[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-15 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
Dear Jim, Rob and List:Before turning to Jim's post, a couple of comments about the Salzburg conferences.The Whitehead conference attracted about three hundred (300!!) participants.  The Chinese are keenly interested in Whitehead.  It was rumored that they intend to establish 25 research institutes to explore philosophical and political relations.  The sessions on mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology attracted about 25 participants to each!  very impressive relative to other philosophical conferences.Peirce was frequently mentioned in sessions.  A special session included discussions about the Whitehead - deChardin linkages.  Roland Faber's paper suggested to me an orthogonality between these two views of philosophy.  By orthogonality in this context I mean the approach to extensions.The abstracts are on the web and papers will also be posted on the website for the conference.The Biosemiotics gathering was attended by about 50 participants from perhaps a dozen different countries.  Peirce played a role in many many papers.  The abstracts are on the web and the papers will be posted.  Lots of discussions of coding and bio-logic.Is it not absolutely wonderful that we can access current research reports from our desktops in a timely and efficient manner?  Now,  on to the issue of Peirce and chemical isomers that are distinguished by a specific property of rotating light that has passed through a crystal, generating what is called "polarized light."  Jim wrote:From: "Jim Piat" [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2006 18:17:21 -0400 X-Message-Number: 7  Jerry Chandler wrote:  "But, my point is that if four different groups are necessary to = construct an optical isomer of carbon such that it distinguishes between = the logic of polarized light, then it is mathematically impossible to = achieve this logical distinction with any notion of 'threeness".  = Optical isomers are not a question of trichotomies and triadicies.  They = are questions of tetrachotomies and tetraadicies.  I would welcome = arguments to the otherwise".   Dear Jerry, =20  Actually, handedness and materials that polarize light are among the = very examples Peirce gives of his notion of Thirdness.   Do you have a direct source of this passage?  The notions of = left verses right (which distinguished between mirror image optical = stereo-isomers) Peirce pointa out require the consideration of the = triadic relation of three directions (up-down,  front back, left right). = It may well be that different carbon groups are involved naturally = occuring steroisomers but in fact only three conjoined points are = required to achieved the distniction beween left and right.This is an interesting point.  Of course, it refers to the cartesian plane, not space itself.In general, chemistry operates in space and optical isomers rotate light is space.  Triadic  examples of handedness  Left                       Right  A---B                 B--A           l                   l           l                   l          C                  C   Verses "redundant" tetradic examples of handedness  Left                                        Right  A--B--D                 DB-A          l                                     l          I                                     I          C                                   C  I don't mean to be present the above as authoritative  -- this is merely = my understanding of the issue.=20Modern theory (simplified) considers light rotation to be a spatial operation emerging from the difference between four DIFFERENT material attachments to a central carbon atom.In order to deduce the relation with "left" or "right", one starts with the concept of a tetrahedron.Hold the tetrahedron in space and imagine looking down one of the apexes through the middle point (the central carbon atom) and out the plane opposite the apex and middle point.The "back plane" will contain the other three points of the tetrahedron.  These three points can be in two possible orders:    A - B  - C  or A - C - B.Pastuer noticed that two crystal forms of tartaric acid existed and was able to separate them "by eye".One rotated light left, the other right.  Many years later it was found that two crystalline forms of tartaric acid with identical molecular formula and structure, represented the order A_B_C or the order A_C_B, differed by the organization in space.  This is a slightly simplified version of the narrative but captures the essential features.From a philosophy of science perspective, the existence of optical isomers clears shows the irreducibility of chemistry knowledge to independent physical concepts.  As nearly all biochemical molecules are optical isomers, often having hundreds or thousands of optical centers, it is widely believed that a theory of biology depends on explaining the origins of optical isomerism in living systems.I certainly would appreciate any insights individuals may have on how this related to 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-04 Thread Jim Piat





  Ben wrote:
  
  A 3-D object can be so rotated in 4-D space as to turn it 
  opposite-handed. I remember an episode of the original _Outer Limits_ 
  about it -- some man ended up with two right hands :-).
  
  My response:
  
  Thanks, Ben. I'm not surprised to hear from 
  you on this issue four-most importance.  But so quickly -LOL. Well 
  if you are right (and I imagine you are) it seems to me that this would shed 
  some doubt on the universality of Peirce's claim regarding the nature of 
  triads being sufficient to account for all higher order relations. Still 
  I think the result holds for three dimensional space (especially with respect 
  to the issue of sterio-isomers requiring in principle only three groups to 
  establish their handedness. Would you agree with this latter more 
  limited conclusion? I recall a similar discussion on list years back 
  when the question of whehter Peirces conclucions regarding the sufficiency of 
  triads was merely an artifact of the the fact that we lived in three 
  dimensional space and someone said that the issue had been addressed by some 
  mathematicians and apparently "those" mathematicians felt Peirce was 
  correct. But I'm in no position to judge. Seems its a fairly 
  straightforward issue that I would think topologist have,or could, 
  address.
  
  Thanks again. Ben.Would my blaming my 
  breaking ofmy vow of holiday silence on you be a some sort of degenerate 
  third or just a plain old garden variety lame excuse. 
  
  Cheers,
  Jim Piat
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-04 Thread Benjamin Udell



Jim, list,

I'm not sure at this point what more limited conclusion it is that we're 
talking about! 

Generally speaking, I don't have a view on any logical valence numbers's 
being sufficient or necessary for all higher-valence relations. But I'm a bit 
doubtful that Peirce's trichotomism  triadism are an artefact of his not 
considering hyperspaces.

The only case of which I know where a "minimum adicity" makes really clear, 
really simple sense to me is that of Feynman diagrams of which it's said that 
the "minimum possible event" involves two triadic vertices. I'm able to make 
sense of it because it's specified that to be such an "event," an interaction 
has to be capable of showing the conservation of quantities.The 
corresponding idea in semiosis might not be that of some sort of conservation, 
however. I would consider that some sort of evolution must be showable. The 
interpretant is merely a development, a hopeful monster, a construal. Triadic 
semiosis has no way to learn and keep learning to distinguish sense from 
nonsense. Real evolution involves not merely development of construals, but 
their testing against the reality which they supposedly represent.

As to tetrads, I just say that, in whatever sense an 
interpretant-sign-object relationship can't be reduced to some strictly dyadic 
sign-object relationship, so, likewise, in that sense, a 
recognition-interpretant-sign-object relationship can't be reduced to a strictly 
triadic interpretant-sign-object relationship. Since a collaterally based 
recognition is logically determined by its correlates and logically determines 
semiosis going forward, it is a semiotic element. Since it is as experience of 
the object, that it is a collaterally based recognition, it is neither sign of 
the object nor interpretant of the object. If it were the object itself, then 
neither sign nor interpretant would be needed. It is indistinct from the 
interpretant only when the sign is indistinct from the object; in which case all 
four are indistinct from one another. (The interpretant's elucidation of 'fresh' 
info about the object implies a distinction or divergence between sign  
object.) We are sufficiently code-unbound to be able to test our signs, 
interpretants, and systems and "codes" of interpretation. This involves 
collateral experience. No degree of elucidation, interpretation, or construal, 
is a substitute for (dis-)confirmation, whereby wetake over the task of 
biological evolution andlessen our risk of being removed from the gene 
pool as penalty for a bad interpretant.

As regards 4-chotomies, some significant ones are transparently logical and 
are not subject to any useful kind of trichotomization that I can see. Other 
4-chotomies are more or less established, e.g., the special-relativistic light 
cone, which is a ubiquitous physical instance of a general structure which one 
might revise to a 5-chotomy or even a 6-chotomy; a trichotomization would be the 
division into past, present, future, but this is crude for some purposes, 
including the understanding of communication. Information theory has its 
division into source, encoding, decoding, and recipient, often compared with 
that of semiotics up to the stage of "interpretant = decoding." However the 
comparison fails at the fourth stage (the recipient) and thereby renders quite 
suspect the comparison as a whole. The collaterally based recognition 
("recognizant"), however,is what correlates to the info-theoretic 
recipient. (Note: Information theory also places channels between the stages, 
especially between encoding  decoding.)

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Jim Piat 
To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
Sent: Tuesday, July 04, 2006 12:37 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - 
help!



  Ben wrote:
  
  A 3-D object can be so rotated in 4-D space as to turn it 
  opposite-handed. I remember an episode of the original _Outer Limits_ 
  about it -- some man ended up with two right hands :-).
  
  My response:
  
  Thanks, Ben. I'm not surprised to hear from 
  you on this issue four-most importance.  But so quickly -LOL. Well 
  if you are right (and I imagine you are) it seems to me that this would shed 
  some doubt on the universality of Peirce's claim regarding the nature of 
  triads being sufficient to account for all higher order relations. Still 
  I think the result holds for three dimensional space (especially with respect 
  to the issue of sterio-isomers requiring in principle only three groups to 
  establish their handedness. Would you agree with this latter more 
  limited conclusion? I recall a similar discussion on list years back 
  when the question of whehter Peirces conclucions regarding the sufficiency of 
  triads was merely an artifact of the the fact that we lived in three 
  dimensional space and someone said that the issue had been addressed by some 
  math

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-03 Thread Patrick Coppock

Thanks Bill for your comments.

You wrote:


Patrick,
I'm don't know what in my post you're replying to.  I don't keep my 
posts, so I can't be sure, but I don't recall mentioning an 
expression continuum, segments or meaning continuum.  I may 
have; I sometimes think I only think I know what I say or mean.  My 
post (I think) had to do with the confusion/conflation of 
independent processes.  If that's what you're doing in your last 
paragraph, quit it!  (I don't have any of those smiley gadget to put 
here.)

Cheers,
Bill


Ok, on the last point, you can borrow this smiley here if you like :)

Apropos: expression continuum and meaning continuum are actually 
supposed to be considered part and parcel of one and the same general 
continuum of meaning-expression potential that is capable of being 
cut in various ways, according to Eco's creative blending of 
Peirce and Hjelmslev's sign functions.


My last paragraph was of course pure speculation, and I apologise if 
it seemed to you too arcane, since there are some flavours in there 
(transitivity) that I pulled in from systemic functional linguistics.


But since I am at present trying (I think) to build/ defend a 
position that says that all independent processes, though discrete, 
must always be seen as to some degree presuppositionally linked to 
one another in the immediate context of any given current event, I 
fear some conflation/ confusion/ overlapping of perspectives is 
probably inevitable.


Whether it is actually worth trying to defend such a position is of 
course another matter (cf Steven's recent comments on useful and 
non-useful hypotheses/ predictions), but that is what (I think) I'm 
trying to do.


But actually, I did keep your message, so let's have a look at it in 
some more detail.


You wrote:

Patrick:  In addition to representing what I have always hoped is 
Peirce's developmental teleology, your description of sign function 
seems to me to get to the heart of pragmatic discourse analysis in 
which conventional sign structures and meanings (syntactics and 
semantics) serve principally as orientation to what the situated 
discourse is being used to do.


I would only add that it is sometimes useful to recognize that a 
number of differentiable processes occur simultaneously  within the 
great alpha process.  There is the action processes associated 
with life-forms. There is the motion/matter processes associated 
with non-life-forms. (I'm using these terms only as gestures, 
fingers that point in a given direction, and not as depictions.) 
The highly ephemeral acts of sign usage are real events in several 
related but distinct processes--e.g, those
physical, physiological, psychological and sociological processes 
necessary to communication acts.


My point here would be that it may be of interest to try to 
investigate/ describe in some more detail the possible relationships 
that may obtain or exist between salient aspects of the several 
related but distinct processes you mention above.


In this connection it has occurred to me that the notion of narrative 
possible worlds as used by Eco, coupled with a dynamic notion of 
transworld identity, where there can be some degree of transmission 
or intersection of some salient aspects of actual events as these are 
seen, or made pertinent, by the inhabitants of each of the 
involved possible worlds.


I sometimes feel that we have developed so specialised languages and 
norms of communication in our different disciplinary fields that it 
is often more and more difficult to find some common ground about 
which we can communicate.


Mathematical and computational models provide one interesting, and 
perhaps relevant means of doing this kind of thing.


Mathematics with its high level of abstraction has the advantage of 
being open to systematically/ formally describing (or modelling) any 
kind of physical or other phenomenon in processual terms.


A problem with this is that any model we make in this way will be 
reductive in some sense or other, and we will only be able to 
suggest/ grasp a fairly vague idea of what may be going on in some 
domain or other of our supposed whole.


But mathematical models can certainly be used to predict and 
confirm working hypotheses, at least to a certain extent


When computer science is brought in, coupled with narrative, 
argumentational or explanatory forms of discourse and dynamic 
visualisation technologies, this allows intersemiotic translations of 
descriptive models into visual narrative forms that may be easier to 
intuitively understand for non mathematicians.


It seems to me these different processes often get confused or 
conflated.  Existential objects are also events, but typically in 
a much slower process that makes them available to our exteroception 
for comparatively vast periods of time, which we think makes them 
empirically real, extant.


Re-reading this makes me want to ask you what you meant here by 
exteroception?


I 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-03 Thread Bill Bailey

Patrick,
My responses are interspersed below.

- Original Message - 
From: Patrick Coppock [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Cc: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, July 03, 2006 9:26 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!



Thanks Bill for your comments.

You wrote:


Patrick,
I'm don't know what in my post you're replying to.  I don't keep my posts,
so I can't be sure, but I don't recall mentioning an expression
continuum, segments or meaning continuum.  I may have; I sometimes
think I only think I know what I say or mean.  My post (I think) had to do
with the confusion/conflation of independent processes.  If that's what
you're doing in your last paragraph, quit it!  (I don't have any of those
smiley gadget to put here.)
Cheers,
Bill


Ok, on the last point, you can borrow this smiley here if you like :)


I'd be the first to argue that the more abstract--featureless--sign works
best (I'm not a perceptual cognitivist  ( :) ), but I'll have to pass.


Apropos: expression continuum and meaning continuum are actually
supposed to be considered part and parcel of one and the same general
continuum of meaning-expression potential that is capable of being cut
in various ways, according to Eco's creative blending of Peirce and
Hjelmslev's sign functions.


I've never been much of an Eco fan;  in my view, his creative blending tends
to bend Peirce to mend Saussure's linguistics based-semiology.   But maybe
I'm too provincial.


My last paragraph was of course pure speculation, and I apologise if it
seemed to you too arcane, since there are some flavours in there
(transitivity) that I pulled in from systemic functional linguistics.


I think you can see why I might twit you on that paragraph from the above
response.  I'm not much for linguistic approaches to semiotics; however, my
comments on your post were absolutely sincere.  I very much liked the
pragmatic attitude of your post.  But I'm not sure you can carry it to
fruition in your theoretical enterprise.  Gregory Bateson once commented
that there are two mutually discrete universes--the Newtonian universe of
objects and the communication universe of information.  If you start in one,
you can never reach the other.  Similarly, I think, we might distinguish
between the two universes of signs and language, and arrive at the same
conclusion.


But since I am at present trying (I think) to build/ defend a position
that says that all independent processes, though discrete, must always
be seen as to some degree presuppositionally linked to one another in the
immediate context of any given current event, I fear some conflation/
confusion/ overlapping of perspectives is probably inevitable.

Whether it is actually worth trying to defend such a position is of course
another matter (cf Steven's recent comments on useful and non-useful
hypotheses/ predictions), but that is what (I think) I'm trying to do.

But actually, I did keep your message, so let's have a look at it in some
more detail.

You wrote:


Patrick:  In addition to representing what I have always hoped is Peirce's
developmental teleology, your description of sign function seems to me to
get to the heart of pragmatic discourse analysis in which conventional
sign structures and meanings (syntactics and semantics) serve
principally as orientation to what the situated discourse is being used to
do.

I would only add that it is sometimes useful to recognize that a number of
differentiable processes occur simultaneously  within the great alpha
process.  There is the action processes associated with life-forms.
There is the motion/matter processes associated with non-life-forms.
(I'm using these terms only as gestures, fingers that point in a given
direction, and not as depictions.) The highly ephemeral acts of sign usage
are real events in several related but distinct processes--e.g, those
physical, physiological, psychological and sociological processes
necessary to communication acts.


My point here would be that it may be of interest to try to investigate/
describe in some more detail the possible relationships that may obtain or
exist between salient aspects of the several related but distinct
processes you mention above.

In this connection it has occurred to me that the notion of narrative
possible worlds as used by Eco, coupled with a dynamic notion of
transworld identity, where there can be some degree of transmission or
intersection of some salient aspects of actual events as these are seen,
or made pertinent, by the inhabitants of each of the involved possible
worlds.

I sometimes feel that we have developed so specialised languages and norms
of communication in our different disciplinary fields that it is often
more and more difficult to find some common ground about which we can
communicate.

Mathematical and computational models provide one interesting, and perhaps
relevant means of doing this kind of thing

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-03 Thread Jim Piat



Jerry Chandler wrote:

"But, my point is that if four different 
groups are necessary to construct an optical isomer of carbon such that it 
distinguishes between the logic of polarized light, then it is mathematically 
impossible to achieve this logical distinction with any notion of 
'threeness". Optical isomers are not a question of trichotomies and 
triadicies. They are questions of tetrachotomies and tetraadicies. I 
would welcome arguments to the otherwise".

Dear Jerry, 

Actually,handednessandmaterials 
that polarize lightare amongthe very examples Peirce gives of his 
notion of Thirdness. The notions of left verses right (which 
distinguished between mirror image optical stereo-isomers) Peirce pointa out 
require the consideration of thetriadic relation of three directions 
(up-down, front back, left right). It may well be thatdifferent 
carbon groups are involvednaturally occuring steroisomers but in fact only 
three conjoined points are required to achieved the distniction beween left and 
right.

Triadic examples of handedness

Left 
Right

A---B 
B--A
 
l 
l
l 
l
CC


Verses "redundant" tetradic examples of 
handedness

Left 
Right

A--B--D 
DB-A
 
l 
l
 
I 
I
 
C 
C

I don't mean to bepresent the above as 
authoritative -- this is merely my understanding of the issue. 


Best wishes and good luck witht he 
conference,
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-02 Thread Patrick Coppock

Hi Bill, you wrote:

I think it is not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the 
same process as existential objects,  but if we must, perhaps we can 
say, Yes, signs exist, but much faster than objects do.


Well yes I guess so. The sign function may be construed (rather 
simplistically) as an event where some segment of expression 
continuum is perceived as entering into, or being brought into, 
relation with some segment of meaning continuum.


If we are considering any kind of culturally contingent sign 
processes we normally will have to try and take into account the 
varying amounts of time and energy consumption and different forms of 
effort that are associated with our semiotic use of the many 
different possible forms and mediums of expression that may be 
brought into play during the course of sign production and 
interpretation processes.


Thought is just one of these.

Thoughts flash by, words take longer to speak, and even longer to 
write down - especially if we want others to understand what they are 
supposed to mean.


The production of cinema, theatre and ballet performances, each will 
have their own specific time and energy consumption requirements.


Diagrams, sketches and pictures written on paper have their own time 
and energy consumption requirements, digital variants of the same 
objects theirs.


But it seems to me that if we adopt a process perspective on 
semiosis, what becomes central is that the existence of both signs 
and objects becomes conceivable of as a transient form of reality 
(of varying durability and speed), and it also seems feasible that 
the inherent transience of signs and objects, and the various types 
of transitivity that may be attributed to them in the course of the 
(intersubjective, or other)  negotiation of their potential meanings 
in different situations and contexts must be closely interrelated 
aspects of this reality and/or existence.


Best regards

Patrick
--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-02 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
Dear Patrick:A few quick notes from Salzburg as I found your comments of interest and perhaps I can clarify some issues.My goals are more concerned with a coherent philosophy of science, especially a coherent relation between chemical philosophy and biological philosophy and medical philosophy.  Peirce, as a 19 th Century chemist should be relevant to my interests.  Whitehead asserts a philosophy of organism, which also should be relevant.While the course of development of an individual's thought and patterns of digestion and indigestion are always relevant to understanding the individual, they are not always relevant to my restricted interests.  In particular, at the turn of the 21 Century, we see highly specialized logics in Quantum mechanics, chemistry (valence) and molecular biology (genetic code).  The challenge I face is to place the modern logics in context of earlier logics.  The QM advocates have a highly developed narrative.  Chemistry and biology do not.  Thus, I seek connections that allow development of coherent narratives for these sciences.  It is in this context that I appreciate the narratives you construct.Now for a few comments:On Jul 2, 2006, at 1:08 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: In any case, I can see I'll have my work cut out=20 to be brief in replying to your notes, since=20 brief though they may be, they are also fairly=20 "dense" in "content". terms, at least if I try to=20 read between the lines.. I would prefer the terms "concise" and "crisp", but, if you insist on the term "dense" I accept your judgment.   :-) You wrote:  My take on the distinctions between Peirce and Whitehead is rather differen= t.  In early Peirce (1868), the analogy with=20 distance functions and branching was the given=20 basis for distinguishing paths of logic,=20 relation to chemical valence and the more=20 general concept of extension.  The later=20 writings of Peirce describing "division" of a=20 sign  in natural language is not a crisp way of=20 looking at the concept of extension.  (One might=20 substitute for the term "division" such terms as=20 partition, trichotomy, lattice, subtraction,=20 incomplete parts, lack of additivity, and so=20 forth; but I do not see how that would create a=20 coherent concept of relational extension.)  Well, first off, I personally think it is very=20 important that "early" and "late" Peirce's are=20 seen as part and parcel of one and the same=20 philosophical project, that developed (emerged)=20 over a considerable time period, but always with=20 the key notion of synechism ("the tendency to=20 regard everything as continuous") at its base.=20 Kelley Parker's work on Peirce's continuity is a=20 useful point of reference here.This comment identifies a critical issue.  It is not clear to me how relate Peirce's later views to continuity.  I do not know the writings of Parker.  Clearly, the concept of continuity as well as chemistry was in the early writings.  However, in later works, the "flow of semiosis" displaces the relevance to chemical logic; it remains consistent with various aspects of "signal processing" and "Memory Evolutive Systems."   When you write that "The later writings of Peirce=20 describing "division" of a sign  in natural=20 language is not a crisp way of looking at the=20 concept of extension", I think I'll have to ask=20 you for a bit more detailed explanation of what=20 you mean by that... Very simple.  Extension as growth; as increase; as sequence of relations, the later extending the former.My conjecture is that extension is easy in number/arithmetic, difficult in chemistry, and very difficult in natural language.In the example, sign is extended  to qualisign, sinsign and legisign. This extension appears to me to include a fair amount of arbitrariness.  Fine for a philosophy of belief, not adequate for chemical or biological purposes.  It would be helpful if someone could suggest a path that associates these terms with chemical, biological or medical practice. In late Whitehead, Process and Reality, he gets=20 into bed with set theory and never re-emerges=20 from this highly restrictive view of extension.=20 In modern chemistry, a multitude of=20 possibilities for extension exist .  (The flow=20 of passions in a bed are great, but they should=20 not be conflated with the light of reason.  :-)  Regarding "early" and "late" with regard to=20 Whitehead, the same considerations as above=20 regarding the recursive, stepwise development of=20 Peirce's architectonic, I think also holds for=""> Whitehead. From the beginning he was a=20 mathematician (and education theorist) more than=20 a philosopher (and in fact, like Peirce, he never=20 "formally" studied philosophy apart from his own=20 personal readings of other philosophers' work),=20 but process and reality is built round ideas=20 developed in his many other philosophical=20 writings, such as "Adventures of Ideas", "Science=20 and the Modern World" -- in my opinion a good=20 starting 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-07-02 Thread Bill Bailey

Patrick,
I'm don't know what in my post you're replying to.  I don't keep my posts,
so I can't be sure, but I don't recall mentioning an expression continuum,
segments or meaning continuum.  I may have; I sometimes think I only
think I know what I say or mean.  My post (I think) had to do with the
confusion/conflation of independent processes.  If that's what you're doing
in your last paragraph, quit it!  (I don't have any of those smiley gadget
to put here.)
Cheers,
Bill
- Original Message - 
From: Patrick Coppock [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Cc: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 10:46 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!



Hi Bill, you wrote:


I think it is not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the same
process as existential objects,  but if we must, perhaps we can say, Yes,
signs exist, but much faster than objects do.


Well yes I guess so. The sign function may be construed (rather
simplistically) as an event where some segment of expression continuum
is perceived as entering into, or being brought into, relation with some
segment of meaning continuum.

If we are considering any kind of culturally contingent sign processes we
normally will have to try and take into account the varying amounts of
time and energy consumption and different forms of effort that are
associated with our semiotic use of the many different possible forms
and mediums of expression that may be brought into play during the course
of sign production and interpretation processes.

Thought is just one of these.

Thoughts flash by, words take longer to speak, and even longer to write
down - especially if we want others to understand what they are supposed
to mean.

The production of cinema, theatre and ballet performances, each will have
their own specific time and energy consumption requirements.

Diagrams, sketches and pictures written on paper have their own time and
energy consumption requirements, digital variants of the same objects
theirs.

But it seems to me that if we adopt a process perspective on semiosis,
what becomes central is that the existence of both signs and objects
becomes conceivable of as a transient form of reality (of varying
durability and speed), and it also seems feasible that the inherent
transience of signs and objects, and the various types of transitivity
that may be attributed to them in the course of the (intersubjective, or
other)  negotiation of their potential meanings in different situations
and contexts must be closely interrelated aspects of this reality and/or
existence.

Best regards

Patrick
--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www: http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty: http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...

2006-07-01 Thread Claudio Guerri



Jorge,
thanks, 
but as I wrote, after a glance to the CP I found out that this was Vol. 2 
of "The Essential Peirce" which Amazon is delivering for me in Pittsburgh this 
days... I will pick it up in October...

List,
does somebody knows some scholars of this Association?
ALASE _Asociación Latinoamericana de Semiótica_ [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Thanks
Claudio



  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Jorge Lurac 
  
  To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
  Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 10:22 
PM
  Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, 
  Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...
  
  Claudio,
  
  2.457-458 are not paragraphs. SeeA Sketch of Logical Critics 
  on EP 2, pages 451 to 462.
  
  J. Lurac
  
  
  Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  wrote:
  



Joe, Ben, Jim, List

thanks for all information

I could not find 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 
1911
because (I suppose) it is in Vol. 2 of EP
and 2 is for vol and not paragraph... etc. etc...






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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-30 Thread Joseph Ransdell
In response to me saying:.

Maybe I should add that I find it difficult to believe that anyone has 
actually been able to read all of the way through Calvino's practical joke 
of a book!

Ben says:

It's also difficult to believe that anyone eats all the way through a rich, 
multi-layered Italian pastry. And yet, we do (usually).
Kidding aside, I have literally no idea why Joe says it's difficult to 
believe that anybody could read all the way
through it. Too much coherence? Too much mix of coherence and incoherence?
Now, it's fun to try to work a certain amount of seeming incoherence into 
one's writing. Conversations, for instance, don't have to be written as give 
 take where speakers understand or even address each other's previous 
remarks in any direct way. It's a literary technique, or challenge, which 
one sees here and there.

REPLY:

Good point, Ben, and incoherence certainly is not always bad.  Maybe it is 
the mix, as you suggest, but reading that whole book -- instead of just 
dipping into it now and again to see if one can find firm footing (which I 
never could) -- seems to me rather like reading the same joke told in many 
different ways. Shaggy dog stories:  do you remember when they were all 
the rage as avant garde humor? -- they are fun heard once, though it seems 
to depend upon the realization that it is just a shaggy dog story and funny 
because of its pointlessness, i.e. because you recognize it as a practical 
joke comparable to having the chair jerked out from umder you when you are 
trying to sit in it.  But to listen to variations on the same shaggy dog 
story knowing that it is a shaggy dog story for 135 pages?  It makes me 
suspect that there is a sense to it that I am missing and you are picking up 
on, being more wiedely read than I and in the relevant way. Well, I do seem 
to remember owing  a copy of _t zero_, too, but I probably jmissed the point 
to it, toom since I remember notihng about it except the title!   But I'll 
give it a try -- maybe -- if I can track it down.

Joe


===


 _Teitlebaum's Window_ by Wallace Markfield has some of it. Some of the 
conversations in _Mulligan Stew_ by Gilbert Sorrentino.  In real life, of 
course, that kind of talk is often motivated by evasiveness. One year at a 
Thanksgiving dinner, a relative asked a question about another relative, a 
question which those of us in the know didn't want to answer. So I answered 
that the reason why the relative in question had gone to California (we're 
in NYC), was in order to buy some shoes. There followed about an hour's 
worth of purposely non-responsive conversation by all the relatives, both 
those in the know and those not in the know (conversation which really 
confused some of the non-family guests), which was really jokes, puns, 
whatever we could muster. But the point wasn't incoherence, but, instead, 
unusual coherences intensified and brought into relief against the lack of 
some usual kinds of coherence. Years ago I read a newspaper column doing 
this, by Pete Hamill of all people, and it was really pretty funny.
Also don't miss _t zero_ with The Origin of Birds.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 11:13 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Michael said:

[MD:]  Haven't had the pleasure of Calvino's Cosmicomics, [but] I like the 
antidotal sound of it [cure for hyper-seriousness]. The 
asymptotic/singularities of beginnings and endings in continuous processes 
challenge all systems that allow for them, and do make for pretzelian 
thought-processes. But I note that the final chapter of David Deutsch's very 
creative The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its 
Implications is titled The Ends of the Universe, which posits an 
asymptotic end of the universe(s) [actually, a sort of coming together of 
all the infinite parallel quantum universes a la Wheeler and co], which in 
part prompted the parallel question on the denouement in Peirce's cosmology. 
But, you're right, Joe: I think I'll retreat to Calvino. I never really 
recovered from trying to conceptualize the cosmological stew that preceded 
the sporting emergence of Firstness.

RESPONSE:

[JR:]  Well, I'm not sure what the moral of it is supposed to be, Michael. I 
put all that down rather impulsively, not thinking much about what might 
justify it or what it might imply. In retrospect I think that what I was 
doing was trying to re-express what I thought Peirce was expressing in the 
following passage from the MS called Answers to Questions Concerning my 
Belief in God which Harshorne and Weiss published in the Collected Papers, 
Vol. 6:

==QUOTE PEIRCE

508. Do you believe Him to be omniscient? Yes, in a vague sense. Of 
course, God's knowledge is something so utterly unlike our own

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...

2006-06-30 Thread Jorge Lurac
ject as determined by the mind. That was nothing else than to consider every conception and intuition which enters necessarily into the experience of an object, and which is not transitory and accidental, as having objective validity. In short, it was to regard the reality as the normal product of mental action, and not as the incognizable cause of it.  This realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the realist will not be the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious doubts. For according to him it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality. What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. And if a general belief, which is perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way be produced, though it be by the fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in such belief is utterly absurd. The realist will hold that the very same objects which are immediately present in our minds in experience really exist just as they are experienced out of the mind; that is, he will maintain a doctrine of immediate perception. He will not, therefore, sunder existence out of the mind
 and being in the mind as two wholly improportionable modes. When a thing is in such relation to the individual mind that that mind cognizes it, it is in the mind; and its being so in the mind will not in the least diminish its external existence. For he does not think of the mind as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to be out of. To make a distinction between the true conception of a thing and the thing itself is, he will say, only to regard one and the same thing from two different points of view; for the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the reality. The realist will, therefore, believe in the objectivity of all necessary conceptions, space, time, relation, cause, and the like.  No realist or nominalist ever expressed so definitely, perhaps, as is
 here done, his conception of reality. It is difficult to give a clear notion of an opinion of a past age, without exaggerating its distinctness. But careful examination of the works of the schoolmen will show that the distinction between these two views of the real-one as the fountain of the current of human thought, the other as the unmoving form to which it is flowing-is what really occasions their disagreement on the question concerning universals. The gist of all the nominalist's arguments will be found to relate to a res extra animam, while the realist defends his position only by assuming that the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is real. The notion that the controversy between realism and nominalism had anything to do with Platonic ideas is a mere product of the imagination, which the slightest examination of the books would suffice to disprove. [...]End quote 
 --I would like to answer Jim, but my List-time is over for today...  and tomorrow we have Argentina-Germany and Italy-Ukraine...  nobody is perfect...  Best  Claudio- Original Message -   From: "Jim Piat" [EMAIL PROTECTED]  To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu  Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 4:49 PM  Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!It is found in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear": The opinion which is fated to
 be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP  5.407 Joe Ransdell   Dear Folks,  Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence. I take the  above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of opinions  and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to which those  opinions (signs) refer. An opinion that is true represents an object that  is real.  But what is the relation between real and existance? Can a first (such as a  quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself  real? A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I remain  puzzled as to the
 reality of qualites as mere firsts. I guess what I  wondering is whether Peirce equates the real soley with what actually exist  or whether real can also be applied to mere firsts.  I suppose one could use Peirce's above definition of real to apply to mere  qualities (as firsts). For example, if one were to express a true opinion  as to what potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the  character of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical  objects of those opinions) would be real.One could also express false  opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their nature) in  which case the qualities referred to would not be real.  And if the immediately above interpretation of real is correct (as I now  think it is) then I would sa

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Claudio Guerri

Patrick, List,

Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object 
for which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you 
got it?


I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another 
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as 
representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.


(I imagine that Lo is So)

Thanks
Claudio



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Benjamin Udell
Claudio, Patrick, list,

That object for which truth stands doesn't sound fully like Peirce. But 
Peirce did say that truth is of a predicate, proposition, assertion, etc. ; a 
true predicate corresponds to its object. Inquiry seeks to arrive at true signs 
about the real.

66~~~ ('A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911) ~~~
To say that a thing is _Real_ is merely to say that such predicates as are 
true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual 
person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that 
single respect constitutes what we call Reality.[---] I call truth the 
predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which _would_ 
ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that 
particular direction.  
~~99

Lots of Peirce quotes on truth and reality are at 
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html

Lo is an old-fashioned word, now generally obsolete, used to attract 
attention or express wonder or surprise, and now used with at least some 
quaintness of effect. It now seems oftenest encountered in the phrase Lo and 
behold. The Online Etymology Dictionary says 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=losearchmode=none that lo is from 
Old English _la_, exclamation of surprise, grief, or joy, influenced in M.E. by 
_lo!_, short for _lok_ look! imperative of _loken_ to look.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 10:25 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Patrick, List,

Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for 
which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got 
it?

I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation 
to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its 
interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.

(I imagine that Lo is So)

Thanks
Claudio


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Joseph Ransdell
It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear:

 The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in 
this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.  CP 5.407

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:25 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Patrick, List,

Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object
for which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you
got it?

I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as
representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.

(I imagine that Lo is So)

Thanks
Claudio



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Michael J. DeLaurentis
May be way out of school here, but what is the ultimate fate of opinion,
representation: ultimate merger with what is represented? Isn't all mind
evolving toward matter, all sporting ultimately destined to end? 

-Original Message-
From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:40 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear:

 The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in 
this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.  CP 5.407

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:25 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Patrick, List,

Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object
for which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you
got it?

I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as
representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.

(I imagine that Lo is So)

Thanks
Claudio



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Jim Piat



It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.  CP 
5.407


Joe Ransdell




Dear Folks,

Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence.   I take the 
above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of opinions 
and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to which those 
opinions (signs) refer.  An opinion that is true represents an object that 
is real.


But what is the relation between real and existance?  Can a first (such as a 
quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself 
real?  A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I remain 
puzzled as to the reality of qualites as mere firsts.   I guess what I 
wondering is whether Peirce equates the real soley with what actually exist 
or whether real can also be applied to mere firsts.


I suppose one could use Peirce's above definition of real to apply to mere 
qualities (as firsts).  For example,  if one were to express a true opinion 
as to what potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the 
character of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical 
objects of those opinions) would be real.One could also express false 
opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their nature) in 
which case the qualities referred to would not be real.


And if the immediately above interpretation of real is correct (as I now 
think it is) then I would say that real  is a property of all modes of being 
(potential, actual and general).  To be,  is to be real.  However true or 
false is a property only of thought. Unreal is a property only of objects 
that are falsely represented.  Anything that has potential or actual being 
is real but we can mis-represent or falsely represent both qualities and 
objects and to the extent that that either is falsely represented (or 
interpreted) that quality or object is not real.


So, for example, hallucinations are real but they are falsely interpreted 
and the objects they are thought to represent by the person experiencing the 
hallucination are not real.  Similarly possible objects do not necessarily 
exist but if truly (faithfully) represented then they are real. All 
potentially possible objects (truly represented) are real but impossible 
objects are not.  And so on...


I think that sovles the problem for me.  My basic conclusion is that all 
modes of being are real.  An object need not exist to be real but it must be 
possible. Some representations are true and some are false.  Objects 
represented are real or false to the extent the representation is true.  I 
wanted to make sure I had an understanding of real, true and actual that 
allowed for all sorts of conceptions including lies, illusions, 
contradictory statements, and mere potential states of affairs.  I think the 
above does it but would welcome errors being pointed out.


Cheers,
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Joseph Ransdell
So it would seem, according to Peirce -- at first.  But upon reflection, 
what could that possibly mean? Since it is supposed to be something that 
comes about only asymptotically, which is to say, not at all, it doesn't 
seem to make much difference one way or the other, does it?  Then, too, 
there is the further consideration that no sooner is one question 
definitively answered -- supposing that to be possible -- than that very 
answer provides a basis for -- opens up the possibility of -- any number of 
new questions being raised.  Of course they may not actually be raised, but 
we are only speculating about possibilities, anyway, aren't we?  And isn't 
sporting something that might very well happen, though of course it need 
not, so that the possibly is always there, and the absolute end of all is 
not yet come to be?.  So . . . not to worry (in case the coming about of the 
absolute end of it all depresses you): it won't be happening.  But if, on 
the other hand, your worry is because it won't happen, I don't know what to 
say that might console you except:  Make the best of it!   (Of course there 
may be a flaw in my reasoning, but if so please don't point it out!)

Did you ever read Italo Calvino's _Cosmicomics_, by the way?  135 pages of 
utterly incomprehensible cosmological possibilities!  Calvino must have been 
insane.  How could a person actually write, and quite skillfully, a 135 page 
narrative account of something that only seems to make sense, sentence by 
sentence, and actually does seem to at the time.even while one knows quite 
well all along that it is really just utter nonsense!

Back to Peirce.  I suspect he thought all along of this grand cosmic vision 
that seems to entrance some, repel others, but leave most of us just 
dumbstruck when pressed to clarify it, as being the form which the dialectic 
of reason takes -- in Kant's sense of transcendental dialectic, in which 
reason disintegrates when regarded as anything other than merely 
regulative -- in his modification of the Kantian view.  The equivalent of a 
Zen koan, perhaps.  Peirce says that God's pedagogy is that of the practical 
joker, who pulls the chair out from under you when you start to sit down. 
Salvation is occurring at those unexpected moments -- moments of grace, I 
would say -- when you find yourself rolling on the floor with uncontrollable 
laughter!  (Peirce didn't say that, but he might have.)

Joe Ransdell

- Original Message - 
From: Michael J. DeLaurentis [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:42 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


May be way out of school here, but what is the ultimate fate of opinion,
representation: ultimate merger with what is represented? Isn't all mind
evolving toward matter, all sporting ultimately destined to end?

-Original Message-
From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:40 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear:

 The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.  CP 5.407

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 9:25 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Patrick, List,

Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object
for which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you
got it?

I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as
representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.

(I imagine that Lo is So)

Thanks
Claudio



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...

2006-06-29 Thread Claudio Guerri
conception and intuition which enters necessarily into the 
experience of an object, and which is not transitory and accidental, as 
having objective validity. In short, it was to regard the reality as the normal 
product of mental action, and not as the incognizable cause of 
it.
This realistic theory is thus a highly 
practical and common-sense position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the 
realist will not be the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious 
doubts. For according to him it is a consensus or common confession which 
constitutes reality. What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. 
And if a general belief, which is perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way 
be produced, though it be by the fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in 
such belief is utterly absurd. The realist will hold that the very same objects 
which are immediately present in our minds in experience really exist just as 
they are experienced out of the mind; that is, he will maintain a doctrine of 
immediate perception. He will not, therefore, sunder existence out of the mind 
and being in the mind as two wholly improportionable modes. When a thing is in 
such relation to the individual mind that that mind cognizes it, it is in 
the mind; and its being so in the mind will not in the least diminish its 
external existence. For he does not think of the mind as a receptacle, which if 
a thing is in, it ceases to be out of. To make a distinction between the true 
conception of a thing and the thing itself is, he will say, only to regard one 
and the same thing from two different points of view; for the immediate object 
of thought in a true judgment is the reality. The realist will, therefore, 
believe in the objectivity of all necessary conceptions, space, time, 
relation, cause, and the like.
No realist or nominalist ever expressed 
so definitely, perhaps, as is here done, his conception of reality. It is 
difficult to give a clear notion of an opinion of a past age, without 
exaggerating its distinctness. But careful examination of the works of the 
schoolmen will show that the distinction between these two views of the real-one 
as the fountain of the current of human thought, the other as the unmoving form 
to which it is flowing-is what really occasions their disagreement on the 
question concerning universals. The gist of all the nominalist's arguments 
will be found to relate to a res extra animam, while the realist defends 
his position only by assuming that the immediate object of thought in a true 
judgment is real. The notion that the controversy between realism and nominalism 
had anything to do with Platonic ideas is a mere product of the imagination, 
which the slightest examination of the books would suffice to disprove. 
[...]

End quote
--

I would like to answer Jim, but my List-time is over for today...
and tomorrow we have Argentina-Germany and Italy-Ukraine...
nobody is perfect...
Best
Claudio





- Original Message - 
From: "Jim Piat" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 4:49 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
  It is found in "How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear": The opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and 
the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way 
I would explain reality. CP  5.407 Joe 
Ransdell   Dear Folks,  
Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence. I take 
the  above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of 
opinions  and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to 
which those  opinions (signs) refer. An opinion that is true 
represents an object that  is real.  But what is the 
relation between real and existance? Can a first (such as a  
quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself 
 real? A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I 
remain  puzzled as to the reality of qualites as mere 
firsts. I guess what I  wondering is whether Peirce equates 
the real soley with what actually exist  or whether real can also be 
applied to mere firsts.  I suppose one could use Peirce's above 
definition of real to apply to mere  qualities (as firsts). For 
example, if one were to express a true opinion  as to what 
potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the  character 
of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical  
objects of those opinions) would be real.One could also express 
false  opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their 
nature) in  which case the qualities referred to would not be 
real.  And if the immediately above interpretation of real is 
correct (as I now  think it is) then I would say that real is a 
pr

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Joseph Ransdell
 attempt to conceptualize the 
cosmic stew or not. But thanks for the thoughtful response to a rather 
impulsive post, Michael. Maybe I should add that I find it difficult to 
believe that anyone has actually been able to read all of the way through 
Calvino's practical joke of a book! So I wouldn't count on it as a solution 
to anything. But it's a good read as far as you can stand it nonetheless!

Joe Ransdell

- Original Message - 
From: Michael J. DeLaurentis [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 4:37 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Haven't had the pleasure of Calvino's Cosmicomics, by I like the antidotal
sound of it [cure for hyper-seriousness].  The asymptotic/singularities of
beginnings and endings in continuous processes challenge all systems that
allow for them, and do make for pretzelian thought-processes. But I note
that the final chapter of David Deutsch's very creative The Fabric of
Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its Implications is titled
The Ends of the Universe, which posits an asymptotic end of the
universe(s) [actually, a sort of coming together of all the infinite
parallel quantum universes a la Wheeler and co], which in part prompted the
parallel question on the denouement in Peirce's cosmology. But, you're
right, Joe: I think I'll retreat to Calvino.  I never really recovered from
trying to conceptualize the cosmological stew that preceded the sporting
emergence of Firstness.

-Original Message-
From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 5:19 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

So it would seem, according to Peirce -- at first.  But upon reflection,
what could that possibly mean? Since it is supposed to be something that
comes about only asymptotically, which is to say, not at all, it doesn't
seem to make much difference one way or the other, does it?  Then, too,
there is the further consideration that no sooner is one question
definitively answered -- supposing that to be possible -- than that very
answer provides a basis for -- opens up the possibility of -- any number of
new questions being raised.  Of course they may not actually be raised, but
we are only speculating about possibilities, anyway, aren't we?  And isn't
sporting something that might very well happen, though of course it need
not, so that the possibly is always there, and the absolute end of all is
not yet come to be?.  So . . . not to worry (in case the coming about of the

absolute end of it all depresses you): it won't be happening.  But if, on
the other hand, your worry is because it won't happen, I don't know what to
say that might console you except:  Make the best of it!   (Of course there
may be a flaw in my reasoning, but if so please don't point it out!)

Did you ever read Italo Calvino's _Cosmicomics_, by the way?  135 pages of
utterly incomprehensible cosmological possibilities!  Calvino must have been

insane.  How could a person actually write, and quite skillfully, a 135 page

narrative account of something that only seems to make sense, sentence by
sentence, and actually does seem to at the time.even while one knows quite
well all along that it is really just utter nonsense!

Back to Peirce.  I suspect he thought all along of this grand cosmic vision
that seems to entrance some, repel others, but leave most of us just
dumbstruck when pressed to clarify it, as being the form which the dialectic

of reason takes -- in Kant's sense of transcendental dialectic, in which
reason disintegrates when regarded as anything other than merely
regulative -- in his modification of the Kantian view.  The equivalent of a
Zen koan, perhaps.  Peirce says that God's pedagogy is that of the practical

joker, who pulls the chair out from under you when you start to sit down.
Salvation is occurring at those unexpected moments -- moments of grace, I
would say -- when you find yourself rolling on the floor with uncontrollable

laughter!  (Peirce didn't say that, but he might have.)

Joe Ransdell

- Original Message - 
From: Michael J. DeLaurentis [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:42 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


May be way out of school here, but what is the ultimate fate of opinion,
representation: ultimate merger with what is represented? Isn't all mind
evolving toward matter, all sporting ultimately destined to end?

-Original Message-
From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 1:40 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

It is found in How to Make Our Ideas Clear:

 The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-29 Thread Benjamin Udell
Interesting remarks, including but not limited to those by Peirce.

Maybe I should add that I find it difficult to believe that anyone has 
actually been able to read all of the way through Calvino's practical joke of 
a book! 

It's also difficult to believe that anyone eats all the way through a rich, 
multi-layered Italian pastry. And yet, we do (usually).
Kidding aside, I have literally no idea why Joe says it's difficult to believe 
that anybody could read all the way through it. Too much coherence? Too much 
mix of coherence and incoherence?
Now, it's fun to try to work a certain amount of seeming incoherence into one's 
writing. Conversations, for instance, don't have to be written as give  take 
where speakers understand or even address each other's previous remarks in any 
direct way. It's a literary technique, or challenge, which one sees here and 
there. _Teitlebaum's Window_ by Wallace Markfield has some of it. Some of the 
conversations in _Mulligan Stew_ by Gilbert Sorrentino.  In real life, of 
course, that kind of talk is often motivated by evasiveness. One year at a 
Thanksgiving dinner, a relative asked a question about another relative, a 
question which those of us in the know didn't want to answer. So I answered 
that the reason why the relative in question had gone to California (we're in 
NYC), was in order to buy some shoes. There followed about an hour's worth of 
purposely non-responsive conversation by all the relatives, both those in the 
know and those not in the know (conversation which really confused some of the 
non-family guests), which was really jokes, puns, whatever we could muster. But 
the point wasn't incoherence, but, instead, unusual coherences intensified and 
brought into relief against the lack of some usual kinds of coherence. Years 
ago I read a newspaper column doing this, by Pete Hamill of all people, and it 
was really pretty funny.
Also don't miss _t zero_ with The Origin of Birds. 

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 11:13 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Michael said:

[MD:]  Haven't had the pleasure of Calvino's Cosmicomics, [but] I like the 
antidotal sound of it [cure for hyper-seriousness]. The 
asymptotic/singularities of beginnings and endings in continuous processes 
challenge all systems that allow for them, and do make for pretzelian 
thought-processes. But I note that the final chapter of David Deutsch's very 
creative The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its 
Implications is titled The Ends of the Universe, which posits an asymptotic 
end of the universe(s) [actually, a sort of coming together of all the 
infinite parallel quantum universes a la Wheeler and co], which in part 
prompted the parallel question on the denouement in Peirce's cosmology. But, 
you're right, Joe: I think I'll retreat to Calvino. I never really recovered 
from trying to conceptualize the cosmological stew that preceded the sporting 
emergence of Firstness. 

RESPONSE:

[JR:]  Well, I'm not sure what the moral of it is supposed to be, Michael. I 
put all that down rather impulsively, not thinking much about what might 
justify it or what it might imply. In retrospect I think that what I was doing 
was trying to re-express what I thought Peirce was expressing in the following 
passage from the MS called Answers to Questions Concerning my Belief in God 
which Harshorne and Weiss published in the Collected Papers, Vol. 6:

==QUOTE PEIRCE

508. Do you believe Him to be omniscient? Yes, in a vague sense. Of course, 
God's knowledge is something so utterly unlike our own that it is more like 
willing than knowing. I do not see why we may not assume that He refrains from 
knowing much. For this thought is creative. But perhaps the wisest way is to 
say that we do not know how God's thought is performed and that [it] is simply 
vain to attempt it. We cannot so much as frame any notion of what the phrase 
the performance of God's mind means. Not the faintest! The question is gabble.

509. Do you believe Him to be Omnipotent? Undoubtedly He is so, vaguely 
speaking; but there are many questions that might be put of no profit except to 
the student of logic. Some of the scholastic commentaries consider them. 
Leibnitz thought that this was the best of all possible worlds. That seems to 
imply some limitation upon Omnipotence. Unless the others were created too, it 
would seem that, all things considered, this universe was the only possible 
one. Perhaps others do exist. But we only wildly gabble about such things.

==END QUOTE=

[JR:]  But wildly gabbling doesn't necessarily mean utterly senseless, as I 
was exaggeratedly construing it, but might only mean that what we are saying or 
thinking becomes seriously and irremediably

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Patrick Coppock

At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do 
not anticipate much time for replies.


Talking of Whitehead, whose process philosophy, or philosophy of 
organism is surely an interesting and challenging read for any 
Peirce student or scholar, it strikes me that in all the talk on the 
list of late of lattices and diagrams, firsts, seconds and thirds, 
ordered or non ordered systems of relations, we seem along the way to 
have lost something of the essentially processual character of the 
peircean notion of semiosis.


Perhaps it's the seemingly concrete nature of the diagrams/lattices 
themselves that has been leading us a bit astray?


Let me try speculating a bit by merging a few notions from a 
Whitehead'ian process perspective with a Peircean one. This is all 
very sketchy and speculative, so I'm naturally open for all forms of 
positive or negative criticism.


In the interests of saving time and energy for one and all, however, 
it would probably be a good idea if respondents could keep their 
comments fairly brief and to the point...


OK, as pointed out by Joe and others here a number of times (also 
recently), the (phenomenological) category of Thirdness will always 
presuppose Secondness, which in turn presupposes Firstness, but none 
of these three more basic categories (or any of their ten or more 
fine-tuned variants as these can be seen to emerge in any form of 
narrative traversing of the various triadic configurational rooms 
represented in the tables of sign classes) can actually be said to 
exist as pure, or static forms or entities.


They always emerge as part of a process, which could be described 
roughly in terms of an ongoing narrative (or argumentation, if you 
like)


According to Peirce's developmental teleology, these three aspects 
of the sign (function), by way of which we are able to experience 
or recognise the presence of any given (manifest for someone or 
something) sign, are destined to keep on morphing into one another 
continuously, emerging, submerging and and re-emerging again as the 
meanings we singly or collectively attribute to the signs we 
encounter from day to day continue to grow in complexity -- at 
different rates of development, of course, depending on the relative 
strength of the habits (mental or otherwise) that constrain 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and allow them to oscillate/ 
morph in relation to one another at different rates in different 
situations and contexts, and allow them to be conceived of by us as 
conventionally (or otherwise) representing signifying (or 
culturally meaningful, if you like) units/ configurations/ events/ 
states of affairs.


Every culturally significant event that we are able to conceive of 
as a sign (objects, thoughts, actions etc.) may then be seen to 
embody or posess, to a greater or lesser degree, and more or less 
saliently, all three qualities/ aspects of the sign (Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness)  at any given time in the ongoing flow of 
semiosis.


However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
exist, beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing 
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a 
Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness in Whitehead's terms.


The categories/ classes are essentially functional event-states that 
must be seen as potentially transitory and recursive all along the 
line in any given semiosic process. They can pass from one to another 
at will, or better as needs be, only to reappear again, perhaps 
in a different giuse or configuration (class) on some later occasion. 
The specific charactistics that make Firsts appear to us as 
Firsts, Seconds as Seconds and Thirds as Thirds, i.e. Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness, are able to emerge transitorily and make 
themselves subjectively known to us at any given moment in any 
given event (the two latter 'ed notions I've taken from 
Whitehead, rather than from Peirce) that forms part of any given 
semiosic process, which by default must be seen as open-ended and as 
possessing only a potential for limits.


It strikes me that might be more profitable if we were to try 
thinking dynamically of the ten classes of signs as possible 
emergent events that may arise as a result of any given ongoing 
semiosic process, and that they are all inter-related with one 
another, and that each class must possess a subjective organic 
potential for having more or less stable periods of duration, 
according to the relative strength of the specific habits or laws 
that (have) become culturally/ contextually associated with any given 
configuration/ class at any given time...


It also occurred to me that someone well versed in Category Theory 
(cf some earlier discussions here on the list) might well be able to 
realise some kind of visual, dynamic model in these (or similar) 
terms, perhaps?


Or maybe someone already has 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet

Patrick Coppock wrote:

At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do 
not anticipate much time for replies.

...
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
exist, beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing 
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a 
Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness in Whitehead's terms.


Not at all.
Peirce was a three-category realist, acknowledging the reality fo 
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness is just another word for nominalism in that context. 
Peirce was not a nominalist.


Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 
1890). Look for outward clash, or  Scotus in the CPs and his 
criticism of Hegel's idealism.


He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), and 
of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs) I 
don't have the exact references, but that's not too difficult to find if 
you go through the Collected Papers, look for nominalism, realism, 
idealism ...


However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning 
that they have no real existence.


Regards
/JM


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Arnold Shepperson
Jean-Marc, Patrick

Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way to use `presuppose, by the way?). Jean-Marc equally has a point in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later thinking. Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess. Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known.


Cheers

Arnold Shepperson


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet

Arnold Shepperson wrote:

Jean-Marc, Patrick
 
Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in 
representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the way 
to use `presuppose, by the way?).  Jean-Marc equally has a point in 
noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later 
thinking.  Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in 
Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for understanding 
this may be found in his mathematical writings, I would guess.  Also, 
the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent material than the CP, 
the editorial dismemebrment of which is well enough known.
 
Cheers
 
Arnold Shepperson
--- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] 


Hi, I don't think there's any contradiction. semiosis being an 
inferential process that reconstructs the forms of reality, a third 
can be created by a combination of a dyad with a monad. A second will 
evolve into a Third.  This will be an internal third or degenerate 
third, a third by construction --call it what you like. but a third anyway.


the only forms that are directly experienced from reality are the 
Seconds -- with which we experience the clash to use a Peirce 
expression.  Thirds are constructed by inference. Firsts are embedded in 
Seconds.


the phenomenological approach which consists in studying how forms can 
be combined together have the advantage that there is no need to resort 
to teleology to explain how these forms (First, Second, Thirds) can be 
seen to emerge from semiosis.


PS: this is an interesting discussion but I'm off the list for a while...

Regards
/JM


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Patrick Coppock

Thanks JM for your brief comments,

I still think we need some way of distinguishing between that which 
is for us phenomenologically or experientally real and that which is 
(enduringly) existent in the world.


Peirce and Whitehead both operate with notions that postulate some 
kind of relational continuity between what we call mind and 
matter. In this connection Whitehead introduces into the cartesian 
(epistemological) chasm between mental and material substance his 
notions of actual occasion or organism, while Peirce handles the 
same problem with his conception of matter as effete mind.


For both, being is in some sense always becoming -- the 
actualisation of a potential for what Peirce often referred to as 
the growth of concrete reasonableness, and what Whitehead refered 
to as satisfaction, or in one of his definitions of that notion: 
the culmination of concrescence into a completely determinate matter 
of fact both of which I think, can be tied to the notion of 
entelecheia, which was discussed at some length here on the list 
previously.


I may well be wrong here, of course -- indeed, I haven't been working 
with Whitehead's ideas so long myself, and trying to see these in 
relation to those of Peirce is actually quite a daunting task -- so 
it would be interesting to hear some opinions from other Peirce 
listers too...


Best regards

Patrick


Patrick Coppock wrote:

At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I 
do not anticipate much time for replies.

...
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
exist, beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing 
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a 
Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness in Whitehead's terms.


Not at all.
Peirce was a three-category realist, acknowledging the reality fo 
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness is just another word for nominalism in 
that context. Peirce was not a nominalist.


Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around 
1890). Look for outward clash, or  Scotus in the CPs and his 
criticism of Hegel's idealism.


He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility), 
and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or 
signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's not too 
difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers, look for 
nominalism, realism, idealism ...


However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, 
meaning that they have no real existence.


Regards
/JM


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--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Patrick Coppock
Thanks for your comments Arnold, and yes indeed, what Peirce and 
Whitehead probably have most in common is their respective 
competencies in mathematics, and the way in which they use these 
competncies to consolidate and explicate their respective 
philosophical projects.


It's their maths that lets them try building a bridge between 
physics, phenomenology and metaphysics, if you will.


One of my great frustrations is that I am no theoretical 
mathematician myself, and cannot read or make sense of anything 
rather than really quite simple mathematical proofs, so I basically 
have to take on trust anything that Peirce or Whitehead might have 
used mathematical forms of argumentation in order to demonstrate in 
detail.


If you read around the lives and works of both these talented 
authors, you can see from many qualified commentators that both were 
fairly well respected in the international mathematical communities 
of their times for their mathematical musings.


In any case, it seems quite clear to me that any philosophical or 
other project that is trying to really get a handle onto what they 
were talking about in all the various corners of their work, and to 
put it all into perspective needs must be a fairly inter- or 
transdisciplinary one...


Peirce-l always seemed to me right from the beginning to be that kind 
of community...


Best regards

Patrick


Jean-Marc, Patrick

Patrick has a point in that Peirce's categories are such that in 
representation the higher-order presupposes the lower (is that the 
way to use `presuppose, by the way?).  Jean-Marc equally has a point 
in noting that Peirce became a `Three-Category Realist' in his later 
thinking.  Both points seem to highlight the role of transitivity in 
Peirce's thought, and perhaps the more solid sources for 
understanding this may be found in his mathematical writings, I 
would guess.  Also, the Logic Notebook perhaps has more pertinent 
material than the CP, the editorial dismemebrment of which is well 
enough known.


Cheers

Arnold Shepperson
--- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]



--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jim Piat



Dear Patrick, Folks--

Whitehead, yes-- and also Wittgenstein's 
notion of family resemblance. Signs, like thought are more or less 
continuous and resist our attempts to pigeon hole them.OTOH contrasting 
mere intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, "But the 
highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make neither by the 
inward attractions of the feeling or representations themselves, nor by a 
transcendental force of haecceity, but in the interest of intelligibility, that 
is, in the interests of the the synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does 
by introducing an idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which 
they would not otherwise have had". Later in that same paragraph 
(fromA Guess at the Riddle) Peirce continues with a further good word for 
those who attempt to sort and categories experience saying "Intuition is 
regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation 
of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable thought. Very 
shallow is the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided. You 
might as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has led to 
so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought would that e and so 
well in accord with the spriit of nominalism that I wonder some one does not put 
it forward. The true precept is not to abstain from hypostatisation, but 
to do it intelligently".


Cheers,
Jim Piat
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jim Piat

Patrick wrote:
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually 
exist, beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing semiosic 
process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness in Whitehead's terms.



Jean-Marc responded:

Not at all.
Peirce was a three-category realist, acknowledging the reality fo 
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness is just another word for nominalism in that context. 
Peirce was not a nominalist.



Dear Patrick, Jean-Marc,  Folks--

I have a bit of trouble keeping track of the similarities and differences 
among the notions of  true, real and existent as Peirce uses them.


I am especially unclear about the the application of the term real to his 
category of Firstness.Are firsts real but non existent?   Seems to me 
the notion of real qualities (as opposed to illusory ones) only has meaning 
in the context of qualities coupled with secondness as they are embodied in 
objects.


In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love for 
someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent and true are 
related.


Best wishes
Jim Piat


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Patrick Coppock

Hi Jim, and thanks for your comments.

You wrote:
At 8:47 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:

Dear Patrick, Folks--

Whitehead, yes -- and also Wittgenstein's notion of family 
resemblance.  Signs, like thought are more or less continuous and 
resist our attempts to pigeon hole them. OTOH contrasting mere 
intellectual associations with triadic thought Peirce says, But the 
highest kind of synthesis is what the mind is compelled to make 
neither by the inward attractions of the feeling or representations 
themselves, nor by a transcendental force of haecceity, but in the 
interest of intelligibility, that is, in the interests of the the 
synthetising 'I think' itself; and this it does by introducing an 
idea not contained in the data, which gives connections which they 
would not otherwise have had.


Connections, yes, in the habit-forming, relational aspect of 
Thirdness, but retaining always the possibility of chance being 
operative in the universe as an active element that can introduce 
novelty into the world and into the reality of our experience of the 
world, as an integral part of it.


In a sense, we are the world and the world is us, but we also have 
the possibility of thinking about it, and about ourselves, and 
exchanging thoughts with one another so they can grow and develop, 
and that's a great ol' thing!


Later in that same paragraph (from A Guess at the Riddle) Peirce 
continues with a further good word for those who attempt to sort and 
categories experience saying Intuition is regarding of the abstract 
in a concrete form, by the realistic hypostatisation of relations; 
that is the one sole method of valuable thought.  Very shallow is 
the prevalent notion that this something to be avoided.  You might 
as well say at once that reasoning is to be avoided because it has 
led to so much error; quite in teh same philistine line of thought 
would that e and so well in accord with the spriit of nominalism 
that I wonder some one does not put it forward.  The true precept is 
not to abstain from hypostatisation, but to do it intelligently.


Yes, exactly, but then when I see presumably intelligent people 
getting so worked up about defending their own particular point of 
view on reality (or let's say on Peirce's view of reality) that they 
start insulting others in the process, then I often start to wonder 
if they haven't become momentarily blinded to the possibility of 
realty having many many facets, as Joe often likes to put it, and 
that in order to get a firmer grip on as many as possible of these 
facets, then we all have to do a bit of grass-like bending in the 
wind, just moving with the flow, so to speak, from time to time...


Cheers

Patrick


Cheers,
Jim Piat
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--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Patrick Coppock

At 9:19 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:

In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love 
for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent 
and true are related.


That's the big one Jim!

I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that 
object for which truth stands


Regarding what is real, I think Peirce would say that we all have our 
opinions, more or well founded about what is real, or what the real 
is, and there is always a cheerful hope that we shall develop some 
further opinions on the matter that are even more well developed in 
this some respect or other.


But of course, we are fallible, and thus no none, however well read, 
can claim any kind of absolute monopoly on the truth, so it's better 
to always keep an open mind (bearing in mind too, that some matters 
have been reasonably well settled for the time being) and keep on 
asking questions and making (courageous) speculations about how 
matters that cause us puzzlement may best be answered on the basis of 
what we already know, or at least think we know.


Regarding existent, I think that Peirce always keeps fairly close to 
the whiteheadian notion of actual occasions in his conceptions of 
this, and again on this matter I think it is most profitable to make 
reference to his notion of matter as effete mind, and Objects as 
Things or Existents that are characteristic for our experience of 
Secondness as a Modality of Being.


In a letter to Lady Welby (See EPII: 479), and talking of Secondness 
(which he actually refers to in this particular connection as 
Another Universe, distinguished by a particular Modality of 
Being), Peirce writes:


Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in 
their Brute reactions, and of second, the facts (reactions, events, 
qualities etc.) concerning these Objects, all of which facts, in the 
last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, 
Things, or more unambigously, Existents, and the facts about them I 
call Facts. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object 
subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of 
Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a 
singular subject.


Best regards

Patrick
--

Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice:  http://morattiddl.blogspot.com

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Patrick, Jean-Marc.

On Jun 28, 2006, at 7:27 AM, Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:


Patrick Coppock wrote:

At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I  
do not anticipate much time for replies.

...
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds  
actually exist, beyond their being mere transitory events in an  
ongoing semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's  
terms, or a Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness in Whitehead's terms.


Not at all.
Peirce was a three-category realist, acknowledging the reality fo  
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call Fallacy of  
Misplaced Concreteness is just another word for nominalism in  
that context. Peirce was not a nominalist.


Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness  
(around 1890). Look for outward clash, or  Scotus in the CPs  
and his criticism of Hegel's idealism.


He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of  
possibility), and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe  
of thought or signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's  
not too difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers,  
look for nominalism, realism, idealism ...


However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate,  
meaning that they have no real existence.


Regards
/JM


Thanks for your stimulating comments.

My take on the distinctions between Peirce and Whitehead is rather  
different.


In early Peirce (1868), the analogy with distance functions and  
branching was the given basis for distinguishing paths of logic,  
relation to chemical valence and the more general concept of  
extension.  The later writings of Peirce describing division of a  
sign  in natural language is not a crisp way of looking at the  
concept of extension.  (One might substitute for the term division  
such terms as partition, trichotomy, lattice, subtraction, incomplete  
parts, lack of additivity, and so forth; but I do not see how that  
would create a coherent concept of relational extension.)


In late Whitehead, Process and Reality, he gets into bed with set  
theory and never re-emerges from this highly restrictive view of  
extension. In modern chemistry, a multitude of possibilities for  
extension exist .  (The flow of passions in a bed are great, but they  
should not be conflated with the light of reason.  :-)


One might say that modern chemistry has in richer view of extension -  
valence is richer than -1,2,3-  and it is richer than set theory by  
using irregularity as a basis of calculation.


Also, the propensity of process philosophers to neglect the concept  
of inheritance of properties in time restricts the potential  
correspondence between process philosophy and scientific philosophy.


A modern philosophy of chemistry must cope with numbers of relations  
grater than three and also recognize that islands of stability exist  
within the torrential seas of change.


(I repeat my earlier disclaimer - I am neither a philosopher nor  
mathematician, my background is in biochemistry and genetics - so  
everyone ought to take my conjectures in these fields that are remote  
my personal area of concentration with a huge grain of salt.)


BTW, the Whitehead conference includes sessions on Mathematics,  
Physics, Chemistry and Biology.  Several abstracts were quite novel  
and may be of interest to readers of this listserve.


 see:

http://www2.sbg.ac.at/whiteheadconference/index2.html


Cheers

Jerry LR Chandler

(PS:  Patrick, if you know David Lane, please convey my personal  
greetings to him.)



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Frances Kelly
Frances to Jean-Marc...

This muse is somewhat off topic, but may be related to the subject.
You recently stated here that Peirce wrote some thirds and seconds are
degenerate, which means that they have no real existence. The
statement that degenerate categories have no real existence is
intriguing, but it does confuse me somewhat in that my understanding
of Peircean degeneracy is that such categories will have real
existence, but will fail to be true to the conditions of their ground.
In regard to symbols for example, there are three categories called
abstract symbols and singular symbols and genuine symbols, but only
genuine symbols are not degenerate, because they are faithful to their
conventional ground in that they are formally arbitrary, unlike the
other symbols. In any event, degenerate symbols and genuine symbols
would both continue to have real existence, regardless of the absence
or presence of degeneracy.

At issue here perhaps is likely the strict Peircean meaning of such
terms as object and real and existence in that say representamen
that are not signs have no objects, and are not real if not sensed,
yet might have existence as representamen even if not sensed and not
real. My reading of meaning into these Peircean terms may of course be
off base here. The term have here for the thing categories might
possess as a sensible objective property, independent of say life and
mind, is also a problem for me. For example, would genuine symbols
like some lingual words have existence or have arbitrarity within
their form, merely waiting to be sensed and thus be real. The
dependence of reality on sense also seems to imply that what is real
might be a mental construct, unlike factuality and even actuality
which might be held as a material construct. In other words, if an
existent fact and whether it is actual or not is not sensed, then it
simply is not real, so that a fact is only as real as sense.


Jean-Marc Orliaguet partly wrote...

Peirce was a three-category realist acknowledging the reality of
Firsts and Seconds and Thirds early on. ...Peirce acknowledged the
reality of actuality or of secondness...the reality of firsts (the
universe of possibility) and of course the reality of thirdness (the
universe of thought or signs)...However he wrote that some thirds and
seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence.



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-28 Thread Benjamin Udell
Bill, Patrick, list,

Just a note. I'd just point out that meaning or significance in Peircean 
semiotics is what is formed into the interpretant, particularly in respect of 
informativeness (though not always). Questions of to what object does an index 
refer, to what ground does the icon refer, or to what connotation does the 
symbol refer, seem to correspond, more or less, to what we now call semantics. 
But as to the informativeness of the sign, the information which the 
interpretant brings freshly to light, i.e., the change of information which is 
brought about semiotically, this seems to correspond to what is now sometimes 
called combinatorial, not in the sense of combinatorics or of combinatory 
logic, but in the sense of the fresh meanings or information of informative 
combinations of terms, or, in the more general Peircean view, terms (rhemes), 
propositions (dicisigns), arguments, whatever kinds of signs. An interpretant, 
as I understand it, does not have to be informative and in any case can't 
consist purely of fresh information, but the rendering explicit of such 
information is usually (though not always) what's in mind in discussions of the 
interpretant.

Best, Ben

- Original Message - 
From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 12:03 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!


Patrick:  In addition to representing what I have always hoped is Peirce's 
developmental teleology, your description of sign function seems to me to get 
to the heart of pragmatic discourse analysis in which conventional sign 
structures and meanings (syntactics and semantics) serve principally as 
orientation to what the situated discourse is being used to do.

I would only add that it is sometimes useful to recognize that a number of 
differentiable processes occur simultaneously  within the great alpha 
process.  There is the action processes associated with life-forms. There 
is the motion/matter processes associated with non-life-forms. (I'm using 
these terms only as gestures, fingers that point in a given direction, and not 
as depictions.)  The highly ephemeral acts of sign usage are real events in 
several related but distinct processes--e.g, those physical, physiological, 
psychological and sociological processes necessary to communication acts.  It 
seems to me these different processes often get confused or conflated.  
Existential objects are also events, but typically in a much slower process 
that makes them available to our exteroception for comparatively vast periods 
of time, which we think makes them empirically real, extant.  I think it is 
not very useful to speak of signs as existing in the same process as 
existential objects,  but if we must, perhaps we can say, Yes, signs exist, 
but much faster than objects do.

Bill Bailey

Patrick Coppock wrote, in part:

 According to Peirce's developmental teleology, these three aspects of the 
 sign (function), by way of which we are able to experience or recognise 
 the presence of any given (manifest for someone or something) sign, are 
 destined to keep on morphing into one another continuously, emerging, 
 submerging and and re-emerging again as the meanings we singly or 
 collectively attribute to the signs we encounter from day to day continue to 
 grow in complexity -- at different rates of development, of course, depending 
 on the relative strength of the habits (mental or otherwise) that 
 constrain Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and allow them to 
 oscillate/ morph in relation to one another at different rates in 
 different situations and contexts, and allow them to be conceived of by us as 
 conventionally (or otherwise) representing signifying (or culturally 
 meaningful, if you like) units/configurations/ events/ states of affairs.

 Every culturally significant event that we are able to conceive of as a 
 sign (objects, thoughts, actions etc.) may then be seen to embody or 
 posess, to a greater or lesser degree, and more or less saliently, all 
 three qualities/ aspects of the sign (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) at 
 any given time in the ongoing flow of semiosis.


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-19 Thread Gary Richmond






Jerry, 

Here's the 'classic' presentation of qualisign, sinsign, legisign (why
they are given in the order of the subject of the thread I don't know,
but the categorial order I just gave them in is as to their firstness,
secondness, and thirdness). In any event, this is the order in which
Peirce first presents them.
CP 2.243 
4. ONE TRICHOTOMY OF SIGNS
  
 243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies;1 first, according
as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a
general law;2 secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its
object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in
some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an
interpretant;3 thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as
a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason.4
Peirce: CP 2.244 Cr
 244. According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a
Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign.
Peirce: CP 2.244 
 A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as
a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with
its character as a sign.
Peirce: CP 2.245 
 245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning "being
only once," as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual
existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its
qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a
sign through being actually embodied.
Peirce: CP 2.246 
 246. A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually
established by men. Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not
conversely]. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it
has been agreed, shall be significant. Every legisign signifies through
an instance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it.
Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five
times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word,
the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica
is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not
ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded
as significant. Nor would the Replica be significant if it were not for
the law which renders it so
Peirce employs this same order in a letter to Lady Welby:
CP 8.334
 334. As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an
appearance, when I call it a qualisign; or secondly, it is an
individual object or event, when I call it a sinsign (the syllable sin
being the first syllable of semel, simul, singular, etc.); or thirdly,
it is of the nature of a general type, when I call it a legisign. As we
use the term 'word' in most cases, saying that 'the' is one 'word' and
'an' is a second 'word,' a 'word' is a legisign. But when we say of a
page in a book, that it has 250 'words' upon it, of which twenty are
'the's, the 'word' is a sinsign. A sinsign so embodying a legisign, I
term a 'replica' of the legisign. The difference between a legisign and
a qualisign, neither of which is an individual thing, is that a
legisign has a definite identity, though usually admitting a great
variety of appearances. Thus, , and, and the sound are all one
word. The qualisign, on the other hand, has no identity. It is the mere
quality of an appearance and is not exactly the same throughout a
second. Instead of identity, it has great similarity, and cannot differ
much without being called quite another qualisign.
These two passages are, it seems to me, equivalent. I guess all of this
is clear enough as you wrote:

Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me. 

Then you continued:
At issue is the question of why are these terms important
to understanding human communication. 
  
The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a "sign" is
clearly a creative use of language. 
  
The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new categories as
derivatives of the parent word, sign. 
  
Could one imagine other prefixes to the word sign? 
  
Could one imagine more than three other prefixes? 

Again, the three are associated with Peirce's category theory (not to
be confused with modern mathematical category theory, but concern what
Marty refers to as "simple category theory" first appearing in Peirce's
decidedly trichotomic phenomenology), so that
what a sign in itself is is its 'firstness' but as a firstness it is
itself either
a firstness, secondness or thirdness in so far as when it is
embodied it expresses some character or quality as a sign, or is a
single existent thing or event--again when it is embodied (and will
then also
employ a qualisign), or as a sign it is 'merely' a convention and then
must appear as a replica of this law that is a sign, so that the
written
word two, the numeral 2 (or II, etc.) and the vocable "two" are all the
same convention several of which 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-19 Thread Jean-Marc Orliaguet

Gary Richmond wrote:

Jerry,

Here's the 'classic' presentation of qualisign, sinsign, legisign (why 
they are given in the order of the subject of the thread I don't know, 
but the categorial order I just gave them in is as to their firstness, 
secondness, and thirdness). In any event, this is the order in which 
Peirce first presents them.


In earlier texts, the icon / index / symbol was considered the most 
important one and the one from which the other classes were derived.


CP 2.275 ...  The most fundamental [division of signs] is into Icons, 
Indices, and Symbols.


then Peirce continues by dividing icons into images (qualisign), 
diagrams (iconic sinsigns), metaphors (iconic legisigns). These are the 
same classes that you would have found had you started with the 
qualisign / sinsigns / legisign division.


see CP 2.283 for the division of indices

to be honest I think that Peirce gives the divisions in that order 
because when you have several things to talk about ... you have to start 
with the first one before you can start with the second :-) The results 
of the divisions eventually are the same, thank God..


/JM

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

2006-06-19 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jerry, Gary, list,

 A number of recent posts have addressed the topics of:

On Jun 19, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote:
 Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

 I am seeking help in understanding the importance of these terms to 
 individual scholars.
 The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me.
 At issue is the question of why are these terms important to understanding 
 human communication.

To Peirce, logical process = representational process, and is not a 
specifically human or intelligent-life phenomenon, a chapter in the books of 
psychology, sociology, history, even if these books covered reasoning creatures 
other than homo sapiens which is the only clear example of which we know (SETI 
hasn't found ET, at least not yet).  

Instead, to Peirce, humans are a special logical phenomenon -- he might assent 
to a current phrase like logic processors though not in the computer sense 
(deductive, with strict algorithms, etc.). For my part, I would say that 
logicality is general like statisticality or (in the information-theoretic 
sense) information.

So these terms (signsign, legisign, qualisign) are important in understanding 
the logical possibilities which human communication tends to actualize. IMHO 
the importance is not so very different from the importance of aerodynamics to 
the evolution and anatomy of winged insects, pterosaurs, birds, bats, flying 
organisms generally. But I think that a more exact analogy would be the 
relationship of probability, statistics, and, as a general mathematical  
statistical subject, stochastic processes, to matter. 

In the Peircean system, terms like qualisign/sinsign/legisign are also 
important, or regarded as destined to be important, in understanding the 
possibilities realized in metaphysics -- questions of ontology, questions of 
God, freedom, immortality, and (philosophical) questions of space, time, 
matter, etc. This is implicit in Peirce's classification of logic as a field 
which does not presuppose metaphysics but which is presupposed by metaphyiscs.

 The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a sign is clearly 
 a creative use of language.
 The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new categories as 
 derivatives of the parent word, sign.
 Could one imagine other prefixes  to the word sign?

Peirce imagined quite a few other prefixes to the word sign. But presumably you 
mean such as to make a semantic distinction, not merely a morphological 
improvement.

 Could one imagine more than three other prefixes?

Your question would be helpfully clarified if you stated it directly instead of 
morphologically. Obviously one can imagine, so to speak, many more classes of 
signs, and Peirce certainly did. Can one imagine a classification into a 
4-chotomy of signs? Of course one can, but, for better or worse, it would be 
unPeircean. Triadism is built deeply into Peirce's semiotic.

 How is this context important in distinguishing among paths of usages?

It's a way of distinguishing between specific occurrences of signs, the 
appearances of signs, and the general meaning or habitual 'conventional' 
interpretation of a sign. (The symbol's interpretant, in being an inferential 
outcome, usually goes beyond such conventional significations.) For many 
practical and theoretical purposes, English horse and Spanish _caballo_ are 
the same legisign.  Horse and _caballo_ won't be regarded as the same 
qualisign (except by those for whom all human words are indistinguishably the 
same qualisign). Horse and _caballo_ won't be regarded as ever being the same 
sinsign (except by those for whom pretty much all human occurrences are one 
single undecomposable occurrence).

 What other terms might be substituted for these terms?

Peirce himself offered, at various times, at least three sets of words for the 
same trichotomy of logical terms:

Tone, token, type.
Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
Potisign, actisign, famisign.

One might call them:
a quality-as-a-sign, a singular-as-a-sign, and a general-as-a-sign.

He at least mentioned other words as candidates as well.

 Do these terms impact the concept of a grammar?

It depends on the grammar. If this were some other forum, your conception of 
grammar might be implicitly understood and accepted. Here, in a philosophical 
forum which happens to be a crossroads of many specialties and traditions, you 
need to define it and state the context and tradition from which you are 
drawing your sense of the word, in order to make yourself widely understood.

 Is this ad hoc extension of the concept of sign desirable for mathematics?
 How does it contribute to the mathematical usages of signs?

You specified neither the hoc nor the basal concept of which you characterize 
Peirce's terms as an extension. I guess everybody likes to think of his or her 
concept as the genus and of the other forms of the concept as the 
specializations.  But you haven't said what your concept is, 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-18 Thread Auke van Breemen

Ben,


-Original Message-
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Sent: vrijdag 16 juni 2006 16:25
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign


MessageAuke, list,

[Auke] Ben I have the feeling that much of your uneasyness is a
consequence of the way in which you use the terms. It seems as if you 
promote the semiotic aspects that can be discerned (are involved) in 
signs to full fledged signs. I try to make this clear between the 
lines.

[Auke] BU:
There is a qualisign which is the English word red, and which
consists in the appearance and/or sound of the word as 
written/printed/uttered.  The qualisign red's semiotic object is the
sinsign red which is the single actual appearance of the word red on
the page or its single utterance. The sinsign red is a replica of the
symbol red (and is an index).  This bothers me because the semiotic
object of both the legisign and sinsign reds is the red thing or
redness (dependently on context), but the semiotic object of the
qualisign red is the sinsign red, because a qualisign is always an
icon and can have for its object only that which it resembles.
---

[Auke] I would state things differently like: the English word red
involves the qualisign aspect. With qualisign aspect we draw 
attention to the qualities of a sign, its appearance or sound when 
written, printed, uttered, part of thought or perceived, to the 
exclusion of all other aspects.

BU
It seems six of one or half a dozen of the other. 
---

? The question mark expresses that I have to gamble a little. I quess
that it is an expression with a fixed meaning like It is synonymous in
its consequences.  
I don't see such a sameness in meaning in our wordings. But won't argue
this further. My initial response was written because you wrote about
something bothering you, that did bother me some time in the past, but
not anymore. 

For the remainder just one remark. I only keep the relevant context of
the previous mail.

1
[Auke] One of the objects in the range of possibilities is the sinsign
that arouse the feeling. We must be aware however that the sign in this

case is not red, but the feeling of red and the object is not the 
object of the sinsign red, but the sinsign red itself. Here we have 
one of the possible sources of error in the process by which signs 
generate their meaning effects.

BU:
The sign in this case is not feeling of red but feeling of 'red' 
i.e. the appearance of the _word_ red. 

Ben, you are right, this is better. Maybe it is even better to write
The feeling of '...'. This in order to express that in terms of
articulation it is below the iconic replica sinsign rheme level.



Best,
Auke



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread merkle
List, Bernard, Robert, Joe, Ben, Gary, Claudio, Arnaud,

For a long time I do not post on this list. I wish I had more time, so
interesting and dear to me is this topic. It's nice to see how this topic
is a recurrent theme in the important discussions that take place here,
and how new visualizations of Peirces classes appeared.

Well, some time ago I attempted to visualise Peirce's Classes and their
relations through a formalism known as a Hasse Diagram, which I extended
to three dimensions. It was a final chapter of a Computer Science Ph.D.
Thesis.

My aim was to show that some formalisms used in mathematics could
contribute to mediate some discussions I've found in the literature about
classes of signs.

Indeed, my objective was not to discuss the meaning of the classes, or the
corresponding order (or partial order) of the sign relation (triadic,
hexadic, decadic), but to show that different partial orders correspond to
different class sets. If a specific order (or partial order) was
correct according to Peirce was way beyond the scope of that work,
although I had my views of it.

The reader will find appendend a diagram of a  3D hasse
diagram of the ten classes. I've tried to include a second diagram of a 6D
Hasse Diagram of two sets of 28 classes (page 299 at
http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf), derived from two
distinct hexadic sign relations. The 729 possibilities appear on the
background.

Unfortunately it was too large to send to the list. There are some classes
in common in sets associated with distinct sign relations. Although I have
problems with the hexadic notion of sign, because I think that they lack
the relations between SOI, I never did a 10D Hasse diagram of the 66
classes, showing at least all 59059 possibilities.

A word of caution. At the time when I wrote it I used the term
categories instead of classes, which may cause confusion for those
acquainted with Peirce's work. My apologies. However, I always used
Cenopythagorean Categories to stand for Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness. Once I have time to review that text, replacing single
occurrences of categories to classes, I will post again the link to it
at Arisbe. For the moment, I post it on this list, which may contribute to
the currend discussion.

The whole chapter, which include several other visualizations of the
classes, and some footnotes indicating my favorite interpretations, is
available at:
http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf

[]s,
Luiz Merkle






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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen
Title: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign








List,



I did not know the Digital
Peirce online site before. But am now reading some article there which I regard
very good. And it is just the first article I am reading. Would advice people
here who did not see the site before to certainly take a look at the link below
(the modelling applets), but also to the site in general (removing the last
part of the mentioned http). So just http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/



Kind regards,



Wilfred











Van: Patrick Coppock
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: vrijdag 16 juni 2006
12:38
Aan: Peirce
 Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign,
Legisign, Qualisign







Ben, I wonder, have you, Gary or any of the others looked at and evaluated
any of the potential of the modelling applets mentioned below (this comes from
the Digital Peirce online site)?











http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/p-intfar.htm











Interactive diagrams for
Charles Peirce's classifications of signs





Priscila Farias





This article presents some results of an
ongoing program of research on new strategies for the visualization of sign
processes and structures --something I am proposing to call 'sign design'. The
current focus of this research are the various (3-, 10-, 28- and 66-fold)
classifications of signs described by Peirce. The main issue addressed here is
how computer graphics and design methodology may help us to build dynamic and
interactive models that serve as tools for the investigation of sign theory.
Two models are presented. One of them concerns specifically the 10-fold
classification, while the other deals with the deep structure of Peirce's
various trichotomic classifications. The first is '10cubes', an interactive 3-D
model of Peirce's 10-fold classification. The second is '3N3,' a computer
program that builds equivalent diagrams for any n-trichotomic classification of
signs, allowing us to analyze and compare different hypothesis regarding those
classifications.





Keywords: Peircean semiotics, graphic design, sign
design, dynamic diagrams, interface design, HCI











It would be interesting to hear your opinions.











Best











Patrick



-- 




Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www: http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty: http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-16 Thread Benjamin Udell



Wilfred wrote, 
"List, 
"I did not know the Digital Peirce online site before. "

I should just send this to every new peirce-lister. Additions  
corrections welcome. I've checked these links, they're all live, though some of 
the URLs seem to be the result of recent changes. - Ben Udell

- Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway: http://members.door.net/arisbe/ 
(Joseph Ransdell)
- Peirce-Related Papers On-Line http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm
- Papers by C.S. Peirce [Online] http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/aboutcsp.htm
- Special Resources http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/rsources.htm
- Syllabus - Classification of Sciences 1.180-202 G-1903-2b (1903) http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm
- Classification of the Sciences http://www.textlog.de/4257.html
- Digital Encyclopedia of C. S. Peirce http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/ 

- Dictionary of Peirce's Terminology http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html 
(Mats Bergman  Sami Paavola)
- The Peirce Helsinki Commens http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/index.html
- Peirce Edition Project http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce (Nathan 
Houser, Andre DeTienne, Indiana University Purdue University at 
Indianapolis, USA)
- UQAM satellite of the Peirce edition Project http://www.pep.uqam.ca/index_en.pep 
(François Latraverse  David Lachance, working on the preparation of the 
Century Dictionary material for W7)
- The Century Dictionary online http://www.global-language.com/century/
- The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlpeir.htm
- Charles Sanders Peirce: Published Works I http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlppw1.htm
- The Writings of Charles S. Peirce -- A Chronological Edition 
(Forthcoming) http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlcspc.htm
- [in FAQ] What is the relation between the various Peirce titles? http://www.nlx.com/pstm/pstmfaq.htm#peirce
- Conceptual Graphs http://conceptualgraphs.org/ (John Sowa, 
IBM, Fritz Lehmann, USA, et al.) 
- CeneP (Centro de Estudos Peirceanos) http://www.pucsp.br/pos/cos/cepe/ 
(M. Lúcia Santaella-Braga, Pontificia Universidade Católica de São Paulo 
(PUC-SP), Brasil)
- John Josephson, Ohio State, USA (LAIR: Logic of Abduction) http://www.cse.ohio-state.edu/~jj/
- Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos http://www.unav.es/gep/ (Jaime Nubiola, 
University of Navarra, Spain)
- The Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html
- Institute for the Study of Pragmaticism http://www.pragmaticism.net/
- Wyttynys.net (_His Glassy Essence_) http://www.wyttynys.net/ (Kenneth Lane 
Ketner)
- Computer Semiotics: Peircean Semiotics and Digital Representation http://www.ckk.chalmers.se/people/jmo/semiotics/
- Institut de Recherche en Sémiotique, Communication, et Éducation 
(L'I.R.S.C.E) http://www.univ-perp.fr/lsh/rch/semiotics/irsce/irsce.html 
(Gérard Deledalle, Joëlle Réthoré, Université de Perpignan, France)
- International Research Group on Abductive Inference at the Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth 
(Uwe Wirth, Alexander Roesler; Frankfurt, Germany)
- Research Group on Semiotic Epistemology and Mathematics Education, 
Institut für Didaktik der Mathematik http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/idm/semiotik/semiotik-e.html 
Michael Hoffman, Michael Otte, Universität Bielefeld, Germany)
- Nijmegen C.S.Peirce Study Center http://www.kun.nl/fil-beta/peirce-en.html 
(Guy DeBrock, Director; Menno Hulswit, Coordinator: University of Nijmegen, 
Netherlands) This Webpage seems to have disappeared, and the Wayback Machine (http://www.archive.org) says that access to 
archived versions has been blocked.
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-15 Thread Benjamin Udell



Wilfred, list,

Wilfred wrote,
So why would the word “red” be a symbol??? To me it is also not. I 
would regard the word “red” more as being a qualisign, which then would also fit 
the last sentence below. To me the word “red” can not be a sinsign since it is 
not an actual existing thing or event. And to me a quality (like red) can also 
not be a legisign. But I might be wrong. Of course.

Well, perhaps I should have said the _term_ (rather than the 
_word_) red is a symbol (and a legisign). It seems hard to argue 
against the idea that words do occur singularly, in single utterances, writings, 
printings. The classic example is the difference between the word "the" in 
general and the number of its occurrences on a given page.

There 
is a qualisign which is the English word "red," and which consists in the 
appearance and/or sound of the word as written/printed/uttered. The 
qualisign "red"'s semiotic object is the sinsign "red" which is the single 
actual appearance of the word "red" on the page or its single utterance. The 
sinsign "red" is a replica of the symbol "red" (and is an index). This 
bothers me because the semiotic object of both the legisign and sinsign "red"s 
is the red thing or redness (dependently on context), but the semiotic object of 
the qualisign "red" is the sinsign "red," because a qualisign is always an icon 
and can have for its object only that which it resembles. In the Peircean 
system, a qualisign cannot be a symbol because this would violate the 
involutionary rulewhich involvesthat3rds presuppose 2nds  
1sts, but not vice versa, and 2nds presuppose 1sts but not vice versa. 

And actually, I don't understand how it is that the sinsign "red," -- when 
used mainly as a replica of the symbol (and not used indexically with an 
implicit "over there!") -- can be regarded as having redness or something red as 
its semiotic object. If its semiotic object is redness or something red, because 
it is a replica, then I don't see why a qualisign "red" should not have redness 
or something red as its semiotic object by virtue of being a kind of qualisignal 
version of a replica of the symbol. I'd rather say that the single 
utterance/appearance of "red" is simply a symbolic sinsign (or "sinsignal 
symbol")andthat the qualisign "red" is simply a symbolic qualisign. 
The only purpose thatI can see in the constraints which eliminate these 
options is to maintain a rule which restrains the multiplication of signs but 
does little else except to multiply problems, having us adding little detours 
and curlicues like the conception of the "replica" and like the qualisign's 
being an icon of an indexical sinsign which is a replica of a symbol. In 
everyday language and thought we think of such qualities as colors as quite 
capable of being symbolic in certain typical contexts, and certain appearances 
such as that of the English word "horse" are so tied habitually with specific 
symbolic significations that I think it's just strange to say that it's false 
that the qualisign "horse" has for its semiotic object not a horse but an 
individual utterance, writing, or printing of the word "horse."

Now, suppose I define a kind of sign which I call an "evocant," and define 
it as any sign which is either a symbol or a replica of a symbol.The 
distinction between sinsign  legisign is not abolished by this. Instead, 
the replica becomes simply the sinsignal evocant and the symbol is the legisinal 
evocant. Well, it wouldn't be enough. If I define the evocant simply as either 
symbol or replica, then I've defined it as either symbol or a kind of index 
whose significative power I've already found problematic. Instead I have to 
argue that a singular thing is capable of "evoking" and I have to define this as 
a power much like symbolizing. I'd have to argue that the habits which 
constitute symbols can be tied to qualisigns in such a way as to embody 
themselves in sinsigns such that the qualisign "horse"'s object, the sinsign 
"horse"'s object, and the legisign "horse"'s object, are all the horse, insofar 
as all three evoke the horse in the interpretant mind. Now is it really false 
that the qualisign, the appearance, "horse" evokes a horse in its interpretant's 
mind? I think that the appearance of the word does evoke a horse in my mind at 
least, because of the habitual connection of that appearance with an idea of a 
horse. Furthermore the interplay of singular utterances, qualitative 
appearances, and habits,do affect the symbol in its habitual 
character.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen To: Peirce 
Discussion ForumSent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 6:43 PM Subject: 
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legis

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Bernard Morand

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies 
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in 
progress for Peirce.


I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering 
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.


However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow 
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2) 
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view. I would tend 
to comprehend such statements within a pessimistic view aiming at 
undervaluate what was at stake for an understanding of Peirce's 
semiotic. In fact your diagnosis could remain correct while what Peirce 
tried to clarify at the beginning of the century and during quite a 
decade could be of the utmost interest for semiotics. This is more or 
less my own view. In particular I think that if we manage to produce 
someday a sufficient account of signs theory in order that it be of 
practical usage in special sciences, such a sign theory will be informed 
by the 10 trichotomies system. I know that this statement will have to 
be justified but just an example: the study of concrete signs needs some 
concepts as the distinctions between immediate and dynamic objects, and 
betweeen the three interpretants too. From the theoretical point of view 
I am also convinced that the transition from the 3 trichotomies to 10 
and the relation between the two kinds of systems deserves to be studied 
on the methodological level (pragmatism).


Bernard




Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Ben asks:
 
My basic question here is whether these structural relations are 
correct or whether the ordering of the trichotomies I, II, III, IV, 
V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X is correct.
 
REPLY:
The MS material in the logic notebook (MS 339) shows quite clearly 
that Peirce did not regard himself as having arrived at anything he 
could regard as satisfactory, as regards the ten trichotomies, as late 
as Nov. 1 of 1909, and the two versions which he thought were -- at 
best -- the least objectionable were ones he formulated on Oct 13th of 
1905 and March 31st of 1906.  The version you are working with is from 
an unsent draft of a letter to Welby of 1908, a year earlier than the 
assessment just mentioned, and it differs in significant ways from the 
versions he thought best though still unsatisfactory.  The fact that 
it appears in the Collected Papers gives it no special status since it 
is really just discarded draft material.   Take all talk about the ten 
trichotomies with a VERY LARGE grain of salt, Ben, until we get 
some effective and shared access to the relevant MS material.  Of 
course it is perfectly okay for people to do their own constructions 
of the expanded set of trichotomies as they should have been 
formulated, provided they are clear on the fact that this is their own 
theory; but if the question is as to what Peirce's theory was it can 
only be said that it was work in progress which never arrived at a 
reasonably stable developed state and which cannot reasonably be 
represented as being his view.   
 
Joe Ransdell
 
 



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Joseph Ransdell
Bernard says::,

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in
progress for Peirce.

I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.

However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2)
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view.

REPLY:
I'll reply more extensively later in the day, Bernard, but the basis for
my saying this is as follows, from MS 339D.662 (1909 Nov 1)

=quote Peirce
During the past 3 years I have been resting from my work on the Division of 
Signs and have only lately -- in the last week or two -- been turning back 
to it; and I find my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though 
the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by without 
consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red The Prescott Book, and also this one 
[the Logic Notebook, MS 339], I find the entries in this book of 
Provisional Classification of 1906 March 31st and of 1905 Oct 13 
particularly in imporant from my present (accidentally limited, no doubt) 
point of view; particularly in regard to the point made in the Prescott 
Book, 1909 Oct 21, and what immediately precedes that in that book but is 
not dated.

Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to define this difference besween 
Icon, Index,  Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction 
as to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.

end quote==

Joe Ransdell




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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Bernard Morand
Thanks very much for the quote Joe. The last sentence puzzles me. Will 
have to think about it: seems like Peirce considered lately that he had 
earlier put erroneously some considerations related to the (dynamic) 
interpretant  into his characterizations of the relation of the object 
to the sign. This is a common mistake that we all do everyday.


Bernard


Joseph Ransdell a ¨crit :


Bernard says::,

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in
progress for Peirce.

I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.

However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2)
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view.

REPLY:
I'll reply more extensively later in the day, Bernard, but the basis for
my saying this is as follows, from MS 339D.662 (1909 Nov 1)

=quote Peirce
During the past 3 years I have been resting from my work on the Division of 
Signs and have only lately -- in the last week or two -- been turning back 
to it; and I find my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though 
the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by without 
consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red The Prescott Book, and also this one 
[the Logic Notebook, MS 339], I find the entries in this book of 
Provisional Classification of 1906 March 31st and of 1905 Oct 13 
particularly in imporant from my present (accidentally limited, no doubt) 
point of view; particularly in regard to the point made in the Prescott 
Book, 1909 Oct 21, and what immediately precedes that in that book but is 
not dated.


Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to define this difference besween 
Icon, Index,  Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction 
as to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.


end quote==

Joe Ransdell




 




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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-14 Thread Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen








So why would the word red be a
symbol??? To me it is also not. I would regard the word red more
as being a qualisign, which then would also fit the last sentence below. To me
the word red can not be a sinsign since it is not an actual
existing thing or event. And to me a quality (like red) can also not be a
legisign. But I might be wrong. Of course.



Wilfred 











Van:
Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Verzonden: dinsdag 13 juni 2006
9:51
Aan: Peirce
 Discussion Forum
Onderwerp: [peirce-l]
Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign







. If the same rules hold for these 10 trichotomies as for
the three, then it would appear, for instance, that all symbols are copulants.
Copulants neither
describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express logical
relations; for example If--then--; --causes--.
That seems like it just must be wrong. Then a symbol like the word
red couldn't be a symbol, instead, since it's descriptive, it can
be a legisign, a sinsign, or a qualisign, but in any case it has to be a descriptive abstractive iconic
hypothetical sympathetic suggestive gratific rhematic assurance of instinct.
That just can't be right.














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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Joseph Ransdell
Gary:

Would you mind reposting the diagram you refer to below?  I don't recall 
what was said about that at that time but I think it important to get clear 
on what can and cannot legitimately be imputed to Peirce, and the absence of 
availability of the relevant MS material is important to bear in mind and I 
don't recall if that was sufficiently stressed at that time.

Joe


.
- Original Message - 
From: Gary Richmond [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 10:35 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign


Claudio, Ben, Robert, Bernard, Joe, list,

Claudio, so goo to see you on list. I too am pleased to see all the
diagrammatic discussion and especially some of Ben's abductions relating
diagrams (one I believe he hasn't posted yet, but which I hope he will,
shows a possible correspondence between Robert's lattice
structure--which I want to discuss this summer with I want to respond to
just one of your questions, Claudio, as it concerns the diagram of the
10 classes of signs which I devised and which Ben produced in power
point. You asked:
I am sure that also Ben/Gary's diagram has a criteria for that
rotation...? Which is the purpose of that change?








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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Gary Richmond




Claudio, Ben, Robert, Bernard, Joe, list,

First, sorry for sending out that last incomplete message by mistake.

Claudio, so good to see you on the list again. I too am pleased to see
all the
diagrammatic discussion and especially some of Ben's abductions
relating diagrams (for example the one which shows a possible
correspondence between Robert's lattice
structure--which possible correspondence I want to discuss this summer
at ICCS in Aalborg, Denmark with Rudolf Wille, whom I believe in part
inspired Robert to his lattice structure of the 10 classes). 

I want now to respond
to just one of your questions, Claudio, as it concerns the diagram of
the 10 classes of signs which I devised and which Ben produced in power
point and now in these new gifs. You asked:
 I am sure that also Ben/Gary's diagram has a
criteria for that rotation...? Which is the purpose of that change?
The diagram of the 10 classes is itself meant to be observed as a
categorial trikon with firstness at the top, secondness at the bottom,
and thirdness to the right (as in all trikonic structures):

firstness
| thirdness
secondness

for semeiotics this involves the structure of semiosis itself:

sign
| interpretant
object

and for each of these in the 9-adic diagram, which are the parameters
of the signs to be embodied at the level of the 10-adic
classification--using Ben Udell's very useful parametric notion 
language which came about as he was editing my ICCS paper on trikonic
of last year, available at Arisbe-- (these three themselves arranged as
the trikon of 3 trikons) upon which Peirce builds his 10-adic
classification. So we have:

9 sign parameters

sign (in itself) parameters: 

qualisign
| legisign
sinsign


| interpretant parameters:

. . .rheme
. . .| argument
. . .proposition


object parameters:

icon
| symbol
index


Finally, as noted at the top, my diagram of the 10 classes of
signs is itself arranged trikonically, three trikons of trikons
(each associated with one of the three categories for reasons which I
hope are obvious enough involving the notion that firstness, secondness
or thirdness dominate their respective structures) around a central
single lone trikon (which is NOT dominated by firstness,
secondness, or thirdness at this level of structure), namely the
rhematic indexical legisign. One is supposed to see all these
levels of tricategorial structure observing the diagram, so of course,
as the _expression_ goes, trying to explain it is like trying to explain
a joke. :-) Maybe Ben can do a better job?

Best,

Gary





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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Joseph Ransdell
Frances:

In view of what I was just now relating to Ben, I would have to regard the 
sort of enterprise you speculate about below as a timewaster of monumental 
proportions, promising to generate word salad that startle even the inmates 
at Bedlam, given that it would be based on an unreliable understanding of 
Peirce's view to begin with (as I explained to Ben), taken together with 
what is surely a misguided attempt to conflate Peircean semiotic with the 
radically different conception of Charles Morris (as Gene Halton reminds us 
now and again).

In short: fuhgeddaboutit! (as T. Soprano might state the point).

Joe Ransdell


- Original Message - 
From: Frances Kelly [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 10:59 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign


Frances to listers...

The broad theme of this topic and its leading threads is a subject
that remains intriguingly foggy for me. At the core of my haze perhaps
is the forced application of categorics upon semiotics, yet with
synechastics lurking in the wings. In my attempt to wrestle with the
many classes of signs in acts of semiosis as listed by Peirce, it is
tempting to take various kinds of signs he mentioned and organize them
within a sort of tridential diagram of soles and pairs and terns.

Some of those signs would require a tentative assumption that they are
not mere synonyms of each other. These signs might include potisigns
and actisigns and famsigns as immediate representamen signs or
moderating vehicles, and then qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns as
immediate object signs of fundamental reference, and then icons and
indexes and symbols as dynamic object signs of advanced reference.
These might also include semes or rhemes and sumisigns and terms as
immediate interpretant signs of initial effect, and then phemes and
dicisigns or dicents and propositions as dynamic interpretant signs of
obstinate or remediate effect, and last delomes or dolemes and
suadisigns and arguments as final interpretant signs of destinate and
culminate and ultimate effect. Another thorn here for me is that those
classes of dynamic object signs and dynamic interpretant signs are of
secondness, but are not listed or structured in a trichotomically
consistent manner. In other words and for example, icons would be a
sole first, with indexes and symbols as a subsequent dual pair under
some categorical umbrella, which is seemingly missing here.

All these signs furthermore might rest only within the first semiosic
division of grammatics, often called the inscriptive information of
signs by Morrisean semioticians. Many of the signs mentioned correctly
as other interpretant signs might very well be kinds of super signs
that rest further within the other semiosic divisions of critics and
rhetorics, where critics is often called the descriptive evaluation of
signs, and rhetorics is often called the prescriptive evocation of
signs, again by Morrisean semioticians. Those other interpretant
super signs that could be deemed post grammatic might include
normative assurances to the signer or semiotician of the sign.

Another thorn for me is whether Peirce intended that these further
divisions of critics and rhetorics, and seemingly infused with
advanced interpretant signs, would be categorically structured as
phenomenal trichotomies. In this regard, it remains tempting for me to
structure the Peircean divisions of grammatics and critics and
rhetorics each with the Morrisean dimensions of syntactics and
semantics and pragmatics. This might then allow for advanced
interpretants to take on the critical characteristics of appraised
syntactic values and defined semantic meanings and inferred pragmatic
judgements or worths, and for further advanced interpretants under
rhetorics to deal with the syntactic means of communication and the
semantic signification of modes and the pragmatic methods of
responsive actions. All signs would of course be speculative.

The further assumption by me is that while these signs in acts of
semiosis are all objective logical constructs, semiotics or logics in
the broadest sense actually embraces both nonlingual and lingual
signs, and lingual signs would presumably embrace both nonverbal and
verbal signs, but linguistics and its languages is held to a practical
science by Peirce, and thus excluded from semiotic concern as having
no logical import. Of course, all logical signs used by humans are
seemingly proposed by Peirce as degenerate forms of pure logic, so
that there should be little problem in permitting lingual signs into
semiotics and thus into logic. This may imply however that semiotics
with linguistics is degenerate logics, while the normative sciences
aligned as aesthetics and ethics and logics is less so. Nonetheless,
interpretants like terms and propositions are both held by Peirce to
be either nonlingual or lingual, thereby probably yielding arguments
where some

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Joseph Ransdell



Gary:

Sorry for the confusion of the ten classes with 
the ten trichotomies. I didn't read your message carefully enough. I 
have no problem with that and there is no need to respond further to 
it.

Joe

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Gary 
  Richmond 
  To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
  Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 11:51 
  AM
  Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, 
  Legisign, Qualisign
  Joe,By now you've read my corrected and completed post 
  so that I hope some of what you asked is addressed in that corrected post. 
  Just a point or so more for now. You wrote:
  Would you mind reposting the diagram you refer to below?  It 
  is my trikonic diagram of the 10 classes of signs which you find as an 
  attached gif and, hopefully, at the bottom of the message. Ben has produced 
  various versions of this, the last one includes his abduction that relates 
  Robert's lattice structure to my trikonic one.
  I don't recall 
what was said about that at that time but I think it important to get clear 
on what can and cannot legitimately be imputed to Peirce, and the absence of 
availability of the relevant MS material is important to bear in mind and I 
don't recall if that was sufficiently stressed at that time.I 
  agree. My suggestion has been that the diagram at CP 2.264 and the 
  one at EP2:491 are equivalent diagrams (there's much more to be said here 
  regarding some of my reservations, but suffice it to say for now that they are 
  related precisely to the ones you just expressed).That Peirce 
  apparently included this triangular on the back of a letter which included a 
  very tentative presentation of his very different 10 trichotomies of signs has 
  I think resulted in confusing that discussion (EP 483-490) with the 
  diagram in the Essential Peirce which is not as I see it of the 10 
  trichotomies discussed in the letter, but rather of the famous and completed 
  10 classes (the diagram is labeled "Signs Divided into Ten Classes" not 
  into 10 categories). I do not see how the diagram in EP2 would 
  have the variety of numberings which they have since they are all "static" 
  parameters (in Ben's  my sense). Three of them are used to generate the 
  completed diagram of the 10 classes, the 9 parameters recently discussed, and 
  the placement of these in the EP2 diagram strongly suggests that the diagram 
  does not concern these plus 7 additional ones (relating to the two forms of 
  the object and the three of the interpretant). The nonadic group does not 
  requite categorial numbering because those parameters are not embodied. Again, 
  I would hope that diagram observation would make this clear enough.On 
  the other hand, and for the reasons you've recently given, except for my own 
  "guess" at the structure of the later 10 trichotomies (which Ben has put into 
  an attractive form), I have not spent much time on the unfinished, problematic 
  10 trichotomies, while I have found the finished classification most 
  helpful in semeiotic analyses, and not just at the level of semeiotic grammar, 
  but in critic and methodeutic as 
  well.Best,Gary---Message from peirce-l forum to 
  subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  
  

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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Gary Richmond




Ben, list,

By now you've received my completed and corrected message which omits
the request for the not-simplified lattice version of my trikonic
diagram of the 10 classes (since I very much like your simplified form
which I included in the revised message) and adds analytical content.
For right now, and also since I've posted too much today, I'd like to
address for now just your question of why I called your diagram adding
the lattice structure to my trikonic diagram an "abduction." Well,
really, you point to it yourself. 
What I'm getting at, is that it really is fair
to say that the 10-adic triangular arrangement turns out to be quite
suitable to depict the lattice for. . . the structureof ordering and
non-ordering.
Combining the two may also allow for a kind of possible diagram
observation and manipulation which either one apart from the other
wouldn't. Also, what you are "getting at" in the comment above is
clear once one sees it diagrammed! But I do not think that
your bringing together the lattice structure and the trichotomic one is
trivial, and it is that combination which I think may constitute a kind
of abduction (or maybe it's really a form of diagram
manipulation--although perhaps I really do think that to say that the
10-adic triangular structure is suitable for depicting the lattice
structure is a kind of abduction).

Best, 

Gary

Benjamin Udell wrote:

  
  
  
  Gary R., list,
  
  (Note: anybody responding, please remember to delete all
unneeded graphics  text.)
  
  Gary Richmond wrote,
  (one I believe he hasn't posted yet, but which I hope he
will, shows a possible correspondence between Robert's lattice
structure...
  
  The graphic which I already posted (and which is the first one
shown here) pretty much shows it. It's just simplified, and is at a
different angle as a whole than Robert's, and is with Robert's vertical
arrows slanted in order to be like others. Gary's calling this an
"abduction" but, unless he means that I've kidnapped Robert's lattice
diagram (I certainly have done _something_ with it! :-)), the only
element of abduction or surmise is that I don't know whether the
verticality of some of Robert's arrows in fact is somehow determinate
in terms of the lattice representation. I can see how one could argue
that it makes "the most sense" but my surmise is that the distinctive
slope of those arrows with respect to the others is indeed optional.
Aside from that, and aside from the overall orientation and handedness
(left/right) of the visual representation, there's little if any
surmise in it, instead it's an equivalence (at least up to a point,
which I'll get to in a moment). The lattice structure is pretty much
"deterministic" -- I mean, that aside from our flipping it horizontally
or vertically or whatever, and aside from our turning the
"loose-end"-looking vertices to one angle or another, etc., etc., .its
vertices are in a definite arrangement. What I'm getting at, is that it
really is fair to say that the 10-adic triangular arrangement turns out
to be quite suitable to depict the lattice for -- I don't know what
it's called --the structureof ordering and non-ordering. The second
graphic is a re-created version of Robert Marty's. The third is a cross
between Robert Marty's style and Gary's trikonic style. The fourth shows
  


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Frances Kelly
Frances to listers...

As posited by Peirce under speculative grammatics, it is clear enough
to me that the classes of immediate object signs are qualisigns and
sinsigns and legisigns, and that the classes of dynamic object signs
are icons and indexes and symbols, and that the various interpretant
signs of these signs are classed as immediate and dynamic and final.
What is not clear to me however is what classes of signs Peirce may
have posited to account for immediate representamen signs. These would
presumably be determined by the immediate and dynamic objects they
refer to, and would in turn presumably determine the various terns of
interpretants they generate as an effect. Such representamens
therefore would presumably constitute the sign vehicles or carriers
that moderate between their objects and their interpretants.

The only tern of signs Peirce mentions that might be posited to fit
this class called immediate representamen signs are potisigns and
actisigns and famsigns. There is however some seeming resistance among
semioticians and pragmatists to allocate this fundamental tern in such
a way, but the reasons usually turn either on substitutions, whereby
they are claimed to be mere synonyms stated earlier by Peirce for what
is now correctly deemed to be immediate object signs, or on the fact
that they are not mentioned in the familiar ten classes of signs. If
these reasons justly warrant dismissing them from serious semiotic
concern, then the problem persists for me as to just what exactly are
immediate representamen signs within semiosis.



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
Joe, Bernard, Wilfred, list,

_Magno cum grano salis_ it is, then. The content of the 10-chotomy on which I 
got my paws is very suggestive, beginning with the sign's own phenomenological 
category and ending with a trichotomy of _assurances_ of instinct, experience, 
and form, i.e., as at an inquiry's end. I look forward to comparing the 
10-chotomies of -- (clears throat) -- semio-parametric trichotomies.

Wilfred, for my part I don't happen to know why Peirce put some relationships 
and not others into that 10-chotomy. With Peirce, sometimes things not 
immediately explained do have explanations. For all I know, Peirce himself was 
dissatisfied with that 10-chotomy for the pattern of inclusions  exclusions 
which you mention. As Joe said, Peirce didn't bring this aspect of his work 
into a satisfactory form.

The reason that Peirce wanted to put his definitions into structural, 
diagrammatic relations is the same reason that scientists like to do that 
with physical quantities. It unifies understanding, turns it into a sensitive 
web, and makes far-separated things into both supports and checks/balances to 
each other. The unification of conceptions of mathematical  empirical 
understanding in his accounts of the observations and manipulation of diagrams 
has not yet been plumbed, so far as I can tell. The structuring-together of 
definitions strengthens the constraints for consistency, pattern, and logical 
dependence, and provides constraints for making clarity out of things which 
seemed hopelessly confused. However, it's a rare thing to combine a talent for 
that with a talent for giving structural names and habitations to the deep 
elements  patterns of human life  experience. Peirce comes before some sort 
of weird great divide in philosophy, when those who aspired to logical 
structure tended to try to reduce and explain away the deeper things, while 
those whose inclination was opposite thereto seemed to become strangely 
estranged from the scientific worldview.  Anyway, whatever ultimate entelechy 
might be reached would be something beyond our imagining -- if a diagram, then 
a diagram beyond our imagining, and I much doubt that Peirce thought that he 
could imagine in any detail what it would be like. It's an ideal-limit idea, 
something that might be infinitely far off. C.S. Peirce often said that 
adequate research will discover anything, but he never said that ultiimate 
truth was within his grasp (i.e., that adequate earthly funding of C.S. Peirce 
would lead to ultimate truth :-). Now Peirce did think that _some_ of his 
structures of ideas had reached their final form -- he wasn't 
infallibilistically sure of it, but he felt reasonably sure -- but as to the 
10-chotomies of semio-parametric trichotomies, he'd certainly agree that 
they're not at endstate and he'd like very much for discussion and research to 
go on and on. Peirce was not the kind to think that the patent office would 
need to be closed in the foreseeable future.

Best, Ben Udell

- Original Message - 
From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen 
To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 5:55 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

Dear list,

I would like to state First of all that I regard the ongoing discussion about 
sinsign, legisign and qualisign here on the list as being very interesting. 
But, I also have my remarks. Some of them might be worthwhile to reconsider. Or 
not. It might also just be I am just not wise enough to respond the way I do.

First remark is just some remark about the first diagram here below. With the I 
to X at the left. There is stated at IV The relation to the sign to the dynamic 
object. What I do not understand is why there is stated nowhere the relation 
of the sign to the immediate object? Then there is VII the relation of the sign 
to the dynamic interpretant. Again, why nowhere the relation of the sign to the 
immediate interpretant? Then X..why not more triadic relations

Another remark I have, is that somehow Charles Sander Peirce disappoints me if 
he really aimed at putting his definitions in a diagram and if he thought that 
would ever lead to some all-inclusive and complete diagram with perfect 
entelechy. Or, connected with that, that he would think that all thoughts 
SHOULD be diagrammatic. This has to do with the Dutch saying de weg is het 
doel. Maybe. Or maybe not. My dissappointment is still not much if i am 
correct on this one since his definitions are great and also this diagrammatic 
reflections are. But still, I am wondering.

Last remark I have is that Charles Sander Peirce still was a human being like 
all of us. Not some god that never made any mistakes. So whether some diagram 
being his endstate or not is not so important. More important is that the 
discussions will be going on and on and on. Because, eventually, about ALL 
social theories and insights will be wrong. Or, should I say, just less 
optimal for new contexts and social

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-10 Thread Bernard Morand




Benjamin Udell wrote :

  
  
  
  
  I had already produced the second table (Fig. 3) when you sent
the graphic of Peirce's own table. It's really just Joe's table,
re-produced asan HTML table, and with the second column put into
"standard" order (a, ab, abc instead of a, ba, cba) consistentlylike
the other columns. 
  The basic idea was to use less memory and make it easier for
people to edit. Actually, Joe's graphic is small in KB but image files
in emails tend to use more than their own filesize in KB. Anyway, Joe's
descriptors in the first trichotomy happened to be plural nouns, and I
merely followed along in that regard. Part of the reason for the colors
is that they make the html table cohere better. In the html table, it's
more difficult to make everything line up nicely. The colors help.
  
  The emphasis on the viewpoint of the first trichotomy helps
emphasize that the three trichotomies are ordered (first
trichotomy, second trichotomy, third trichotomy), ordered ina way
which is embodied in the collective structure of ideas uniting the
three trichotomies. I had known about this but not really focused on it
before. Wilfred's question about qualisigns/sinsigns/legisigns became
my occasion to really think about it. Here I've added examples to it,
they're all from Peirce but I pasted them in whole-hog from James
Elkins' "Problems with Peirce" http://jameselkins.com/Texts/Peirce.pdf
which, despite the ominousness of its title, displays some real
engagement with Peirce and anyway has a number of handy tables. Turned
out he ordered them all-ascending too.

The view point from the first trichotomy emphasizes an order on the
trichotomies. That's true. Yet this order is not the whole of the
subject matter: it is only the order of the numerical sequence 1, 2, 3
but it does not account for the fact that into three, 2 and 1 can be
found and the fact that into two, 1 can be found. So, developping the
original Peirce's table could result into this alternative
presentation to the one you gave below, this one being grounded on the
second trichotomy: 

icons -(in)- quality -(for)- rhema
icons -(in)- singularity -(for)- rhema
icons -(in)-  law -(for)- rhema
indexes -(in)- singularity -(for)- rhema
...etc.
symbols -(in)- law -(for)- rhema
...etc.

And there is of course a third development grounded on the third
trichotomy showing the structure of rhematic signs, dicent signs and
arguments.

This is the reason why I asked for an explanation of the plural. You
answered that Joe is the original author, I would be interested in his
own view on this. From the point of view of structural forms which was
my starting point, Joe's presentation is a composite of three joined
subgraphs, each of which is a tree (in the Aristotelian tradition)
while Peirce's presentation is a table equipped with an internal
ordering relation. The main practical difference is that the former
cannot display the forbidden combinations while the latter does. For
example, the construct (see below) can't show that qualisigns -
indexical - rhematic are prohibited while the Peirce's table shows it.
I suspect that the invention of matrix calculus at his time and his own
work with quaternions influenced his way of thinking the form of
classifications. I never found a justification of this idea in the
sources but I would be interested in the reflexions of listers if any.
There is evidence that Mendeleiev chemical classification was a
reference for Peirce and it was a table too. But as far as I can know
there remains an enigma on the fact that Peirce invented suddenly the
first trichotomy around 1903 though he had worked the two others in
every detail for many years. Was not such an invention the result of
the necessity of achieving a neat structure for sign classification?
Another way of putting things could be to say that Joe's presentation
is directed in a sense by a specific linguistic usage that requires in
our so called indo-european languages to put things in the form
Subject-Verb-Object(s). Thus the peculiar status attributed to
qualisign, sinsign, legisign that become with the help of the plural
gender the subjects of quasi sentences. I have shown above that there
are two possible alternate forms. In fact I think that in the Peirce's
presentation the terms like qualisign, index, ...and so on, are neither
linguistic nor syntactical elements. They are just markers for places
in a structure of relations, like letters in a geometrical figure. Now
this fact does not prevent to define that which is marked by such
markers.

Ben, as regards to the discussion on the borromean knot and the fourth
category, I did not intend to make your system enter into the figure of
the borromean knot. I was using the latter as some kind of metaphor in
order to inquire into the kind of relation that the 4th category (as
you conceive it) could entertain with the three others. I had always
supposed through your posts that you agree on the idea that Sign,
Object and 

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-09 Thread Gary Richmond




Ben wrote:

  qualisign = tone = potisign
  sinsign = token = actisign
  legisign = type = famisign
   
  While these are often called alternate names of the same things,
Gary has said that they aren't just sets of synonyms but instead
reflect some differences of conception. I.e., for some purposes we
treat them as 9 qualisigns correlated to the same 3 legisigns, but
maybe they're really 9 legisigns.

My position has rather been that these are three sets of synonyms (with
perhaps some subtle changes of emphasis) with the exception of "token"
which is used by Peirce for a brief time as equivalent to "symbol".
See, for example in "On the Algebra of Logic":
CP 3.360  A sign is in a conjoint relation to
the thing denoted and to the mind. If this triple relation is not of a
degenerate species, the sign is related to its object only in
consequence of a mental association, and depends upon a habit. Such
signs are always abstract and general, because habits are general rules
to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for the most
part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the
main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment. For the sake
of brevity I will call them tokens.†3
And the editors' footnote:
Peirce: CP 3.360 Fn 3 p 210
    †3 More frequently called 'symbols'; the word 'token' is later (in
4.537) taken to apply to what in 2.245 is called a 'sinsign.
Unfortunately at the moment I won't be able to get further into this
matter or some of the other points of Ben's interesting post.

Gary


Benjamin Udell wrote:

  
  

  
  Wilfred, list,
   
  (Note: if responding to this html, please remember to delete any
unneeded graphics and text.)
   
  As far as I can tell, when a quality functions as a sign, then
it functions only iconically, the idea being that that's all that it
semiotically _can_ do _as_ a quality. A quality is
just a possibility. The colors of litmus in a litmus test are not
qualisigns but indexical reactions which can, of course, be resembled,
iconized, but which are functioning indexically. Likewise, a symbolic
color is functioning as a sinsignal replica of a legisign, and not as a
qualisign. I'm not sure whether those things clarify your questions,
and anyway I stand ready to be corrected on these matters by listers.
   
  I have to admit, I'm not too firm on qualisigns myself.
According to Joseph Ransdell (as opposed to Thomas L. Short), the
general idea of "the" is the legisign (aka type aka famisign), the
appearances "the," "el," "la," "lo," "le," "der," "die," "das," etc.
are different qualisigns (aka tones aka potisigns), and the individual
instance on the page or utterance in real life is the sinsign (aka
token aka actisign). The idea of an "individual" instance in an
electronic document is a bit more problematic, but that problem is
certainly not peculiar to Peircean signs theory.
   
  qualisign = tone = potisign
  sinsign = token = actisign
  legisign = type = famisign
   
  While these are often called alternate names of the same things,
Gary has said that they aren't just sets of synonyms but instead
reflect some differences of conception. I.e., for some purposes we
treat them as 9 qualisigns correlated to the same 3 legisigns, but
maybe they're really 9 legisigns.
   
  What's not clear to me is this. If, say, I have a diagrammatic
image, as reproduced in text books, and it's neither the individual
diagram (sinsign) nor the general complex idea of the diagram (iconic
rhematic legisign) then it's an icon of "some" individual diagram.
Every qualisign is an icon, though not every icon is a qualisign.
   
  In any case, is it the case that, whatever the involved icon's
object, said object is the qualisign's object? 
   
  Now, if Dutch  _paard_ and English "horse" are two
qualisigns attached to the same idea, that of a horse, then of what are
they icons? Of the individual instances (sinsigns) embodying them? I
guess so.
   
  Now, if, for instance, I have an iconic sinsign for a horse,
then it's an icon for a horse AND a sinsign for a horse -- indeed, for
the same horse, be it an actual horse, or a generic typical horse, or
some fictional horse, etc., etc.
   
  So, if the qualisignal icon has AN object, then one would think
that it would be the same object in regard to both the qualisignal
 iconic aspects. Otherwise one would (I think) have to think of
the total sign as a composite, somehow, of a qualisign and an icon,
rather than as a sign with qualisignal  iconic dimensions.
   


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-09 Thread Benjamin Udell



Gary, list,

Well, I can't remember any more just what conversation it might have been 
that started that notion going in my mind till it turned into something 
mythical. Any record is lost on my old ruined hard drive. I simply have to stop 
relying on these vague recallings when I post to peirce-l. In the old days, it 
didn't seem to matter too much, somebody could always correct me. But now the 
peirce-l posts go to mail-archive.com, and there get picked up by the big search 
engines, so for the foreseeable future there I am saying "Gary Richmond said x" 
etc. When it comes to this sort of thing, from now on I must get it right the 
first time. (Speaking of wishing not to rely solely on my memory, also I have to 
save things from the Internet oftener. I once found a fascinating discussion of 
how it turned out that deductive math theory of information turned out to be 
equivalent to areas in abstract algebra. Now it's gone!)

Best, Ben


Gary wrote,
Ben wrote:

  qualisign = tone =potisign
  sinsign =token = actisign
  legisign = type = famisign
  
  While these are often called alternate names of the same things, Gary has 
  said that they aren't just sets of synonyms but instead reflect some 
  differences of conception. I.e., for some purposes we treat them as 9 
  qualisignscorrelated tothe same 3 legisigns, but maybe they're 
  really 9 legisigns.My position has rather been that these are 
three sets of synonyms (with perhaps some subtle changes of emphasis) with the 
exception of "token" which is used by Peirce for a brief time as equivalent to 
"symbol". See, for example in "On the Algebra of Logic":
CP 3.360 A sign is in a conjoint relation to the 
  thing denoted and to the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate 
  species, the sign is related to its object only in consequence of a mental 
  association, and depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and 
  general, because habits are general rules to which the organism has become 
  subjected. They are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They 
  include all general words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying 
  a judgment. For the sake of brevity I will call them tokens.†3And 
the editors' footnote:
Peirce: CP 3.360 Fn 3 p 210 †3 
  More frequently called 'symbols'; the word 'token' is later (in 4.537) taken 
  to apply to what in 2.245 is called a 'sinsign.Unfortunately at the 
moment I won't be able to get further into this matter or some of the other 
points of Ben's interesting post.Gary
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-08 Thread Bernard Morand

From the own hand of the  inventor ( MS 339, August 7th 1904) :



B Morand






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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-08 Thread Benjamin Udell



Thank you, 
Bernard!-Ben




  
  
Qualisign
Sinsign
Legisign
  

  
Icon
Index
Symbol
  

  
Rheme
Dicisign
Argument




  
  
qualisigns –
iconic –
rhematic
  

  
/ sinsigns 
   \
iconic –
rhematic
  

  
indexical 
rhematic
  
dicentic
  

  
/legisigns   
  \
iconic –
rhematic
  

  
indexical 
rhematic
  
dicentic
  

  
/symbolic 
   \
rhematic
  
dicentic
  
argumental
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

2006-06-06 Thread Frances Kelly
Frances to Wilfred Berendsen...

These signs are of recurring interest to me also, and several past
messages dealing with them by experts are in the list archive. Any
replies to you will hence be followed with enthusiasm. My present
access to the writings of Peirce is limited, but other writers who
refer to these signs might indeed be found in further sources. My
thought here turns for example to books by Alfred Ayer, James
Feiblemen, Thomas Goudge, Benjamin Lee, Winfried Noth, David Savan,
and Thomas Sebeok who all mention and discuss these Peircean signs to
varying degrees, if this is what you are after.

One initial point is that in a strict categorization the correct
ordering of these signs is as qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns.
They are also seemingly not only subjective notions stirred in mind,
but are deemed objective logical constructs that are found or
discovered to exist in the ontic arena of the world, which can then of
course be used to evoke mental notions.

My understanding is that these signs are of immediate objects, and
might further be best called iconic subsigns. To be categorically
consistent, these signs in my opinion might be held to have
subordinate subclasses that fall under them, so that qualisigns would
perhaps have tones, while sinsigns would perhaps have tokens and
replicas, yet legisigns would perhaps have types and something like
codes and semes. There is a tendency however for some interpreters of
Peirce to claim that tones and tokens and types are either mere
alternate synonyms for qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, or are a
broader class of signs in semiosis that goes to making the ideal seem
real to sense.

The subsequent dynamic objects of signs or the main proper signs of
semiosis as generated by immediate interpretants would then be called
icons and indexes and symbols.

My tentative reading of the Peircean literature also leads me to
understand that the signs or iconic subsigns of preceding immediate
representamen are perhaps called potisigns and actisigns and famsigns.
The allocation of this fundamental trident or class of signs in such a
way is however not fully clear to me, as they are often suggested by
many scholars to be mere early substitutes for qualisigns and sinsigns
and famsigns. This explanation would seem to be unlikely though, since
they are after all listed by Peirce as a separate class of signs.

The issue of determinate objects and degenerate signs might also be of
some importance in regard to the subsigns or subclasses of semiotic
immediacy.


Wilfred wrote...
Currently I am very interested in the notions of sinsign, legisign and
qualisign. I know there have been discussions about this before, with
phrases out of texts from CS Peirce defining these terms. What I
however would like to know, is in what texts (preferably from the
essential peirce 12 since I have these) from Peirce and also in what
texts of other scientists explaining his notions, it is best explained
what these notions are all about. I am looking for texts or
combinations of texts  where these notions are explained as complete
as possible.



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