------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date sent: Thu, 27 May 1999 12:11:47 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Selected pieces of analysis of the Kosovo situation from Stratfor Stratfor Analysis Current Status of the War 2100 GMT, 990516 As the new week begins, it is time to take stock of the war. This is not particularly difficult as we have clearly entered a period of stalemate in which neither side is able to bring the conflict to a close and indeed, for the moment, neither side is motivated to bring it to a close. From the NATO perspective, the air war is not particularly costly or risky. Given the fragility of the NATO coalition, the policy of air war intensification without either a diplomatic breakthrough or a ground war is the lowest risk option. The advantage of this strategy is threefold. First, it keeps open the possibility, however distant, that the Serbs will crack under the bombing attack and capitulate to NATO’s demands. Second, absent that, it allows NATO to keep further war fighting options open while also keeping open diplomatic options. Third, as we have said, it also avoids decision-making in NATO’s councils. The less decision- making goes on, the less likely the coalition is to come apart. >From Belgrade’s side, the stalemate is also acceptable. First, while daily tragedies occur, from a strictly military viewpoint, the bombing is not affecting Sebia’s long-term war fighting capability. The light infantry forces that would be used in an extended resistance to a NATO invasion are not being sufficiently hurt by the bombing to force a strategic reconsideration. Second, Milosevic’s political standing has been strengthened by the bombing. While NATO’s psychological warfare staff is trying to generate a sense of impending disintegration in Milosevic’s support, both among civilians and military, and some war weariness is certainly setting in, it is our view that the sense of victimization at the hands of NATO is sufficient to hold his support together. Appearing to be too eager to seek a settlement may actually hurt him rather than help him. Finally, the Russian internal political situation has become so unsettled that the basic premise that allowed Milosevic to resist NATO has become problematic. It is in Milosevic’s interests to wait until the situation in Moscow clarifies itself and hopefully the pro-Serb factions reassert themselves, before entering negotiations. Thus, the major tendency is toward gridlock. There are, however, forces on the horizon that can generate movement. On NATO’s side, the Italian political situation is deteriorating daily. The government could move into crisis by mid-week over the bombing issue. That political crisis could end the war unilaterally. Should Italy deny NATO the use of its air bases for the bombing campaign, it would signal the end of the war. Italy is absolutely necessary for the war. This means that NATO, in anticipation of the outcome of the Italian crisis, might be forced to seek some diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, the Italian situation is one reason that Milosevic not only might, but must, hold out. It is his major hope for a breakthrough. Yugoslavia has its own pressures leading it to make concessions. While the current situation in Moscow is an argument for waiting, there is tremendous long-term danger there for Yugoslavia. If victory in Moscow’s political wars goes to western-oriented leaders, which might happen if only for a short time, and Milosevic loses his support from that quarter, his strategic position will deteriorate dramatically. China is simply too far away to matter. A shift in Moscow could trigger a shift in Greece and Macedonia, opening the way to a ground war. In addition, while the air campaign is not decisive, it does hurt. All of these factors cause movement toward diplomacy. The key question continues to be the makeup of the peacekeeping force and the quantity and type of force Serbia will be permitted to keep in Kosovo. It is interesting to us that the discussions on this seem to be going on in slow motion. Discussions that should take hours are taking days. Discussions that should take days are taking weeks. One reason for this is the situation in Moscow and Rome. But the underlying problem is that each side believes that the other’s problems are more serious than its own. Milosevic hopes that Clinton’s problems with Rome will cripple him. Clinton hopes that Milosevic’s problems with Moscow will cripple him. >From our perspective, there is an ongoing tragedy here. There is a clear structure for a peace agreement in place. It has been there from the beginning. The discussions have now degenerated to what weapons peacekeepers will carry. The real problem is not one of substantial issues, but of appearance. Clinton cannot appear to have fought this war for nothing. Milosevic cannot appear to have put his country through this pounding for nothing. Each must find a way to claim victory while allowing the other to do the same. In an odd way, Clinton and Milosevic are similar men. They are willing to fight wars for domestic political reasons even when the strategic issues could be settled fairly readily. Each knows that the victory he wants is impossible. Clinton cannot invade Serbia and impose a new government. Milosevic will not be able to avoid foreign troops in Kosovo. Each is more concerned about how the final, obvious agreement will be arrived at than what that agreement will contain, because each knows pretty much what will be in the agreement. It is not a question just of stubbornness, although both are extraordinarily willful men. Rather, it is the reasoning behind fighting wars. Wars fought for geopolitical reasons are ultimately manageable. Wars fought for domestic political reasons are the hardest to solve. That means that the nations whose geopolitical interests are most affected by this--Italy, Germany and Russia--will ultimately have to take responsibility for imposing an agreement. The problem is that everyone’s attention is on other things, and there is no pressing urgency in the war. That is the most extraordinary fact: Kosovo refugees and the bombing of Serbia aside, no one at all seems to feel a sense of urgency. This has surprised us during the past few weeks and it continues to surprise us. However, if we had looked closely at the careers of these two men, perhaps we would have been less surprised. For men to whom appearance is everything, how war is settled can be more important than what is achieved. Slouching Toward Peace 0337 GMT, 990519 We continue to see strong indications that we are in the terminal phase of the war. The decision of Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to accompany Viktor Chernomyrdin to Belgrade is a strong indicator that the United States and Russia have now reach detailed agreement on the terms needed to end the war. Ahtisaari had said that he would not travel to Belgrade unless Chernomyrdin and Strobe Talbott made substantial progress and, by implication, had a common position. Ahtisaari, the EU representative on Kosovo, with close ties to the United Nations, was not prepared to commit his offices to negotiations until after a unified position was crafted between the U.S. and Russia. His reasoning was sound. If the U.S. and Russia weren’t working from a common script, nothing he achieved in Belgrade would hold together. Moreover, Milosevic would try to use any gap between the U.S. and Russian position to extract further concessions. Given that, no progress was possible until the U.S. and Russia had a common position. That common position, clearly based on the G-8 agreements already achieved, is now in place. The presence of Ahtisaari in Belgrade means clearly that whatever troops enter Kosovo will be under UN and not NATO command. The presence of Chernomyrdin further guarantees that the political oversight of those troops will not be solely in the hands of NATO and the United States. Finally, Ahtisaari’s involvement signals the commitment by the continental EU countries to end the war. In short, Ahtisaari is going to Belgrade to give Milosevic guarantees on behalf of the UN and EU while Chernomyrdin is going to give him guarantees on behalf of Russia. Chernomyrdin is also going to deliver a harsher message: that unless Belgrade accepts the deal as it stands, Belgrade will be alone, China being irrelevant to the equation. In our view, Milosevic would not have been able to resist NATO with the tenacity he has had he not had Russian support. The threat of the loss of Russian backing changes the strategic and geopolitical foundations of his decisions. Therefore, with the premise on which his decision was based dissolving, the decision itself has to be altered. Belgrade is already indicating that it is prepared to live with the deal. Milosevic will undoubtedly want to scrutinize the details and attempt to extract whatever technical points possible that would increase the probability of retained sovereignty over Kosovo. He will also have one additional demand: disarming the KLA. That will be easier to agree to than to enforce. This actually will help Milosevic in the long run. By agreeing to withdraw most Serbian forces from Kosovo, Milosevic shifts the responsibility for controlling the KLA to the United Nations and to Russia. KLA actions will create an opportunity to drive a wedge between Russia and NATO as Russia blames NATO for its actions. Indeed, it will drive a wedge between NATO members Germany and Italy on one side and the U.S. and UK on the other. Germany and Italy will want the KLA controlled and will hold the U.S. and UK responsible for its actions. Since the KLA has become uncontrollable and will have a vested interest in maintaining tension, this will give Milosevic leverage in the post-war environment. Thus, the next few days will be filled with discussions of how to control the KLA and how to return the Albanians to their homes. Milosevic will use the former as a means to make himself the aggrieved party. Delays in the latter he will blame, with some legitimacy, on the damage caused by NATO bombing of Kosovo’s infrastructure. Milosevic will concede many points, but he will be in a fairly good position to control the post-war evolution of events. Indeed, having filed charges against NATO for war crimes already, he will even be able to counter demands that he face war crimes tribunals with full agreement, provided Bill Clinton and Tony Blair also go on trial. Milosevic’s position: let the courts judge us all. Milosevic is in an excellent position to complicate the peace. So as we close in on the end game, we will be seeing merely the beginning of a new chapter in the eternal book of Balkan politics, into which few wise men intrude without good reason. We are now finally moving to a peace agreement not fundamentally different from what could have been achieved in the second week of the war. Indeed, had NATO not made Rambouillet accords a take it or leave it proposition, something like this might have been achieved before the bombing began. As we slouch toward a sullen peace which is merely the preface for future warfare, it will soon be time to dissect the decisions on both sides that led us to war and then back to where we were before the first shots were fired. U.S. Concedes Important Point in Kosovo 2209 GMT, 990523 While movement toward a negotiated settlement in Kosovo appears to have slowed significantly, with each side weighing and perhaps misjudging the other’s resolve, it has not altogether stalled. In an important concession to Belgrade, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in an interview on CBS’s "Face the Nation" that, following a negotiated peace settlement with NATO, some Yugoslav troops may be permitted to remain in Kosovo, though they would be limited in number and authority. This step back from NATO’s demand that all Yugoslav forces withdraw from Kosovo is a necessary element of any negotiated settlement in Kosovo and may be an indicator of progress toward reaching that settlement. On one level, Belgrade can not and will not accept a settlement that leaves it no official politico-military presence in Kosovo. This would be tantamount to surrendering the province to foreign conquerors and, but for lines on the map, would be indistinguishable from Kosovo independence. Belgrade will not abandon Kosovo without a fight. On another level, NATO actually needs Yugoslav forces to stay in Kosovo for a negotiated settlement to succeed. The international security presence envisioned by the Group of Eight will take time to gather, time to organize, time to deploy, and time to gain familiarity with the province, let alone control over it. In the meanwhile, NATO needs a force to maintain order in the province. It certainly can not rely on the KLA to do this – not without acknowledging that it is NATO’s intention to create an independent Kosovo under the leadership of the KLA guerrillas. Instead, as the Western allies did with German troops, officials, and police in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, NATO will have to rely on the forces it only recently bombarded in Kosovo to keep the province from spinning into chaos.
[PEN-L:7366] (Fwd) Selected pieces of analysis of the Kosovo situation from
ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224] Thu, 27 May 1999 23:27:19 -0500