Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
arriving at his own categories, even though Peirce’s are categories of experience in precisely the sense that Kant tried to rule out and foreclose upon for all future philosophy.”¶ Gary Moore: The point is that, though solipsism must be ruled out as an overall system such as Berkeley’s, nonetheless it is based on one’s own and irrevocable experience. The problem is, how then does one then reconcile that one’s knowledge of language came from ‘elsewhere’ than one’s own creation in oneself as the only possible point of experience at all? Obviously, then, the ‘other’ truly and necessary exists but can only be interpreted from one’s absolutely unique vantage point. If all knowledge as known in the acting of knowing is wholly mine, then how do I come about having a language that is given to me somehow? The evolution of language, then, is inexplicable, paradoxical, and yet a fact. It truly comes from a process of learning which, from completely within one’s own experience, must acknowledge a source of experience from ‘elsewhere’ completely unmediated by myself. ¶ Gary Moore: Therefore “ordinary discourse” I only partially share in and partially change, and, being out of my control per se, is “the final cause of all intellectual endeavors.” That it becomes, as you say, “less vague and more specialized” shows an existential interface between myself and the ‘other’ to and for whom I write and speak. Therefore this is not an offhand observation of yours but an observation of the aporia of existence itself. The fundamental real problem is not ‘fixing’ terminology but of aligning myself with others to communicate on the same plain of actual existence. Regards, Gary From: Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Saturday, May 12, 2012 2:10 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Gary M., list, In the passage that you quote from EP 2: 266, what Peirce says is, [] This scholastic terminology has passed into English speech more than into any other modern tongue, rendering it the most logically exact of any. This has been accomplished at the inconvenience that a considerable number of words and phrases have come to be used with a laxity quite astounding. Who, for example, among the dealers in Quincy Hall who talk of articles of prime necessity, would be able to say what that phrase prime necessity strictly means? He could not have sought out a more technical phrase. There are dozens of other loose expressions of the same provenance. Peirce isn't praising the phrase prime necessity by calling it most technical. He's just pointing out that people use, without knowing their meanings, phrases that are supposed to be reserved for technical senses. That much seems clear enough from the context. Less obvious is that prime necessity was no doubt in Peirce's view a good example because he thought pretty much nobody really knew what it meant. Still another threefold distinction, due to Aristotle (I Anal. post., iv), is between necessity de omni (tò katà pantós), per se (kath autó), and universaliter primum (kathólou prôton). The last of these, however, is unintelligible, and we may pass it by, merely remarking that the exaggerated application of the term has given us a phrase we hear daily in the streets, 'articles of prime necessity.' Necessity de omni is that of a predicate which belongs to its whole subject at all times. Necessity per se is one belonging to the essence of the species, and is subdivided according to the senses of per se, especially into the first and second modes of per se. (Peirce, 1902, from his portion of Necessity in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James Mark Baldwin, editor, v. 2, p. 145 via Google Books and via Classics in the History of Psychology . I don't know what Latin word is being translated as necessity in that paragraph but, given the neuter adjective in universaliter primum (literally, universally first), if it's a word with the necess- element in it, then it is necesse (= necessum) or necessarium (necessary, neuter adjectives) rather than necessitas or necessitudo (necessity, feminine abstract nouns). Peirce can be terminologically demanding, but fortunately he defined many terms and phrases, in the Century Dictionary and in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. As for Peirce's own terminology, he defines some of it in those books, but the first place to look is the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms , edited by Mats Bergman and Sami Paavola, U. of Helsinki, and containing Peirce's own definitions, often many per term across the decades. Gary Fuhrman very helpfully took a list of Peirce entries at the DPP that I started in Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography in Wikipedia, and expanded it to include Peirce entries for letters P-W (which aren't at the Classics in the History of Psychology). http://www.gnusystems.ca
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
the essential categories of mind-dependent being insofar as it enters into discourse since, according to Kant, all phenomena are wholly the mind’s own construct. Nonetheless, do not be deceived by this fact into thinking that the Kantian scheme is not worth studying. It is filled with triads, which Peirce found very suggestive in finally arriving at his own categories, even though Peirce’s are categories of experience in precisely the sense that Kant tried to rule out and foreclose upon for all future philosophy.”¶ Gary Moore: The point is that, though solipsism must be ruled out as an overall system such as Berkeley’s, nonetheless it is based on one’s own and irrevocable experience. The problem is, how then does one then reconcile that one’s knowledge of language came from ‘elsewhere’ than one’s own creation in oneself as the only possible point of experience at all? Obviously, then, the ‘other’ truly and necessary exists but can only be interpreted from one’s absolutely unique vantage point. If all knowledge as known in the acting of knowing is wholly mine, then how do I come about having a language that is given to me somehow? The evolution of language, then, is inexplicable, paradoxical, and yet a fact. It truly comes from a process of learning which, from completely within one’s own experience, must acknowledge a source of experience from ‘elsewhere’ completely unmediated by myself. ¶ Gary Moore: Therefore “ordinary discourse” I only partially share in and partially change, and, being out of my control per se, is “the final cause of all intellectual endeavors.” That it becomes, as you say, “less vague and more specialized” shows an existential interface between myself and the ‘other’ to and for whom I write and speak. Therefore this is not an offhand observation of yours but an observation of the /aporia/ of existence itself. The fundamental real problem is not ‘fixing’ terminology but of aligning myself with others to communicate on the same plain of actual existence. Regards, Gary *From: * Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com *To: * PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU *Sent: * Saturday, May 12, 2012 2:10 PM *Subject: * Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Gary M., list, In the passage that you quote from EP 2: 266, what Peirce says is, [] This scholastic terminology has passed into English speech more than into any other modern tongue, rendering it the most logically exact of any. This has been accomplished at the inconvenience that a considerable number of words and phrases have come to be used with a laxity quite astounding. Who, for example, among the dealers in Quincy Hall who talk of articles of /prime necessity/ , would be able to say what that phrase prime necessity strictly means? He could not have sought out a more technical phrase. There are dozens of other loose expressions of the same provenance. Peirce isn't praising the phrase prime necessity by calling it most technical. He's just pointing out that people use, without knowing their meanings, phrases that are supposed to be reserved for technical senses. That much seems clear enough from the context. Less obvious is that prime necessity was no doubt in Peirce's view a good example because he thought pretty much nobody really knew what it meant. Still another threefold distinction, due to Aristotle (I Anal. post ., iv), is between necessity /de omni/ (/tò katà pantós/ ), /per se / (/kath autó/ ), and /universaliter primum / (/kathólou prôton/ ). The last of these, however, is unintelligible, and we may pass it by, merely remarking that the exaggerated application of the term has given us a phrase we hear daily in the streets, 'articles of prime necessity.' Necessity /de omni/ is that of a predicate which belongs to its whole subject at all times. Necessity /per se/ is one belonging to the essence of the species, and is subdivided according to the senses of /per se/ , especially into the first and second modes of /per se/ . (Peirce, 1902, from his portion of Necessity in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology , James Mark Baldwin, editor, v. 2, p. 145 via Google Books http://books.google.com/books?id=Dc8YIAAJpg=PA145lpg=PA145dq=%22Still+another+threefold+distinction%22 and via Classics in the History of Psychology http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Baldwin/Dictionary/defs/N1defs.htm#Necessity . I don't know what Latin word is being translated as necessity in that paragraph but, given the neuter adjective in /universaliter primum/ (literally, universally first), if it's a word with the necess- element in it, then it is /necesse/ (= /necessum/ ) or /necessarium/ (necessary, neuter adjectives) rather than /necessitas/ or /necessitudo/ (necessity, feminine abstract nouns). Peirce can be terminologically demanding, but fortunately he
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
already said – or even just taken for granted? --- Gary Moore: Peirce says, “It is good economy for philosophy to provide itself with a vocabulary so outlandish that loose thinkers shall not be tempted to borrow its words.” Now, he goes on to ameliorate this slightly by saying that if someone reads a term they do not understand, they should know they do not know it. But what fool does not know this already? [1] His first ‘rule’ is disavowal of terms of an “arbitrary nature”. Again, what fool does not already know this? [2] His second rule is “to avoid using words of vernacular origin as technical terms of philosophy”. This is absurd. Every word has a “vernacular origin”. [3] His third rule is to use scholastic terms properly. Then one simply needs a good dictionary. [4] His fourth rule says go back to the original use of the term. This is rather obvious, but Heidegger has thoroughly shown that laziness in such understanding destroys meaningful context. This is a good thing, yes, but violate Peirce’s rules above. You do not know that you do not understand the term precisely because you have not gone back to the original vernacular usage of Aristotle or Plato. Even someone who does not know Greek – and I do not – can get a Greek-English dictionary and find out, to their amazement, what the original vernacular meaning was. Usually one can simultaneously find a reflection in English usage, unusual possibly, but in English context and usage that fixes it in memory. In other words, you understand its vernacular meaning instead of hiding in obscure elitist pomposity and hot air. [5] One should anglicize scholastic Latin. Why? Doing so does NOT preserve “its precise orignal sense” precisely because it has been anglicized! [6] Don’t intellectualize your terms for a “distinctly technical appearance”. Not only has this always been obvious from the time of Plato and Aristotle, but the supposed ‘rescue’ has come too late for Peirce and Deely. Gary Moore: One should rather use common sense and a base of ‘ordinary discourse’, show in a plain and straight forward way what one intends and why others should pay attention. Primarily, the existential situation is that specialized vocabulary will always either be misunderstood or twisted into ordinary discourse because, once you exit specialized vocabulary, you are swept up in the absolute and eternal triumph of ordinary discourse outside the book,the classroom, and the front door. This is not all sweetness and light and unproblematic but Umberto Eco has quite successfully done this. It still takes effort but you should know where you are every step of the way – in the real world! If you get confused, reread. It works for Eco but not always for Peirce and Deely. Regards, Gary Moore From: Phyllis Chiasson ath...@olympus.net To: 'Gary Moore' gottlos752...@yahoo.com; PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Friday, May 11, 2012 5:14 PM Subject: RE: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Dear Gary, Since language only has meaning within contexts, change the context and you are likely to change meaning altogether. Ambiguity and vagueness are the enemies of clarity; Peirce’s concept of terminological ethics is one of his main contributions to philosophy and the extension (and purpose) of his semeiotic. Torkild Thellefsen discusses meaning from a Peircean perspective in his new book. He points out that the word, X-ray, has a much deeper and more complete meaning to a physician than it does to nonprofessionals, who in their fundamental ignorance may nevertheless think they well know what X-rays mean and do. E. David Ford also explains the need for effective definitions in his book, Scientific Method for Ecological Research. Those who do not engage in so-called “ethical terminology” risk being misunderstood—or worse. Regards, Phyllis From:C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Gary Moore Sent: Friday, May 11, 2012 8:24 AM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS To whom it may concern: In trying to muddle through the storm tossed flotsam and jetsam of John Deely’s explanation of Peirce’s “The Ethics of Terminology” I have discovered the only slightly less over-involved muddle of Peirce’s original. There is the plea for a special terminology as opposed to popular terminology or language. The justification of this is ‘precision’. But such ‘precision’ needing a special terminology whether to a greater or lesser degree divorced from popular language simply sets up a ‘privileged’ standpoint of using language that is not judged by the actual rough and tumble usage of real language in real usage. This is not ‘precision’, this is mystification. The success or failure of any idea what-so-ever is its usage in ordinary discourse. Once established on that plain where
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Gary, Phyllis, list, The use of ambiguity and precision or clarity as antonyms is what I. A. Richards might have called a killer dichotomy[1] which doesn't recognize they are all on the continuum of discourse academic as well as ordinary. Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other words, ambiguity is a tool for achieving greater precision. The x-ray example is a good illustration of a situation in which ambiguity and precision both have economic, health, ethical and semeiotic costs and benefits. The question isn't, Is there perfect precision? Some of the questions are, Is there enough precision for the situation or context? and when necessary, How does further inquiry increase the precision and clarity of our understanding? Regards, John [1] Berthoff, Ann E., The Mysterious Barricades: Language and Its Limits (1999), p. 15-17. The Mysterious Barricades makes the case that escaping the enthrallment of recent theory in literary criticism and the philosophy of language will be impossible so long as the meaning relationship is conceived in dyadic terms. Ann E. Berthoff examines certain dyadic misunderstandings, including the gangster theories fostered by Deconstruction and its successors, and offers triadic remedies, which are all informed by a Peircean understanding of interpretation as the logical condition of signification.--BOOK JACKET. The remedies come from a logician, the inventor of semiotics (Peirce); a rhetorician who reclaimed practical criticism (I.A. Richards); a philologist who became the first to develop a general theory of hermeneutics (Schleiermacher); a linguist - some would say the greatest of the century (Sapir); a philosophical anthropologist who sought to define what we need to discover if we are to appreciate the role of symbols in building the human world (Susanne K. Langer); and an amateur semiotician novelist, and religious man who defined the capacity for symbolization as the power which sets the human being apart from the rest of Creation (Kleist). All have seen that pragmatism is the chief consequence of a triadic view of the sign. All have seen that the powers of language are contingent on its limits, whether linguistic or discursive. All recognize the heuristic power of limits, seeing them as mysterious barricades. In a concluding section, Professor Berthoff turns to the idea of a fall into language by way of a discussion of Kleist's essays on marionette theatre and the shaping of thought at the point of utterance. - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Dear John Harvey, Gary Moore: Absolutely excellent! Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other words, ambiguity is a tool for achieving greater precision. This is perfect! Ambiguity, established within a locating context, is therefore necessary for communication per se. Establish the context precisely and you sizably decrease, but never eliminate, the ambiguity. If what you say is important enough, at some time you must enunciate your thoughts to a wider, broader community. Peirce uses the term “prime necessity” as if it were a very precise scholastic logical term. And yet an explanation for “prime necessity” is not to be found anywhere in the Peirce sites nor in any major philosophy resource like the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If, on the other hand as I advocated, we had the literal Latin phrase he was referring to, I would have no problem locating at least a context in which it is used as “prime necessity”. Peirce praises it by saying, “He could not have sought out a more technical phrase” as it “strictly means”. And yet it is impossible to find except in this paragraph in “The Ethics of Terminology” (EP volume 2, page266). So it is hardly a model of intelligibility considering its lack of context and its near total lack of use.¶ Gary Moore: I. A. Richards I am mainly familiar with as a literary critic, obviously with a command of philosophy and logic. However one communicates in English, one uses literary or, better, rhetorical tropes that, while not necessarily being precisely logical (but not hindering it either), none the less state the existential fact a human being who is in a certain situation is making a statement. If done well, all parties, with their appropriate usage of ambiguity, can more or less correctly understand each other. Abuse the ambiguity as Peirce can do in a purely arbitrary fashion, people think, because he has said something extremely obscure, that it is extremely brilliant because either no one understands it or everyone is afraid of saying “The emperor has no clothes on,” that the great ‘truths’ are merely very ordinary pedestrian sideswipes.¶ - Gary Moore: “The x-ray example is a good illustration of a situation in which ambiguity and precision both have economic, health, ethical and semeiotic costs and benefits.” The doctor is now being legally forced to explain why an x-ray is necessary and what it can and cannot do in common, though un-precise, terms. Instead of what? Instead of just doing the x-ray to legally say he did an x-ray to cover himself from legal suits without necessarily being of any use to the patient even from the most outlandish of possibilities, while at the same time economically harming the patient with a needless very expensive charge. As Churchill said of politics, “America and England are divided by a common language.” Well, he had to break down and learn American context if he was going to get American money and weapons, did he not? No one was going to give those things to him simply because he wanted them.¶ --- Gary Moore: Herein perfectly fits the following, “The question isn't, Is there perfect precision? Some of the questions are, Is there enough precision for the situation or context? and when necessary, How does further inquiry increase the precision and clarity of our understanding? “Further inquiry”, though, can only proceed from ambiguity as what is at hand to any possible precision.¶ -- Gary Moore: “In a concluding section, Professor Berthoff turns to the idea of a fall into language by way of a discussion of Kleist's essays on marionette theatre and the shaping of thought at the point of utterance. It has been a while since I have dealt with Kleist’s essays on marionettes and Immanuel Kant. Has a better format and treatment of his essays occurred I do not know about? Regards, Gary Moore From: John Harvey johnhar...@earthlink.net To: Peirce-L peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, May 12, 2012 10:28 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Gary, Phyllis, list, The use of ambiguity and precision or clarity as antonyms is what I. A. Richards might have called a killer dichotomy[1] which doesn't recognize they are all on the continuum of discourse academic as well as ordinary. Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Harvey, Gary Moore: Absolutely excellent! Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other words, ambiguity is a tool for achieving greater precision. This is perfect! Ambiguity, established within a locating context, is therefore necessary for communication per se. Establish the context precisely and you sizably decrease, but never eliminate, the ambiguity. If what you say is important enough, at some time you must enunciate your thoughts to a wider, broader community. Peirce uses the term “prime necessity” as if it were a very precise scholastic logical term. And yet an explanation for “prime necessity” is not to be found anywhere in the Peirce sites nor in any major philosophy resource like the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If, on the other hand as I advocated, we had the literal Latin phrase he was referring to, I would have no problem locating at least a context in which it is used as “prime necessity”. Peirce praises it by saying, “He could not have sought out a more technical phrase” as it “strictly means”. And yet it is impossible to find except in this paragraph in “The Ethics of Terminology” (EP volume 2, page266). So it is hardly a model of intelligibility considering its lack of context and its near total lack of use.¶ Gary Moore: I. A. Richards I am mainly familiar with as a literary critic, obviously with a command of philosophy and logic. However one communicates in English, one uses literary or, better, rhetorical tropes that, while not necessarily being precisely logical (but not hindering it either), none the less state the existential fact a human being who is in a certain situation is making a statement. If done well, all parties, with their appropriate usage of ambiguity, can more or less correctly understand each other. Abuse the ambiguity as Peirce can do in a purely arbitrary fashion, people think, because he has said something extremely obscure, that it is extremely brilliant because either no one understands it or everyone is afraid of saying “The emperor has no clothes on,” that the great ‘truths’ are merely very ordinary pedestrian sideswipes.¶ - Gary Moore: “The x-ray example is a good illustration of a situation in which ambiguity and precision both have economic, health, ethical and semeiotic costs and benefits.” The doctor is now being legally forced to explain why an x-ray is necessary and what it can and cannot do in common, though un-precise, terms. Instead of what? Instead of just doing the x-ray to legally say he did an x-ray to cover himself from legal suits without necessarily being of any use to the patient even from the most outlandish of possibilities, while at the same time economically harming the patient with a needless very expensive charge. As Churchill said of politics, “America and England are divided by a common language.” Well, he had to break down and learn American context if he was going to get American money and weapons, did he not? No one was going to give those things to him simply because he wanted them.¶ --- Gary Moore: Herein perfectly fits the following, “The question isn't, Is there perfect precision? Some of the questions are, Is there enough precision for the situation or context? and when necessary, How does further inquiry increase the precision and clarity of our understanding? “Further inquiry”, though, can only proceed from ambiguity as what is at hand to any possible precision.¶ -- Gary Moore: “In a concluding section, Professor Berthoff turns to the idea of a fall into language by way of a discussion of Kleist's essays on marionette theatre and the shaping of thought at the point of utterance. It has been a while since I have dealt with Kleist’s essays on marionettes and Immanuel Kant. Has a better format and treatment of his essays occurred I do not know about? Regards, Gary Moore *From:* John Harvey johnhar...@earthlink.net *To:* Peirce-L peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu *Sent:* Saturday, May 12, 2012 10:28 AM *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Gary, Phyllis, list, The use of ambiguity and precision or clarity as antonyms is what I. A. Richards might have called a killer dichotomy[1] which doesn't recognize they are all on the continuum of discourse academic as well as ordinary. Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other
