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Date sent: Mon, 14 Jun 1999 13:08:12 -0700
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From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: SECRET TALKS WITH MILOSEVIC SPLIT RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP -
Financial Times
The National Post June 14, 1999
SECRET TALKS WITH MILOSEVIC CAUSE SPLIT IN RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP
London — Russian officials, in collaboration with key leaders in
the European Union, opened a secret channel in May to Slobodan
Milosevic, the Yugoslav president, which was instrumental in
securing a peace deal in Kosovo, according to EU and Yugoslav
officials.
However, the machinations in the runup to acceptance of the deal
have opened up huge fissures in Russian leadership which now
threaten the peacekeeping effort in Kosovo, and even the stability
of the Russian government itself.
A source close to the leadership of the Serbian security services,
who refused to be identified, said Peter Castenfelt, a Swedish-born
financier acting as a secret envoy, had revealed to Mr. Milosevic,
just days before Belgrade approved the Group of Eight peace plan
on June 3, NATO's final terms for an agreement.
The source said it became clear to Mr. Milosevic that the deal was
better than that offered by leading NATO powers during the
Rambouillet negotiations earlier this year — especially since it gave
the UN Security Council control of the operation in Kosovo.
"This means that the UN mandate can be voted down by the
Russians and the Chinese when we don't want them [NATO] in
[Kosovo] any more," said the Yugoslav source.
He said it was critically important to Yugoslavia to have Russian
presence in the province, both to affirm Moscow's strategic interest
in the region and to protect the Serbs.
His testimony, and that of German officials and advisors, suggest
the talks with Mr. Milosevic, both open and covert, were more of a
negotiation than leaders of the NATO countries have admitted.
One advisor said Mr. Castenfelt had been asked to stress in his ne-
gotiations that Mr. Milosevic's indictment as a war criminal was
"completely separate" from a peace agreement. "We could not
change or soften the judgment, but we could say that it was a quite
different matter," the advisor said.
The Serb security official said the effect of the peace settlement
would be to "completely change" the Russian political system, with
the next president of Russia being committed to an anti-West
stance.
He said Mr. Milosevic had had bad relations with Boris Yeltsin, the
Russian president, always supporting and regularly entertaining Mr.
Yeltsin's opponents in Belgrade.
Mr. Castenfelt, the undercover envoy used by the Russians and the
EU, has a record of behind-the-scenes economic diplomacy on
behalf of successive Russian governments for the past six years,
particularly on deals with the International Monetary Fund.
Senior Russian officials loyal to Mr. Yeltsin had become concerned
the talks between Mr. Milosevic and Viktor Chernomyrdin, the
Russian envoy to the Balkans who was appointed in April by Mr.
Yeltsin, were producing no results.
Mr. Chernomyrdin, the longest-serving prime minister under Mr.
Yeltsin, was seen in Russia and the West as not up to the task of
conveying either the West's or NATO's position to Mr. Milosevic.
Mr. Castenfelt was briefed in Moscow by government officials, and
in Bonn by Wolfgang Ischinger, state secretary at the German
foreign ministry; Michael Steiner, foreign policy advisor to Gerhard
Schroeder, the chancellor; and Karl Kaiser, head of the Research
Institute of the German Society of Foreign Affairs and Mr.
Schroeder's foreign affairs advisor during last year's election
campaign.
Mr. Castenfelt also met Martti Ahtisaari, the EU envoy to the
Balkans and the Finnish president, and Arpo Rusi, his advisor. He
then flew to Sofia, Bulgaria from where he was taken to the
Yugoslav border under the protection of Russian special forces and
passed over to Yugoslav security and taken to Belgrade.
In a one-to-one meeting with Mr. Milosevic, in meetings with
ministers and officials and in a six-page analysis of the situation
composed in a bunker during a NATO bombing raid, Mr. Castenfelt
succeeded in defining the terms which could be represented as a
compromise, not a capitulation.
The Serbian security source said that "he explained to us for the
first time what the truth was. We had never heard it before."
The Serb source said the points on which the NATO deal was
significantly better than the terms offered during the
Rambouillet accords were particularly critical for their
eventual acceptance by Mr. Milosevic in talks with Mr.
Ahtisaari and Mr. Chernomyrdin.
These were, he said, that there would be no referendum in
Kosovo after three years, as the Rambouillet accord specified:
that there would be a UN presence, not merely NATO; that the
Kosovo Liberation Army was not recognized, where it had
been at Rambouillet; and that Russian troops were part of the
Kosovo force, which had not been specified before.
Mr. Castenfelt had not, however, touched on the chain of command
in the force in Kosovo — precisely the issue which is now in
contention in the province as Russia continues to reject any
subordination to NATO forces.
The Serb security source said that Russian military officers
travelling with Mr. Chernomyrdin and Mr. Ahtisaari to Belgrade for
the final peace talks had exploded in rage because of their
marginalization, and because Mr. Chernomyrdin had agreed to
Russian forces being subordinated to NATO.
Mr. Rusi said he could confirm he talked several times to Mr.
Castenfelt on the issues, and "this was always kept separate from
the main talks conducted by Mr. Ahtisaari. I hoped he would be
able to convey information to Belgrade which would facilitate the
agreement."
The Financial Times
[PEN-L:7976] (Fwd) SECRET TALKS WITH MILOSEVIC SPLIT RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP -
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