At 11:52 11/12/98 -0800, Ken Hanly wrote: > My bit of whimsy mislead you. Of course the Sicilian gesture did not cause the >change in Wiittgenstein all by itself. I always like to pull economical legs. Von >Wright's remarks are probably quite accurate but my remarks do indicate precisely the >sort of thing that Wittgenstein was convinced was wrong and I note that Sraffa woke >Wittgenstein from his dogmatic slumbers-- as Wittgenstein notes in his preface to the >Investigations.. Ramsey no doubt helped as well. Wittgenstein would never use the sort of >language I used, although he was certainly offensive at times and in a famous incident is >said to have threatened other philosophers with a poker. You ignore all the important >detail of my post that gives it its significance, for I try to make clear what >precisely Sraffa's influence changed in Wittgenstein's views. __________ I didn't comment on those aspects because to a large extent I did not disagree with what you said there. Moreover, I have just started studying Wittgenstein--I'm no Wittgenstein scholar. I do have a shoft corner for Wittgenstein because from all the accounts I have read he was a man bodering on madness but exteremly genuine in his relationship with others, would not have anything do with with conceit, and was genuinely lonely. ________ > By the way the Investigations was not actually published until two years after >Wittgenstein died. He was not able to get it into the finished form he desired. _______ That's right. So the Preface only relates to the first part of Philosophical Investigation. __________ I have no >idea what you are talking about when you refer to silences. Are you sure you haven't been >listening to John Cage rather than reading the Tractatus? > Wittgenstein does talk about silence in the Tractatus but the term is to be >understood as a deduction from his model of the ideal language. The relationship between >language and the world cannot be said or described but only the logical form shown >through the similarity of structure of the symbol and the fact. One of the analogies uses >is a model of a traffic accident versus the accident, or a map and the territory. >Communication is possible through SEEING the common structure of model elements in the >model and actual autos to each other in reality. This can only be shown and not itself >spoken of--according to Wittgenstein. Hence he says: That whereof one cannot speak, one >must be silent. Are these the silences whereof Ajit speaks? This silence disappears in >the Investigations and is replaced by a lot of noisy lanuage games since the whole idea >was based upon an incorrect model of how language works. _____________ I'm sorry I misled you there. I was talking about Sraffa's silences in PCMC (i.e. Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities) and not Wittgenstein's dictum in *Tractatus*. By the way, what do you mean by "incorrect model of how language works"? Is a critique of *Philosophical Investigation* lurking here or it was the *Tractatus* model that is beeing reffered to as being "incorrect"? Thanks for the references below. Cheers, ajit sinha ______ > From 1926 to 1928 just before he went to Cambridge WIttgenstein took part in the >discussions of the Vienna Circle. Although he was never a card-carrying logical >positivist he was sympathetic to their views and the Tractatus certainly makes a strict >distinction between language that can be cognitively meaningful (languages of science and >mathematics) and all other discourse-- a key resemblance to logical positivism. It is >within the context of the attempt to delineate the formal outlines of an ideal language >that would enable everyone to speak clearly (That which can be said. Can be said >clearly.) that the TRACTATUS was written. So what specifically are the family >resemblances between the TRACTATUS and Sraffa's PCMC? By the way most of us including my >do not have an innate mechanism that can automatically interpret what the letters "PCMC" >stabd for. I assume it is Sraffa's book on the reproduction of commodities. I haven't >read it but I have read a bit about it and glanced through it. Perhaps there are >similarities to the TRACTATUS. I don't know. > Again, I would stress that the TRACTATUS is an extremely technical book and to be >understood within a certain tradition of anti-metaphysical writings designed to promote >the development of an ideal language using the tools of the newly developed symbolic >logic and mirroring the features of a deductive system. Just a quote to give you an idea >of one of the main themes of the TRACTATUS. > OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY ed Ted Honderich p 912. The material is by the >Wittgenstein scholar P.M.S. Hacker. This is part of his discussion of what the Tractatus >is about. > "The logical analysis of propositions must yield propositions which are logically >independent of each other, i.e. elementary propositions whose truth depends only on the >existence or non-existence of (atomic) states of affairs. Elementary propositions can be >combined to form molecular propositions by means of truth-functional operators- the >logical connectives." > I submit that the above discourse will make no sense (or ought not) to anyone >not familiar with symbolic logic and the predicate calculus in particular. In the >predicate calculus small letters typically are interpreted as constants analagous to >proper names that refer to individual entities and capital letters refer to properties >and relations. Thus a particular dot being red could be symbolized by the atomic >proposition "Rd" where "R" means "is red" and "d" refers to the dot. All meaningful >discourse can be analysed ultimately in to atomic propositions of this sort or >(truth-functional) combinations of them. For example according to Wittgenstein at this >time: ALL dots are read would mean: Ra and Rb and Rc..... that is a conjunction >conjoining each and every nameable individual thing with the predicate red. Joy of joys >if you could translate everything into these truth functions and empirically determined >whether the atomic statements conformed with reality you could calculate what was >definitively true or false about whatever is said. That's the scenario and the problems >are equally arcane from the viewpoint of non-logicians. The meaning of the symbols >referring to individuals is that to which they refer. How can "Excalibur" have meaning >when the sword is destroyed? When "Ajit Sinha" dies is the name meaningless? The problems >are discussed ad nauseam in the Investigations. The opening passages quoting St. >Augustine are all about an incorrect model of how names mean. Further elaboration of the >problems Wittgenstein is dealing with can be found in Saul Kripke's NAMING AND NECESSITY >(Oxford 1980) and WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (OXford 1982). > Cheers, Ken Hanly > > >P.S. Wittgenstein also knew John Maynard Keynes. Keynes along with Russell championed >Wittgenstein. However, Russell had no sympathy with Wittgenstein's views in the >Investigations. Russell claimed Wittgenstein gave up thinking around 1930! There is a >bizarre movie called simply Wittgenstein that exlpores some of his personal relationships >and includes bits about Keynes. >> >> At 00:43 11/12/98 -0800, Ken Hanly wrote: >> > I didn't realise that Wittgenstein had any influence on Sraffa. I >> >though the influence was the other way around. Sraffa sort of woke >> >Wittgenstein from his dogmatic slumbers. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein >> >holds that all language, to communicate, must have a certain logical >> >structure. An ideal languages would make this structure transparent >> >whereas it is obscured in ordinary language. Symbolic logic basically >> >gives you the form of this structure without any content. (Wittgenstein >> >developed truth tables independently of the mathematician Post. >> >Wittgenstein thought they gave you a picture of "logical space".) >> >Wittgenstein was explaining his ideas to Sraffa and Sraffa made a gesture >> >of contempt. I gather that it is a movement of the hand under the chin >> >that Italians use. Sraffa said: What is the logical structure of that? >> >Strangely enough , since he usually didn't pay attention to criticism, >> >this really impressed Wittgenstein. He said to himself. Shit. Maybe it >> >doesn't have a logical structure. Here I thought I had solved the basic >> >problems of the philosophy of language and have been saying THIS MUST BE >> >SO when any idiot, even an economist, can see it AINT SO. >> ___________________ >> >> Wittgenstein did not see Sraffa as an "idiot" or "an economist". Let me >> give you just two quotations, one from Preface of *Philosophical >> Investigations* and second from von Wright's 'Biographical Sketch' of >> Wittgenstein. >> >> "For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years >> ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that >> first book. I was helped to realize these mistakes--to a degree which I >> myself am hardly able to estimate--by the criticism which my ideas >> encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable >> conversations during the last two years of his life. Even more than to >> this--always certain and forcible--criticism I am indebted to that which a >> teacher of this university, Mr. P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly >> practised on my thoughts. I am indebted to THIS stimulus for the most >> consequential ideas of this book." (L.W) >> >> "Of great importance in the origination of Wittgenstein's new ideas was the >> criticism to which his earlier views were subjected by two of his friends. >> One was Ramsey, whose premature death in 1930 was a heavy loss to >> contemporary thought. The other was Piero Sraffa, an Italian economist who >> had come to Cambridge shortly before Wittgenstein returned there. It was >> above all Sraffa's acute and forceful criticism that compelled Wittgenstein >> to abandon his earlier views and set out upon new roads. He said that his >> discussions with Sraffa made him feel like a tree from which all branches >> had been cut." (von Wright) >> >> So simply it was not just Sraffa's well known 'Sisilyan gesture' that >> caused it all. Now, why I'm reading Wittgenstein, when the influence seems >> to be other way round? It is because Sraffa's writings, and particularly >> PCMC, is like music with full of silences. The silences are part of the >> music, and cannot be 'understood' without a good understanding of the >> silences. On the face of it, PCMC has a family resemblence with TRACTATUS, >> but once you begin to listen to the silences the ground starts to shift. I >> think the nature of shift in Wittgenstein's thought would be able to help >> us understand Sraffa's silences and the nature of his project much better. >> As far as who influenced whom is concerned, I think when two outstanding >> minds indulge in friendly intellectual discussions for many years it would >> be foolhardy for anyone to think that the influence would be a one way >> avenue. I don't know much about Wittgenstein's "antisemiticism", but his >> friend Sraffa was a jew. Cheers, ajit sinha >> >> > >
