\Robin Hanson wrote:
The question is how to choose, on matters of fact as opposed to value, when
disagreement persists, even after substantial discourse. Whose estimate
should determine actions? A vote among everyone? A vote among a random
jury? Administrative agency experts? A panel of
Peter Dorman wrote:
... I suspect that publicizing the ongoing status of a betting game would
tend to interfere with discourse just as constant opinion polling does to
our elections and repeated straw votes would do to a discussion at a
meeting.
Just about anything that happens at a meeting
Peter Dorman wrote:
How is this: "If agreement X is signed into law during time period Y, what will be
the
change in sea level between Jan. 1 2000 and Jan. 1 2030?" And "If agreement X is not
signed into law?" And the payoff is in 2030.
Close enough for this discussion, I think.
One
How is this: "If agreement X is signed into law during time period Y, what will be the
change in sea level between Jan. 1 2000 and Jan. 1 2030?" And "If agreement X is not
signed into law?" And the payoff is in 2030.
One problem: Agreement X must be specified precisely in order to satisfy
OK, your proposal and Sagoff's views on discourse are not mutually exclusive. In
practice, however, I suspect that publicizing the ongoing status of a betting game
would tend to interfere with discourse just as constant opinion polling does to our
elections and repeated straw votes would do to a
I had written:
The question is how to choose, on matters of fact as opposed to value, when
disagreement persists, even after substantial discourse. Whose estimate
should determine actions? A vote among everyone? A vote among a random
jury? Administrative agency experts? A panel of
Let me see if I understand. Take the case of rising sea levels as a function of
CO2. How exactly would you organize a betting market for this? (a) What
precisely would people bet on? Could you provide a sample question? (b) How,
and at what time, would you adjudicate the winner?
It seems to
Peter Dorman wrote:
Let me see if I understand. Take the case of rising sea levels as a function of
CO2. How exactly would you organize a betting market for this? (a) What
precisely would people bet on? Could you provide a sample question? (b) How,
and at what time, would you adjudicate
On 11/6/2000, I wrote:
Peter Dorman wrote:
if people disagree about who the best analyst is, then a betting
market might
give people good incentives to be honest with themselves about who to
rely on.
This is where democratic discourse comes in. Have you read Mark Sagoff's
ECONOMY
OF
At 01:13 PM 11/30/00 -0500, you wrote:
Whose estimate should determine actions? A vote among everyone? A vote
among a random jury? Administrative agency experts? A panel of
distinguished academics?
a vote among everyone seems needed to decide general principles. Experts
and academics can
I had earlier written :
... if progressives accepted that betting markets were as good at estimating
as other known institutions, they might serve as a neutral forum for
deciding
many other important policy questions.
Peter Dorman wrote:
I've been thinking about this for a while ...
Peter Dorman wrote:
A single skillful interpreter ... more reliable than a market
aggregation ...
if people disagree about who the best analyst is, then a betting market
might
give people good incentives to be honest with themselves about who to
rely on.
This is where democratic
I've been thinking about this for a while (thanks!), and here's what I've come up with:
Betting markets make sense when (a) there are severe problems of incentive
compatibility among analysts, or (b) the problem is essentially one of aggregating vast
amounts of private information. (This
Peter Dorman wrote:
An example of what you are talking about is Domenico Nuti's idea of a "pari-mutual"
stock market: people would buy and sell stocks ... but ... no ownership rights ...
The
whole point would be generating information, ... I can't say I was too impressed
...That
does sound
I had written:
... if progressives accepted that betting markets were as good at estimating
as other known institutions, they might serve as a neutral forum for deciding
many other important policy questions.
Peter Dorman responded:
... I would not rule out games and simulations of this kind
Robin, I have several questions about your scheme. 1. I mentioned before about the
apparent irrationality in both stock markets is in foreign exchange markets. 2. In
those markets, you have people with training and with access to enormous amounts of
information. Among the public, you have
Michael Perelman wrote:
Robin, I have several questions about your scheme. 1. I mentioned before about the
apparent irrationality in both stock markets is in foreign exchange markets. 2. In
those markets, you have people with training and with access to enormous amounts of
information.
Robin Hanson wrote:
Iowa Electronic Markets (http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/) ...
Does that market predict better than the polls?
Yes, it predicts substantiallly better than polls. Follow URL for refs.
As they say in physics, don't believe an observation until it's
confirmed in theory. Why
: Progressive Information Aggregation Institutions?
Robin, we have discussed your question quite a bit in the past. Polls
are
obviously flawed. The people who play the Iowa game are fairly well
informed,
so they can use information that goes beyond a simple poll.
I don't think that markets do
Michael Perelman wrote:
Robin, we have discussed your question quite a bit in the past. ...
A few people on the list are sympathetic to the Hayekian view of markets. We
exhausted that discussion, so much so that I called a halt to the discussion.
I know that at one time your colleague, Don
In my Natural Instability book, I made the case that foreign exchange markets are
perhaps the purest markets that exist, yet they are perhaps the most unstable.
did not mean to say anything ill about Don. I only met him once although I had
corresponded with him for a while. My experience
An example of what you are talking about is Domenico Nuti's idea of a "pari-mutual"
stock market: people would buy and sell stocks in socialist firms, and even make (or
lose) money off the transaction, but there would be no ownership rights or (if I recall
correctly) dividends. The whole point
Hello all. I'm an open-minded economist who mostly hangs around
libertarian-leaning economists, but who is interested in engaging economists
who lean far in other directions. :-) I have been lurking on this list for
two months now, and now want to politely ask one question.
What do
What do progressive economists think of how well speculative markets
aggregate information, relative to feasible alternatives?
have you read Doug Henwood's book, WALL STREET? It's a good place to start
(and it's well written).
One might
reasonably complain that stock and other financial
. . . Or do most progressive economists grant
that, whatever their other failings, such betting markets do reasonably
well in terms of producing accurate timely estimates, at least if we set
aside long-term aggregate price movements?
Robin Hanson
I'd say you are glossing over the most
Hi Robin,
What do progressive economists think of how well speculative markets
aggregate information, relative to feasible alternatives?
I would suggest looking at speculative market reactions to downsizing
reports in the 1980s and 1990s. Job cuts were greeted by jumps in stock
prices.
I asked:
What do progressive economists think of how well speculative markets
aggregate information, relative to feasible alternatives?
Jim Devine responded:
have you read Doug Henwood's book, WALL STREET? ...
Yes.
Iowa Electronic Markets (http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/) ...
Does that market
At 09:57 PM 11/02/2000 -0500, you wrote:
Let's say I want a probability estimate right now of the chance Bush will win.
What specific library or conversation should I go to get get a better estimate
than I could find at Iowa Electronic Markets?
can't it be said that the chances are 100% that
Robin, we have discussed your question quite a bit in the past. Polls are
obviously flawed. The people who play the Iowa game are fairly well informed,
so they can use information that goes beyond a simple poll.
I don't think that markets do a particularly good job of managing
Robin Hanson replied
.. speculative market reactions to downsizing ...Subsequent analysis,
.. found no significant relationship Bre-X ... buying into a
swindle ...
I'll accept these as specific examples of errors in market
estimates. But the question is whether some other source has
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