[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Frances to Joseph and listers... If "representamens" and "signs" are held to be separate and distinct, this will certainly make the world more complex and its field of logical study more complicated, and perhaps needlessly so. For now, my task is to carefully read all the passages from the Peircean writings available to me on the matter, before rendering some further appreciation or opinion. There is still perhaps a further related distinction for me to ponder, which is whether there might be any substantive difference between the terms "representamen" and "representation" that might exist in Peircean philosophy. It seems tentatively clear to me nonetheless that the concept of "representation" is about trichotomics and semiotics, and is say a property of signs. This however may not be so with "representamen" if it does indeed differ. My intended study of the writings may of course resolve this muse. Incidentally, the term "reference" is also used occasionally in early Peircean logic to separate and segregate qualitative grounds and relative correlates and interpretive representations. The implication here for me is that things like qualities and grounds and relations and correlates can be "referred" to by some means in isolation of representations, and presumably of signs as icons and indexes and symbols. Those other means may indeed be by way of "representamens" that are not interpretive representations or signs. This passage is liberally edited by me from the source noted below. "We may also make the following scheme. Let 1 stand for reference to a ground, 2 stand for reference to a correlate, 3 stand for reference to an interpretant. The [1] is quality, [1/2] is relation, [1/2/3] is representation. In relation, the references are separable in equiparance which we may write [1-2] and inseparable in disquiparance which we may write [1+2]. In representation: in likeness the references are all separable [1-2-3]; in indication reference to a ground is not separable but the two first references are separable together [1+2-3]; in symbolization all are inseparable [1+2+3]." Peirce Chronological Edition, CE1.476 (1866) Finally, the mature human mind may not be able to think logically about phenomena in the world that it senses without the use of representative signs, nor perhaps should logical semiotics be concerned with such illogical stuff, but that does not necessarily mean that phenomena other than sensible representative signs are senseless or that they cannot by some means be found to in fact exist. It seems to me that metaphysical philosophy and empirical science must leave the representative door to inquiry ajar a little. Otherwise, proposing some rational argument in favor of say supereal deity for example might well prove to be impossible. Allow me for now to posit this speculative and tentative musement. In metaphysical philosophy, a representamen is a phenomenal phaneron serving to represent anything and everything to physiotic matter or biotic life, and represent it to that continuent or existent phaneron itself solely alone; while a representation on the other hand is an existent object serving to represent something to quasi mind or mind for some purpose other than for the mechanistic or organic phaneron itself, which representation in effect is as a representative sign. An important consideration here in scientific semiotics and logics is perhaps that the normal human mind needs representations as signs to think about representamen, even if such thought is nondiscursive and senseless and irrational and illogical. Furthermore and aside from phanerons sensing or thinking or knowing phenomena, it seems that in the whole evolving world all phenomenal phanerons to include representamens can feel to some degree, which means that primordial phenomena can feel either as representamen or can feel other representamen as such. Only in this way can evolving matter and life be semiotically or logically accounted for, because it is not likely that representative signs alone are able to do so. Joseph Ransdell wrote... Neither Theresa nor I disagree with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign" being more narrow in scope of application than the word "representamen" and I assume you agree that there are several quotations which make clear that he regards the one as a technical explication of the other. If so there is no disagreement there. I think I was mistaken, though, in identifying confusion about the nature of that distinction as being what would account for the unintelligibility I find (or think I find) in her message. Also, I agree with Theresa in objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes from her: "In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Steven. You wrote: I do resist conflating your views with those of Frances - I do observe, however, your strong support for her arguments and the position that she takes. I do not offer "strong support" for Frances arguments nor for "the position that she takes," but as previously mention, I applaud her grappling with the challenge brought about by considering Ben's theory that the analysis of the implications of 'collateral' necessitates a fourth semiotic category of 'recognizant'. She has been criticized here recently in connection with that inquiry, her trying to make some sense of it by rightly or wrongly linking it to a sign/representamen distinction. Now, as you may also recall, I completely reject Ben's 4th category, so that my arguments for Frances has not been for her position but for her right to make it without blanket judgments about her. I am entertaining some of her notions provisionally because it hinted at "a way out" of what is for me something of an impasse. Ben seems to be accepting some, rejecting some of her analysis, but still arguing for a fourth category. and see something of a "hysteria" in the adoption of triadics in both Peirce and those who later studied him. So are you saying that Peirce's three categories, his trichotomic semeiotic, his more or less trichotomic division of the sciences, etc. represents some sort of hysteria? I would agree with you that these divisions were badly misunderstood & misrepresented by some of his "followers." But folk like John Sowa and Joseph Ransdell have tended to reject these misrepresenters of Peirce (Joe was quite right imo to question the Morris connection suggested in one of Frances' recent posts, for example). I have read Ben's remarks on the matter - but I am not clear on what purpose it (a forth) serves or how it is *useful.* Neither am I, Steven, neither am I.. But few so far has been willing to "take Ben on" in this matter, which is certainly no service to him or semiotics. However, Frances has, to some extent, and I wanted to support her interesting abduction (whether or not she is correct ought be a conclusion of the inquiry, not assumed to be decided a priori). Best, Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Steven" I agree with you in being unable to find what Frances is saying intelligible, but I want to take the occasion to ask you what you mean by "immediacy", which seems to have a special meaning in your writings which is of special importance to you that I don't understand. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: "Steven Ericsson Zenith" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 12:41 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements") Dear List, I was hoping to keep out of this. Mostly I think the deconstruction of Peirce's writings concerning representamen / sign is a waste of time and simply unable to produce any meaningful result. This message by Frances simply makes no sense to me. How do you, Frances or Gary, propose a representamen that is prior to "all existent objects and 'signs' and semiosis" - this assertion makes no sense ontologically or epistemologically. Indeed, even if I consider such an argument viable, any such representamen would not be accessible to apprehension. It leads me to believe that there is a misunderstanding in Frances argument concerning the very nature of semeiosis. I think you are both reading too much into Peirce's exploration - which he clearly testifies to. Consider the two terms a property of the immediacy of his manifest refinement (his analysis). With respect, Steven Frances Kelly wrote: >Gary... > >Thanks for your search and post. >As you implied, the distinction attempted to be made by me is in deed >the difference between "representamens" that are broader and prior to >all else in the world, including existent objects and "signs" and >semiosis, and that are independent of thought and mind and sense and >life itself. The reason for my making this attempt is simply the >seeming distinction made by Peirce himself in his many passages quoted >here. Agreeably, it may certainly prove useful to distinguish between >"signs" conveying notions to human minds and those "representamens" >which can not or need not do so. My train of thought on this matter >may of course be way off track, in that there may be no substantial >distinction at all. The Peircean writings recently posted to the list >by you on the terms "representamen" and "representamens" and >"representamina" will be read by me in detail for some insight. > >-Frances > > > >--- >Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.1/278 - Release Date: 3/9/2006 -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 268.2.1/278 - Release Date: 3/9/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Dear Gary, I do resist conflating your views with those of Frances - I do observe, however, your strong support for her arguments and the position that she takes. Responding to your questions regarding Ben's proposal of a formal "forth." I really cannot respond to Ben's proposal in isolation for two reasons. First, I do not think that I fully comprehend the category issues as he states them - but I respect Ben and am prepared to hear him out on the matter. Second, I am de facto a skeptic on all questions of natural category in interpretations of Percian semeiotics. Remember that I have not bought into triadism myself - and see something of a "hysteria" in the adoption of triadics in both Peirce and those who later studied him. I have read Ben's remarks on the matter - but I am not clear on what purpose it (a forth) serves or how it is *useful.* With respect, Steven Gary Richmond wrote: Steven, Frances and I have very different views on most everything concerned with Peirce. I hope you will resist conflating our views. Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote: Mostly I think the deconstruction of Peirce's writings concerning representamen / sign is a waste of time and simply unable to produce any meaningful result. You have a right to your opinion as to what is or is not "a waste of time." Perhaps I don't think this is a crucial issue myself, but it was singled out by Joe, and pursued to some extent by Frances and others. This message by Frances simply makes no sense to me. How do you, Frances or Gary, propose a representamen that is prior to "all existent objects and 'signs' and semiosis" - this assertion makes no sense ontologically or epistemologically. Well, the message by Frances makes some sense to me. But, again, the message reflects Frances's position--not mine. However, as I mentioned, there are questions related to the early cosmos which are not semeiotic according to Peirce, although they do have at least a (proto-)categorial structure. I also mentioned the question of bio- and physio-semiotics, neither of which has held much interest for me, although I am reading Sebeok's book referenced in my last post in order "to keep up with the literature.". Indeed, even if I consider such an argument viable, any such representamen would not be accessible to apprehension. It leads me to believe that there is a misunderstanding in Frances argument concerning the very nature of semeiosis. Let us see. . . (you are apparently not alone in holding this viewpoint; while I think that particular errors in her understanding will eventually be corrected as she seems to be a person capable of learning in the Peircean sense. I would like to add that we ALL err from time to time, and this is especially possible in setting forth abductions. But these grand pronouncements of her ineptitude, etc. are certainly tending to irk me. What do you think of Ben's hypothesis of a fourth semeiotic element? Is that a "misunderstanding. . .concerning the very nature of semeiosis" or would you be willing to argue for it? I think you are both reading too much into Peirce's exploration - which he clearly testifies to. Again, I would appreciate your not conflating our positions. Mainly I have been arguing Frances's right to present ideas certainly not as radical as, say, Ben's, who has not met with the kind of criticism that has been leveled at Frances. Consider the two terms a property of the immediacy of his manifest refinement (his analysis). Certainly you have a point here. On the other hand, there may be a subtle distinction which is important to analyze. Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Steven, Frances and I have very different views on most everything concerned with Peirce. I hope you will resist conflating our views. Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote: Mostly I think the deconstruction of Peirce's writings concerning representamen / sign is a waste of time and simply unable to produce any meaningful result. You have a right to your opinion as to what is or is not "a waste of time." Perhaps I don't think this is a crucial issue myself, but it was singled out by Joe, and pursued to some extent by Frances and others. This message by Frances simply makes no sense to me. How do you, Frances or Gary, propose a representamen that is prior to "all existent objects and 'signs' and semiosis" - this assertion makes no sense ontologically or epistemologically. Well, the message by Frances makes some sense to me. But, again, the message reflects Frances's position--not mine. However, as I mentioned, there are questions related to the early cosmos which are not semeiotic according to Peirce, although they do have at least a (proto-)categorial structure. I also mentioned the question of bio- and physio-semiotics, neither of which has held much interest for me, although I am reading Sebeok's book referenced in my last post in order "to keep up with the literature.". Indeed, even if I consider such an argument viable, any such representamen would not be accessible to apprehension. It leads me to believe that there is a misunderstanding in Frances argument concerning the very nature of semeiosis. Let us see. . . (you are apparently not alone in holding this viewpoint; while I think that particular errors in her understanding will eventually be corrected as she seems to be a person capable of learning in the Peircean sense. I would like to add that we ALL err from time to time, and this is especially possible in setting forth abductions. But these grand pronouncements of her ineptitude, etc. are certainly tending to irk me. What do you think of Ben's hypothesis of a fourth semeiotic element? Is that a "misunderstanding. . .concerning the very nature of semeiosis" or would you be willing to argue for it? I think you are both reading too much into Peirce's exploration - which he clearly testifies to. Again, I would appreciate your not conflating our positions. Mainly I have been arguing Frances's right to present ideas certainly not as radical as, say, Ben's, who has not met with the kind of criticism that has been leveled at Frances. Consider the two terms a property of the immediacy of his manifest refinement (his analysis). Certainly you have a point here. On the other hand, there may be a subtle distinction which is important to analyze. Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Dear List, I was hoping to keep out of this. Mostly I think the deconstruction of Peirce's writings concerning representamen / sign is a waste of time and simply unable to produce any meaningful result. This message by Frances simply makes no sense to me. How do you, Frances or Gary, propose a representamen that is prior to "all existent objects and 'signs' and semiosis" - this assertion makes no sense ontologically or epistemologically. Indeed, even if I consider such an argument viable, any such representamen would not be accessible to apprehension. It leads me to believe that there is a misunderstanding in Frances argument concerning the very nature of semeiosis. I think you are both reading too much into Peirce's exploration - which he clearly testifies to. Consider the two terms a property of the immediacy of his manifest refinement (his analysis). With respect, Steven Frances Kelly wrote: Gary... Thanks for your search and post. As you implied, the distinction attempted to be made by me is in deed the difference between "representamens" that are broader and prior to all else in the world, including existent objects and "signs" and semiosis, and that are independent of thought and mind and sense and life itself. The reason for my making this attempt is simply the seeming distinction made by Peirce himself in his many passages quoted here. Agreeably, it may certainly prove useful to distinguish between "signs" conveying notions to human minds and those "representamens" which can not or need not do so. My train of thought on this matter may of course be way off track, in that there may be no substantial distinction at all. The Peircean writings recently posted to the list by you on the terms "representamen" and "representamens" and "representamina" will be read by me in detail for some insight. -Frances --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited"was "Peircean elements")
Frances to Theresa... You partly wrote that for Peirce the word "representamen" is more a technical term than the word "sign" at least within logical contexts. One thorn here is whether "signs" in some extended nonlogical sense are to be admitted or allowed in the nonhuman biotic arena, or even in the nonorganic dead world prior to life, given that matter is deemed semiotically a quasi mind and that mind is after all of matter. Aside from this issue, much that Peirce writes of about "representamens" is as they might exist within semiosis, and then as logical "signs" of which claim there is no dispute for me. This placing of "representamens" as "signs" in semiosis is seemingly however not the final word on "representamens" in Peircean philosophy. The fact is that Peirce clearly states there are "representamens" that are not tridential and not signs, and that do not determine interpretants, and that are not mental thoughts. It is difficult for me to simply ignore these distinctions, especially since they may turn out to indeed be substantive, albeit outside logical contexts. It is still unclear to me nonetheless whether this mixture of the terms is mere substitution on his part, or if in fact he sought a prior nonsemiotic arena for "representamens" where all things in the world are such, rather than their being signs. This would make "representamens" the primordial genus umbrella under which falls as species that of existent objects, and objects as signs, and objects of signs, and interpretants of signs. If this intent by Peirce is so, then it may very well introduce semioticians to the logical categories of nothingness, like zeroness as an empty class holder ready to be filled with the phenomenal terness of firsts and seconds and thirds; or even to the logical categories of enthness, like fourths and beyond into anythingness and everythingness and allthingness. Perhaps this could be the neglected argument for collateral "representamens" like ephemeral or ethereal recognizants, and supereal aliens or deity. This musing of mine is a guess that maybe the world of phenomena is not as broad as previously thought for logical categories or representamens. If the phenomenal world is in fact bracketed by other possible aspects of the world, like the nomenal world and the epiphenomenal world, then phenomena is categorically and trichotomically only a secondness itself, and thus not even a sign. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Gary... Thanks for your search and post. As you implied, the distinction attempted to be made by me is in deed the difference between "representamens" that are broader and prior to all else in the world, including existent objects and "signs" and semiosis, and that are independent of thought and mind and sense and life itself. The reason for my making this attempt is simply the seeming distinction made by Peirce himself in his many passages quoted here. Agreeably, it may certainly prove useful to distinguish between "signs" conveying notions to human minds and those "representamens" which can not or need not do so. My train of thought on this matter may of course be way off track, in that there may be no substantial distinction at all. The Peircean writings recently posted to the list by you on the terms "representamen" and "representamens" and "representamina" will be read by me in detail for some insight. -Frances --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited"was "Peircean elements")
Theresa, Frances & List, Certainly Peirce at moments & in places suggests that there may be representamen which are not signs, probably the clearest & simplest example being that famous sunflower. CP 2.274. . .A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation. and this is implied in the passage you just quoted: CP 1.540 . . . all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so. When, however, he's considering the universe as "perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs," Peirce has considerably broadened his notion of what a sign may be (never forgetting also that a person may be a sign from that perspective) to include, apparently, all representamens whatsoever. See: CP 5.448 Fn P1 Para 5/6. . . the fact that the entire universe -- not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth" -- that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. The distinction that I saw Frances making--or at least I hope this is the case-- is the difference between signs which "convey notions to human minds" and those representamen which Peirce sees "no reason" to imagine need necessarily do so. It is this distinction which I thought I saw Frances employing in her post concerning Ben's ideas about collateral knowledge which prompted the current discussion. Now this may all be just my interpretation of this matter, and no doubt I should let Frances speak for herself in the matter. Yet it seems to me that whatever the terminology used, it may prove useful to distinguish between signs conveying "notions to human minds" and those representamens which need not do so (again, consider the sunflower). Gary Theresa Calvet wrote: Frances, and list: Frances, you say: "In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may not. My current access to the published writings of Peirce is however limited, which further irritates me." I really have no idea what made you guess that. Definitely not Peirce and what he wrote. For Peirce the word "representamen" is a more technical term than the word "sign". Please read the following from Lecture III (Lowell Lectures of 1903): "In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word REPRESENTATION to the operation of a sign or its RELATION TO the object FOR the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a SIGN or a REPRESENTAMEN. I use these two words, SIGN and REPRESENTAMEN, differently. By a SIGN I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a REPRESENTAMEN as being whatever that analysis applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of what I say about SIGNS will be false. For in that case a SIGN may not be a REPRESENTAMEN. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen, since that is all that the word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something may happen to be true of all SIGNS, that is of everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to HUMAN MINDS; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so" (CP 1.540; the words in capital letters here are in italics in the original published text). And then Peirce adds his definition of a representamen (this whole definition is in italics including all the words in capital letters): "A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" (CP 1.541). CP 1.542: "It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would be another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant of
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited"was "Peircean elements")
Frances, and list: Frances, you say: "In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may not. My current access to the published writings of Peirce is however limited, which further irritates me." I really have no idea what made you guess that. Definitely not Peirce and what he wrote. For Peirce the word "representamen" is a more technical term than the word "sign". Please read the following from Lecture III (Lowell Lectures of 1903): "In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word REPRESENTATION to the operation of a sign or its RELATION TO the object FOR the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a SIGN or a REPRESENTAMEN. I use these two words, SIGN and REPRESENTAMEN, differently. By a SIGN I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a REPRESENTAMEN as being whatever that analysis applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of what I say about SIGNS will be false. For in that case a SIGN may not be a REPRESENTAMEN. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen, since that is all that the word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something may happen to be true of all SIGNS, that is of everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to HUMAN MINDS; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so" (CP 1.540; the words in capital letters here are in italics in the original published text). And then Peirce adds his definition of a representamen (this whole definition is in italics including all the words in capital letters): "A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" (CP 1.541). CP 1.542: "It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would be another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant of its own of which the same would be true; and thus there would be an endless series of events which could have actually occurred, which is absurd. For the same reason the interpretant cannot be a DEFINITE individual object. The relation must therefore consist in a POWER of the representamen to determine SOME interpretant to being a representamen of the same object" (words in capital letters here are in italics in the original published text). Theresa Calvet --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
A string search of "representamen or representamen's or representamens or representamina" in the electronic CP yields the following passages (I have not included comments by the editors of the CP). Note that what follows are in most cases the complete paragraphs in which the terms occur, but in a very few cases I have excluded a continuation of the paragraph which did not seem relevant, or added a short paragraph preceding or following the one employing the term. This has not been indicated in any special way. Gary Richmond CP 1.480 Cross-Ref:†† 480. Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living. Peirce: CP 1.540 Cross-Ref:†† 540. The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of genuine Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough blackboard sketch of the true state of things; and I must begin the examination of representation by defining representation a little more accurately. In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of what I say about signs will be false. For in that case a sign may not be a representamen. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen, since that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something may happen to be true of all signs, that is of everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so. Peirce: CP 1.541 Cross-Ref:†† 541. My definition of a representamen is as follows: A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant. Peirce: CP 1.542 Cross-Ref:†† 542. It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would be another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant of its own of which the same would be true; and thus there would be an endless series of events which could have actually occurred, which is absurd. For the same reason the interpretant cannot be a definite individual object. The relation must therefore consist in a power of the representamen to determine some interpretant to being a representamen of the same object. Peirce: CP 1.557 Cross-Ref:†† 557. Since no one of the categories can be prescinded from those above it, the list of supposable objects which they afford is, What is. Quale (that which refers to a ground) Relate (that which refers to ground and correlate) Representamen (that which refers to ground, correlate, and interpretant) It Peirce: CP 1.564 Cross-Ref:†† 564. I must acknowledge some previous errors committed by me in expounding my division of signs into icons, indices and symbols. At the time I first published this division in 1867 I had been studying the logic of relatives for so short a time that it was not until three years later that I was ready to go to print with my first memoir on that subject. I had hardly commenced the cultivation of that land which De Morgan had cleared. I already, however, saw what had escaped that eminent master, that besides non-relative characters, and besides relations between pairs of objects, there was a third category of characters, and but this third. This third class really consists of plural relations, all of which may be regarded as compounds of triadic relations, that is, of relations between triads of objects. A very
