[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-06-05 Thread Benjamin Udell



Cassiano wrote,
It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests 
me.I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about 
entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: 
entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can 
see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the 
obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic 
range).In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather 
than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the 
ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called 
"ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. 
Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I 
can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not 
as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being 
fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible 
aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in 
Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's 
theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the 
final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy 
would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of 
attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. 
So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, 
but still a process.I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of 
mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the 
best to all,Cassiano(from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, 
Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).I tend to see an 
entelechy assomething which is stable but not merely exhausted, but 
instead "in working order" to do more. In its stability, it'snot just a 
form but a structure, andit can serve as a foundation and basis for more, 
as for instance we say that knowledge is a basis anda grounding. So it's a 
settledness yet it contributes to a process, helps ground it more securely, 
sometimes precisely in order for the process not just to repeat but to 
evolve (through learning). It supports us, is our human supportedness by 
reality. So I tend to see entelechy as the confirmation, the solidification, of 
that action or culmination which is an end or is supposed to be an end -- but 
which may or may not hold up. If it holds up, stands stably, then it is, in that 
sense, confirmed. It's the difference between coming to an end, and being ended, 
being settled, settled ina constructive sense, ready for more. In a 
broader sense, I regard intelligent experience, formed as collateral to sign 
 interpretant in respect of the object, as the entelechy of semiosis as 
such. And they all keep on going, and cannot culminate except as "energy" or 
solidify except as basis -- energy and basis, for _more_ of 
themselves.Charles Olson once said that Edward Dahlberg pounded it into 
his head as a poet that "every perception leads DIRECTLY and IMMEDIATELY to 
another perception."

Culmination  entelechy. It's also the difference between the Thomistic 
"necessaries for the beautiful" -- "claritas" (which Joyce well translated as 
"radiance," as of a culmination, a bloom, the bright colors of flowers, the 
shiny colors of fish, etc.,)and "integritas sive perfectio" (which Joyce 
sonorously translated as "wholeness" but misunderstood as simple unity as 
provided by a bounding line drawn around an object. Aquinas instead meant 
structural integrity, as of something not "diminuta" (dashed to pieces or 
destructively violated) and thereby "turpia" (base, disgusting, "gross"). 
Diminuta http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2314023 
turpia http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?turpis

But in my emphasis on entelechy as something cognitive and even epistemic, 
as confirmation, confirmed value, etc., (as opposed to a telos or teleiosis 
asmore affective, aculmination, a value), I part with Aristotle, 
Aquinas, Peirce, and everybody but myself. I also think of entelechy as a causal 
principle like telos, in a sense like the formal cause, but deepened, just as a 
vital telos is something deeper than mere thermodynamic decay. With entelechy, 
there is dependence, often complex dependence,on sign and evidentiary 
conditions. E.g., knowledge  expectations are causes in markets. This is 
not "instead" of telic influence, nor does it leave teleology behind -- but it 
does take things to a new level, a level of ongoing evolution (mental, social), 
which distinguishes a human from, say, a vegetable organism which, in its way, 
is quite telically governed, but certainly does not evolve in its own 
lifetime.

So those are just my opinions.

Joe Ransdell sent 

[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-06-05 Thread Gary Richmond

Victoria  Cassiano,

I agree that Cassiano's is a sane, sound, and even 
evolutionary way of looking at entelechy. Peirce too saw 
that Kant and Bergson were on the right metaphysical track, 
process and vitalism, not mechanism and predetermination. 
The resultant 'emergent principle' is thus the seeking
of a final and not an efficient cause. Tracing out the 
history of the principle further would seem a most valuable 
intellectual enterprise.


Gary


Victoria N. Alexander wrote:


Dear Cassino,

I think that your characterization of Aristotle's (and Pierce's)  
entelechy as a process is correct.  I think an argument can be made  
that this is true of genuine teleology in general. Teleology seeks, 
in  additional to material causes, evidence for an emergent vital 
force  immanent in the process itself.  It seeks internal final causes 
not  external efficient causes. As vitalist Bergson writes in 1907,  
predetermined teleology, based on a definite end, implies that 
things  and beings merely realize a programme previously arranged … As 
in the  mechanistic hypothesis, here again it is supposed that all is 
given.  Finalism thus understood is only inverted mechanism.


Kant imagined that limiting principles, inherent in ongoing natural  
processes themselves, guided events. According to Alicia Juarrero,  
Kant's emphasis on recursive causality, wherein the parts are both  
cause and effect, precludes the existence of a preexisting whole  
(113).  And as Ernst Cassirer explains, the Kantian whole is 
contained  in them [the parts] as a guiding principle. In Kant telos 
is emergent,  given in the interactions between parts and the whole.


Victoria

Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D.
Dactyl Foundation for the Arts  Humanities
64 Grand Street
New York, NY 10013
212 219 2344
www.dactyl.org

Support the arts! Copy and paste the link below to donate to Dactyl  
Foundation using PayPal.


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business=art%40dactyl.orgitem_name=Member+%2420+Friend+%24100+Patron+%2 
4500+Benefactor+%241000item_number=Various+Levelsno_note=1tax=0curre 
ncy_code=USD

On Jun 4, 2006, at 9:50 PM, Cassiano Terra Rodrigues wrote:


Hello list:

 It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.
 I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about  
entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate:
 entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I 
can  see) en telos echein, that is, something like to have the end 
[aim?]  in, the obtaining of the end (since the verb echein has 
a wide  semantic range).
 In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather 
than  the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy 
to the  ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the 
interpretant  is called ultimate, it's nonetheless still an 
interpretant,  sign-process in sum.
 Now, the substantive entelechia seems to indicate exactly this, 
as  I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), 
which  should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final 
and not  capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of 
telos  carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final 
cause is  of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's 
interpretation (which  seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's 
theory of the four  causes - the formal cause being in the end the 
same as the final  cause, the material cause the same as the 
efficient cause). So,  entelechy would be a process of causation, the 
finalization of the   process of attainment a telos, or of 
fulfillment of the end, if I can  say this in English. So, it 
continues to be a process, as I tend to  read it; not the same as 
before, but still a process.
 I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also  
hope I'm not completely out of the discussion.

 All the best to all,
 Cassiano
 (from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of  
São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).


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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-06-04 Thread Cassiano Terra Rodrigues
Hello list:

It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.
I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about
entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: 
entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can
see) en telos echein, that is, something like to have the end [aim?]
in, the obtaining of the end (since the verb echein has a wide
semantic range).
In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than
the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the
ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is
called ultimate, it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process
in sum. 
Now, the substantive entelechia seems to indicate exactly this, as I
can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which
should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not
capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos
carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is
of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which
seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four
causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause,
the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy
would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process
of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this
in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not
the same as before, but still a process.
I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. 
All the best to all,
Cassiano
(from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).



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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-11 Thread Jim Piat

Dear Folks--

I came across this definition of Entelechy among the words Peirce is reputed 
to have defined for the Century Dictionay in 1886  (page 404 of  Writings of 
Charles S Peirce A Chronological Edition Volume 5 1884-1886)  -- I was 
looking for a definition of form.



BEGIN QUOTE

ENTGELECHY, n. CGr entelecheia, word invented by Aristotle, from en telei 
echon, having atained the end.)
Literally, attainment, realization; opposed to power, potentiality, and 
nearly the same as energy or act (actuality).  The idea of entelechy is 
connected with that of FORM (caps from piat), the idea of power with that of 
matter.  Iron is potentially in its ore, which to be made from must be 
worked.  When this is done, the iron exists in entelechy.  The passage from 
power to entelechy takes place by means of change (kinesis). This is the 
imperfect energy, the perfected energy is the entelechy.  Tirst entelechy is 
being in working order, second entelechy is being in action.  The soul is 
said to be first entelechy, that is, a thing precisely like a mani in every 
respect, except that it would not feel, would b e body without a sould; but 
a soul once infused is not lost whenever the man is asleep.  This is the 
Aristotelian sense, but Cudworth and others have used entelechy and firt 
entelechy somewhat diferently.  Cudworth calls his plastic nature or vital 
principle the first entelechy, and leibniz terms a monad an entelechy.


END OUOTE

My apologies if I'm repeating previously posted material.

Cheers,
Jim Piat

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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-11 Thread Bill Bailey

Joe,
Thank you for the below post--which I've cut away all but 
it's identification.  I don't find entelechy of particular 
interest, but I'm in awe of Peirce's conception of 
communication and mediation.  It's ready to bottle and label.

Bill Bailey
For the benefit of those who don't have a copy of Essential Peirce 2, here 
is the passage referred to by Vinicius Romanini in which Peirce appears to 
be defining perfect sign in such a way as to make it synonymous with 
entelechy (Peirce's emphasis shown here by use of capital letters):



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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-09 Thread Janet Singer
Title: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy


Gary --

I see now that Merrell is mentioned in the Life of Meaning
resources on your site. Nice collection!

I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under Models and simulations of mind.
Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky generally at odds
with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly at odds with
Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations?

Janet

Gary --

Are you familiar with the work of Floyd
Merrell? Your characterization of your own work brings his to mind. To
quote from a review of three of Merrell's books by Robert E. Innis (review available in the archives of the Semiotic Review of Books
at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc/srb/srb/signtrek.html )

Merrell's account of the
physical contexts of semiosis culminates in the notion of the physical
conditions of possibility of open systems, exemplified in the
revolutionary work of Prigogine (perhaps, after Peirce, Merrell's
intellectual hero), which make possible on the ontological level
emergence of higher-order structures, including the higher-order
structure that doubles back on itself, the field of consciousness
itself. On this view, consciousness is an emergent property of cosmic
processes and condition of the possibility of our knowledge of these
very properties.


Sorry I incorrectly attributed the
Ehresmann reference to you -- it will take a while to get oriented to
the list.

Janet
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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-09 Thread gnusystems
Vinicius,

[[ I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in 
terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of Perfect Sign 
(EP2: 545, n.25). ]]

I see what you mean -- although Peirce doesn't mention the word 
entelechy there, perfect sign seems synonymous with it.

Janet,

I'm relatively new around here myself, so i know it takes awhile to get
oriented. Welcome to the list! (I don't recall whether that's been said
to you already, but if so, another welcome won't hurt.)

[[ I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under Models and
simulations of mind. Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky
generally at odds with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly
at odds with Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations? ]]

No more at odds than the latter group are among themselves, if you allow
for some major differences in focus and idiom. But i have to admit that
i don't find much of interest in Dennett or Minsky nowadays. They were
central to my reading and thinking 25 years ago (before the others that
you mention appeared on my horizon), but much more peripheral now. I put
them on the list because i think much of what i learned from them is
still valid; and in Hofstadter's case, because my work in progress still
draws upon his concepts of tangled hierarchy and strange loops and
(especially) his modeling of the creative process. Besides, Hofstadter
was quick to pick up on the emerging concepts of chaos and complexity.

Actually, if i had to list those who are most out of step with the rest
of the list, i'd name Pinker, Dawkins, Koch and Crick. But they still
have a place there, if only because i think that any point on which they
agree with the others can be assumed to have very broad support, simply
because the supporters are so diverse.

But really i'd rather not speak as glibly of these folks as i have here,
as if i could fit each one neatly into some mental pigeonhole. Each one
of us is a whole world. We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.

gary F.

}The simple fact is that no measurement, no experiment or observation is
possible without a relevant theoretical framework. [D.S. Kothari]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson  Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
 }{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{


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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-09 Thread Eugene Halton


Kirsti M: “…The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here
refers to is something never attained to full, but strived at, again and
again. Just as with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving
to approach, better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end,
the absolute perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would
be in contradiction with life and living. Life and living IS
striving - with some kind of an end. Never the last possible…”
 I have to disagree, Kirsti.
Life is more than “science and scientific knowledge,” and more than
“striving to approach, better and better, The Truth.” And I mean this in
a Peircean sense. Stated differently, science is part of life, not the
determinant of it. 
By my
lights life is participant in the entelechy of being, not a spectator
looking at a scoreboard it can never reach. The perfection of being
manifests all the time in realized aesthetic moments. Entelechy has
Firstness, here and now, does it not? 
Perhaps
something like this aesthetic perspective is what William Blake had in
mind when he wrote: “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing
would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up,
till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.” 
 “…[T]he living intelligence
which is the creator of all intelligible reality…”, as Peirce put it in
the earlier quotation you comment on, means that ongoing creation
involves more than chaos or chance, it involves a “reasonableness
energizing in the world,” as Peirce put it elsewhere. If logic, as
self-controlled thought, is a species of ethics, as self-controlled
conduct, and ethics is itself a species of aesthetics, as the
intrinsically admirable, then “The Truth” ultimately gives itself to
Beauty, as the ultimate of entelechy, as I understand Peirce. 
 And if so, as I see it, the
perfection of being involves genesis, as well as development. Perfecting
habits of conduct and even the laws of the universe itself, means the
perfection of ongoing creation, not the “overcoming” of it in some
Hegelian straitjacket. From this perspective the final entelechy of all
being is itself such a moment, poem, painting, banquet, music, or better,
mousike, rhythm-rhyme-dance-musicking, at least in the sense in which
Peirce claimed that: 
“The
Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem
-- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as every true
poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting --
with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a Premiss
is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they are all
meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs to the
whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can
appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole --
which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that
belong to the premisses.” CP 5.119
 
 Gene

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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-09 Thread Gary Richmond

Gary,

Your concluding comment:


We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.
 


for some reason brought to mind this famous one.

I do not think much of a man who is 
not wiser today than he was yesterday. 
Abraham Lincoln 


Gary

gnusystems wrote:


Vinicius,

[[ I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in 
terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of Perfect Sign 
(EP2: 545, n.25). ]]


I see what you mean -- although Peirce doesn't mention the word 
entelechy there, perfect sign seems synonymous with it.


Janet,

I'm relatively new around here myself, so i know it takes awhile to get
oriented. Welcome to the list! (I don't recall whether that's been said
to you already, but if so, another welcome won't hurt.)

[[ I am surprised, however, to see the entrants under Models and
simulations of mind. Aren't the views of Hofstadter, Dennet and Minsky
generally at odds with the spirit of rest of your list -- and explicitly
at odds with Damasio, Lakoff, Maturana and Varela, Rosen, and
Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations? ]]

No more at odds than the latter group are among themselves, if you allow
for some major differences in focus and idiom. But i have to admit that
i don't find much of interest in Dennett or Minsky nowadays. They were
central to my reading and thinking 25 years ago (before the others that
you mention appeared on my horizon), but much more peripheral now. I put
them on the list because i think much of what i learned from them is
still valid; and in Hofstadter's case, because my work in progress still
draws upon his concepts of tangled hierarchy and strange loops and
(especially) his modeling of the creative process. Besides, Hofstadter
was quick to pick up on the emerging concepts of chaos and complexity.

Actually, if i had to list those who are most out of step with the rest
of the list, i'd name Pinker, Dawkins, Koch and Crick. But they still
have a place there, if only because i think that any point on which they
agree with the others can be assumed to have very broad support, simply
because the supporters are so diverse.

But really i'd rather not speak as glibly of these folks as i have here,
as if i could fit each one neatly into some mental pigeonhole. Each one
of us is a whole world. We are worlds in conversation, turning still.
Sometimes we spin in synchrony and sometimes we don't. When we do, we
have structural coupling, as Maturana and Varela called it. And when we
don't, we may have a chance to learn something new.

   gary F.

}The simple fact is that no measurement, no experiment or observation is
possible without a relevant theoretical framework. [D.S. Kothari]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson  Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{


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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-09 Thread Jeffrey
Gene,

I wonder if you can comment a bit more on the end of your note--how exactly 
does it make sense from a Peircean point of view to claim that poems are 
arguments?  More specifically, if poems qua aesthetic objects partake most of 
firstness, how can they also be arguments?

Jeff

-Original Message-
From: Eugene Halton [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: May 9, 2006 7:45 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

Kirsti M: ��The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here refers to is 
something never attained to full, but strived at, again and again. Just as 
with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to approach, 
better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, the absolute 
perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would be in 
contradiction with  life and living. Life and living IS striving - with 
some kind of an end. Never the last possible��

 I have to disagree, Kirsti. Life is more than �science and 
scientific knowledge,� and more than �striving to approach, better and 
better, The Truth.� And I mean this in a Peircean sense. Stated 
differently, science is part of life, not the determinant of it.

 By my lights life is participant in the entelechy of being, not a 
spectator looking at a scoreboard it can never reach. The perfection of 
being manifests all the time in realized aesthetic moments. Entelechy has 
Firstness, here and now, does it not?

 Perhaps something like this aesthetic perspective is what William 
Blake had in mind when he wrote: �If the doors of perception were cleansed 
every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed 
himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.�

 ��[T]he living intelligence which is the creator of all 
intelligible reality��, as Peirce put it in the earlier quotation you 
comment on, means that ongoing creation involves more than chaos or chance, 
it involves a �reasonableness energizing in the world,� as Peirce put it 
elsewhere. If logic, as self-controlled thought, is a species of ethics, as 
self-controlled conduct, and ethics is itself a species of aesthetics, as 
the intrinsically admirable, then �The Truth� ultimately gives itself to 
Beauty, as the ultimate of entelechy, as I understand Peirce.

 And if so, as I see it, the perfection of being involves genesis, 
as well as development. Perfecting habits of conduct and even the laws of 
the universe itself, means the perfection of ongoing creation, not the 
�overcoming� of it in some Hegelian straitjacket. From this perspective 
the 
final entelechy of all being is itself such a moment, poem, painting, 
banquet, music, or better, mousike, rhythm-rhyme-dance-musicking, at least 
in the sense in which Peirce claimed that:

 �The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a 
great poem -- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as 
every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a 
painting -- with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a 
Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they 
are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs 
to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can 
appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- 
which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that 
belong to the premisses.� CP 5.119


 Gene



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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-08 Thread gnusystems
Janet,

[[ Is entelechy the same as final cause to Aristotle or are they just 
related concepts? ]]

My understanding is that the entelechy is an entity, while the final 
cause is not. If we could map a process onto a sentence, the entelechy 
would correspond to a noun while the final cause would be more like a 
verb. Or maybe a better analogy is the attractor in physical state 
space: final cause would be its *attracting* function, while the 
entelechy is the final state that would be achieved if the attractor 
could complete its work. As long as the attractor is still working, the 
entelechy has only such identity as a sign may have (Peirce) -- so 
it's an odd sort of entity.

I'm not using Aristotelian language here, because his usage of the term 
is not very clear to me, and i'm trying to carry forward Peirce's 
attempt to clarify the concept more than Aristotle himself did (while 
also trying to preserve Aristotle's meaning). Here's what Peirce said in 
New Elements:

[[[ Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which 
he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the 
very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so 
identical, -- in such identity as a sign may have, -- with the very 
matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy 
of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that 
Universe in its aspect as a sign, the Truth of being. The Truth, the 
fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant 
of every sign. ]]]

[[ I believe your point about -tel- concepts and non-linearity agrees 
with Robert Rosen's treatment of final cause and complexity. ]]

I'm glad you think so too! Rosen did not use the idiom of semiotics but 
i have no doubt that his modeling relation is a semiotic one; and his 
idea of the modeling process is virtually identical with what Walter 
Freeman (the neuroscientist) calls circular causality. But this is the 
central concept of my work in progress, so i'd better drop the subject 
here lest i get carried away ...

I too would be curious about what people find in Professor Ehresmann's 
work on Memory Evolutive Systems -- i still haven't found time yet to 
tackle it myself. (Jerry Chandler, who provided us with the link to it, 
finds it radically different from Rosen's view, but i don't know why.)

I guess it's questionable how appropriate this topic is to Peirce-L, but 
in my view it's close enough. I subscribe to a complexity list which 
hosted a lengthy discussion on Peirce last year, so i don't see why we 
shouldn't discuss complexity on the Peirce list! But Joe and others 
might disagree about that, and perhaps rightly so.

gary F.

}Into deep darkness fall those who follow the immanent. Into deeper 
darkness fall those who follow the transcendent. He who knows both, with 
the immanent overcomes death and with the transcendent reaches 
immortality. [Mascaro, Isa Upanishad]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson  Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
 }{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
 


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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-08 Thread Vin�cius
List,  I think the best definition of Entelechy given by Peirce, done in terms of Semeiosis, can be found in his definition of "Perfect Sign" (EP2: 545, n.25).  Best,  ViniciusKirsti M¨¨tt¨nen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:  Gary, Wilfred et al.Gary wrote: I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy" myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end product of a completed process."Yes, that's a good definition. Keeping in mind Peircean idea of meaning as something having it's being in futuro. So, the process in question will never actually be completed. Which is tied with Peirce's idea of continuity (which goes beyond those of Aristotle and Kant).The Greek word comes from: en-telos-ekhein. With en
 (preposition)= inside, telos =end, and ekhein = to have. So, it comes to something like: Having it's (or a ?) being within an end. G.F.: So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the  reality of the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean senses of those words.Agreed. I don't think it does in the Aristotelian sense either. Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical domain.So do I, so do I. This is exactly where Peirce's notion of continuity is crucial. It's not a linear notion. And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New Elements", which for me is the central text in the discussion of "entelechy". There he applies the term to the
 universal process -- the process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he  doesn't appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't think he rules it out either.)I assume Peirce takes it in New Elements as something he had already made clear in earlier writings, and consequently did not feel the need to make it explicit there. (Thus highly overestimating the capacities his audience:).)Well, I do hope I'll have time in the future to discuss the New Elements in the list. Now I've just jotted down these few thoughts in a hurry. Noticing that there are twenty unread messages. So, someone else might have written something I should have taken notice.BestKirsti M¨¨tt¨nen<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>7.5.2006 kello 18:25, gnusystems kirjoitti:Kirsti, Wilfred et al., Kirsti writes, [[ I was quite perplexed to read
 that J.A. Smith's translation of De Anima renders [entelechy] as "actuality." ]] Yes, that perplexed me too when i compared the Smith translation with the Greek original. Peirce would never translate it that way -- he  would no doubt write "realization". And yet Smith's choice does make some sense in the context (though it might make more sense if rendered "actualization"). I'm still trying to get a firmer grip on the concept of "entelechy" myself, but the best definition i can offer at the moment is "the end product of a completed process." (The "end" part represents the connection with /telos/ cited in the Century Dictionary.) In that sense, the complete actualization of an idea would be an entelechy;  it's what you'd have when the material, efficient, formal and final causes  of the fact had all completed
 their work. The problem is that we can (and  i think Peirce does) talk about the entelechy of a process which may  never *actually* be completed. As you say, Kirsti, [[ Perfection of being, which you take up from Peirce, is something never attained to the full. Still, something which is effective, and in that sense real, even if never actual, to the full. ]] So the problem with the translation "actuality" is that the reality of the entelechy does not depend on its actuality -- not in the Peircean senses of those words. Personally i find it almost impossible to apply these "-tel-" concepts (such as entelechy and final cause) to a linear process. It seems to me that they are only really meaningful in the nonlinear or cyclical domain. And yet this is not evident from Peirce's discussion in "New Elements", which for me is the central text in
 the discussion of "entelechy". There he applies the term to the universal process -- the process of the universe evolving toward complete being -- and he  doesn't appear to say that this universal process is nonlinear. (Though i don't think he rules it out either.) That's the crux of the problem, to me -- and this problem is the main reason i wanted to start (or rather revive) the discussion of "New Elements" on this list when i first joined. (It's also the main reason that i first looked into Aristotle's book On the Psyche.) By the way: Looking again at the Century Dictionary entry on "entelechy", we can see that the final part of it is attributed to E. Wallace. But where in the entry does Peirce's contribution end and Wallace's begin? Where the fine print starts, or at the paragraph  break? Does anyone know? gary
 F.---Message from peirce-l forum to 

[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy

2006-05-08 Thread Kirsti Määttänen

Neal,

I didn't succeed in opening your attachment. Could you possibly copy it 
and send it as a mail?


Kirsti

7.5.2006 kello 23:09, Neal Bruss kirjoitti:

 . . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link 
entelechy with the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic, 
and, of course, to his semiotic. [The mode of being of the composition 
of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a 
predicate to a subject . . . ].




winmail.dat---
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[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy

2006-05-08 Thread gnusystems
Kirsti, it's good that you couldn't open the attachment -- according to 
my software it contained a virus (the worm Mydoom.O). Neal doesn't 
mention it in the message itself, so i'd bet he didn't even know it was 
attached when he sent it.

Neal, better check your system --

gary

- Original Message - 
Sent: Monday, May 08, 2006 1:51 PM


Neal,

I didn't succeed in opening your attachment. Could you possibly copy it
and send it as a mail?

Kirsti

7.5.2006 kello 23:09, Neal Bruss kirjoitti:

  . . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link
entelechy with the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic,
and, of course, to his semiotic. [The mode of being of the composition
of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a
predicate to a subject . . . ].



 winmail.dat---


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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-07 Thread Jim Piat

Dear Folks--

I looked up escatology (which I though is at least a remotely related 
notion) and entelechy in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy.  I found the 
entry below for Entelechy.  I think it adds a fun slant that is consistent 
with the picture you folks are painting.  I especially like the religious 
teleological  (from the Greek word for goal task completion or 
erfection  -- also according to the Oxford Companion) movtives that I think 
are implicit in this notion.


BEGIN QUOTE:

entelechy.  Hans Driesch (1867-1941) this century's leading neovitalist, was 
much impressed with his discovery that, despite extreme interferene in the 
early stages of embrological development, some organisms nevertheless 
develop into perfectly formed adults.  In a thoroughly  Aristotelian 
fashion, therefore, he became convinced that there is some life-element, 
transcending the purely material, controlling and promoting such 
development.  Denying that this 'entelechy' is a force in the ususal sense, 
Driesch openly argued that it is end-directed.  In his later writing, 
Driesch moved beyond his Greek influences, starting to sound more Hegelian, 
as he argued that ll life culminates ultimately in a 'supra personal whole'.


END QUOTE

the artical ends with a cross reference to vitalism which reminds me that 
Peirce was himself an investigator of spritualism.


Cheers,
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy

2006-05-07 Thread Neal Bruss
. . . and notice how the first two clauses of the passage link entelechy with 
the Peirce's freuqent turn to grammar in his logic, and, of course, to his 
semiotic. [The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of 
the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject . . . ].  



-Original Message-
From:   Kirsti Määttänen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent:   Sun 5/7/2006 12:59 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Cc: 
Subject:[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy

Neal,

A good quote you brought up. The entelechy or perfection of being 
Peirce here refers to is something never attained to full, but astrived 
at, again and again.

Just as with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to 
approach, better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, 
the absolute perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which 
would be in contradiction with  life and living. Life and living IS 
striving - with some kind of an end. Never the last possible.

Welcome to the list!

Best,

Kirsti Määttänen

6.5.2006 kello 18:01, Neal Bruss kirjoitti:

  Dear Wilfred:

 Do you have 6.341,  noted as from Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth 
 Curiosity, (c. 1909)?

 341  The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always 
 of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the 
 living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, 
 as well as the knowledge of such reality.  It is the /entelechy/, or 
 perfection of being.

 Neal Bruss
 (new to the list
 English department
 University of Massachusetts Boston)


 -Original Message-
 From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Sat 5/6/2006 4:23 AM
 To:   Peirce Discussion Forum
 Cc:   
 Subject:  [peirce-l] Entelechy

  Dear list,

 I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of
 entelechy in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether 
 Peirce
 might have defined this term in other sources than the Century 
 Dictionary
 (where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources.

 Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek
 (?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle.

 Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek 
 (?)language ?

 Kind regards,

 Wilfred

 -- 
 Internal Virus Database is out-of-date.
 Checked by AVG Free Edition.
 Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 
 28-4-2006



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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-06 Thread gnusystems
Wilfred,

I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with 
a little information.

Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has 
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in 
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the 
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De 
Anima renders it as actuality.

It is sometimes transliterated entelechia and sometimes entelecheia 
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on 
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.

As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his New Elements 
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another 
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that 
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which 
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their 
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for 
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and 
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that 
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while 
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the 
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is 
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the 
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]

Another term he gives as equivalent to it is perfection of being (CP 
6.341).

I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and 
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.

gary F.

}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical 
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation. 
[The Bab]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson  Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
 }{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{



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[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy

2006-05-06 Thread Joseph Ransdell
Just one point to add to what Gary says, namely, that the word perfection, 
as used by Peirce in this context (and wherever the concept of a process is 
pertinent) should be understood as implying completion.

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: gnusystems [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, May 06, 2006 7:07 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy


Wilfred,

I have a smattering of classical Greek, maybe enough to provide you with
a little information.

Aristotle apparently coined the term, and didn't define it, so one has
to figure out its meaning from context. (There is no listing for it in
Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, which is the
only Greek dictionary i have at hand.) J.A. Smith's translation of De
Anima renders it as actuality.

It is sometimes transliterated entelechia and sometimes entelecheia
(the latter is closer to the actual Greek), so an Internet search on
either of those spellings will bring up some useful items.

As for Peirce, the term plays a prominent role in his New Elements
essay, which you'll find in EP2 and online at Arisbe. Another
illuminating passage is CP 6.356: [[[ It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is, that he belonged to a family which
for generation after generation, from prehistoric times, had had their
attention turned to vital phenomena; and he is almost as remarkable for
his capacity as a naturalist as he is for his incapacity in physics and
mathematics. He must have had prominently before his mind the fact that
all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds are very much alike, while
the animals that grow out of the one, the plants that grow out of the
other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his dunamis is
germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy is the
perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. ]]]

Another term he gives as equivalent to it is perfection of being (CP
6.341).

I hope this is of some help, though the more accomplished Peircean and
Aristotelian scholars can probably provide more.

gary F.

}The revelation of the Divine Reality hath everlastingly been identical
with its concealment and its concealment identical with its revelation.
[The Bab]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson  Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin Island, Canada
 }{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{



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Checked by AVG Free Edition.
Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.5/333 - Release Date: 5/5/2006




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Checked by AVG Free Edition.
Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.5/333 - Release Date: 5/5/2006


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[peirce-l] RE: Entelechy

2006-05-06 Thread Neal Bruss
Dear Wilfred:

Do you have 6.341,  noted as from Some Amazing Mazes, Fourth Curiosity, (c. 
1909)?

341  The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the 
nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living 
intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as the 
knowledge of such reality.  It is the /entelechy/, or perfection of being.

Neal Bruss
(new to the list
English department
University of Massachusetts Boston)


-Original Message-
From:   Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent:   Sat 5/6/2006 4:23 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Cc: 
Subject:[peirce-l] Entelechy

 Dear list,

I am currently writing my PhD thesis and want to use the concept of
entelechy in it. But, for doing so, I would be interested whether Peirce
might have defined this term in other sources than the Century Dictionary
(where I got it from). If so, I would be very interested in sources.

Besides this, I would like to know the exact translation of the greek
(?)word entelechia like it was used by Aristotle. 

Is there anyone here on the list who knows this ancient greek (?)language ?

Kind regards,

Wilfred

-- 
Internal Virus Database is out-of-date.
Checked by AVG Free Edition.
Version: 7.1.385 / Virus Database: 268.5.1/327 - Release Date: 28-4-2006
 


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