This is from the J2000 web page:
http://www.oneworld.org/jubilee2000/index.html, which is searchable.
It has some invocations of authority which might be useful.

See esp. the reference to Kunibert Raffer of the University of Vienna.

-bob naiman
-------------------
An International Bankruptcy
    Clause: 

   
     A proposal for resolving the current debt crisis
     and preventing future ones developing

     The current financial crisis has re-opened the debate on the process of
     prevention of future debt crises, and much of the discussion at the
     Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank has focused on this
     issue. The debate is not new. Adam Smith, Scottish philosopher and
     economist and universally regarded as the founding father of
     economics, wrote as follows: 

     When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in
     the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do
     so, a fair, open and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is
     both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the
creditor.
     Wealth of Nations, 1776 

     More recently, the Financial Times wrote: It is now well known that
     countries politically incapable of meeting their liabilities need some
sort
     of bankruptcy procedure that ensures that all creditors share the
     losses. Financial Times, 30th July 1992 

     In the current debate, Business Week contributed the following:
     History suggests that in times of crisis, demanding full repayment of
     debt can be an enormous mistake. After World War I, the victors'
     moves to collect war debts from each other and reparations from
     Germany helped create the conditions that bred the Great Depression
     and World War II. By contrast, the US system does not require
     companies or people who fall on hard times to spend the rest of their
     life paying debts back. Business Week, 12th October 1998 

     At the Annual Meetings the President of the World Bank, Jim
     Wolfensohn, was questioned on the issue of a world bankruptcy court.
     He said that this was an initiative that was being considered, although a

     simpler method of freezing a nation's accounts and providing additional
     funding could prove adequate. He said that national bankruptcy laws
     were being drawn up with help from the World Bank for many
     developing countries, who did not have operating bankruptcy laws. 

     Below is a summary of some of the current pressures on the
     international financial system and the discussion amongst opinion
     formers and policy makers of the need for a reformed process to deal
     with the issue of international debt. 

     Default and bankruptcy 

     The western banking community does not like the word default, and the
     awful d-word is replaced by such euphemisms as debt moratorium,
     debt standstill, effective default. However, Russia, Ukraine and
     Indonesia have all defaulted over the past year, as their struggling
     economies finally gave up the pretence of trying to match the galloping
     costs of debt service. Pakistan will default if the World Bank does not
     extend loans put on hold as part of the sanctions imposed on the
     country following its nuclear tests. Brazil will default unless the IMF
     puts together a multi-billion dollar rescue package to provide
     short-term financing to calm the fears of investors. 

     The likelihood is that the IMF and World Bank will act under G7
     encouragement to reschedule debts in Brazil, Pakistan and South
     Africa, as default in these countries carries a real threat to
economies in
     the west. Increasingly, however, world leaders and opinion formers are
     considering how to improve the current system of international debt
     management. Jubilee 2000 Coalition has called for a fair and
     transparent process for negotiating debt relief, and an international
     bankruptcy code could form a vital part of this. It is almost certain
that
     such a code will become reality one day, and if there is a benefit of the
     current financial crisis, it is that this day may have come closer. 

     National bankruptcy clauses 

     Bankruptcy laws developed in the UK and other industrialising
     economies around the 1840s. They replaced a hateful system where
     debtors were imprisoned for being in debt, and were forced to assume
     a lifetime obligation to pay. Charles Dickens immortalised the
     inhumanity of the system in his novel Little Dorrit, the story of a
child
     whose father was condemned to a life sentence in the Marshalsea
     debtors' prison in London. Governments in northern Europe and the
     US made decisions to introduce limited liability and permissive
     bankruptcy laws with the explicit intention of encouraging
     entrepreneurial behaviour. They were rewarded with an explosion of
     economic activity. 

     The idea of a lifetime obligation to pay may have been banished to the
     history books in a national context, but it strikes a chilling chord when
     considered in the context of the international debt crisis. Creditors
have
     shown ruthless intransigence in their demands for payment. However,
     the fiction that all sovereign debt can and will eventually be repaid is
     finally crumbling away, and the likelihood of extending a national law
     into the international context has been increased. 

     An International Insolvency Clause 

     At the Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank there has been
     discussion of extending the USA's Chapter 11 of Title 11 (Bankruptcy)

     of the United States Code. The United Nations Conference on Trade
     and Development (UNCTAD), Nobel Laureate Lawrence Klein and
     economist and Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs are amongst the many
     champions of this proposal. At the Annual Meetings, Canada's finance
     minister, Paul Martin, called for debt standstills to be formally
endorsed
     by the IMF and World Bank. 

     A country in debt difficulties would receive a temporary standstill on
     debt payments with the approval of the IMF. Creditors and debtors
     would come to an agreement without the rush and panic brought on by
     a default. Debtor countries would receive the equivalent of
     debtor-in-possession financing, giving special rights to those lenders
     who provide credit after the original bankruptcy is declared. This would
     allow countries to get enough foreign exchange loans, guaranteed by the
     IMF, to allow exporters to keep functioning. 

     The counter argument 

     Counter arguments to this proposal are based on the idea that
     differences between firms and sovereign states mean that Chapter 11
     cannot be applied in an international context. [1] In the corporate case,
     a court has the power to knock all relevant heads together, and to
     punish those who refuse to co-operate. In the international context, this
     is not possible: no single jurisdiction covers all the creditors
involved. In
     addition, the reorganisation that follows corporate bankruptcy usually
     both reshuffles the ownership and replaces the management. These are
     the main defences against the moral hazard that would otherwise arise
     from protecting owners from creditors. In an international context,
     however, the IMF cannot remove a government and appoint a new
     one. 

     Paulo Ferraz, the Chief Executive Officer of Banco Bozano Simonsen,
     one of Brazil's premier investment banks, has described a Chapter 11
     for nations as the worst idea I've heard in my life. It would be the
     end of the global financial system. [2] Such fears are clearly more
     imagined than real. The proposal will undoubtedly redress the balance
     between creditors and debtors, and the banks and their apologists are
     likely to be the most vehement in their opposition. 

     However, worries that an international court would not have the
     jurisdiction over creditors could be addressed with an international
     treaty. As it is creditors co-operate with each other in the informal and
     unconstitutional Paris Club, and the cost of debt rescheduling and
     write-off is borne equally. Certainly the IMF cannot replace a
     government, but many of the severely indebted countries have fledgling
     democracies, which have inherited debts from previous regimes. They
     deserve the benefit of any doubt. Generous debt relief for Germany for
     Chancellor Adenauer's fledgling democracy in 1953 had no moral
     hazard repercussions. The country found its path to sustainable
     economic growth and within a generation had become a vital trading
     partner for the rest of Europe. 

     Chapter 9, not Chapter 11 

     Kunibert Raffer of the University of Vienna has suggested that Chapter
     9 of Title 11, which deals with local government bankruptcy is more
     relevant, and his ideas have received widespread support within the
     Jubilee 2000 Coalition. In his paper What's Good for the United

     States Must be Good for the World he advocates an International
     Chapter 9 Insolvency. This chapter deals with local government and is
     based on the understanding that although a municipality may fall in
     financial difficulties, its essential services must continue to be
provided
     for the sake of the community it serves. The potential relevance to a
     severely indebted poor country is clear to see.  A municipality is not
     expected to stop providing social services essential to the health,
     safety and welfare of its inhabitants in order to pay its creditors.
     The US Supreme Court rejected the idea that a city has unlimited
     taxing power stating that a city cannot be taken over and
     operated for the benefit of its creditors. 

     An independent court 

     An international, independent court would be appointed to arbitrate
     between creditors and debtors. Each side (the debtor country and the
     main creditors) would nominate the same number of persons, who in
     turn would elect a further member to achieve an uneven number. One
     of the arbitrators is elected as chairperson. Creditors and debtors
     would argue their separate cases, much as they do now in the Paris
     Club and the London Club. The vital difference is that the final decision
     would rest with the arbitrators, and they would only endorse an
     agreement that was fairly, equitably, and openly arrived at. 

     A debtor voice 

     The Paris and London Clubs by contrast are secretive and inequitable.
     Negotiations are heavily weighted in favour of the creditor nations, who
     in a particular sitting may outnumber the debtor nation by 30 to 1. Any
     rescheduling of debt is carried out purely on the basis of ability to
pay,
     with no allowance made for the debtor government's capacity to deliver
     essential services. An international Chapter 9 would change this. The
     international court could permit any interested person or organisation to
     be heard. Grass-roots organisations of the poor, NGOs or international
     organisations such as UNICEF or the World Council of Churches
     could argue alongside the debtor government for the retention and
     increase of health and education spending. 

     A reduction in moral hazard 

     As well as providing a safeguard for spending on the poor, the
     mechanism would have the advantage that banks would never again
     presume that sovereign debtors will always repay. IMF bail-outs in
     Korea and Indonesia have led to the losses of private lenders being
     borne by the taxpayers of member countries of the IMF. This leads to
     moral hazard, the idea (in this context) that such a policy will
encourage
     rather than discourage future reckless lending. A bankruptcy clause acts
     as a brake on reckless lending. If an international Chapter 9 had existed
     during the 1970s enormous misallocation of funds could have been
     avoided and the debt burden would certainly have been much smaller. 

     An international Chapter 9 Insolvency will be resisted vehemently by
     many of the larger investment banks, in much the same way that the
     conservative, regressive forces argued against national bankruptcy
     laws. Currently, as the experience of the bail-outs from Korea to
     Russia have shown, they are in the enviable position of keeping private
     profits, but having (at least some of) their losses borne by governments.
     It is time to bring an end to what many feel is this inequitable,
     indefensible, indeed scandalous situation. The introduction of an
     international bankruptcy law could well be a step along this road. As
     Kunibert Raffer concludes: 

     Economic history, not least the history of present creditors,
     teaches us that debt reduction is economically unavoidable. It only
     remains to be asked how long it will take and how much human
     suffering decision makers are prepared to allow before debtor
     countries' obligations are finally brought in line with their capacity
     to pay. [3] 



     Footnotes

     [1] See The Economist October 3rd 1998, page 138 

     [2] Business Week, 12th October 1998 page 50 

     [3] What's good for the United States Must be Good for the World:
Advocating
     an International Chapter 9 Insolvency. Kreisky Forum Symposium, Vienna
     September 1992 


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At 04:13 PM 1/20/99 -0800, you wrote:
>Forwarded message:
>>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu Jan 21 00:12:38 1999
>Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Message-Id: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Date: Thu, 21 Jan 1999 11:03:38 +1100
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>From: "Sean Turnell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: POST-KEYNESIAN THOUGHT <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Jubilee 2000 enquiry
>X-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b)
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>
>Does anyone know of any economist who has written on the 
>"Jubilee 2000" debt cancellation programme?
>
>A feature in a leading Australian newspaper will shortly be devoted 
>to this topic, and I would like to point its author to sources which 
>do not necessarily follow financial market orthodoxy.
>
>
>
>-- 
>Michael Perelman
>Economics Department
>California State University
>Chico, CA 95929
>
>Tel. 530-898-5321
>E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
-------------------------------
Robert Naiman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Preamble Center for Public Policy
1737 21st NW
Washington, DC 20009
phone: 202-265-3263
fax:   202-265-3647
http://www.preamble.org/
-------------------------------



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