In an interview with F. engels just before he died, he rasied concerns about the future casualties of war with the development of smokeless gunpowder, now it is shock and awe, every missile fired is like a commercial for anew and improved product. and now my question is how to provide for a international security arrangement that really criminilises war sine it is bye bye United nations.
k hanly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Hmmm..obliterating downtown Baghdad would be a
"colossal mistake"...oops sorry...just meant a bit of shock and awe and got
carried away...
Cheers, Ken Hanly
>From paper to the battlefield
By Seth Stern | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
If all goes according to plan, thousands of smart bombs raining down on Iraq
will paralyze the country: Iraqi commanders will be cut off from their
divisions, troops in the field will be cowed by an enemy they can't see,
civilians will be so confused they don't dare confront the American
invaders.
The goal is to "shock and awe" the Iraqi military into submission, while
minimizing casualties on both sides. In a decade, "shock and awe" has grown
from a theory dreamed up by retired generals to the concept undergirding
current US war plans against Iraq.
Critics say it ! sounds like an overoptimistic rehash of bombing campaigns
that devastated Dresden and Hanoi, but did little to end fighting. And they
worry that in Iraq it will once again be infantry on the ground, not smart
bombs from the sky, that actually wins the war. Either way, the acceptance
of this plan shows how an idea can percolate through Pentagon ranks and
capture the military's imagination.
Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, said earlier this
month that the best way to ensure a short conflict is to "have such a shock
on the system that the Iraqi regime would have to assume early on that the
end is inevitable." The military's war plan calls for dropping an
unprecedented 3,000 precision-guided munitions in the first 48 hours,
quickly followed by lightening-fast ground attacks.
The idea behind such a strategy was born in the mid-'90s when seven former
cold war warriors gathered to rethink US defense strategy. ! At the time, they
were one of many groups exploring ways to exploit US advantages in speed,
weapons accuracy, and control of the electronic environment.
The group was cochaired by Harlan Ullman, a retired navy destroyer commander
who had always been fascinated by "immaculate battles," where brilliant
commanders devastated enemies by outthinking and overpowering them.
The study group included Charles Horner, the commander of American air power
during the Gulf War, and Fred Franks, the general who led US tanks through
southern Iraq.
General Horner says they hoped "to discover some hidden truths" from Desert
Storm. For example, Horner recalls how instead of focusing on shooting down
the entire Iraqi air force, the US neutralized it by destroying the
ground-based radar stations that directed them. Iraqi pilots were left
flying blind without instructions. "They became very confused and then
terrified about flying," Horner says! .
Ullman points out the example of American atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, when, he says, "a society that was prepared to die was turned
around."
Members of the group wondered whether, in a post- Hiroshima era, an
adversary's will to resist could be destroyed without resorting to that same
destructive firepower. Psychological means could supplement a military so
advanced it moved faster than most enemies could react. They laid out their
approach in a 1996 report entitled "Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid
Dominance." The group met on and off in succeeding years, explaining its
ideas in papers and seminars for current and former military officials.
Donald Rumsfeld, President Ford's secretary of defense, attended one of
those briefings in 1999 and joined several former defense secretaries in
signing a letter to the Clinton administration supporting a shift in
military strategy. A year later, President-elect Bu! sh returned Mr. Rumsfeld
to his old job at the Pentagon, where he brought his enthusiasm for
transforming the military's thinking.
The US military may have no equal in developing high-tech weaponry, but
changes in doctrine or missions don't come as easily at the Pentagon. The
last major strategic innovation, called the AirLand doctrine, was adopted in
the US in the early '80s, after Israel's experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur
war. Designed to more fully integrate air and ground forces, the doctrine is
still untried in the battle field.
But skeptics both inside and outside the military say "Shock and Awe"
doesn't add much new to that body of thought beyond a catchy title.
"It says something all soldiers know: War is a test of will, not of physical
strength," says retired Gen. Robert Scales. "Shock and awe" may, in fact,
paralyze the enemy, he says, but the effect is only temporary. Enemy forces
must still be physically inca! pacitated or frozen in place by occupation.
Ullman says he never claimed the idea was completely new. He cites diverse
sources of inspiration: Pizarro's defeat of the Incas in the 16th century
with only 100 troops but the advantage of firearms, armor, and horses; the
German blitzkreig during World War II, and the bombing of Japan.
That last comparison earned Ullman the ire of antiwar activists who labeled
him a modern-day "Dr. Strangelove." Ullman counters that "shock and awe"
should reduce deaths. "This is not obliterating downtown Baghdad. That would
be a colossal mistake," Ullman says. "Given the choice of surrender or die,
our preference is for you to surrender."
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