-change. Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
much open
Jon, list,
1. I am inclined to agree with you on this. As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively
Gary R., List:
1. I am inclined to agree with you on this. As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has
Jon S, Edwina, list,
For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
1. It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying
Edwina, List:
1. It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process. That is why I find your tendency to use the
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}Gary R, list
Thanks for your comments.
1] Yes, my point is that there is no such thing as an isolate sign.
Even a stone on a sandy beach is in interaction. It is
Mind-as-Matter, and this matter/mind is
Gary R., List:
Edwina and I agree that "the individual's semiosis is not discontinuous
with that of his environment," and that every Sign requires a DO to
determine it. The issue is whether it is consistent with Peirce's writings
and/or conceptually advantageous to use the term "Sign" for the
Edwina, Jon, list,
I'm trying to catch the upshot of your (including others) recently
exceedingly illuminating discussion even given the remaining differences in
viewpoints. So, springboarding off Jon's recent bullet points:
- The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
Helmut, List:
As I believe Edwina and I agree, the II is precisely the range of *possible
*effects that a Sign *may *produce, so having an II is sufficient for
something to qualify as a Sign. Whether the Sign produces any *actual *effect
(DI), and whether that leads to the development of a
Edwina, List:
Our deeper differences are resurfacing, so we might want to stop here,
before things get contentious again. Briefly ...
- The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.
- A Quasi-mind "stores"
Stephen R., List:
I would say all of the above--we are each trying to design a *model *that
accurately *represents *something that exists and is real, in accordance
with what Peirce thought, which we interpret differently.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer,
Edwina, List,
So, if DI and FI are not necessarily expressed, maybe they do have a function for the Sign, because they potentially exist, exist as a possibility? They exist as a telos? So the sign functionally does consist of them, though not actually, spatiotemporally, at the moment and within
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}Jon - - my view is that the IO and II are internal to the FORM that
is involved within the semiosic interaction. BUT - this semiosic
process could not take place without an external stimuli, the DO.
That is why I refer
Is this an effort to agree on something that exists and is real, or to
design something, or to identify what Peirce thought. If it exists then
there can only be one right interpretation. If is it a matter of coming to
an agreement with each other well and good. If it has to do with what
Peirce
Edwina, List:
I still cannot agree with your definition of the Representamen, nor with
your inclusion of DO and DI within "The FULL Sign." On my reading of
Peirce, only the IO and II are *internal *to the Sign, while the DO and DI
are *external *to the Sign. That said, I believe we do agree
Helmut - none of these 'parts' of the total Semiosic process, which
I call the Sign [capital S] exists on its own. None of them. This
full Sign only functions within relations, within interactions...and
these interactions determine the nature of what is going on at that
moment.
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}Jon, list
I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage.
That would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a
mediation process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs
Edwina, Jon, List,
I find this all very interesting and think it is enlighting, though I am far from being enlightened yet, but it seems to me like a (new? Neo-Peircean?) well-suiting theory about to being constructed, or already is by you, Edwina. I have so far two questions:
- Why is the sign
Edwina, List:
Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for storage,"
rather than the Sign/Representamen. However, I do see the latter as the
means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity," since it always adds
new Collateral Experience to a particular Quasi-mind as its
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}Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.
I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for
the introduction of novelty and
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