[PEN-L:6524] (Fwd) NATO'S COMPROMISE ON TERMS FOR ENDING STRIFE SIGNALS DI

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Date sent:              Fri, 07 May 1999 12:22:07 -0700
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From:                   Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject:                NATO'S COMPROMISE ON TERMS FOR ENDING STRIFE SIGNALS
        DIPLOMATIC RETREAT

The Globe and Mail                                      Friday, May 7, 1999

NATO'S COMPROMISE ON TERMS FOR ENDING STRIFE SIGNALS DIPLOMATIC RETREAT

        By Marcus Gee

        The Kosovo peace plan announced by Russia and seven 
Western powers yesterday appears to represent a significant 
diplomatic retreat by NATO.
        Trapped in a war that they seem incapable of winning with air 
power alone, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's leading 
countries have compromised on some of their major conditions for 
ending the conflict, from the composition of a postwar occupation 
force to the shape of a postwar political order.
        They have also shifted position by inviting the participation of 
Russia and the United Nations in any solution. After initially 
shunning the UN and brushing aside Russia's objections to the 
bombing of Yugoslavia, NATO now sees both as crucial to the 
success to any peace plan.
        "NATO began all this saying that it was the only effective 
organization to stand up against this schoolyard bully [Yugoslav 
President] Slobodan Milosevic," said University of Toronto scholar 
Aurel Braun. "Well, 40 days later, the schoolyard bully is just fine 
and NATO is running to the UN."
        Under the G8 agreement, concluded in Bonn yesterday, the UN 
would oversee the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo 
and the establishment of an interim administration.
        Russia's support would ensure the passage of the plan through 
the UN Security Council.
        All this takes NATO a long way from the position held when it 
began bombing Yugoslavia on March 24.
        At that time, the alliance said it would stop the bombing only if 
Belgrade agreed to halt its attacks on Kosovo Albanians, withdraw 
its military forces from Kosovo, accept the Rambouillet peace plan 
for a postwar settlement and accept a NATO peacekeeping force 
that would protect returning refugees.
        NATO still demands an end to the attacks, the safe return of all 
refugees and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. But on the other 
two points, its position has softened. Consider them in detail:
*       Postwar occupation force: NATO originally insisted that it 
would lead any postwar peacekeeping force in Kosovo. When it 
became clear that NATO leadership was a deal breaker for 
Belgrade, NATO said Russia and other countries could take part, 
as long as the force had "NATO at its core."
        The G8 agreement softens NATO's position still further. It calls 
for "the deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and 
security presences." There is no mention of NATO. The omission 
was a deliberate attempt to secure the help of Russia, which has 
supported Belgrade in its insistence that the NATO "aggressors" 
should not be part of any peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
        Questioned about the change, Canadian Foreign Affairs 
spokesman James Wright told reporters yesterday that "NATO core 
participation" must still be a key element in any peacekeeping force. 
But that fact that NATO was left out of the document was 
significant. It seemed to indicate that alliance countries might 
participate under the UN flag, as they do in neighbouring Bosnia.
*       Postwar settlement: The G8 agreement calls for "the 
establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full 
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army)."
        Notice that the agreement does not demand the acceptance of 
the Rambouillet peace accords, which called for wide-ranging 
autonomy in Kosovo and an eventual vote on independence. That is 
not new. NATO has acknowledged for some weeks that 
Rambouillet might have to be altered because of what has happened 
since the bombing started. But the phrase "taking full account" of 
Rambouillet appears to be a climbdown from NATO's early 
position that a final agreement would have to be concluded "on the 
basis" of Rambouillet.
        It's significant, too, that the agreement explicitly acknowledges 
the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and the disarming of the Kosovo 
rebels. Though both were provided for in the Rambouillet accords, 
it's no mistake that the agreement underlines these points. 
Belgrade's greatest fear is that foreign troops in Kosovo would give 
cover to the rebels and prepare the ground for the secession and 
independence of the Kosovo.
        Whether this is enough to satisfy Yugoslavia is far from clear. 
Helpful as it is to get Russia on side, nothing will happen until 
Belgrade indicates the same flexibility that NATO has.