Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

2012-04-26 Thread Stephen C. Rose
Thanks for elevating me to the realm of the academically enabled . No
doctor I. A mere lapsed MDiv. As to your concluding question, my answer is
why not? At least in the realm of dreams and musement. It seems to me that
Peirce has a sense of benignity that when tied to his sense of continuity
and fallibility excludes no possibility that can be proved out. Bring on
the dolphins and therapy dogs. Cheers, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/



On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 2:38 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote:

 Dear Doctor Rose,**
 Thank you for your reply! 
 --
 The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it
 potentially referred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal
 characters of the subject”. 
 ---
 Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there
 are times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more
 ‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse
 itself – which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS
 triumphs over philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption
 to ‘ordinary discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy
 insignificant] – but rather refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does
 here. 
 
 Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce
 quote into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the
 theological ‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing
 high regard for Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor
 Heidegger would accept literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive
 internal characters of the subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly
 and almost uniquely recognizes the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something
 I was lucky enough to see in Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the
 categories of John Duns Scotus whom Peirce admired]. 
 
 Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal”
 and to “subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of
 experience presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is
 completely ‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem
 to me Peirce would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience
 is an undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this
 for Peirce.
 
 Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since
 such a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language
 as either ‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be
 approached obliquely or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J.
 Richardson SJ does this with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems
 anyway, Deely disapproves of. The point is, it seems with both Heidegger
 and Peirce, the popular phrase “What you see is what you get” is taken in a
 strict and radical sense. I think also both consider the ‘unconscious’ as a
 matter of historicity being logically being teased out of the long dream of
 language which completely overwhelms any one individual.
 -
 Another issue with Deely and Heidegger related to this is Deely’s
 seemingly strict separation between human consciousness, which dreams the
 dream of language, and the ‘animal’ which largely does not do so. Heidegger
 also separates the two but simply as an observation and method of trying to
 delimit language within manageable bounds, and not because of a religious
 agenda since he explicitly holds for an “atheistic methodology”. In other
 words, if he had found another animal than human being he could converse
 with, he would have no ideological or theological problem, being more
 attuned to Nietzsche in this matter.
 
 Therefore I raise another question: “Does Peirce raise a distinct
 separation between the human being as the only linguistic animal, and if
 so, where, and if not, where?”
 -
 Gary C. Moore




  - Forwarded Message -
 *From:* Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
 *To:* Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
 *Cc:* PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
 *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 6:36 AM
 *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY
 LOCATION

 The wonders of Google,

  Commens Peirce Dictionary: Thirdness, Third [as a 
 category]http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/thirdness.html:
 
 Thirdness, Third [as a category]
 (see also Firstness, Secondness, Categories)


 Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
 indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
 predicates. Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of
 the subject in itself; secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of
 one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of 

Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

2012-04-26 Thread Gary Moore
Dear Stephen Rose, MD
---
Thank you again for the reply!

Your introduction of dolphins leads to two problems in this regard that 
befuddle me profoundly - which is very easy to do. Both dolphins and sperm 
whales have enormously larger cerebrums than humans do. This would seem to 
completely undermine any possible ground to ‘progressive’ evolution making 
physical adaptation merely the chance happening of time and place, Darwin’s 
“niche”, with purely accidental inheritances which you as an MD know more times 
than not are far more malignant in the short or long run than benevolent if 
they are truly ever so. There is no point to physical existence except the 
lottery of abilities you have at the singular moment of selection. And whatever 
is selected as survivor traits at that moment may kill the species off in the 
moment after that. So there is never any accumulation of benefits, just 
different levels of liabilities hopefully on the whole neutral or of 
indifferent ‘quality’. 
---
Also, these sea creatures with enormous brains and what seems to us ‘primitive 
linguistic’ abilities [reading Melville’s MOBY DICK from its literal mass of 
quotes on cetology to Job-type messenger end, “I alone have survived to tell 
thee” is a real help] brings up the Heideggerian distinction between 
present-to-hand with ready-to-hand. Our whole intellectual milieu is purely 
oriented to tool usage and being busy with work for one’s daily bread, whereas 
cetaceans romp and play all day. Everything – largely – is a game to them. If 
tragedy strikes it is but for a moment then either disregarded as irrelevant or 
simply forgotten. With human beings we drag it with us to the grave. Which, 
then, is the ‘superior’ being?
-
Therapy dogs: this follows therefrom. If there is no care, there is no 
unhappiness. Heidegger founded the whole of what might be loosely called 
‘consciousness’ or ‘attention’, or better ‘circumspection’ from Peirce’s 
original mentor, Kant, in being-there upon “care” largely derived from 
Augustine. This hardly seems a benefit in and of itself unless one really 
counts the accomplishments of human kind as a whole as beneficial. But it is 
hard for me to see that in the actual case of the facts of the matter.
---
Regards,
Gary C. Moore
 

From: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com 
Cc: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu 
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2012 5:26 AM
Subject: Re: Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY 
LOCATION


Thanks for elevating me to the realm of the academically enabled . No doctor I. 
A mere lapsed MDiv. As to your concluding question, my answer is why not? At 
least in the realm of dreams and musement. It seems to me that Peirce has a 
sense of benignity that when tied to his sense of continuity and fallibility 
excludes no possibility that can be proved out. Bring on the dolphins and 
therapy dogs. Cheers, S 


ShortFormContent at Blogger




On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 2:38 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote:

Dear Doctor Rose,
Thank you for your reply! 
--
The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it 
potentiallyreferred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal 
characters of the subject”. 
---
Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there are 
times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more 
‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse 
itself – which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS 
triumphs over philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption to 
‘ordinary discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy insignificant] – 
but rather refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does here. 

Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce quote 
into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the theological 
‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing high regard 
for Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor Heidegger would accept 
literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive internal characters of the 
subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly and almost uniquely 
recognizes the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something I was lucky enough to 
see in Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the categories of John Duns Scotus 
whom Peirce admired]. 

Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal” and to 
“subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of experience 
presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is completely 
‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem to me Peirce 
would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience is an 
undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this for 
Peirce.

Heidegger 

Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION

2012-04-26 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Gary M.,

 

The passage in Deely to which you refer defines Peirce’s concept of Firstness 
by collecting several quotations from Peirce that refer to it. I’m not sure why 
you have singled out one of those quotations in connection with “metaphysical 
concerns”, but i think a better acquaintance with Peirce’s phaneroscopic 
(phenomenological) categories would serve you better in the task of 
interpreting both Peirce’s text and Deely’s. Both of them are referring 
primarily to logic, i.e. semiotic, and while it is true that just about any 
principle of logic “potentially refers to metaphysical concerns”, those 
concerns are secondary and derivative. Comparisons with Heidegger’s terminology 
are even more remote, in this context. I think you’d be better advised to 
peruse Selection 28 in EP2; the passage from Peirce that Deely quotes from CP 
5.469 is a variant reading from that same MS (318), the MS in which he 
introduces the term “semiosis”.

 

Gary F.

 

} The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, 
not when it is doing work. [Wittgenstein] {

 

 http://www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic 
studies: Peirce

 

 

 

From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Gary Moore
Sent: April-26-12 2:38 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN 
DEELY LOCATION

 

Dear Doctor Rose,

Thank you for your reply! 

--

The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it 
potentially referred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal 
characters of the subject”. 

---

Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there are 
times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more 
‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse itself 
– which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS triumphs over 
philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption to ‘ordinary 
discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy insignificant] – but rather 
refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does here. 



Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce quote 
into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the theological 
‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing high regard for 
Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor Heidegger would accept 
literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive internal characters of the 
subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly and almost uniquely recognizes 
the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something I was lucky enough to see in 
Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the categories of John Duns Scotus whom 
Peirce admired]. 



Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal” and to 
“subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of experience 
presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is completely 
‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem to me Peirce 
would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience is an 
undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this for 
Peirce.



Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since such 
a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language as either 
‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be approached obliquely 
or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J. Richardson SJ does this 
with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems anyway, Deely disapproves of. The 
point is, it seems with both Heidegger and Peirce, the popular phrase “What you 
see is what you get” is taken in a strict and radical sense. I think also both 
consider the ‘unconscious’ as a matter of historicity being logically being 
teased out of the long dream of language which completely overwhelms any one 
individual.

-

Another issue with Deely and Heidegger related to this is Deely’s seemingly 
strict separation between human consciousness, which dreams the dream of 
language, and the ‘animal’ which largely does not do so. Heidegger also 
separates the two but simply as an observation and method of trying to delimit 
language within manageable bounds, and not because of a religious agenda since 
he explicitly holds for an “atheistic methodology”. In other words, if he had 
found another animal than human being he could converse with, he would have no 
ideological or theological problem, being more attuned to Nietzsche in this 
matter.



Therefore I raise another question: “Does Peirce raise a distinct separation 
between the human being as the only linguistic animal, and if so, where, and if 
not, where?”

-

Gary C. Moore